

## INTERVIEW OF ANDON L. AMARAICH

by Howard P. Willens and Deanne C. Siemer

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- Willens: We have the opportunity today to interview the Chief Justice of the Federated States of Micronesia, Andon L. Amaraich. We are in the capital of the Federated States, Palikir. Mr. Chief Justice, thank you very much for being available to talk with us about the events of some nearly 30 years ago. Why don't we begin by your telling us when you were born and where you were born.
- Amaraich: Thank you. As I said at the outset, I don't know whether I can answer all of your questions or I can remember everything. But I'll try to be helpful. I was born on a small island in the Mortlock group called Ta. They say that it is the island with the shortest name and longest land mass in the group. I was told I was born on August 24, 1932. Of course, I have no way of contradicting that or confirming it. That's what they told me, so I've been carrying that date of birth all this time on all the documents that require disclosure of date of birth.
- Willens: What were your parents' names?
- Amaraich: My father was Akin, and my mother was Mikila.
- Willens: Had they lived on the island of Ta for some time?
- Amaraich: Yes. They were born there.
- Willens: And how about their ancestors? Do you recall from what you learned from them when their ancestors first came to this part of the world?
- Amaraich: No, I didn't learn that from them. I don't think they really knew that. Within the islands, they know where their parents resided at various times. The parents moved from the Mortlocks up here and back during 1905 or 1907 because of a typhoon. That caused the evacuation of the islanders to Pohnpei.
- Willens: The island group that you mentioned was part of the Trust Territory district known as Truk at the time?
- Amaraich: Yes. It's about 185 miles from the main capital of this district then, the Truk District.
- Willens: The Truk District center?
- Amaraich: Yes. You had to take a ship to go out there.
- Willens: As a young boy growing up, did you get into the district center on occasion?
- Amaraich: Not until I went to intermediate school on the main island of Moen. Before that, I was in Ta and didn't go to an elementary until late during the U.S. Naval Administration after their elementary school had been going for several years.
- Willens: Did the Japanese Administration provide elementary school education on your island?
- Amaraich: No. We had to go to another island about 25 miles away, crossing the open ocean, to attend elementary school on that island. When I went, it was already during the War, and it didn't last long. I think about a year later they closed it down because of the War, so I didn't finish the full elementary school under the Japanese.

- Willens: Did your father have a job in the Japanese Administration?
- Amaraich: No, he was a fisherman.
- Willens: Tell us about your education after the War. Did the Naval Administration provide elementary school training?
- Amaraich: Yes, it did. The problem was there were no teachers, Micronesian citizens who could teach the English language. So we started with some local people who did not have training at all and no English at all. We kind of started struggling with that. Elementary school went up to sixth grade, then you moved to what is now Wenna, Moen Island, for what was called intermediate school, 7th, 8th and 9th grades.
- Willens: Do you remember approximately when you completed your intermediate school education?
- Amaraich: It was about 1950.
- Siemer: Were you staying with relatives there?
- Amaraich: No, we stayed in dormitories on Moen. After I finished intermediate school, I went on an elementary school teaching job for one year and then came back and was sent to the only high school in the Trust Territory, which was located then on Moen.
- Willens: Was that PICS?
- Amaraich: Pacific Islands Central School, yes. At that time, it was only up to 11th grade.
- Willens: You went there about a year after you graduated from intermediate school, so about 1951 or 1952?
- Amaraich: It's about that, yes. Because I graduated from PICS in 1955.
- Willens: How do you look back on that PICS experience now? Did you meet people from other districts?
- Amaraich: Yes, there were students from all over the Trust Territory, including the Northern Marianas.
- Willens: Do you remember who you met, if anyone, from the Northern Marianas?
- Amaraich: Yes. I remember quite a few them. Some have passed away, but there are still some that I can remember, boys and girls.
- Willens: Were there girls there?
- Amaraich: Yes, there were girls, too.
- Willens: Many of the people we have interviewed in the Marianas went to PICS and remember it very favorably. Your recollection is that it only went through the 11th grade when you were there, is that right?
- Amaraich: That's for sure. There were only 11 grades there; there was nothing beyond.
- Willens: Did there come a time when they added a 12th grade?
- Amaraich: After I left, it stayed for one or two years in Truk, then it was moved to Pohnpei as PICS. And that's when it became a full high school, but still Pacific Islands Central School in Pohnpei here.
- Willens: Why did it move from Truk to Pohnpei, if you know?

- Amaraich: Yes, I happen to know. The students initiated the request to the government to move the school to somewhere where there is water, because that's what we did not have.
- Willens: Water for drinking purposes?
- Amaraich: Water for drinking or for anything. The water system was only for the American homes, the military, and there was nothing for us. We bathed in the streams, and there was no running water, even when it rains, because there was not enough storage. So we always were faced with a problem at PICS and at the school dining room. That's one of the reasons why we requested that it be moved to Pohnpei or somewhere where water is more available.
- Willens: Was that a Trust Territory school?
- Amaraich: Yes.
- Willens: And so the Trust Territory made the decision at some point I guess to establish it in Truk?
- Amaraich: Yes. I think it started in Guam as a teacher training school, PITTS, Pacific Islands Teacher Training School, and it moved to Truk before I went there and continued under the name PITTS, and then it was changed to PICS after that. But it was a Trust Territory-wide school involving Saipan, the Marianas, Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the districts of Yap, Ponape and Truk.
- Willens: What happened then after you graduated from PICS?
- Amaraich: I went to work with the Trust Territory District Court in Truk.
- Willens: How did you happen to find that job?
- Amaraich: They were looking for interested students, so I spent some afternoons there on work study or whatever you call it. I became interested and, before graduation, the Chief Justice of the Trust Territory was looking for an assistant clerk of courts. Through his staff, he inquired whether I would be interested in working there.
- Willens: That was the beginning of a long career in the court system, was it not?
- Amaraich: Yes. I worked there from 1955 until 1958, three years. Then I moved to the Public Defender's Office.
- Willens: What interested you about the Public Defender's Office?
- Amaraich: I was intrigued by the job of helping the, you might call them criminals, but people at the time got tried for drinking yeast or drinking liquor without permission from the chief, and they were always in court.
- Willens: That was a crime at the time?
- Amaraich: That was a crime. You could not drink any alcohol. At that time, the local people were drinking yeast, you know this thing you mixed in the bread. They had a way of mixing it with coffee and other things and fermenting it.
- Siemer: At that time, was this a violation of the local code?
- Amaraich: It was a violation of the municipal ordinance of Moen Island. And the thing was, you could not drink it without getting a piece of paper from the chief that authorizes you to drink. I was interested in the juvenile problem that was just beginning to come to the surface, so I went to the Public Defender's Office.
- Willens: That was based in Moen in the district center?

- Amaraich: Yes.
- Willens: Were more people moving in from the outer islands to the district center at the time?
- Amaraich: It was just beginning where some people from the outer islands found employment and found relatives or friends to live with. Some of the educators or education workers were able to find housing on campus, but a very small number of outer-islanders compared to what you see today.
- Siemer: Were there any restrictions on people moving from outer islands into the district center?
- Amaraich: No, there weren't. The only restriction was kind of indirect, because it depended on how frequently the ship went out there and came back, which was maybe six months, every six months in the year. There was very little transportation.
- Siemer: Was there any restriction on moving from one district to another back in those days?
- Amaraich: No, there was no restriction. Again, the restriction was the airplane—we had sea-planes with 13 seats, and if you have to go, even on government business, you could plan on being away for 30 days for one week's work. Because it was very hard to get on the airplane, even for government workers.
- Willens: I've heard stories about people who were not on government business and tried to fly but got bumped, because the capacity was so limited.
- Amaraich: Yes.
- Willens: Who was the District Administrator in Truk at the time, if you remember?
- Amaraich: During the Naval Administration, when I was in intermediate school, there was a Captain Robert Long. He was the commander. Then it was changed to civilian administration, and they called them district administrators. There was a Bob Quigley; he was the Administrator when I was with the Public Defender's Office.
- Willens: The Public Defender's Office was part of the district administration, is that right?
- Amaraich: It was sort of independent. It reported directly to the chief public defender who resided in Saipan. But there was someone before Quigley. It was Alan McGuire.
- Willens: Were there any Micronesians involved in the district administration in the late 1950s?
- Amaraich: Even before that, I think. Because there were already Micronesians like Tosiwo Nakayama, who was already with the Public Affairs Office, or Island Affairs then.
- Willens: Within the district?
- Amaraich: Yes. And Mr. Raymond Setik, who became a congressman later, was already working as Finance Officer there.
- Willens: Had you met either of them before in the course of your education?
- Amaraich: No, not until I came to intermediate school. I didn't know them before that. Then later on they created two assistant district administrators for each district, one for administration and one for public affairs. The two second-level posts were given to Micronesians. So Tosiwo Nakayama was one, and Raymond Setik was the other, as far as senior posts.
- Willens: Did you have any interest yourself at that time in going into the Executive Branch, so to speak?
- Amaraich: Not really, but somehow I got drafted into serving one year as Assistant District

- Administrator for Public Affairs when Mr. Nakayama went to school in Hawaii. So I spent about one year there.
- Siemer: What did the Administrator for Public Affairs do back in those days?
- Amaraich: He dealt with the island governments, public information broadcasts, and elections, while the Assistant District Administrator for Administration handled finances, personnel, and supplies.
- Siemer: What kind of radio communications did you have back then?
- Amaraich: The kind that you have to shout when you talk into.
- Siemer: And say "Over and out" and things like that?
- Amaraich: Yes. They call that HF system. That's all we had at the time.
- Willens: How long did you stay with the Public Defender's Office?
- Amaraich: I left in 1965 when I became a Senator.
- Willens: Had you ever run for the District Legislature?
- Amaraich: There was a Congress, a District Congress first, and then it changed to a Legislature. I was with both. At that time, it was possible for an employee of the government to also be a member of the District Congress or Legislature at the same time.
- Willens: Do you remember when you first ran for political office?
- Amaraich: No, I don't remember. I was just chosen; that's what happened.
- Willens: Did the chiefs designate you, or was there some other process?
- Amaraich: There was some kind of election process, very, very simple and efficient. You go out to the outer islands to conduct election, and you sit at the table. One by one, people will come and say the name of the person they want to choose. Then you write it down, and you start marking the same way, you know, for the next. There was a lot of trust in this system. That's what happened. I didn't participate in the election, and there was no campaigning there. We were just told: "You've been elected."
- Willens: What you've just described is the process by which you were elected to the District Congress?
- Amaraich: Yes.
- Willens: Was a different process in place when you ran for the Congress of Micronesia?
- Amaraich: Yes. At that time we started voting on paper.
- Willens: Were there any political parties in your district at the time?
- Amaraich: No. There were no political parties.
- Willens: Did you have any opponents in the election?
- Amaraich: I think in the first go-around, no, I did not. There were no opponents.
- Willens: And do I recall correctly that Mr. Nakayama also was a successful candidate at that same election?
- Amaraich: Yes, he was.
- Willens: Were you and he sort of a team in terms of political views?

Amaraich: No, not really. He was ahead of me in terms of education and government employment. He was out there already, recognized as a leader. I was a newcomer into the government, and for some reason I got drafted into the District Congress and the Micronesian Congress. But we didn't work together until we went to Congress. I went into the administration because he left for schooling, so we didn't have time to work together.

Willens: Before the Congress of Micronesia was created by the Secretary of the Interior were you aware that there was this idea of a Territory-wide Legislature?

Amaraich: Yes.

Willens: Did you have any views about whether that was a good step to take?

Amaraich: I thought it was good. As a matter of fact, I served on the Council of Micronesia, which was the predecessor to the Congress. First it was the Indigenous Leaders Conference with representatives from all the districts, and then the Council of Micronesia replaced that, and through the Council of Micronesia, recommendations were made urging that administration to make it a more substantive organization with legislative authority compared to the Council, which didn't have any final approval or authority.

Willens: The Council was just advisory?

Amaraich: It was.

Willens: Did you think that the Council served any useful purposes in advising the High Commissioner?

Amaraich: I think it did. The High Commissioners at that time I think were sincerely interested in improving the political strength [of the Trust Territory]. They encouraged the Council to recommend what would be better for the Trust Territory government. I do not think, like I was saying earlier, that they fully realized what a Congress like they were creating would do in terms of actual legislative activities, but I think it sounds good to go back to the United Nations and say that we have improved the Council of Micronesia and we have a legislative body Trust Territory-wide.

Willens: Did you serve on the Council when Mr. Nucker was the High Commissioner?

Amaraich: Yes.

Willens: And then you continued on it when Mr. Goding became High Commissioner?

Amaraich: Yes. Goding came in when the Trust Territory Headquarters was moved to Saipan. Mr. Nucker was in Guam when the Trust Territory Headquarters was in Guam.

Siemer: Did the Council talk about specific substantive problems, or was it limited to kind of how the Congress ought to work—how many sessions it should have and things like that?

