

INTERVIEW OF ELIZABETH A. BROWN

by Bruce M. Kalk

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- Kalk: I'm here with Ms. Elizabeth Brown at her home in Washington. You are very gracious to let me spend a little time with you.
- Brown: Sure.
- Kalk: You had in 1961 just returned from the U.S. Embassy in Bonn?
- Brown: 1963.
- Kalk: And that was the beginning of your acquaintance with the Marianas and the Micronesian issues. Is that correct?
- Brown: Largely so, although I'd attended a number of U.N. sessions in the 1950's when trusteeship issues were discussed, but I didn't have any direct responsibility.
- Kalk: Did you attend any meetings of the Trusteeship Council?
- Brown: I have attended meetings of the Trusteeship Council, but I could not tell you in what period. Nothing in particular about Micronesia.
- Kalk: What were your duties when you returned to Washington in 1963?
- Brown: I returned as Deputy Director of the Office of U.N. Political Affairs and was responsible for dependent area affairs (and dependent areas is what the Committee of 24 did), and the trusteeship, and a number of the political issues. But it was a fairly flexible organization, and you were really expected to cover the waterfront of the political issues. I had less to do with arms control and nuclear energy, but I was involved with all the political issues.
- Kalk: Was the Micronesian issue a very high priority for you at the time?
- Brown: No.
- Kalk: So how did it fit into your general responsibilities?
- Brown: Well, we had I think half a dozen political officers, so-called, who worked on a whole array of dependent area and trusteeship affairs, even including things like Southwest Africa. I was responsible for overseeing that part of the office.
- Kalk: Had you any background at the time on Micronesia?
- Brown: Not really. Well, more or less what I'd absorbed along the way.
- Kalk: I think you mentioned before the interview began that you never did have the opportunity to travel there.
- Brown: That is correct.
- Kalk: Who would you say were prominent figures in the State Department and inter-agency discussions [of the Micronesian issues] at the time of your arrival in 1963?
- Brown: Well, I suppose Sisco and Buffum were both there at the time. And some of the people in Far Eastern Affairs: Ruth Bacon (who's now deceased) and Louise McNaught, who followed this generally for the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.
- Kalk: Does the name David Popper ring a bell?

- Brown: Yes, David was at that point, I guess, deputy assistant secretary. He's also here in Washington, and you may have been in touch with him.
- Kalk: I believe Mr. Buffum also is in Washington.
- Brown: Yes. Well, I don't think he's in Washington now. The last I heard, I think he lives in Honolulu.
- Kalk: And Louise McNaught?
- Brown: She lives in Washington. She and her colleague, Ruth Bacon, had a kind of watching brief from the standpoint of East Asian affairs and everything in the Pacific area. Hence the interest in the Trust Territory. But they were so-called U.N. advisors to that bureau.
- Kalk: What about some of the individuals outside of the State Department? For example, do you recall Ruth Van Cleve, John Carver, or Richard Taitano, who was the head of Office of Territories?
- Brown: Well, Taitano doesn't even ring a bell. Carver, vaguely. Most of our dealings were with Ruth Van Cleve. As the documents show, the relations between Interior and State on this particular issue were not particularly cordial or cooperative. The problem—this is just a candid comment of my own—being the Interior people considered that they were the creature of the House committee.
- Kalk: Chairman Aspinall's committee.
- Brown: Chairman Aspinall's committee, and that their possibilities for negotiations, flexibility, whatever were almost non-existent.
- Kalk: How would you describe some of the leading personalities in the conflict that was beginning to emerge?
- Brown: Well, I'd go back to my first comment. I think the Interior people—this was the Secretary of the Interior with whom we dealt directly, who now is the governor of Alaska.
- Kalk: Hickel.
- Brown: The view, then, from Interior was: We can't do anything unless Aspinall will go along. And there was never a possibility, in that period, of getting through to them the one essential point that the Trust Territory was totally different from the other territories under U.S. administration, like Guam or the Virgin Islands, and I remember, and very vaguely, and I have no idea if there is a record of a meeting we had in Hickel's office in which he literally told us that he thought there was no chance of doing anything in terms of ending the Trusteeship Agreement, or that if we ended it, we would end it by turning the Trust Territory into something like the other American territories.
- Kalk: This is under Hickel. Now, Hickel didn't come in until 1969. So, this is rather late in the day.
- Brown: Are you sure?
- Kalk: Yes. Stuart Udall was Secretary of the Interior from 1961 to 1969.
- Brown: I left in 1969 to go to the so-called senior seminar and take an academic year off, and so from August 1969 until 1970, I had nothing to do with this.
- Kalk: I think Hickel came in earlier in 1969 under Nixon. He was Nixon's Secretary of the Interior.