Amaraich: I do not know how much our officers of the Congress were involved, but the main charter came out from Interior. There was the general desire of letting Micronesians make decisions for their own mistakes or their own good, and that was the theme that the Council was pressing for. The details of course they did not involve themselves in too much.

Siemer: So that money and budget would be allocated the way the Congress of Micronesia thought it should be?

Amaraich: Yes, part of that was to have the input by the Micronesian leaders themselves into how the government should be run and where the spending should be, using the very limited amount of money we were getting.

- Willens: Do you have any recollection of High Commissioner Nucker and his general attitude toward the Trust Territory?
- Amaraich: I have favorable thoughts of High Commissioner Nucker. He was stationed in Guam. He presided over the Indigenous Leaders Conference all the time that he was there. I think he was genuinely sincere and interested in giving the Micronesians more involvement in the running of things for the Micronesians. He had his frustrations like we had with Washington, and he was operating on a \$4 million budget for the Trust Territory, the entire Trust Territory government. He was able to do it with that small amount of money.
- Willens: Was it your understanding that he thought that budget was sufficient?
- Amaraich: No, I don't think that was his thought, but somebody was deciding in Washington. At that time, the policy of the United States regarding the Trust Territory was not too clear. I think some people were going this way and some people were going the other way as to just what to do with these islanders. So I was exposed to the way he ran things in Guam. He frequently visited these districts. That's one thing good about it.
- Willens: When Mr. Goding came into office, did you see any significant changes in the Trust Territory Administration, in 1961 and 1962 for example?
- Amaraich: He came in when the Trust Territory Administration Headquarters moved to Saipan. In fact, we went together to the United Nations. That was my first visit to the United Nations.
- Willens: When was that?
- Amaraich: I think 1960 or 1961 or somewhere around there.
- Willens: With Mr. Goding?
- Amaraich: Yes. Mr. Goding and Mr. John DeYoung. We went together.
- Willens: What was your impression of that visit to the U.N.?
- Amaraich: I think I went there three times. This was just my first trip there, and I may have said things honestly that the Administration people didn't find comforting.
- Willens: Did you feel free to speak out about the deficiencies in the Administration?
- Amaraich: I did. It was during Johnston's time that they walked out on us, or they left us without lunch, at the U.N.
- Willens: That was intentional?
- Amaraich: Yes. The Trust Territory special representatives, including the Micronesians, go there, and this is usually in the morning, and after that they would adjourn to lunch hosted by the Trust Territory High Commissioner. That's the first time I didn't go to lunch with them.
- Willens: And that was because of what you said in the morning session?
- Amaraich: Well, I have to say yes. Have you talked to Mike about it?
- Willens: Mike White?
- Amaraich: Yes.
- Willens: No, I haven't. But I will, now that you mention that. So that would have been sometime between 1969 and 1972, somewhere in there.
- Amaraich: Yes, I think way after Goding.

- Willens: But going back to the early part of the 1960s, there was some effort back in Washington to provide more funds and to change education policy here. What is your recollection of any changes that came about?
- Amaraich: It was after the so-called Solomon exercise that the accelerated education program started. He came out there in the outer communities of the Trust Territory. That's where they started building schools, concrete, tin roofs, real classrooms, because of the recommendations of the Solomon Report that the United States should do something about the conditions of education and health. Also, as I understand it, their motive was to make Micronesians feel more like they'd like to be part of the American family. But the improvements were needed, and that was the big change. You started seeing the hospitals getting constructed and some roads and the runways. It was during the Kennedy Administration, things started changing.
- Willens: There was some criticism of the educational program because some of the buildings weren't well constructed, and people claimed money was wasted. But is it your recollection it was on the whole an important program?
- Amaraich: I think it was an important program. Because first, as a symbol, it shows to the people and the kids that yes, learning English is important and people are doing something very serious about it. I think that's one thing that's important. The handling of the land negotiations left a lot to be desired. It was so fast. And until now some people are still claiming compensation for lands that were supposedly donated for the classrooms. But it was a crash program. That's all you can say. You go in there and build these classrooms. And the islanders were told, "If you don't provide the land, then you don't get a school." Sounds logical, but a difficult policy [to implement] and it has come back to haunt us. The present government is still burdened with some of those old problems. But all in all, I think it was good. That's when the teaching of English started to become widespread.
- Siemer: Who were the teachers back then?
- Amaraich: Peace Corps.
- Willens: Did people generally want to have their children taught English in the elementary school?
- Amaraich: Yes. But not at the expense of their language, their local language. There was a great desire to learn English. When I went to intermediate school, in 1949 I guess, around there, they had to bring in English-speaking people to translate what the teacher was teaching us. That's how bad it was.
- Siemer: Who were the teachers back then? Were they mostly local people?
- Amaraich: No. The spouses of the military personnel.
- Willens: There was a director of education here called Dr. Gibson.
- Amaraich: Yes, I know him.
- Willens: And he apparently had a different philosophy about teaching English. He thought the Micronesians should have to raise the money for their own schools, and the kids should be taught by their own people (Micronesians), so you would have English being taught by Micronesians who might not be sufficiently well trained in the language to teach it to their children. Did you disagree with Dr. Gibson on those issues?
- Amaraich: I thought he was not realistic about things at that point. I know him, and I served on the Board of Education. I used to represent Truk in educational conferences in Saipan and in

- Guam. I know what you're talking about, but I don't think he had everybody's support. I think that he realized that there were some differences in the thinking of the people and some of them were Micronesian. But I worked with him. I remember when he fell off that chair.
- Willens: What happened?
- Amaraich: He fell off his chair because that's when he had the heart attack, right in the conference.
- Willens: You were present?
- Amaraich: I was there.
- Willens: When you found yourself in the Congress of Micronesia, as one of the members of the first Congress, did you have any particular issues that you personally wanted to pursue in the Congress?
- Amaraich: I don't know whether it was what I was interested in, but I ended up in the Committee on Judiciary and Governmental Operations.
- Willens: You ended up being chairman of that from the very start, as I recall.
- Amaraich: Yes. And I thought that the administration of the Trust Territory through Headquarters and the state level, district level, could improve. I concentrated in those areas, trying to work with the High Commissioner and see how we could move things along. Before the Congress, the district administrators were appointed by the High Commissioner, and the department heads at the cabinet level were also appointed. I had learned something about the process of advise and consent, and so that was my project. I said, why can't we have some of these cabinet members, district administrators, subject to advice and consent of Congress?
- Willens: What happened?
- Amaraich: It happened. It worked. Because the High Commissioner finally agreed.
- Willens: Was he reluctant?
- Amaraich: Initially, yes. It took some convincing. I was just trying to see how the government could be more responsive to the people, and I thought that was one way to do it. We finally agreed, and I sponsored legislation, and the High Commissioner approved. So then they made me chairman of the Advice and Consent Committee. And we went through some exercises, some very unpleasant ones. But it was the American system working. We disapproved some, including my own people, and we approved some. I was accused of having too high of a standard that I was operating on.
- Willens: So you did disapprove some expatriates?
- Amaraich: Expatriates and Micronesians, including Trukese who I know and we went to school together.
- Willens: Were there political consequences based on that?
- Amaraich: Well, as you know, I lost the election in 1974. I don't know whether that's why or because the American government didn't like me, or what.
- Siemer: What was the status of land issues when you first went into the Congress of Micronesia?
- Amaraich: In Truk, there wasn't much public land, so we didn't really have a problem with that. What we had in Truk was the problem of knowing who owns what land where. And so the Truk Delegation, through my suggestion, sponsored what is now the Land Commission, which

includes registration, hearing on determining title to ownership, land boundaries, and all that. I felt then and still do now that knowing the boundaries and what you own and having a piece of paper that says so was important. So we established an administration to research and come up with legislation for that which established the system which we have now. At that time, the land administrator was an Australian. But in Truk, we didn't have that many problems. There were some land problems, government land, but not that much compared to Saipan and Palau.

Siemer: How about here in Ponape?

Amaraich: There are more problems in Ponape than in Truk.

Siemer: There were a number of bills that came before the Congress of Micronesia about establishing surveyor courses and training for surveyors. Was that a particular problem?

Amaraich: When I was still going to high school at PICS, we had training in Truk for surveyors conducted by the Land Management Office. And in Truk, those who were working there were people who went to small training in Truk. But yes, surveying was a problem, because there were not many [surveyors]. So we had to bring out American surveyors to train locals. They were able to train some and establish a certification system for land surveyors. What created the land problem was the concern in Palau and in the Marianas and the fear that maybe the American military would just take all of the land, and therefore we wanted some control over that. That spilled over into the status negotiations, as you know.

Siemer: But well before the status negotiations, there were a number of eminent domain bills, including several where you were able to override the High Commissioner's veto.

Amaraich: Yes, but we couldn't do anything with the Secretary of the Interior, who has the last say on that. But yes, eminent domain was a foreign thing, and when it was exercised and with the amount of money that the government was saying was fair compensation, that started the whole effort to try and curtail use of eminent domain. It was alien in the first place, and second, the amount of money that the government was saying was the fair market value just was too low. I forget how much it was, but people thought that was really, really low.

Siemer: Were they using eminent domain primarily for roads during those days?

Amaraich: For roads and for government facilities. But, as you know, in Truk the roads were taken without compensation under the so-called indefinite land use agreement with the military when they first came.

Siemer: No, I didn't know that. How did that work?

Amaraich: They just came in and asked people to sign an agreement that the U.S. can use this area for land or for the buildings and no compensation.

Siemer: And no limitation on how long they could use it?

Amaraich: No. It was indefinite. That's why it created a problem. It was indefinite, and that was interpreted to mean forever. So we were really concerned about that, and you see it in the Constitution later on. There was a provision about that. The land owners in Truk were finally compensated, but it took a long time. Interior was not forthcoming. It took a lawsuit by the Micronesian Legal Services in Truk to get people focused on that land. They finally settled it.

Willens: Was that much later on?

Amaraich: Yes. And back after I moved to Ponape in 1980, some cases were still being resolved. The compensation had been agreed to, and there was not enough money in one appropriation,

so we had to wait for a second appropriation to finally pay all those in Truk. Because that's where most of the indefinite land use was.

Willens: You mentioned that the performance of the Trust Territory Administration was one of the principal concerns you had when you became a Senator in the Congress of Micronesia and that the advice and consent mechanism was one way you saw as improving the situation. Were there specific problems with the TTPI Administration that you were focused on in terms of allocation of money or the quality of personnel?

Amaraich: Take the district administrators. They were appointed by the High Commissioner, and they think about all they owe to the High Commissioner, and not much about what they owe to the people. And I thought they should consider the people at the same time that they are reporting to the High Commissioner. That's what I thought. Responsiveness to the people in the performance of your work. You have responsibilities.

Willens: What was your judgment after some years of experience with the advice and consent process? Did you think that it did change the attitude of the district administrators?

Amaraich: Yes, I really think it did. I don't think I'm the only one who thinks so. But the other thing was that Administration was growing very big, and I thought there was something wrong. I thought it would be better to make a review of the way that the government was structured and whether they have too many people somewhere or the wrong people in the wrong departments. We had the government reorganization legislation.

Willens: Was that in one of the first Congresses?

Amaraich: Yes. I forgot which year, but I know that's one we worked on. I worked on it a lot, and we went out into the islands and talked to them, how the people felt about their government. And we came back and made our report. We retained some consultants to assist us, and most of our recommendations were acceptable to the High Commissioner. He was glad to have it. That's one that they did not resist too strongly. They thought that they needed it, and they also used some of our recommendations to get rid of people that they were having problems of getting rid of just because they could say yes, the Congress says this, and so we have to make this change. I thought it really helped. It was the Committee on Government Reorganization, and I had the pleasure of co-chairing it, because it was a joint committee. That one I think was one of the things that I really enjoyed.

Willens: During the 1960s, the issue of putting more Micronesians into the Trust Territory Government seemed always to be on the agenda. What was your attitude during those days about the readiness of the Trust Territory to hire Micronesians and train them if necessary to take the positions of expatriates?

Amaraich: I realized that we have to be trained, but I also was concerned about just putting people in there, and that's why the advice and consent became very important to me. You could really weed out the undesirables through advice and consent, by rejecting those that you don't think can perform or whose performance is not acceptable. But as far as training, that was consistent with the goal of having Micronesians take over the administration of the islands.

Willens: Did High Commissioner Goding and High Commissioner Norwood and High Commissioner Johnston generally favor that kind of a program of placing more Micronesians in the Administration?

Amaraich: Yes, I think all three were generally favorable. I was worried about Johnston, because I thought he had some people or friends who tried to push him through the committee. He worked very hard in lobbying against or lobbying for individual nominees. And when we

rejected some, he got very upset. So he was a very strong person.

Willens: In the very first Congress, the two Senators from the Marianas District were Senator Borja and Senator Cruz. I know you probably worked with both men for many years. Could you give us your recollections of Senator Borja?