- Brown: McHenry will have a good memory of that meeting. I remember being sort of shell-shocked at the narrowness of the range, both of knowledge and of opinion on the part of Hickel.
- Kalk: Did you feel that that was peculiar to himself?
- Brown: No, I think it was representative of the Interior Department's complete domination by Aspinall and company. Because, after all, Interior was beholden to that committee, not just for these territories but virtually for their whole operation.
- Kalk: Did you have any interactions with Aspinall?
- Brown: No.
- Kalk: What about with Ruth Van Cleve?
- Brown: Well, she's a very able woman lawyer, quite personable. Within this framework that we're discussing, she had a very limited perspective in terms of what she thought could be done. She was not prepared to discuss real alternatives but stuck very closely to her own brief, which was that we were going to just have another non-self-governing territory when the Trusteeship Agreement came to an end.
- Kalk: The alternatives that she did not consider, I presume, included a self-governing status for Micronesia.
- Brown: Yes. Well, I would just add that she is an extremely articulate person. She had a particular brief of her own and there was a high degree, I think, of resentment in the Department of the Interior that the State Department should have this interest in what they considered as their own private bailiwick.
- Kalk: You think that that accounts for the reluctance on the part of Interior to be more open to self-governing status?
- Brown: Well, I think that's part of it, but I think the other part is that they thought there were very practical political considerations that mitigated against any kind of future arrangement for Trust Territories that could reduce the control of either Interior or the Aspinall committee.
- Kalk: What sorts of confines or restrictions would those be?
- Brown: Well, I think just the idea that someone outside of the U.S. government, namely the U.N., was going to make certain determinations. Now, I think to a degree, those concerns were alleviated when we said, if we don't get this through the U.N. on our terms, we'll make a unilateral declaration that the Trusteeship Agreement is finished.
- Kalk: Was that a consideration at some point?
- Brown: Yes.
- Kalk: And that would be presumably without a plebiscite?
- Brown: Well, perhaps after a plebiscite, but, there was a period—and, again, I have to apologize for my bad memory—but there was a period when we had serious misgivings as to whether we could get through the kind of action at the Trusteeship Council that would allow us to terminate the Trusteeship and, so to speak, get U.N. endorsement.
- Kalk: But you mentioned, and it's interesting, that Interior was mindful of this consideration as well.
- Brown: I'm not sure what you mean.