Amaraich: It was very pleasant working with Senator Borja. I think sometimes he talked too much. I know you are asking me how I feel about him, but that's the way I was seeing him. He said a lot, maybe more than necessary. He was very smart, very bright.

Willens: He seemed to have a particular interest in fostering economic development.

Amaraich: Yes, he was a businessman.

Willens: I just saw one exchange in the Journal which related to a proposal to establish Duty Free Stores in the terminals. He was in favor of it and, as I read the record, you raised some questions about whether it really was in the interest of Micronesia to have more tourists.

Amaraich: I don't remember that.

Willens: But do you associate him as someone who was pushing for economic development?

Amaraich: Yes, and that was natural because he already was running a store at the time that he was a Senator. And unfortunately later on I think it was sold to the Japanese. But I thought of him or think of him as a business person that might succeed if he really concentrated on that. I didn't think he was in the right place when he was in the Congress.

Willens: Joe Cruz is a different person.

Amaraich: He is a different person. As you know, we had a problem electing was it the second president or the first president of the Senate at one time. I forget which. But we went for about two weeks without getting organized in the Senate, because we'd always tie every time we voted.

Willens: Between whom and whom?

Amaraich: Between I think Nakayama and John Muraket.

Siemer: There were 12 of you at the time, weren't there?

Amaraich: Yes. Anyway, we had Dr. Norman Meller and Tom Gill, and I forgot the name of the other guy. They came out to conduct training for us and also help us get organized [with the first Congress of Micronesia]. But I think it was Joe Cruz who switched his vote and elected President Nakayama. Well, as you know he had a problem getting seated initially because of some criminal charges back in the mainland.

Willens: Who challenged him?

Amaraich: It was some people from Saipan who filed a complaint. I think they were represented by Bill Nabors.

Siemer: Did any of the Saipan businessmen have stores in Truk at the time?

Amaraich: There was a John Pangelinan who owns a store where it is now called Chigero's Store. It's a big store now. But John Pangelinan was married to a woman from Uman in Truk, and I forget the name of his brother-in-law, who also has a store in Saipan, and he and John Pangelinan were doing that business in Truk.

Willens: Were you interested in stimulating more commercial activity in your district?

- Amaraich: Honestly, I was focusing on government, and I was not concentrating on business as such. Resources, yes, I was concerned about land. And that's why I thought a certificate of your land, a title to your land, helps development, because you are more sure that you own this land, and so you can lease it out or build on it. So I was concentrating on trying to have the land system working. Then later on, as a result of an appearance before the U.N. Trusteeship Council, I became interested in the control over marine resources. That's what I focused on during the latter part of my turn in Congress.
- Willens: And also you probably continued that in the status negotiations between the United States in the late 1970s.
- Amaraich: Yes. In fact, that was what changed our picture in the negotiations, when we were not able to get U.S. agreement that we wanted control of the marine resources. I was chairing the Committee on the Law of the Sea at the time and then became a consultant to the committee after my defeat. As you recall, initially the proposal by the Micronesians was that the U.S. would handle foreign affairs as well as defense. It was the marine resources issue that changed the whole thing, because we couldn't get the U.S. to agree that we own and we have control, as a coastal state, of the marine resources. And we had difficulty voicing ourselves independently at the Law of the Sea Conferences in New York and Caracas and Geneva. That really changed all that. When we came back, we said either you give us recognition or we're going to take back foreign affairs, because fishery is foreign affairs, and that's where we disagreed [with the U.S.].
- Willens: Did the United States consider control over the fisheries part of the foreign affairs responsibilities?
- Amaraich: Yes. It was their policy that nobody owns the tuna because it migrates so fast and so widely that it has to be regulated by international law. We said yes, it moves around, but as long as they come into our waters they are ours, and we must control them.
- Willens: Who was the ambassador at the time?
- Amaraich: It was still Ambassador Williams at the time we were fighting over this. There was something else. The U.S. Congress and the Administration were really under pressure by the American Tuna Board Association in San Diego not to give up control, coastal state control over marine resources. Keep it international. They prevented us from even coming to see the Ambassador at the Law of the Sea Conference. They wouldn't let us in to see him. That really angered the Micronesian members of the committee.
- Willens: That was still at a time when there was the Joint Committee on Future Status?
- Amaraich: Yes.
- Willens: Ambassador Williams didn't resign until 1976.
- Amaraich: Right.
- Willens: During the 1975-76 time frame....
- Amaraich: Yes. We were still hung up on that.
- Willens: What happened?
- Amaraich: After scolding us because we had gone to Caracas, I forget which year, and we, the FSM or Trust Territory Delegation, had an observer status, because we couldn't get the U.S. Delegation to sponsor some of our proposals which were in conflict with the U.S. position. I came back for a committee meeting and then went back. They told us the American Delegation was going to censure us or something like that because some of our

proposals were showing up in Fiji and New Zealand and Australian proposals, and they recognized them. So I went and met with the Ambassador. I forget his name.

Willens: Not Manfred.

Amaraich: It will come back. He was the Ambassador on the Law of the Sea. We finally agreed that we cannot agree because the two positions were going that way. He said I'm going to tell my government to let you speak for yourself in this Conference. And that started changing it. When we went back to Saipan after that, or when the issue was still hot, that's when the position changed. We said either we get it, or we're not entertaining free association any more. That's when Ambassador Williams said you wanted your land, you got your land; you wanted your Constitution, you got your Constitution; you wanted your law, you got your law; now you want the fish also. And that didn't help the situation.

Willens: He was upset.

Amaraich: The way he said it, I guess, like we were asking too much. But then they went back and decided to give the Micronesians their foreign affairs—they handle it and they pay for it. And that's the way it came out in the Compact of Free Association.

Siemer: Going back to the resources question, when you were in the Congress of Micronesia in the 1960s, there was the question of how to allocate local resources—tax dollars that had been collected from the local people. There seemed to be some agreement in the early years that there would be an equal allocation among the districts. Was that how it worked?

Amaraich: For some reason that I don't know, there was always less money for Truk as a district than the Marshalls, Palau, and the Marianas in the Trust Territory budget, and that continues. How it happened I really don't know.

Siemer: Federal funds?

Amaraich: Yes. The way the Trust Territory budget was allocated, and that continues until now in terms of Truk, Ponape, Yap and Kwajalein, Truk is the lowest. We tried when we were in Congress to influence that, but as you know we really didn't have too much to say about the budget because it's already appropriated and itemized by the Trust Territory and by Interior. When it comes down, it's already fixed. We tried to see if we could go on an equal distribution basis and then on population basis. It didn't work perfectly in terms of amount, because to give more to the less advantaged district would mean a reduction in the level of the others that are already up, and it was a difficult task to try and equalize it. So even when the Compact money came, there was a conscious decision to keep the level of Trust Territory funding because it would mean too much reduction in force or reduction in level of government services.

Siemer: Was that a source of difficulty with your colleagues from the Marianas?

Amaraich: On the tax? Of course, that's what broke up the whole Trust Territory. Kwajalein was paying more in terms of taxes into the local revenue, and it got distributed to other districts, because that's the place where that gives us more money. And the Marshallese leaders did not really like the fact that they were contributing to the other states out of their Kwajalein tax.

Siemer: Looking back, do you see any way that the Congress of Micronesia could have gotten around that problem?

Amaraich: I thought if we tried, if we would really work at it with the help of the Administration, we could have done it. Because people were more generous. There was a united concern about development. If we do it now, I think it would be more difficult. If we were still

- with Palau, the Marianas and the Marshalls, if we tried to equalize it at this point it would be very difficult.
- Willens: When you found yourself in a Congress with representatives from the other districts, was it your sense at the beginning that there was a way to get to a common political future?
- Amaraich: It really was possible, at least in my view. I felt that. I was sad when we got separated. I was thinking on a Trust Territory-wide basis, not on the basis of where I come from or even Truk. I let my House colleagues look for appropriations for Truk, and I was trying to see if I could help on a Territory-wide basis. I would sponsor legislation to build a classroom in Rota or something in Yap. That's the way I was thinking.
- Willens: Were your views shared by Mr. Nakayama, for example?
- Amaraich: Yes. You would find very few [items of] money legislation under our signature in the Senate—Nakayama and I. We let the House members from Truk handle that. I think we were thinking about Micronesia-wide problems and needs.
- Willens: One of the complaints about the Secretarial Order creating the Congress of Micronesia was that it did not give the members of Congress real control over the budget that was funded by the U.S. Congress. Was that an important issue for you in the early years of the Congress?
- Amaraich: It was very important. We were able to get authority to make our laws. Granted there were limitations in that the Secretary of Interior could veto. We can override [the High Commissioner], but the Secretary of Interior may not approve. So there was a great deal of progress politically and legislative-wise. But there was not enough on the Administration side like finances and selection of who comes to work for the Trust Territory from the outside. The most frustrating part was on the budget itself, that we did not have much control over it.
- Willens: There's some suggestion that when High Commissioner Johnston came in at the beginning of the Nixon Administration, there was a real effort to at least give the Congress a chance to review the draft budget. Do you recall that being a change in policy under High Commissioner Johnston?
- Amaraich: I think it was an effort to be consistent with the development in other areas of the government. We did have committees that were created to work with the Administration people to see if we could get involved even before the Trust Territory budget goes to Washington. We thought that would be a better approach. We'd have our inputs first before things got locked in. I think that helped, because when the budget goes to Washington, the High Commissioner was able to say this is what the Congress representation brought in to the process. Yes, I think it was good.
- Willens: When you were in your first term of the Congress of Micronesia, did you have any view at the time as to whether future political status was a current issue?
- Amaraich: The first organization was a Commission, and I was not on that. It was after the Commission did all of this [work] that I was brought in to join the Committee on Status Delegation. But I was not involved in the Commission, and even though I am aware that this thing was going on, I was not focusing on it until I was made a member of the Micronesian Status Delegation.
- Willens: In 1966, the Congress of Micronesia passed a resolution asking the President of the United States to appoint a status commission. Do you recall the reasons that led to that request?

- Amaraich: It was kind of confusing, because those resolutions came one after the other, and sometimes we were contradicting ourselves. There was one after Hickel's speech. But the first one was to ask the President of the U.S. and the U.S. Congress to consider future political status. And then a couple of weeks later, another one came in asking the U.S. Government or Congress not to do anything without the approval of the Congress.
- Willens: That's exactly right. But the 1966 resolution doesn't seem to have any foundation, and nothing happened.
- Amaraich: That was the 1966 resolution that you're talking about? What was it?
- Willens: It requested the President of the United States to create a status commission, I think on which Micronesians would sit, to examine future political status. And the United States did not act in response to that request. And so a year later, you and the Congress created the Future Political Status Commission on which Dr. Palacios sat and others. That issued an interim report in 1968 and a final report in 1969. Were you aware of the thinking of the Commission as it did its work over that two-year time period?
- Amaraich: I was aware that they were making rounds. They traveled throughout the districts and had some outside travel to learn about various options. I was aware of their report when they came back. But I was not closely following what the Commission was doing until the Delegation was appointed.
- Willens: What's your recollection today of how you reacted to the report of the Commission? Had you heard of free association before?
- Amaraich: Not at that time. I had no knowledge about free association like the Cook Islands had. I knew about relationships, but free association as was discussed later on, the kind that the Cook Islands have, no, at that time I was not focusing on it. I had to do a lot of reading or listening before I could understand what it was.
- Willens: Earlier 1969, Secretary Hickel had come out. Do you recall visiting Hickel at the time?
- Amaraich: I was there when he made the speech in Chalan Kanoa. I remember that.
- Willens: What kind of event was it?
- Amaraich: My recollection is that my feeling was, at least somebody's talking about it. I was not able to say whether what he said was good or bad, but there had been a lot of talk among ourselves as to what's going to happen down the road. Then finally Hickel came out and said something that forced us to also focus on where do we go from here. I remember the occasion when he spoke in Chalan Kanoa.
- Willens: Did you meet with him in a smaller group?
- Amaraich: I only just shook hands with him. I didn't really meet with him.
- Willens: Did you meet with any other members of the U.S. group that came out with him? A young man named Edgar Kaiser, Jr.?
- Amaraich: Yes, I met Edgar.
- Willens: Did you come to know him over time?
- Amaraich: No. It was very brief.
- Willens: Secretary Hickel, in addition to sort of offering an invitation to come talk about political status, also outlined what he called an action program. What happened to that action program?

- Amaraich: We kept the civic action team, but not because of what Hickel said. There was a need for putting more Micronesians in government positions, and what Hickel said was consistent with what I thought we were jointly doing with the Trust Territory Administration.
- Willens: Was there any follow through on some of those items?
- Amaraich: No, I don't think there was follow-through, one, two, three, because of the Hickel presentation. I think it was the natural thing of the time that we were focusing on the question of Micronesians taking over.
- Willens: The Congress did pass a resolution, as you said earlier, requesting the U.S. Congress and the President to consider seriously the future political status of the Trust Territory. As I understand it, a copy of that resolution was hand-carried to Guam and delivered to President Nixon, who was passing through Guam. Were you part of the Delegation that went to Guam?
- Amaraich: No. I went to Guam, but I didn't go when they gave the resolution to the President.
- Willens: Did you hear what happened when they delivered this to President Nixon?
- Amaraich: No.
- Willens: Do you have any idea whether there was any conversation with the President about this?
- Amaraich: No. I don't know what happened.
- Willens: Had you seen a copy of the draft Organic Act that the Department of the Interior had prepared that would have made the Trust Territory a territory of the United States?
- Amaraich: No, I didn't see anything in writing. I knew what Hickel said, and what later on Secretary Loesch came out and offered, but I don't remember that [draft Organic Act].
- Siemer: It seemed like in each session of the Congress of Micronesia, particularly in the Senate, your Senators would introduce a resolution asking for a [Micronesian] delegate to Washington. Each session that resolution would come up and then the next session it would come up again.
- Amaraich: Especially in 1969.
- Siemer: What was the High Commissioner's reaction to that?
- Amaraich: I don't think he had any role in it. It was not prompted by the High Commissioner. The attitude of the High Commissioner at that time, as far as political status was concerned, was hands-off.
- Siemer: It wasn't his jurisdiction?
- Amaraich: Yes. That's the way I read it. Kind of hands-off and maybe he was instructed to do that. Sometimes they [in the High Commissioner's office] even complained that they were not being told by Washington what was happening. I remember High Commissioner Winkel was so upset that people would keep showing up in Saipan. Then they posted these State Department liaisons in Saipan, and they had their offices there, but they didn't seem to coordinate. The High Commissioner was upstairs, they were downstairs, they were doing their own thing. So the High Commissioner was not really kept informed or was not in the loop.
- Siemer: What was your view about having a [non-voting] delegate [to the U.S. Congress] in Washington?

Amaraich: Oh, the FSM Micronesian delegate? I supported that. It just seemed to be a good idea at the time.

Willens: Let's turn then to the first round of negotiations that took place in Washington in October of 1969. What did you hope to accomplish at that first set of discussions with the United States in Washington?

Amaraich: The 11 points were our focus. We spent about three days on those in Majuro. We were in Saipan and went to Majuro. We finished up what came out to be the 11 points. There was this big send off at the airport with Father Hecker and a band praying and singing and it was a very emotional time, because we were going to Washington to talk about the 11 points.

Willens: Did you have any consultants that helped you with the 11 points?

Amaraich: I don't remember. There was a Kurt Ludwig. He was with the High Commissioner's office. He was in public affairs, but I don't know whether he was there with us. My recollection has faded. I know that we worked on the 11 points for almost three days after it had been drafted by staff and added or subtracted in Majuro. We finalized those 11 points on the airplane going to Washington.

Willens: When you put these 11 points together, were you thinking that if the United States agreed to these 11 points, that you and your colleagues might have found a basis for agreement with the United States?

Amaraich: Some of the points there were problems that existed at that time—war damage was something that we felt had to be resolved. If not, then it would have a place in the Compact to assure eventual resolution down the road. The access to the U.S. immigration-wise was also important. I think at the time we were discussing these, our people were having difficulty in the United States because of immigration, limited access to the U.S. So it became one issue every time we met with people in the districts. I think those were things that were immediate in our mind for resolution, and others were built in because of our hope that they would be included in the eventual relationship agreement. As far as whether we expected them to be resolved in Washington on the first trip, no, we did not. I think we realized that the United States would need more time to respond and that when they responded we would need time to respond at the same time. They were issues as we saw them that needed addressing, maybe not a resolution right away, but ways to preserve them in whatever resolution we had with the United States. We spent a lot of time on those.

Willens: It sounds from what you're saying that these are the issues that were on your mind and that you thought deserved discussion with the U.S.

Amaraich: Yes.

Willens: Did the members of the Delegation sit down together and think about whether they really favored free association?

Amaraich: Not at that point. No, not in Majuro. I don't think at that time we really were fixed on a position yet. We knew that the sentiment was free association and if that fails then independence was the last alternative, but we were not focusing on those yet. We were trying to see if we could solve these problems before it really came down to the status itself. At that point, I think (at least in my mind) the label was not important to me. You can put any name on it, but let's try to talk substance so we can try and resolve this or find ways to preserve those. What you call it later on, you can put it on the cover of the relationship agreement. It didn't bother me much. I was not focusing on free association

or independence. But later on, as you know, the four points came out.

- Willens: What is your recollection now of the way in which your 11 points were received by the U.S. Delegation?
- Amaraich: The sticky ones as I recall were the land and war claims things. My recollection is that those were the difficult ones that we couldn't get an immediate reaction from the U.S. Delegation to consult or talk about.
- Willens: Do you recall any discussion at that first meeting about your first point, which is that the people of Micronesia will draft and adopt their own Constitution? Do you remember whether the U.S. Delegation had a reaction to that proposal?
- Amaraich: No, I don't think they had any specific reaction to it, and I don't think they would have or could have said no at that point. I don't remember exactly what they said, but I don't think they turned it down right away. We had expected that it would not be wholeheartedly acceptable, but that it would not be rejected out of hand, because it makes sense. At least I couldn't see the United States arguing against it, that it's a wrong evil thing for you to be wanting to have.
- Willens: Do you remember being shown a draft Organic Act when you were in Washington as part of that delegation?
- Amaraich: I don't remember.
- Willens: Do you remember an effort by Secretary Hickel and Assistant Secretary Loesch to work out a compromise to the effect that if the United States was willing to give up the power of eminent domain so that you had control of your land, the Micronesians in turn would agree to a territorial relationship under the sovereignty of the United States? Does that strike any bell?
- Amaraich: No. Maybe that did go on, but maybe it was flying over my head.
- Willens: Do you remember any personal meetings with either Secretary Hickel or Assistant Secretary Loesch?
- Amaraich: Not personal meetings, no.
- Willens: What was your assessment overall of the U.S. Delegation? Did they seem well prepared?
- Amaraich: Not when we went there the first time. No, I don't think they were well prepared for that, and we didn't expect them to be giving final answers to the 11 points.
- Willens: Were they prepared to undertake to give you an answer some time after the meeting?
- Amaraich: Yes, I think there was an understanding that future consultation would take place, and responses were going to be coming from the U.S. Delegation.
- Siemer: Did you have the sense at that meeting that the members of the U.S. Delegation were familiar with what you had been doing in the Congress of Micronesia?
- Amaraich: No, I did not. Frankly, I didn't think that they had spent sleepless nights thinking about the Micronesian problems.
- Siemer: Many of the positions that were important to you were very evident from the records of the Congress of Micronesia. It was not hard to find out what the key problems were.
- Amaraich: Yes, that's what I meant. I think the focus was somewhere else, and the Micronesians were the small guys out there. The attitude was, we'll get to them when we have time. That's my impression.

- Willens: Following that first round, Assistant Secretary Loesch came out to Saipan in January 1970. He carried with him something called a Political Status Act on which he asked for comments. Do you have any recollection of meeting with him on that occasion?
- Amaraich: Not separately with him, but I was (if you're talking about the same thing that I'm thinking about) at the meeting when he made the presentation. I didn't meet with him separately.
- Willens: What was the thrust of his presentation?
- Amaraich: Join the American political family. Join the American political family as a commonwealth.
- Willens: What was your reaction?
- Amaraich: I thought he was joking.
- Willens: Why?
- Amaraich: Because I thought by that time that they should know that we were not interested in commonwealth. They were not formally told by us, I suppose, but I think there was enough said by leaders and the Congress [of Micronesia] indicating that we were not going that way. So I thought they felt they had to make that offer first before they went on to something else. Maybe they did it knowing that it would be rejected.
- Willens: Was Senator Salii the chairman of the Delegation?
- Amaraich: Yes.
- Willens: Senator Salii wrote back a letter to Assistant Secretary Loesch in which he said, "At this time I simply wish to informally let you know that, unless the United States is willing to let the Micronesians draft and adopt their own Constitution, I do not see much chance for successful negotiations between your group and ours." Was that your view at the time?
- Amaraich: Yes.
- Willens: Was there any disagreement among the Micronesian Delegation as to the importance of a Micronesian convention?
- Amaraich: Are you talking about the Loesch offer?
- Willens: Yes, the Loesch offer and Salii's statement that you must let us draft our own Constitution.
- Amaraich: I don't think there was any disagreement. I recall after this session that you can feel their reaction. You can almost touch it, that—no; that's not what we want and we'd better stop it right away before we spend too much time on it. And I think that's what Salii was trying to convey—forget it.
- Willens: There was a formal session in May 1970. I think this took place in Washington. The Four Principles were set forth by the Micronesian Delegation for the first time. Where did the Four Principles come from?
- Amaraich: The Commission had done some work, and then the Delegation also did some work. There were long meetings in Saipan preparing these. It didn't come out from Lazarus alone. I think it represents what the group was very serious about.
- Willens: It did include the unilateral termination point that I raised with you earlier.
- Amaraich: Yes.

- Willens: By this time, had your own views become more firm or focused with respect to what you thought was a desirable outcome?
- Amaraich: Individually, my own views?
- Willens: Yes, your views.
- Amaraich: By this time, I guess I'd done some reading and studying and thinking about it, and my feeling coincided with the feeling of the others.
- Willens: What led you to think that this kind of statement of Four Principles would produce a future status that would be good for your people?
- Amaraich: We had considered, along with other issues, the length of free association as we wanted it. I don't know whether you call it principles or understanding. This is new, we may not know what we are doing, so let's don't lock future generations into something that we might regret or they might regret. So let's don't lock it in. Let's make it flexible so that those who come after us, instead of going and bouncing on our graves, they can amend it. They can go back and say look, we didn't think our first group of so-called leaders did a good job. This is the way we think we ought to go. I think everybody recognized that, and that's why that 15 year term also is related to this. At least that's the way I was thinking.
- Willens: Did you consider this package of Four Principles as really amounting to free association? Were you now prepared to think of this as a free association relationship with the United States?
- Amaraich: Personally, as I said, at that time I was not thinking about the label, you know, what do you call it. I was thinking about the substance. So it was not a free association of some fixed type that caused us to feel or think the way this thing came out. I had been made aware of the Cook Island/New Zealand model and some research had been done on it. But I didn't think it was important to focus on what do you call it. The content was what I was concerned about.
- Willens: Do you remember the reaction of the United States representatives when you first announced these Four Principles?
- Amaraich: I remember the violent reaction regarding the termination principle; I think it was the last one. And that was consistent. The U.S. was, I guess, still entertaining in their mind that they want us hopefully to change into a permanent relationship with the U.S. So to me it was not surprising that they would react, kind of pull back on that.
- Willens: Do you remember anyone on the U.S. side saying anything in response to these Four Principles?
- Amaraich: At this point, I cannot pinpoint it, but I thought the military people were not ready to swallow it. That was my impression at the time, because I remember I could look around and see what the body language was. That's what I thought. Maybe that's not fair, but that was my reading.
- Willens: Were there military people in uniform present at these negotiating sessions?
- Amaraich: During formal negotiations, I think Admiral Crowe would come in with the brass and all that kind of thing. But in the informal sessions, no, the lower guys who operated the machines and things like that were in uniform, but sometimes the Admiral would come in informal attire during informal chats, drafting sessions. My recollection is that in every formal session he was in uniform. Whether he was in uniform at the time we presented that, I don't remember.