- Kalk: Well, some of the documents indicate that Interior tended to criticize the State Department as being overly sensitive to United Nations pressure.
- Brown: I think that's correct. I think she was concerned about the U.N. I think that concern was more a kind of doctrinal that the U.N. shouldn't have ever had anything to do with these territories. That may sound rather simplistic, but I think that was her concern. One of her concerns.
- Kalk: You really approached this issue as an outsider, as a career foreign service officer.
- Brown: That's correct.
- Kalk: That gives you a very different perspective from many others.
- Brown: Well, I approached it, though, I think more from the United Nations standpoint because in that period, the 1960s, the U.N. had changed markedly. I had been very familiar with the U.N. in the period from about 1946, 1947 until 1959 or 1960, which was a time in which the U.S. could pretty much do what it chose in the U.N. When I returned to U.N. political affairs, the U.N. was in a kind of ferment in the sense that it had all these new members.
- Kalk: Third World groups.
- Brown: Yes. The group that became sort of the non-aligned bloc. There was a much more critical attitude toward the U.S. in those days, and I think that that reflected heavily upon our sense of priorities to bring the Trust Territory along. We didn't wish to be the last country holding a territory in trust.
- Kalk: Who in particular advocated the United States not being the last country to hold a trusteeship?
- Brown: Well, I think everybody in the State Department. I mean, people like Sisco and Popper and Buffum. Perhaps even people who were more conservative in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.
- Kalk: EA is that office?
- Brown: Yes, it is now. It used to be FE, but EA is right.
- Kalk: Would you characterize that office as more conservative than UNP?
- Brown: Yes.
- Kalk: In what sense?
- Brown: Well, they were perhaps a little more reluctant to see any development in East Asia that might have some adverse impact elsewhere, I think. In other words, the stability of the South Pacific was assured when we were there as a trust power.
- Kalk: Did that cause any differences within the State Department?
- Brown: Well, I don't think so. I think the only differences had to do with the pace of moving ahead.
- Kalk: And that was within State?
- Brown: Yes.
- Kalk: Who advocated that the pace be accelerated? Was there a faction, say, within the State Department?

- Brown: No, I don't there was a faction. I think that once Nauru became independent and Australia finished its trust responsibilities, the thought was the time had come for the U.S. to move ahead, and I don't think there was any question in the State Department that the timetable should be as rapid as possible. But everybody recognized that it was going to be highly complicated and also very difficult to push through, both because of the more or less depressed economy of the Trust Territory, the lack of political skills in the Territory, and the problems on the Hill.
- Kalk: There really was no debate within State.
- Brown: No.
- Kalk: Are you familiar with this notion of Micronesia as an "anthropological zoo," a laissez-faire approach that the Navy had during the 1950s toward the islands?
- Brown: Well, I know about it, but to say that I'm familiar with it, no.
- Kalk: Are you familiar with any criticism, say, within the United Nations? I seem to recall there being some castigation of the United States within the U.N.
- Brown: Well, I think there were some problems having to do with nuclear testing in the early period. Eniwetok and so forth, but I was never involved in that.
- Kalk: There is a March 1961 document from the Bureau of the Budget that I wanted to address with you. There are three assumptions in it. The first is that the Trust Territory should be self-sufficient. The second, that the "primitive economic and social structure" should be preserved. The third, that there was no urgent reason for Micronesia to make a decision about its status for another 15 or 20 years. Do you have any comment about the assumptions in that document?
- Brown: Well, it's not a document I have ever heard of, but I find that it reflects sort of a colonial mentality that is not very realistic in light of subsequent events.
- Kalk: Was the Bureau of the Budget active on this issue?
- Brown: Not to my knowledge.
- Kalk: What about the U.N. visiting mission in 1961 that was very critical of the United States policies towards Micronesia.
- Brown: I really can't comment. I was involved with something totally different at that time.
- Kalk: Let me draw attention to another matter that is in the Kennedy years, which is National Security Memo No. 145. Are you familiar with that directive?
- Brown: I think that it probably is something that I have seen because it sounds vaguely familiar, but again, I was not in the State Department at that time. It is probably something that I may have looked at subsequently, but it doesn't ring any distinct memory.
- Kalk: Do you recall there being substantial mention of that directive during the Johnson years when you were in the State Department in Washington?
- Brown: I can't really say. I keep coming back to the fact that this particular part of the office was not one that engaged nearly the same amount of my time as some political issues like the Arab-Israeli problems.
- Kalk: In what month in 1963 did you arrive from Bonn?
- Brown: About August.