- Willens: Do you recall how the second round of negotiations came to conclusion?
- Amaraich: This one?
- Willens: Yes. What happened after you announced the Four Principles and they reacted somewhat strongly?
- Amaraich: That's difficult to remember what happened. I only remember when they finally came around . . .
- Willens: And changed their view?
- Amaraich: And changed their view.
- Willens: Okay. The documents suggest that there really was an impasse, that the presentations on the part of the Micronesians were so far afield from what the United States wanted that there was not much give and take.
- Amaraich: I think that would be correct, because if there was a kind of a violent reaction I would have remembered. But it was something that you sensed just by sitting there and observing. And a recognition that each side has as to the difficulties.
- Siemer: At those negotiations, did you have informal get-togethers? Were there dinners or cocktail parties or things like that?
- Amaraich: There wasn't much of that. There were informal get-togethers between the two chairman from our side and Admiral Crowe and Ambassador Williams. I think there were some informal sitting around in a hotel room or somewhere. Except maybe for a formal reception sponsored by one group and the other group would sponsor another, we maintained distances.
- Siemer: Did you know any of the members of the U.S. side at that point? Had you met them in any other capacity?
- Amaraich: Of course I had met Secretary Loesch when he came out and when we went to Washington. I don't know whether Mr. Whittington was still there when we presented it, but he was out here in Ponape as a Peace Corps volunteer. And the technical people, you know, they move with negotiations from place to place. I'm no good in remembering names.
- Willens: What do you remember about the debate in the Congress of Micronesia on these developments—the rejection of the commonwealth proposal, the Four Principles, and so forth?
- Amaraich: On the floor? My recollection is that there may have been some speeches on the floor, but most people got exposed through committee discussions, so when we hit the floor, we already knew what was coming and why. My recollection is that there was not much debate, and I may be wrong. I don't remember any yelling or shouting on the floor about how bad it was or how good it was.
- Willens: I guess the issue was then put to the Congress of Micronesia as to whether they wanted to appoint a joint committee to hire counsel and continue the negotiations. Why was it felt that a new committee should be formed to carry on the negotiations?
- Amaraich: I was wondering about that last night when I went through this stuff. We had the Commission and a Joint Delegation and then a Joint Committee. On the Joint Committee, I think there was a feeling (that's my vague recollection) within the Congress that if we kept the Commission, there would be some effort to include the Executive Branch people, our own Trust Territory Executive Branch people, in the negotiating

group. The feeling at that time was we don't trust even some of our own people. I think that's why it was changed to a Joint Committee, because it connotes a group of Congress members as a committee instead of some delegation from Micronesia going over. I think the thinking was evolving. First we thought a Commission was the right name, and some people later thought that was not right, and then some people expressed concern about our interest to join the Congress in the negotiations with the United States. At that time I think the Executive Branch was still viewed as at least half U.S. Government and half Trust Territory and they are not to be privy to what the Congress was doing yet then at that time. And I think that's why we changed to the Joint Committee of the House and the Senate.

Willens: Did you have any sense at the time that it would be useful to convene a constitutional convention to try to work out a constitution for Micronesia at the same time as you were conducting status negotiations with the United States?

Amaraich: It was thought to be very important (at least my recollection of the discussion) because that was one of the principles that we articulated. It was a test also at the time just how the Trust Territory government and the U.S. government were going to react to us drafting our Constitution. So we drafted the legislation to form the constitutional convention. So your question is whether it had any relationship to the status negotiations? Yes. Our thought was that it would be consistent not only with the Trusteeship Agreement, to begin with, and also with our decision on political status, and it was going to be a test on how sincerely the American government was. There was a fear that it might be vetoed in Washington.

Willens: It might be vetoed.

Amaraich: It might be vetoed by Interior, and I guess that was as challenge at the same time. Okay, let's do it and see what they do. But as it turned out, it went through the High Commissioner. He didn't disapprove it.

Willens: It took several years, as I recall, for the bill to actually become approved.

Amaraich: Yes, it took some doing. That's my recollection of why we went that route.

Willens: The debate within the Congress was I think as you described, with the overwhelming majority of the members supporting the positions taken by the Delegation. But both Senator Borja and Senator Palacios spoke briefly (maybe not so briefly in some cases) and suggested that although this commonwealth proposal was rejected by the group as a whole, that it was closer to what some of the people in the Marianas thought they might want. What's your recollection of those presentations by the Marianas legislators and their impact on the group?

Amaraich: The Marianas leaders' position was known. They wanted a different thing. So it was not surprising that they would make those kind of statements like Senator Borja and Senator Palacios made. I was against fragmentation of the whole thing. At that time, I thought we would be better off being united. But when the American Delegation showed that they would encourage it, I said oh, we're in trouble. I thought if they didn't encourage it, it wouldn't have happened.

Siemer: How about back at the time of the 11 points? Were the Marianas leaders favoring a different approach at that time?

Amaraich: I think it was more prominent after we had developed the 11 points, because on the 11 points, especially on land and those, we were united, we had a common goal, a common enemy. They did not argue against unilateral termination because at that time it was not

really clear yet what we were doing. So they didn't really fight that. But the other things, everybody wanted those, so it was not a point of contention. I think it started with Palacios and Oly after the Loesch visit and all that. They felt they must articulate more because of the reading of their own constituents' desire, and I think that they felt they must say something, even though privately Palacios would tell me, and even Oly would tell me, that they really thought they would eventually associate themselves with free association. But at that time, it was so hot a political issue that they told me that they could not afford to be seen as not supporting separate negotiations.

Siemer: Did they try to get you to soften your position so that it would be more acceptable in the Marianas?

Amaraich: What I recall was informal conversation, I guess that was in the Senate, that as long as you're not forgetting your own citizenship [separate from the United States], that will not sell in Saipan or in the Marianas. We are Americans. And that's completely opposite from what we [in the rest of the Trust Territory] were looking for. We must have our own identity and must have our own citizenship. At that time, I was not about to say okay, we're going to become Americans. I didn't think that was right.

Willens: You mentioned Assistant Secretary Loesch. I understand that he came out in the summer of 1970 to make a presentation to the Congress of Micronesia, and he was not invited to appear to present the views of the United States before the Congress took action.

Amaraich: Oh, he's a nice guy.

Willens: Was he friendly with Bailey Olter?

Amaraich: Yes. They went on a first-name basis. They just fit together, their personalities and activities. So he was very nice to chat with, and he joked a lot. I didn't find any reason to hate him or dislike him.

Willens: But somebody made a decision not to let him appear.

Amaraich: No, we didn't think it was appropriate at that time. I was part of that group. I said no, it's too early. It's not appropriate to have him speak to our Congress at this point. Why? I don't know why I felt that way. It so happened that other people felt the same way at the same time. So who goes and speaks before the U.S. Congress on this thing from our side?

Willens: You'd heard what he had to say.

Amaraich: Perhaps if he had come out with good news, it would have been an inducement, even maybe at least before a formal committee or before a formal reception, for him to speak. But at that time, I think it was the wrong time.

Willens: There was no indication that he had anything new to say to the Congress?

Amaraich: That's right.

Willens: In early 1971, there was a memorable event—the arson of the Congress of Micronesia. What do you remember about what led to that criminal act?

Amaraich: It was not an accident. We concluded that the next day.

Willens: Did you ever learn who did it?

Amaraich: No.

Willens: Did the law enforcement people conduct an appropriate investigation?

- Amaraich: Not very hard.
- Willens: Why was that?
- Amaraich: I don't know. It would have been embarrassing if they found who did it.
- Willens: Then they'd have to do something.
- Amaraich: Yes. I don't think they worked very hard, in my view, to chase down the thing.
- Willens: What impact did it have on you and other members of the Congress?
- Amaraich: I was saddened by it. I think it had an impact on the question (in my mind) whether this is the way life was going to be in Saipan with all the districts together, that if somebody is not happy he goes and burns some office buildings down to get the message across.
- Willens: One of the issues that caused this reaction was the question of taxation, but I'm unclear about that. Do you remember what the issues were in the Congress at the time that sharply divided the Marianas people from the other districts?
- Amaraich: I don't remember exactly what the real issue was at the time. What year was that?
- Willens: That was 1971. Had there been an increasing number of issues with respect to revenue allocation or taxation or other issues on which the districts were beginning to fall into the more economic successful districts, like the Marianas and the Marshalls, as opposed to districts that had less.
- Amaraich: They were already ahead of Truk and Yap in terms of allocation, because the military in Saipan and Kwajalein was supporting economic development.
- Willens: But Truk had the votes. You had the most populous district, didn't you, at the time?
- Amaraich: Yes. Funding-wise, per capita-wise, it was the lowest at that point and still is at this point. I was just trying to think, maybe the tax problem was one, but I thought it was more than that. And I'm trying to recall what it was at the time. At one point, we were also debating over the service to Saipan on the [air] route from Japan. I don't know whether that was the time during which we were concerned about that.
- Willens: That could be actually.
- Amaraich: Because Saipan and some people from the Marshalls and Palau were favorable to Pan Am. But they were in the minority, and the Congress [of Micronesia] was pushing for Air Micronesia. It was started even before we moved into the new meeting halls on the upper part. We started down at the Tapa Tapi Club. That's when we first started. And the debates on airline matters started there. When we moved, it continued in the Senate at least, because we were handling the resolution on that. I cannot say at this time whether that was one of the issues, but it was a very hot issue at that time.
- Willens: The next session of the Congress was in Truk. I think it was a special session in the spring of 1971, and the Marianas delegates boycotted. What is your recollection about the effect of that boycott, if any?
- Amaraich: I thought it was very un-Micronesian to do that. You know, you can have your view and you can still go to a meeting, and that's the way I thought I would conduct myself. Yes, I have a different view, but I will still go to the meeting out of respect for my colleagues, and I will exercise my vote the way I want it, and perhaps some day down the road the same people that I don't want to associate with will become useful to me. That's why I was thinking, why don't they think this way instead of acting the way they are doing. Of course, they are not me and I am not them.

- Willens: Do you remember the Marianas delegates apologizing for the boycott and being welcomed back by you and others?
- Amaraich: They were welcomed back, but no, I don't remember whether they apologized. My reaction at that time was they should not do that. They could still come and participate in the process and contribute their thinking to the group.
- Willens: It was about this time in May of 1971 that a group was formed that called itself the Independence Coalition. Did you have a role in that group?
- Amaraich: I was a member.
- Willens: How did that come about?
- Amaraich: Well, it was not surprising that people had their own views. The U.N. Trusteeship Agreement provides for that. We didn't see anything wrong with it. We were only disadvantaged because of our smallness and our geography. At least that's the way I saw it. It was something that we were entitled to, and somebody better speak about it. Whether it would happen or not, I was not thinking about that.
- Willens: Did it represent a change in your views from the Four Principles, or was it simply putting a name on the Four Principles?
- Amaraich: No, my reading of the desire of my constituents or the Congress was for free association first—let's try it. If it doesn't work, then the next one is independence. I also felt that we had an obligation to be responsible and to explain to the people what that means or what effect that will have. Somebody who will advocate that status can also help the people understand what they would be getting into. At least that's what I thought. The other thing was of course naturally if you are part of the negotiation, then you want to use that too, the way I saw it.
- Willens: Use it in what respect?
- Amaraich: Use it in saying to the Americans that if you don't agree with what we want, then we have this, and I am here to support that as part of the negotiation. I didn't see anything wrong with that.
- Willens: Who were the other principal leaders in the Congress who were a part of the Independence Coalition?
- Amaraich: Tosiwo Nakayama was part of it. Roman Tmetuchl was identified with it. Then when Hans Williander came in [to the Congress of Micronesia] he was identified with that, and I was identified with it. The Truk Delegation, except for Nick Bosse who came in after that, identified with the movement or the group. So it was not just me and Nakayama.
- Willens: Did Father Hezel have any role in the independence movement in Truk?
- Amaraich: They had this program, the Henry Schwalbenberg Program, that was supposed to be explaining the various political status alternatives. So the Catholic Jesuits or the Catholic group had a program going.
- Siemer: It was like political education?
- Amaraich: Yes, it was kind of a political education program.
- Siemer: Did it advocate a particular avenue?
- Amaraich: Not publicly. My impression (at least in Ponape—all of this was before the vote on the Compact) was that the program sponsored by the Catholic mission favored independence. Brother Henry Schwalbenberg was the guy that was given the assignment by the Catholic

- mission to develop and carry out the program. I remember at one time I had to go and talk to them.
- Willens: You went to talk to him?
- Amaraich: I talked to Father Hezel. We were concerned about their explanations of what we were doing. Some of them, I think, were not really correct. There was a concern. But this was when we became a commission in the latter part of the Trust Territory Administration and after the split-off of the other districts. That's when they became really active and may have had something to do with the defeat of the Compact in Ponape.
- Willens: I see.
- Amaraich: But yes, I did go as chairman of our own commission later on and asked Father Hezel to see if he could suspend their program, that it was creating problems. Which he did. He kindly did and he sent Henry to the Marshall Islands for a while.
- Willens: It's interesting to me that there was a focus of the leaders in Truk on independence. Did this reflect some different views and aspirations of the people in Truk as distinct from the people in Ponape, the Marshalls, or wherever?
- Amaraich: At that point, my sense of the feeling of my own people was that if we explain enough to them, they will listen to us, the leaders or the members of Congress. And I was worried about that. I was worried that they might do that because of my lack of education or lack of knowledge about what would happen. But I didn't want to just tell them forget about it, it's not a viable option. So I kind of took it upon myself to take some role in that alternative status. You will recall also that there was an informal plebiscite throughout Micronesia (I think it was after the Congress of Micronesia's first Commission had reported) on what the people would prefer. There was an education program, and there was a very informal plebiscite. My reading of it was that there were enough people in favor of independence as an alternative to free association that anybody who was in a position to influence or to lead them should just not completely disregard independence as an option. This may have come either before or after the Joint Committee, but my recollection is that (I think you will find it on record) there was a plebiscite on those three—independence, free association, statehood.
- Siemer: The public education with respect to that plebiscite was sponsored by the Congress of Micronesia, was it not?
- Amaraich: Yes, it was a resolution from the Congress. The education program in the districts involved the explanation of the alternatives that people were informally voting on prior to the plebiscite. So [there was] an actual carrying out of the program of education, each of the district information officer's broadcast stations were involved.
- Siemer: Was most of the political education done by oral communication—speeches and radio broadcasts and things like that?
- Amaraich: Yes, it was mostly talking in classrooms, in community meetings. I think there were some flip charts. And I think one part was on video. There were some programs that were set up, and video tapes were made and played in some areas to see how people were doing their education program.
- Siemer: What did you think about that political education program as far as Truk was concerned? Some of these concepts are very difficult even when you have a good deal of education.
- Amaraich: You are right. It was difficult to explain in our languages the meaning of different English words for independence and free association. It was a little bit easier to explain it in terms

of you as a sovereign person or a sovereign people—that God made you and gives you what you are. That was easier to explain. There is nothing wrong with us in Micronesia. Don't ever feel that there is something inferior about us. That was easier and it helped when you tried to explain free association and independence. I found it also more enlightening if you explain the United Nations and Trusteeship Agreement, and that's what we used. This is where we started; this is where we are; and this is where we might go. Instead of just dealing with the options or the political status, some of our people were really good in explaining in a different way—telling stories at night with the lantern burning, the waves coming up, on the outer islands, take off his shirt, sit, then smoke, and tell stories.