- Kalk: The Solomon Commission report, I believe, was November of 1963, so that would be shortly after your arrival.
- Brown: Yes.
- Kalk: How familiar were you with the report?
- Brown: Well, I can remember going through the Solomon Report, and I can also recall that we thought of it as a very constructive step in simply providing a whole background of material that was drawn on subsequently. But beyond that, I don't recall the details of the report.
- Kalk: It was classified as secret for many years. Do you recall why? Or who classified it?
- Brown: I think it was just the bureaucratic pattern of the days. Well, and also the fact that we thought we had, or the Defense Department maintained that we had, very vital security interest in that area. Things were just classified like that.
- Kalk: Do you recall anything in the document that was something that perhaps the public shouldn't know?
- Brown: I don't, but I'm speaking from thirty years ago and lack of recollection.
- Kalk: Professor Richard Cooper, who was on the Solomon Commission, speculated that it was possible that since the report was critical of the Interior Department's administration of the Trust Territory, possibly it was the Department of the Interior which had secured its classification as secret.
- Brown: Well, it's possible, but I suspect it was classified by the State Department.
- Kalk: OK. Do you recall the extent to which the Administration attempted to implement the findings of the Commission's report?
- Brown: No.
- Kalk: Do you recall where the idea came from to conduct the study in the first place?
- Brown: I don't. I can't even refer you to somebody who might know because I don't know who in the early 1960s was dealing with those issues.
- Kalk: Well, there was a task force, an inter-agency task force. Do you recall any of the members of that? That was 1962, 1963, so just before you arrived.
- Brown: No. It was before I came back.
- Kalk: Again, in your first year back in Washington in the Office of U.N. Political Affairs, what were your contemporaneous impressions of the pressures within the United Nations with regard to this issue?
- Brown: I think the pressures were troublesome but definitely could be dealt with in meetings of the Trusteeship Council. Troublesome in the sense that I believe—and the chronology escapes me at this moment—that we already had the Committee of 24 that was stirring up issues. That's why I say I think it was troublesome, but not terribly difficult to handle.
- Kalk: Did you detect a change in the wind between the approaches of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations towards the Trust Territory?
- Brown: Well, I can't really speak much about the Kennedy Administration. Somehow I would have thought, and this is just sort of out of the top of my head, that the initiatives were launched in the Kennedy Administration and just carried along in the Johnson Administration. I think that as the political pressures against the United States in the

- U.N. mounted, there probably was an increasing sense in government generally that this was one issue we might work on and get out from under “nasty” surveillance.
- Kalk: And how clearly formulated was the State Department’s approach by the time you arrived there?
- Brown: I wouldn’t think it was terribly clearly formulated. I don’t know. I can recall that we sat around and discussed the need to begin to move forward in Micronesia, but to say that it had attached to it a real priority, I think would be stretching matters.
- Kalk: Well, at what point did the Department really come to terms with, this is our approach to the policy?
- Brown: Oh, I think by 1965, 1966, 1967.
- Kalk: That late?
- Brown: Yes. To try to pick a year now, all this time later, is more difficult for me, but I don’t think that the sense of urgency was very great. We got the Peace Corps out there and [did] various things that looked like positive steps.
- Kalk: Do you think that was a positive step, bringing the Peace Corps to Micronesia?
- Brown: Well, I think so, yes.
- Kalk: In what sense?
- Brown: Well, simply in the sense that it began to work on one of the objectives; namely, to make the people of the Trust Territory a bit more able to take care of themselves.
- Kalk: Economic development and so forth?
- Brown: Yes.
- Kalk: There were a series of debates between State and Interior. We’ve commented briefly on this already.
- Brown: Yes.
- Kalk: Quite a few documents seem to indicate there was an impasse between the two departments, roughly between 1964 and 1968.
- Brown: I think that’s correct.
- Kalk: One might identify five issues. We can run through each individually. The first was the need for change, a new policy towards Micronesia. How would you characterize the State Department approach to that question? That there was a need for change?
- Brown: Well, you partly addressed that point by saying, I think, the State Department believed it was time to get rid of the trusteeship arrangements for Micronesia and wanted to press ahead with this.
- Kalk: Do you recall Interior’s position on the need for change?
- Brown: No. I think Interior’s position was that there really wasn’t any great urgency, that things were sort of rocking along satisfactorily. Their whole attitude was a bit patronizing. These people were wards of the United States, and we would take care of them just as we had taken care of our other territories.
- Kalk: Do you recall any individual who was most closely identified with that perspective?

- Brown: Well, we've already spoken about Ruth Van Cleve, and I think she was—of the people that I met in the Interior Department, she was certainly the most able and most intelligent, but, as I say, very much inhibited by the relationship to Aspinall and company and the history of the other territories of the United States.
- Kalk: Would you say that her feelings on this issue reflected more the political realities of dealing with Aspinall in Congress or an ideological belief that the Trust Territories should remain in a dependent relationship towards the United States?
- Brown: Well, a little of both. I think the Aspinall consideration is certainly the primary one. Because her whole approach was linked to what had happened with our other territories, I think that she perhaps thought in those terms as well.
- Kalk: Let me turn to a second impasse between Interior and State, which is the desire for change. How much of a desire there was on the part of the Micronesians for change? Do you recall State's position on that matter?
- Brown: Not really, no.
- Kalk: Or Interior's?
- Brown: No, I would just be giving you a personal opinion, I think.
- Kalk: A third issue that came up was the readiness of the Micronesians for self-government. Do you recall what the State Department feeling was about the level of readiness?
- Brown: Well, I think we had real misgivings about how ready they were for self-government, but on the other hand, we were willing to do what could be done to prepare them for some self-government.
- Kalk: What about Interior?
- Brown: Well, I really don't know what Interior thought. I do remember meeting both some of the Micronesians and also meeting some of the people the Australians used to bring before meetings of the Trusteeship Council to talk to the State Department. I had sort of a similar not-enthusiastic reaction to their political capabilities.
- Kalk: Please give me an example, if you could.
- Brown: No, I really can't, with respect to Micronesia. I simply recall the fact that when Australia still had a trust territory, it would bring to the State Department a couple of people from their trust territory who really were ducks out of water in every sense of the word. Now, I think that the Micronesians I saw were a cut above those people.
- Kalk: Were they mostly the traditional elites, the tribal chiefs, or were they more of the younger, educated people?
- Brown: I think they were the traditional elites.
- Kalk: What of the measures that the U.S. government had taken for self-government? For example, the establishment of a Council of Micronesia in 1962, led to the Congress of Micronesia in 1965, the Territorial Municipal Councils, and so forth.
- Brown: Well, I think that we made some gradual progress.
- Kalk: Do you think that they were substantive steps towards self-government, that they were genuinely meaningful steps toward self-government?
- Brown: I really can't say. I don't know.

- Kalk: The option of independence, ultimately, for Micronesia. What were your feelings and those of other State Department policymakers?
- Brown: I don't believe anyone had seriously contemplated that Micronesia would choose to be independent in this period when we were considering how to proceed. Now whether it was a matter of practical consideration, such as lack of economic strength in Micronesia or political immaturity on the part of the Micronesians, I can't say. But I don't think anyone really was concerned that they would go for independence.
- Kalk: When do you think that changed?
- Brown: I don't know. Let me put it this way. As far as my involvement with this issue is concerned, I don't [remember] a point. Now some of your other people you'll interview may have worked more intimately on this problem than I did, but you have to understand that I had two people working for me who spent all their working time on this.
- Kalk: That was Mr. McHenry and who else?
- Brown: Gleysteen was my deputy, and the trouble was that by then, I can't recall just when it was, I think about 1965, I became the director of the office and my responsibilities went over a much wider area.
- Kalk: So your involvement beginning in 1965 was even more remote?
- Brown: A little bit.
- Kalk: Do you recall how the policymakers at Interior felt about the option of independence or any debates between State and Interior?
- Brown: Well, they ruled independence out of the question.
- Kalk: But at that point, even the State Department, if I understand you correctly, did not see this as a consideration.
- Brown: Well, I think that we recognized—and you'll have to get somebody else's view on this—I think we recognized that perhaps as we became closer to the period of terminating the Trusteeship Agreement, we would have to have shown that the option of independence had been discarded by the Micronesians.
- Kalk: Do you recall much of a sentiment in Micronesia at this point, say 1965, for independence?
- Brown: No.
- Kalk: Were there any forces at work in Micronesia, leaning towards an independence movement?
- Brown: I really don't know.
- Kalk: There are a lot of documents pertaining to concerns on the part of Interior that for the Trust Territory to become a commonwealth or a freely associated state of the United States, it would leap-frog beyond American Samoa, Guam and a number of other territories, and that this was a concern. Do you recall any discussions on this?
- Brown: I can recall that Interior made that point, yes.
- Kalk: And what were your feelings at State about the issue?
- Brown: I think our feelings all along were that the Trust Territory was not like these other territories of the United States.