Willens: That's the way to do it.

Amaraich: Yes.

Willens: I gather that Chairman Salii was pretty firmly committed to free association, is that fair? Did you have trouble as a group in formulating a strategy in dealing with the United States?

Amaraich: No. We didn't have any problem with Lazarus. Lazarus probably had his own preference, but he was brilliant enough to know that the Congress had spoken, or the Committee had spoken. Even if he disagreed with it, he'd go and advocate what the Committee or the Congress said. And he knew that the rest of us understood that we had our own preferences, but we were sworn to support whatever the majority decided. That's the way I saw it. I think we were consistent and operated according to instructions. And it was comforting to know that our people understood and agreed with what we were doing. I don't think Lazarus had any fear that we might not support him, because we supported him all the way through. We disagreed sometimes, and we argued and we argued, but once we agree on something, then we carried it out. I have heard some of the things he wrote. Sometimes he would get irritated too easily, you know. But I guess that's natural.

Siemer: What was the strategy that you thought would be effective with Ambassador Williams?

Amaraich: I never had the pleasure of dealing with him directly, so I really cannot speak from experience. He had this approach of only showing up in a formal setting where speeches are made and then we finish. And then the real work is done through his staff, with members of the Delegation, so for me it was very difficult to read him. I thought he was very rigid. I thought, maybe because of his instruction from back home, that he would just come and give us the instruction, and then he'd say okay, we hear you, and I will go back and come back. There was never any talking back and forth across the table, unlike with Ambassadors Rosenblatt and Manhard. There we were able to shout at each other across the table, and I thought that was better than Ambassador Williams' approach.

Willens: Was it more formal than it had been with Assistant Secretary Loesch?

Amaraich: Ambassador Williams was very, very formal. Loesch was informal. He would come into our office, and everybody would be shouting and talking and all like that—very informal. Ambassador Rosenblatt was a little nervous at times, but we were able to exchange, and he sought us out or sought me out and we'd sit and talk over coffee. And he would come out to Truk looking for me to talk. So it was easier to understand his problems—where he was coming from. He would say: "The well is dry." And I'd say: "Where is the well—I'll go dig."

Willens: Did you and your colleagues on the Joint Committee think the appointment of an Ambassador-level representative was a good step for the United States to take?

Amaraich: Yes, I really thought so. When we were dealing with Loesch and the Under Secretary and

with the Interior people, I thought that was wrong. This is an international issue and I'd asked it to be elevated, because first we were talking with what's her name, the Director ....

Willens: Ruth Van Cleve or Mrs. Farrington?

Amaraich: Farrington, yes. It was Farrington first. She would come there and just sit, never say anything. So I thought we had to do something about the elevation of the level [of these discussions].

Willens: You have mentioned the United Nations on several occasions. Did you really think that the United Nations could be used by you to bring influence on the United States in these negotiations?

Amaraich: At the time, I thought the U.N. was unavoidable. It had to be dealt with even though the decision may be an American decision. But as a body, I was sure that we had to include them in the process down the road. I didn't think it was too early to let them know what we were doing. That's why I kept mentioning the U.N., because I probably did believe we could use their forum to our benefit.

Siemer: Was there anyone at the U.N. who was particularly helpful to you back in those days?

Amaraich: Not really. Australia and New Zealand were sympathetic in terms of economic development and the way the United States was administering the Trust Territory. In fact, the delegation that was most effective from the U.N. was one that was headed by an Australian ambassador (I forget his name).

Willens: Australian or New Zealander?

Amaraich: I think he was Australian.

Willens: Ambassador Corner?

Amaraich: No.

Willens: Not Corner.

Amaraich: The name will come back. Yes, I think that was the best delegation. It made very strong recommendations about the way the Trust Territory was administered and the power of Congress and the land problem. They came out to Saipan while Congress was in session, so I thought that was the best. And we tried to utilize this. And of course when we went to the Law of the Sea Convention, we had already made acquaintance with them, and through them we were able to get our views into the proposed agreement on the Law on the Sea.

Siemer: Back to Ambassador Williams for just a minute. When he was first appointed, did anyone out here in the Congress know him?

Amaraich: Somebody must have known him, but I cannot remember who. But the first reaction was, there was this CIA connection. So somebody must have known that, and the word got filtered down or around among us. When we finally saw him, that thing was there, so there was some element of whether it was good or bad to have someone who has been connected somewhere.

Siemer: Did any of you ask your friends in Washington about him?

Amaraich: Not me. I didn't ask anybody. I think someone must have asked.

Willens: Do you remember having dealings with John Dorrance when he was out here as a liaison officer?

- Amaraich: I met John, yes. He was not very well liked.
- Willens: Why was that?
- Amaraich: The story I got was that he would come around, looking on people's desks and reading things that he was not supposed to. He was doing his job.
- Siemer: He was a liaison officer for the State Department.
- Amaraich: Maybe that's why a lot of people didn't feel comfortable with him.
- Willens: Was he someone you could use to get information about the United States, or was the information always flowing the other way?
- Amaraich: I don't think anybody trusted the guy.
- Siemer: How about the woman who followed him, Mary Vance Trent?
- Amaraich: Trent. Oh, that's the one that we almost threw out from a reception by the Congress, from a luncheon.
- Siemer: Why was that?
- Amaraich: She managed to seat herself uninvited at the luncheon hosted by the president of the Senate. A famous story.
- Siemer: That's an unusual mistake for someone from the State Department to make.
- Amaraich: She wouldn't budge. No, I think she was determined to be invited. I think that turned people off.
- Willens: The third round of negotiations involving Ambassador Williams did take place in Hawaii in the fall of 1971, and for the first time the United States spelled out in detail its U.S. military requirements, principally in the Marianas and the Marshalls and to some extent in Palau. What was your reaction to this set of requirements?
- Amaraich: My reaction was: I thought finally the U.S. has changed its position for the better for us. They were specific about a lot of things, and even on the land, you know. They were forthcoming at that point. You do your own constitution, you do your laws, and we need this land, and some of them only on an emergency basis. That was good. At least we could deal with specifics if they tell us. So that was my recollection of how I felt at that time. I thought that was the breaking point in the negotiations. The U.S. changed. They wouldn't agree on the termination question at that point, but we finally worked it out. I thought it was more forthcoming at that point at Hana. That's the name of the place -- Hana, Maui.
- Willens: It looks from the papers as though the Micronesian Delegation was prepared at that time to agree to U.S. control over foreign affairs. What is your recollection?
- Amaraich: My recollection is that yes, we had agreed to delegate instead of retain. Instead of saying the U.S. retains foreign affairs, we said we delegate foreign affairs to the United States. That was a big difference in our view because we maintained then [our position that] sovereignty lies with the people, and therefore the U.S. has nothing to retain because it didn't have it in the first place. So it was a fight over words. But we said yes, we are so poor, we cannot handle foreign affairs. We've never been trained in it. As you know, the U.S. was not training us in foreign affairs. So initially we thought that was the course to take. We tried to put some conditions in there, such as consultation in the conduct of foreign affairs and events. The U.S. resisted that because they said there would be no time to consult in case of emergencies. We said okay, fine, fine, fine. As I was saying before, what

changed the whole thing was the U.S. hard position on control over the marine resources, which we thought (and I still think) they don't need to control. There was no need. It had nothing to do with defense. That's what changed our position. We said if we cannot own the fish, which is the only thing that we have left, then and as long as the U.S. thinks of that as foreign affairs, no, we'll retain foreign affairs. And that's what changed.

- Willens: We have talked briefly about your service on the Council of Micronesia in the early 1960s. How were you selected for that?
- Amaraich: There was some election process that took place. I don't remember exactly what it was. My recollection is that it was the first time that the people got to elect through some kind of election process of the kind that I described to you.
- Willens: That's actually why I asked, because I read some United Nations materials that said that just about in 1961 they were going to change the process and rather than have the members of the Council chosen by their own local council or Congress, they would be chosen directly by the people.
- Amaraich: My recollection is that was the first time that we elected representatives to this Territory-wide body. Prior to that it was the Indigenous Advisory Leaders Council who advised the High Commissioner—and that was always by consultation and then appointment by the High Commissioner.
- Willens: The other question about the Council of Micronesia relates to the draft Secretarial Order that created the Congress of Micronesia. Do you remember as a member of the Council being given the opportunity to review a draft Order and make suggestions?
- Amaraich: My recollection is that we were exposed to the idea. I don't remember exactly whether we went through paragraph by paragraph, but some papers were provided to the Council for its review and comment with the understanding that the High Commissioner had the last say as far as what he submitted to Washington. But yes, there was some review process by the Council before the Secretarial Order came out.
- Willens: One issue that seems to have been presented by the Council was the Council's desire to have a bicameral Legislature rather than a single-house Legislature. Do you have any recollection of that subject being discussed?
- Amaraich: No. I'm sorry.
- Willens: Did you have a view at the time about a bicameral Legislature in which each of the six districts would be equally represented?
- Amaraich: I'm trying to think back. I really don't know whether I took any specific position on it. At the district level, at least in Truk, there was only one Congress, not two houses. I had learned about the U.S. system where there is a House of Representatives and a Senate, and my general feeling at that time was that it would be better to have two houses. Of course, I was not sure whether I think equal representation in the Senate was the right thing to do. That one I was not sure about. As far as having two houses, I think I was more in favor of having two.
- Willens: Just one last question about the Council of Micronesia. Is it your recollection that the Council of Micronesia provided the impetus for the Congress of Micronesia, or did the idea of a Congress of Micronesia come from Washington?
- Amaraich: Prior to the Council of course, through the Indigenous Leaders Advisory Council to the High Commissioner, the question of more legislative authority to the Micronesians had been raised. And I think that the Council of Micronesia carried that on. As a matter of fact,

I think the Council existed only for two years, and then the Congress came. I don't think more than two years later the Congress was formed. So I think it was a joint effort with the Trust Territory government, prompted by the insistence of the Micronesian leaders that we had to move away from this purely advisory status. And that would be consistent with the goal of achieving political status in terms of democratic representation.

Siemer: I had one other question, Chief Justice. At the very beginning of the Congress of Micronesia, your very first term, there were a number of resolutions introduced asking the administering authority to produce an Organic Act for the Trust Territory. Do you remember what people in the Congress understood what an Organic Act was back in those very early days?

Amaraich: I did not understand it, to be truthful about it. At that time, I think most members had heard about the Organic Act for Guam. That's what created Guam's status. I'm not sure whether we fully grasped the implication of an Organic Act, but we had attorneys that did research and said that this is what we should be asking at this point. But I don't know whether it really was well thought out. That's my recollection. I don't think there was any particular group advocating an Organic Act as a tool to accomplish our goal. It just happened to be in existence in the general area.

Siemer: It seemed from the discussion that some people here thought that you could have an Organic Act and then go on and have a Constitution and state laws and so on. And on the U.S. side, their understanding was that an Organic Act would sweep all of that off the table and would be the entire governing act.

Amaraich: Yes, that's why they went the Secretarial Order route, I guess.

Willens: Let's go back then to the third round of negotiations in Hana in the fall of 1971. The fourth of the Four Principles was unilateral termination, and the issue of termination was discussed back and forth as I understand it. Were there any members of the Joint Committee in late 1971 that in your opinion were prepared to agree to mutual consent?

Amaraich: At that time, my recollection is that we were not fixed into a position, but as a negotiating tactic, that's why we went in for that [unilateral termination]. We wanted it, but we realized that we might have an uphill battle with the United States because we understood the United States was not favoring unilateral termination, because they were worried that these Micronesians shouldn't be trusted.

Siemer: You mentioned earlier that when the issue of control over the fishing and marine rights became crystallized, that was a key for your Delegation. Do you remember what explanation the U.S. gave for insisting on that point?

Amaraich: One thing that was no secret, it was clear, was that the fishing industry of the United States was strongly against coastal states control over the marine resources. And as I explained yesterday, part of their reason was that they said the fish moves, the tuna moves a long distance, and therefore cannot be managed by one nation and has to be managed on a regional or international basis. That's one. The other one was that the fishing industry had been so used [to fishing] without having to pay for it, I don't think they were ready to accept that changes were coming. That's one of the reasons. I think the lobby was so strong on the U.S. Congress and Executive Branch that, even if they gave us [what we wanted] through the negotiation, they did not think it would sell in Congress. At least that's the argument they told us. Of course, as part of their argument, it's a mixture of foreign affairs function, as well as economic function. Because we were not able to divide foreign affairs at that point yet, I think there was some fear that they might be giving up

some defense functions. They might be opening up something to regret later on as far as the defense area is concerned. Of course, I think their fear was that we would allow foreign fishing companies in and then the Russian ships, you know, might have non-fishermen on board for research or other things. Those were mentioned as possible no-nos.

Willens: Did the United States ever represent to you that, if they made an exception for the Micronesians with respect to these islands, they might have to make a similar exception for the coastal states or for Hawaii or other members of the American political family?

Amaraich: That was not the prominent concern at that point. I think they knew that we would have to say we're not a territory and we're not a commonwealth of the U.S. We are a different thing. I think you can handle the protection of the resources for us, for the Trust Territory islands, and don't lump us into your political family yet. At least that's the way I saw it.

Willens: At the international conferences that you attended on this subject, did the United States oppose the 200-mile EEZ with respect to other nations?

Amaraich: What happened was that the United States had been going to a number of international conferences on the Law of the Sea without telling us that this was happening. We didn't know about it until I went to the U.N. and I picked up something about the next conference on the Law of the Sea. And we started screaming (well, we didn't really scream). But I came back, and we started inquiring with the Trust Territory what's happening with this Law of the Sea? How come we have not been told about it when we have this huge body of water? And that's what prompted us to sponsor legislation to create a Joint Committee on the Law of the Sea of the Congress [of Micronesia]. I sponsored that after the U.N. [trip]. And one thing just added to another. The issue came up to the surface, and it became a very big issue. I don't remember the U.S. arguing on the level that you are talking about. My recollection is that the argument was because we could not manage it, also because of the tuna lobby, so-called American Tuna Board Association lobby, and because of its possible linkage with the defense responsibility which we were going to delegate to the United States. Some people were also suspicious that we might just let the Russian ships come in.

Willens: Let's go back to the status negotiations, and let me ask whether you remember Dr. Gene Mihaly as a consultant?

Amaraich: Yes, he was there.

Willens: What kind of input did he make as a consultant to the Joint Committee?

Amaraich: He was there, and he had been I think to one or two meetings before that. I frankly do not recall right now. I think what was happening was that some of Lazarus' views were Mihaly's views. He wouldn't come and say this is the way you will go. I think he was advising Lazarus on the side, and Lazarus would come in and you can tell that it was not totally just Lazarus' view, that he was conveying this professor's view. Frankly, until now I still don't know how we got him.

Willens: The reason I ask about the mutual consent versus unilateral termination is that Ambassador Williams apparently left this round thinking that there were members of the Joint Committee who would have agreed to mutual consent, and he thought that he had come very close to a final agreement on the important issues. There is other evidence to the contrary. I'm just trying to get your best judgment as to how close people were to being prepared to agree to the U.S. position at the time, which was mutual consent.

Amaraich: No, I think that was a misreading on the part of the Ambassador—that he got some indication that the Micronesians would accept the way he read it. I don't think so. I think

that's incorrect. I think it was a misreading of the situation. And I think whatever he said to Lazarus inside or outside of the meeting caused Lazarus to react back. I think he was trying to defuse a misreading of what was actually the majority view of the Micronesian Delegation.

Willens: There was a sense that a lot had been accomplished at this round.

Amaraich: Oh, definitely.

Willens: Subsequently there was some publicity generated by the Young Micronesians . . .

Amaraich: Friends of Micronesia?

Willens: . . . Friends of Micronesia that suggested the U.S. had rejected out of hand the Four Principles, and that upset the United States representatives a good deal.

Amaraich: Yes.

Willens: Do you have any recollection as to how that all developed?

Amaraich: No. I did not know how it developed. I was describing the role of the education program that was sponsored by the Catholic Jesuits, and they were somehow affiliated with the Friends of Micronesia. They had members, both Protestants and Catholics, and there was a headquarters in New York that called themselves the Friends of Micronesia. I think they were known to believe that they were advocating for the interests of the people of Micronesia, and sometimes we disagreed that they were advocating for us. As a matter of fact, we had to go to New York, a subcommittee or representatives of the Delegation, to talk to people in New York, at the Friends of Micronesia, about this.

Willens: What happened at that discussion?

Amaraich: I think they calmed down, because they were very vocal I think even at the U.S. Congress on their view as to how the U.S. was treating these poor Micronesians, and the poor Micronesians don't know what is good for them, and all that kind of thing. We had to go up, like I went to the Catholic mission, you know Father Hezel, I went to New York.

Willens: Was this at about the same time that you had the discussion with Father Hezel?

Amaraich: I think Father Hezel happened after that. But we went to New York—myself and Doctor Hiroshi Ismael, who was a Senator, and two others. And of course an American who was a consultant to us went with us. He's in Washington now.

Willens: Who was that?

Amaraich: His name is Jack Sullivan. He is with a consulting firm that did an economic study for us, and I think he happened to know some of the people. So we went up to New York, rushed in and met with them and rushed out, went to the airport, came back to Washington. It was snowing so we could not land in Washington. We went back to New York, and took the train back to Washington.

Willens: Obviously one of the bad times.

Amaraich: Yes, it was. And we came to Washington, and found no taxis at the station. I remember that time.

Siemer: Were there any Micronesians living in the U.S. who were in the Friends of Micronesia?

Amaraich: No, I don't think so.

Willens: Did the Friends of Micronesia have a specific view that the only thing that was right for Micronesians was to have their independence? Was that basically their point of view?

- Amaraich: Yes, that's basically the point of view that they were advocating. Unfortunately, I think in general they were not correct. I think they thought that we did not represent the majority view of the people, and so they found it their duty to question what we were doing.
- Siemer: Did any U.S.-based Micronesians ever show up as advisors to the U.S. delegations at the status negotiations?
- Amaraich: No. There were former Peace Corps Americans, but no Micronesians that I can recall.
- Siemer: Were you surprised not to see Micronesians on the other side of the table?
- Amaraich: Well, we heard that some Micronesians were used to gather information from us to feed back to the United States. So I think some of us were used indirectly, but not sitting out front, advocating the U.S. position.
- Willens: We were wondering about whether there were qualified Micronesians who might have strengthened the U.S. team and provided you with an informal channel of communication.
- Amaraich: Some of the Micronesians in high positions may have been talked to by American representatives.
- Willens: By the time of this round in Hawaii, there were two new members of the Joint Committee from the Marianas, Ed Pangelinan and Herman Q. Guerrero. Had you known either of them before they were elected to the Congress in 1970?
- Amaraich: I had known Herman. Eddie just came out from school and of course he joined the Senate after he came from law school. But I had met Herman before.
- Willens: Can you give us your recollection of how they dealt with the rest of you and how they expressed their own views when they were different than the majority?
- Amaraich: Well, I think during that period the desires of the Northern Marianas people were already known facts, and there was no secret about it. I was happy that they did not excuse or leave the Micronesian group at that point. I think it was a wise thing for them to do. Because I think they were also able to obtain information, learn from it as to how the United States might react. But I didn't know Eddie before he joined the Congress.
- Willens: What was your impression of him as a young man?
- Amaraich: I looked up to him. I didn't have a chance to go to law school. I was just an 11th grade graduate, and I looked up to him.
- Willens: I'm sure he looked up to you because of your experience.
- Amaraich: Really, I have this respect for lawyers too, you know.
- Willens: And Herman Q.—how would you have met him?
- Amaraich: I had been to Saipan after the headquarters moved there. I had worked as a public defender before. And I had been to Saipan, and so I got to meet him or know him. On the service to Saipan air route situation, I got to know him also.
- Willens: He was very active in that, as I remember.
- Amaraich: Yes, he was, so I knew him before I knew Eddie.
- Willens: After that Hawaii round, Chairman Salii made a statement (I believe at the opening of the negotiations) recognizing the separate aspirations of the Marianas and making a rather gracious statement that if that's the way they wanted to go, no one was going to stand in

their way or something to that effect. Was the decision to make that kind of a statement discussed within the Joint Committee before the Chairman made it?

Amaraich: I don't remember. But I think that at that point, as I was saying earlier, there was no secret about the desire of the people of the Marianas. And we were arguing respect for the desire of the indigenous people, so it would be awkward for us to oppose them. While we favored unity, we must also recognize the right of people. And we couldn't argue against that while we were arguing against the U.S. to give us the freedom.

Willens: Before the next round in Palau, Paul Warnke was retained. What was your thinking as a member of the Committee about a need for Washington representation?

Amaraich: Oh, I totally agree that we needed that Washington representation. The firm was retained by agreement of the Micronesian Delegation. They helped us a great deal but they were also a very busy firm, and it reached a point where Paul Warnke's time was also limited because of the travel. He had to give it to Mr. Stovall to be the principal contact in the firm. And there was another person that assisted—Terry Fortune. He moved to the Executive Branch later on. But he was the guy who rushed out to Honolulu on a New Year's Day with me going from Truk at the request of Senator Inouye.

Willens: What prompted the Senator's request?

Amaraich: The disclosure of the CIA bugging. The Senator was chairing the Oversight Committee in the Senate. Anyway, that's how I remember Terry Fortune.

Willens: At the next round of negotiations in Palau, Ambassador Williams did formally agree to the request of the Marianas representatives for separate negotiations. Were you aware in advance that Ambassador Williams was going to change the U.S. position and agree to separate negotiations?

Amaraich: Not before my arrival in Palau.

Willens: How did you learn about it?

Amaraich: When they got into Palau, I guess there were some talks and informal whisperings, and it filtered down to our Delegation before the formal presentation of that U.S. position.

Willens: Given what you said a few minutes ago about the difficulty of opposing the Northern Marianas, there seemed to be some effort to get the Congress of Micronesia on more than one occasion to pass resolutions opposing the separate negotiations and saying that only the Congress had the authority to negotiate future political status. What is your recollection of this effort within the Congress to oppose these separate negotiations?

Amaraich: No specific recollection of what a particular Senate member took. I know that we had discussed that as an argument against the United States move to permit separate negotiations. I don't recall how it came out in any formal Congressional session now. My mind is vague on that. By that time, as you know there was a long period of recess as far as the Micronesian status negotiations, because the U.S. just turned and spent all of that time with the CNMI, and so we had to wait before they could have time for us Micronesians.

Willens: I was going to ask you about that long recess.

Amaraich: It was not a recess, it was kind of forced by the situation. The United States just decided you guys wait, we're going to secure our own interests first. That's the way I saw it.

Willens: During the summer of 1972, there was a negotiation round in Washington, D.C., and there was a lot of drafting done in a committee that seemed to include both principals

from the Joint Committee, your lawyers, and Lindsay Grant and some of the U.S. people. Do you recall participating in some of those drafting sessions?

Amaraich: I recall the drafting of the provisions when we were getting down to details, and that may be the same kind of an exercise you're referring to. I know that people were walking in and walking out, consulting in corners, coming back and cross these out and add that in. And then I remember one occasion when we seemed to get stuck with something that we had to call Paul Warnke and you know the way he speaks—very authoritative and very convincing.

Willens: He brought about a change?

Amaraich: He sure did. When he came in and he said how it should be, then they decided, you know, and that really helped.

Willens: That's why he earns his high hourly rate.

Amaraich: And that's one thing that I remember.

Willens: But did that set of negotiating sessions indicate some willingness on the part of the U.S. and the Joint Committee to try to reach agreement on the specifics of a Compact?

Amaraich: Yes, because we were getting down to paragraphs, wording, phrases on the content of the Compact. The issues were known already, and the agreements were also reached. And we reached that time when we had to articulate them in words. That's the one I remember, because there was some real work in the sitting down and negotiating with the lawyers and writing them down, going back out to the Xerox machine, coming back in, and crossing things out.

Willens: A good deal of the discussion seems to have related to the foreign affairs issue. Do you have that recollection, or do you remember any of the other principal topics of discussion?

Amaraich: I don't remember foreign affairs as being one, but that's my mind fading. There were certain things that stuck in my mind, and that was the availability of U.S. federal programs. As you know, we had federal programs amounting to millions and millions before termination of the Trusteeship. We were trying to figure out just which ones the U.S. would be willing to give in Micronesia. I remember we were trying to negotiate the provision on energy programs and on communications, which was the difficult one.