- Kalk: Is that because of the Trusteeship Agreement?
- Brown: Because of the Trusteeship Agreement.
- Kalk: Mr. Gleysteen identified the general counsel's office at the State Department as a force that was extremely literalistic in its reading of the Trusteeship Agreement.
- Brown: That's correct. That's Leonard Meeker, I think. He's also in Washington if you want somebody else.
- Kalk: I'll jot his name down.
- Brown: He did become the Legal Advisor of the State Department, but he was for a long time in the legal office doing all the U.N. questions.
- Kalk: How was the State Department able to persuade—what strategies were used to convince policy-makers at Interior—that the Trust Territory was a different animal from the other American territories?
- Brown: Well, just the facts of the trusteeship and the fact that this was something that had grown out of World War II, that we had voluntarily placed it under the United Nations, and that it was in a different category.
- Kalk: Do you recall when Interior changed its position on this matter?
- Brown: No.
- Kalk: It might be easier for us to run through the documents starting in April 1967. If we could turn to April 5, 1967, which is the first one, that's a letter to you from Ruth Van Cleve.
- Brown: Yes.
- Kalk: Here is a document on the impact of Peace Corps volunteers "fanning the flames of Micronesia nationalism."
- Brown: Yes.
- Kalk: Do you recall this issue?
- Brown: I don't really recall it specifically enough to discuss it.
- Kalk: This is by 1967, so about two years after you were director of UNP.
- Brown: It's true. I simply don't have any special memory of this.
- Kalk: There is perhaps a debate whether there was a pre-existing movement for Micronesian self-government or whether Peace Corps volunteers played a vital role in pushing it.
- Brown: Yes.
- Kalk: Let's turn to April 10, 1967, which is the next document, just a few days later. Were you aware of the meeting at the time?
- Brown: Yes.
- Kalk: This was an especially important gathering. Would you say was true?
- Brown: Yes, I would say that was true, given the level.
- Kalk: Do you recall being apprised of any change in policy that was a consequence, either State Department policy or Interior, of this meeting?
- Brown: No, I don't think so.