Willens: Communication in terms of . . .

Amaraich: Satellite communication. That was the most difficult one. You will recall that we were trying to get foreign aid from Japan for communication equipment and it was vetoed by the U.S. Congress. And then we screamed and yelled, I think it was in one of the Hawaiian islands. And that's how come the \$6 million and other money came in to the Compact. The U.S. committed the money out of embarrassment. They had said we will run our communications with certain conditions. Then some members of Congress went and blocked the foreign aid from Japan, arguing security matters. The Micronesians were very upset because of the tactics. Anyway, that's going afield, but that's one of the topics that was very important to us. Then because of that, in one of the Hawaiian islands we finally got the U.S. to commit money to communications for the FSM.

Siemer: How did the U.S. handle those drafting sessions? Did they have one person who was their principal spokesman?

- Amaraich: Yes. At that time, I think they had John Armstrong. They were doing the drafting, that's my recollection. And I think there were two lawyers already assigned. The Ambassador didn't sit in that drafting. They had lawyers drafting for them.
- Willens: Mr. Stowe of the State Department seemed to be there pretty regularly.
- Amaraich: Yes.
- Willens: And Mr. Whittington from time to time.
- Amaraich: Yes.
- Willens: The materials that we've obtained from the United States agencies suggest that this long recess resulted in part from the session of negotiations that took place later in 1972 after the special session of Congress in Pohnpei, where the Joint Committee was told to negotiate independence as well as free association. So when the Joint Committee met with Ambassador Williams, and I forget where it was . . .
- Amaraich: In Barbers Point.
- Willens: The materials suggest an impasse was reached. What is your recollection of why the Congress of Micronesia provided this change in instructions to the Joint Committee?
- Amaraich: As far as I was concerned, as I said yesterday, there were people in Congress who were genuinely interested in preserving independence as another option. The Commission (or the Joint Committee) also identified that if you fail [to get] free association we would go for independence. It's a combination of what we believe the United Nations Charter says we were entitled to, and also the personal view of those who believed that we should not abandon that one. And I think it was also a negotiating tactic.
- Willens: Did you anticipate the kind of reaction that you got from Ambassador Williams?
- Amaraich: I did. I don't know about the entire Congress, but I did think that a negative reaction would develop. I didn't expect that would derail or stop the negotiations and that the Ambassador would come back and tell us that he had no instruction to negotiate independence. I had a thought at the time that we had guidelines, but we were free to negotiate. And when we say Congress has spoken, we mean that it has spoken. Ambassador Williams came back and said: "I have my instructions from the President, but I want to talk with the advocates of independence." And we said: "No, you don't talk with a small group. You talk with us as a Delegation." That's what he was trying to do in Barbers Point. He requested that he meet with me and Roman. Senator Nakayama had not arrived yet but he arrived after that. So he wanted to go and talk on the side with a small group. My recollection is that we rejected that. We said: "No, we are ready to talk free association and, if no progress, this is what Congress says we should negotiate." He said: "No, I cannot." But I think at that time the United States had made up its mind to conduct separate negotiations with the Marianas and used that one as an excuse to do it.
- Willens: There came a time (and I forget the date) when a draft Compact of Association was initialed.
- Amaraich: Yes. That was in Washington.
- Willens: Was that in 1976?
- Amaraich: I forgot the year, but I initialed it on behalf of the Micronesian Delegation. And Tony DeBum from the Marshalls and Ambassador Rosenblatt from the U.S.
- Willens: So you think it wasn't initialed by Williams? You think this happened later on?

- Amaraich: The one that we initialed in Washington was by Ambassador Rosenblatt. We were going to sign something more formal, but we were waiting and waiting, and the report back to us from Mr. Stovall was that there was a paragraph that the U.S. insisted on putting in there, and we hadn't discussed it. So I said: "No, I'm not signing if that is the case." So they came back and said how about initialing it as indication of we have reached this point. I said okay, we'll initial it. So we went to the Treaty Room at the State Department. Anyway, that's the one that I remember initialing.
- Willens: Before Ambassador Williams resigned in 1976, was there a draft Compact that the Joint Committee and he had agreed on?
- Amaraich: When did he resign?
- Willens: 1976. He initialed some document, and it included the provisions of a draft Compact with one key exception. It did not include any provision on Law of the Sea. And my question to you is whether that refreshes your recollection as to whether there was any agreement reached with him before he left office?
- Amaraich: I don't remember reaching an agreement on a Compact with that reservation. It may have happened, but I don't think there was even (call it) semi-formal agreement to initial something. How come that escaped my mind?
- Willens: I gather from what you say that the document you initialed and that Ambassador Rosenblatt initialed did deal with the foreign affairs power and resolved all of the issues that were of concern to you.
- Amaraich: Yes. That's the only one I remember where we reached agreement except for this one paragraph on defense.
- Siemer: When the U.S. agreed to separate negotiations with the Marianas, and those negotiations began, did you think that the outcome of those negotiations, whatever it was, would have any impact on you?
- Amaraich: The obvious thing was that fragmentation was beginning to occur. It was unavoidable because of that agreement to negotiate separately. So it would affect the composition of the new country that we were trying to shape. That was clear.
- Willens: Do you remember going to the United Nations in 1972 and speaking out on the fragmentation issue?
- Amaraich: I think I said something about that at the U.N. I was sent back after the first one. Usually before the Congress came into being, the High Commissioner selected who goes. And he selected me.
- Willens: In 1972?
- Amaraich: 1960.
- Willens: Early on. I see.
- Amaraich: And then I came back, and I think when the Congress came into being they were involved in the selection of who goes with the High Commissioner. I went back [to the U.N.] with Congressman Polycarp Basilius at one point. When we came back, at our recommendation, [a system was adopted under which] one of the two who went first [on the prior trip] should go back with a new person. I forget who went with me after that. That must have been 1972.

- Willens: Do you remember any reaction from the Trusteeship Council to your concern that the fragmentation was taking place and was going to affect the future of Micronesia?
- Amaraich: No. It was the usual procedure. They have this general debate, they make speeches after all of the reports are in, and as expected the Russians at that time were trying to find good reasons to argue against what the U.S. was doing and also criticized the U.S. That's my recollection. It was the Russian representative who spoke, criticized the U.S. and all that.
- Willens: You told us yesterday that you were defeated for reelection in 1974.
- Amaraich: I think it was 1974 or 1972.
- Willens: Do you think it had anything to do with political status and the views that you had taken on that subject?
- Amaraich: I think so. I may be wrong, but I think so.
- Willens: Did it come up in the campaign in some way?
- Amaraich: It was kind of putting two and two and coming up with five or with four. Just what was happening there. The election was so loose; I mean it was so improper.
- Willens: It was improper?
- Amaraich: No. Well, there might have been fraud. There were rumors that the United States had given money to some people in Truk. I cannot swear to those speculations about that time. District Administrator Juan Sablan was seen to be advocating certain positions of the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory Administration, which is Interior and the American government. I think that's the way it was seen and talked about.
- Willens: Who in fact took your seat from Truk?
- Amaraich: Nick Bossy.
- Willens: Had he been known as an advocate of independence or free association or anything else?
- Amaraich: Something less than free association. I think he was leaning toward a closer relationship with the United States. He was an employee of the Executive Branch at that time, in personnel administration. He was seen that way—that he was not supporting free association or independence. Later on when the Compact was negotiated and was to be voted upon, he modified that in a public statement.
- Willens: He supported the Compact?
- Amaraich: He modified that. But at the time of the election which I lost, he was known to be advocating something less than free association.
- Willens: What do you remember about the changing views of the Marshalls and Palau? From 1970 forward up through 1977, was there still some chance that both the Marshalls and Palau would stay within the confines of an overall Compact?
- Amaraich: Up to the drafting of the Constitution, I think there were high hopes that they would remain minus the Marianas.
- Willens: Were you at that 1975 Constitutional Convention?
- Amaraich: As staff. Because at that time I had lost already, so I must have lost the election before the Constitutional Convention in 1975, yes.
- Willens: Was it the discussion that took place in 1975 at the Convention, or was it the resultant vote on the Constitution, that in your judgment sort of indicated where things were going.

- Amaraich: Well, the resultant vote decided it, because the Constitution itself provides if it does not pass in the district by these number of votes, then it does not apply in that district. And that's the way it came out. It was not passed in the Marshalls with the required number of votes and [was not passed] in Palau. But it passed in the other three districts minus the Marianas.
- Willens: Well, I think Kosrae, by the time the vote took place, was already a district, so I think that was the two-thirds, four out of six.
- Amaraich: Yes.
- Willens: Did the Palauan and the Marshall representatives come to the Convention with some unexpected point of view?
- Amaraich: Well, there was some non-negotiable stuff especially from Palau. What I know from the Marshalls was that they didn't want to share the Kwajalein revenue, and I think that's the main reason why they finally decided not to be part of the Federation. I think they always heard that there were more people in Truk and Pohnpei put together than the Marshalls or Palau and that in a [Federation] government [a majority of] representatives in the Congress and in the Executive Branch would always be nominated by the Trukese. The Trukese, Ponapeans and Yapese were the unity group advocates, and they stuck together. And I think the other districts feared that as a dangerous thing, and these four districts would always get together and vote against them in anything. That's what I think was happening.
- Willens: I gather you were not in the Congress of Micronesia then when it expired?
- Amaraich: No.
- Willens: What is your overall assessment of the Congress of Micronesia and the role that it served in generating leaders and raising issues of interest to the people of Micronesia?
- Amaraich: My view is quite positive on what the Congress did, given the limitation that was imposed back there in Washington without our participation or prior knowledge. Within the confines that were imposed, I think the Congress did very well. Also what they did was a learning process for them. When we separated out, we had leaders already, people who had been trained, not only in school, but in the process. I think it was a positive thing. They did a lot. And as I was saying yesterday, in some of the governmental operations, there were a lot of improvements as a result of the Congress' own initiatives—like the Land Reform Bill, reorganization of the government, and advice and consent, and the effort to get the lands back for development, also the pressure on the government to relax security. As you know, the U.S. had closed the area as far as tourists were concerned.
- Willens: Which area?
- Amaraich: The Trust Territory. But it was through the Council of Micronesia and the Congress that the United States decided to open it up for tourism, economic development. So the Congress did a lot.
- Siemer: Where did you work after the Constitutional Convention?
- Amaraich: After that, I became a representative of Truk Legislature in what was left of the Micronesian negotiating team. I think for two years we still had Roman Tmetuchl [from Palau] and representatives from the Marshalls. Later it was changed to the Commission on Future Political Status Transition. After 1979, they stopped participating, but we just carried on as FSM.

Amaraich: I represented Truk and became chairman of that Commission, and that's what I was doing. I think at the same time, or sometime during the period before I joined the Commission, I was a consultant to the Law of the Sea Delegation. It was something that I started, and I guess people felt sorry for me—jobless and all those kinds of things—so they said we'll give you some work to do. So I was a consultant to the Law of the Sea Delegation. At the same time or after that, I became a member of the Commission and saw it through the negotiations. Unfortunately I didn't see it through in Washington, when they finally approved it in the Congress.

Willens: How long did the negotiations go on?

Amaraich: The Compact went into effect in 1986, I think. And I think there was a waiting period of about two years after we had signed. Because the U.N. process was slow, and at one point a lot of people didn't think it was right to take it to the U.N.

Willens: Did the Reagan Administration adopt any changed position with respect to the Compact that you had negotiated and initialed with Ambassador Rosenblatt?

Amaraich: No, I don't think so. I think by the time Reagan came in, it was only for him to make certain proclamations, and there was an official speech of his that was played out here during the education program.

Willens: Well, I think that concludes our interview. We want to thank you very much. Anything you'd like to say before we close the record, so to speak?

Amaraich: Not really. I just want to thank you for this opportunity to speak. As I warned you, my mind has faded. I did not have the foresight of writing things down. I was busy doing a job, and I just tried to make sure I represented the views of the people. I wish you luck in this project. I'd like to see it when it comes out. If there is anything else you need after you review these things, if there is anything that I need to clarify again or add to, you let me know.

Siemer: Thank you.

Amaraich: Many people have asked me to do this kind of thing, but I kind of hesitated. I don't know why, when you wrote, I thought maybe it was something that I can leave with my people. If they read it, then maybe they will understand some of the things that they were not exposed to. Many of our people, unfortunately, they think now that it's always been like this—that you can come in a jet and land at the airport and get in a car. And I say no, this place was a jungle, the capital. And it takes longer to get to shore after you'd land in a seaplane here in Ponape than flying from Truk to Yap nowadays. You'd land in the water, you get on an M Boat from the small island, get on land, then get back on an M Boat or you were towed in to the dock. I hope whoever reads it will find it helpful to understand that life changes and that people have a right to say what they want to say and to have what they want to have. It cannot always happen, but we have a right to try. Thank you very much.

Willens: Thank you very much, sir.