- Kalk: Interior initially did not accept the principle of an early plebiscite—at least our documents seem to bear that out.
- Brown: I think that's correct. You know, Interior never had any sense of urgency about moving ahead.
- Kalk: Does your understanding of this meeting or of the events in April 1967 lead you to think that there might have been a meeting of the minds between the two departments?
- Brown: More so than previously, certainly.
- Kalk: Was it your feeling at the time that the State Department was moving more towards Interior or vice versa?
- Brown: I think vice versa. Katzenbach, I think, probably did a good bit to sway Interior's position. You know, up until this meeting, I think the meetings had not been at that level. In other words, we were dealing let's say at one Ruth Van Cleve and Bill Gleysteen level or possibly staff level. So that when you get some of the principals involved, you make progress.
- Kalk: Do you recall whether any policy changes on Interior's part reflected a change in heart by Secretary Udall or Under Secretary Luce, or if they reflected a change in heart by staff members?
- Brown: I just can't comment.
- Kalk: What strategies do you recall the State Department using in trying to ensure that its agenda with regard to Micronesia came about?
- Brown: Well, I think we continued to emphasize the general atmosphere at the United Nations and the need to move forward if we were not going to be the last sort of colonial power under U.N. surveillance.
- Kalk: Did you feel that time was your ally in terms of dealing with the Interior Department?
- Brown: Well, time in the sense of the political climate in the U.N., not time if you mean to delay.
- Kalk: Did you seek to use any other government agencies, such as the Defense Department, as an ally in trying to get Interior to change its position?
- Brown: Well the Defense Department was always a bit ambivalent because at the same time we were talking about the Trust Territory and what might happen there, there was a certain degree of apprehension about what was happening to bases generally in the Far Eastern/Pacific area. I think Defense had in the back of its mind always that the Trust Territory was another place that their heavy hand might fall.
- Kalk: Did you seek to use Defense as an ally in this inter-agency debate with the Department of the Interior?
- Brown: To some degree, I think.
- Kalk: How so?
- Brown: Well, I think we pointed out to, and I'm now sort of hesitant to voice this, it seems to me that we did make a little headway with the argument that if the Trust Territory were a settled issue, things in the Pacific would generally be in a better posture for defense interests.
- Kalk: Who did you deal with mostly at Defense Department?

- Brown: I don't recall.
- Kalk: What did you feel was the Department of the Interior's objective in sticking to their position of trying to keep things as much the status quo as possible?
- Brown: I really don't know. I'd like to say that I think that the arguments of the State Department were persuasive, but I don't know whether everything that had happened during the 1960s had its impact on Interior's thinking or not. I really don't know.
- Kalk: Let's turn to May 17, 1967, if we could. This document is from Charles Johnson to you.
- Brown: Yes, Charles Johnson. I don't know if he's still alive or not.
- Kalk: He was at the NSC. Was he very heavily involved in this issue?
- Brown: Well, I think this is Chuck Johnson who previously was in Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department. I think he's a foreign service officer.
- Kalk: And do you recall him having a substantial interest in Micronesia?
- Brown: Not particularly.
- Kalk: This document explains that non-self-governing status for the Trust Territory was not an option for the State Department.
- Brown: That's right.
- Kalk: Would you concur?
- Brown: Yes.
- Kalk: And you feel that this document accurately reflects the views of the department at the time?
- Brown: Yes.
- Kalk: We have a July 25 document that is to Mr. Sisco from you.
- Brown: Yes. Written by McHenry.
- Kalk: Oh, it was written by McHenry?
- Brown: I think so. Well, his initials are not here. I don't know. I'm pretty sure I didn't write it.
- Kalk: Did some of your deputies frequently author memos that pertained to Micronesia if that was their area of expertise?
- Brown: Yes.
- Kalk: And it might go out under your name.
- Brown: It would go out under my name, and I would have read it and probably discussed it, but I'm pretty sure I didn't write it. The reason I say that is that these little corrections are not in my handwriting, and I think they look like they might be in Bill Gleysteen's, but I'm not even sure of that.
- Kalk: Now, this document is discussing an important change in policy incurring at the Department of Interior.
- Brown: Yes.
- Kalk: The consensus is that Udall comes around to the conclusion that a plebiscite must offer self-government as an option.
- Brown: Yes.

- Kalk: Why didn't this settle the issue right here? If the Secretary of the Interior concurred with State's position?
- Brown: I really don't know. It would be unfair for me to even venture an opinion.
- Kalk: Did you feel at the time that Udall possessed the support of his staff on the Micronesian question?
- Brown: I seem to recall that McHenry and Gleysteen were very skeptical that the lower echelon went along. Agreement may be one thing, but the implementation was going to be very tough.
- Kalk: Again, there's another comment on the same issue. January 29, 1968, is the document. That is another memo to Sisco from you.
- Brown: Again, it's written by Bill Gleysteen.
- Kalk: An impasse of some sort has occurred, it would appear, since July. There's a comment here: "Unlike his staff"—this is a quote from the document—"unlike his staff, Secretary Udall has played it very straight" regarding compliance with the Trusteeship Agreement. Do you have any comment about that statement or about this document?
- Brown: I think that's true. I think that goes back to what I said a moment ago, that we all along had misgivings as to whether Secretary Udall's position was going to be faithfully implemented by this staff.
- Kalk: Who in particular on his staff was recalcitrant?
- Brown: Oh, I think it was Van Cleve because the other people in Interior Department were not really in her league intellectually.
- Kalk: And she had a more substantial interest in the matter than other policymakers? Would that be a fair statement to make?
- Brown: In her department, probably.
- Kalk: March 1968, a document, which is prepared by Mr. Gleysteen. These are briefing materials from Mr. Sisco's appearance before the House Committee on Interior.
- Brown: Yes.
- Kalk: What strategy did the State Department have in dealing with Aspinall's committee? Do you recall?
- Brown: Not really. I couldn't give you anything that will add to this memorandum.
- Kalk: Do you have any recollection of Aspinall or any dealings with him?
- Brown: No. Have you tried to talk to Joe Sisco?
- Kalk: He's one of our potential interviewees. The Department of the Interior had charged that State was being unrealistic—I believe that was their term—regarding seeking Congressional approval of self-governing status.
- Brown: Yes.
- Kalk: What was your feeling at the time on this subject? Did you think you were being unrealistic?
- Brown: I don't think we thought we were being unrealistic. I think that most of the State Department officers who were working on this whole problem were absolutely convinced that our position was the only one that would get us through the U.N.

- Kalk: What about through Congress?
- Brown: Well, we thought we probably could get it through Congress, I think.
- Kalk: These documents, to what extent do you believe they accurately reflect the dialogue going on between State and Interior at the time? Do you think that they're accurate in that regard?
- Brown: Oh, I think they're accurate. I suspect that someone like Don McHenry, who had to talk to these people in Interior on a very frequent basis, may be able to give you a bit more of the flavor of the dialogue than these documents. [These documents] I don't think reveal the extent of the differences.
- Kalk: So, if I'm hearing your comments correctly, you believe that, if anything, the discussion between State and Interior was more pronounced in its difference of opinion.
- Brown: Yes.
- Kalk: What changes do you believe took place within the Trust Territory between 1963, when you came aboard in Washington, and 1968, that gave rise to a movement to separate from the United States?
- Brown: Well, I would say a combination of factors. A degree—how much is another matter—of growing political skill and awareness among the Micronesians. Political developments completely outside the Trust Territory as the sort of colonial era wound down.
- Kalk: You mean within the U.N.?
- Brown: U.N. and, I think, some appreciation of the vulnerability of the United States to some political fallout if we were dilatory ourselves in moving the Trust Territory forward to a new status.
- Kalk: What would have happened? What was the worst case scenario, if the United States delayed too long?
- Brown: Off the top of my head, I think one concern would have been that we would have been the last trust power, that our continued hold on the territory in different circumstances would have put us under the Committee of 24. We would have had some very unpleasant political fallout in the U.N.
- Kalk: Did you have any sense that this would negatively impact U.S. foreign policy in that regard?
- Brown: Well, at least peripherally.
- Kalk: How would you characterize the change in political ideology and personalities on this issue—the Micronesian issue—between the Kennedy/Johnson Administrations and the Nixon Administration that was just coming in 1969?
- Brown: I don't think I can characterize them at all.
- Kalk: Maybe I should rephrase. If the liberal Democrats or the moderately conservative Republicans would address this question, looked at from their vantage points, how could one characterize those different views of the Micronesian issue in the late 1960s?
- Brown: I really can't answer that. I really don't know. I don't somehow find it possible to draw any line on this particular policy issue of change after Johnson went out of office and Nixon took over.
- Kalk: Are there any anecdotes that you could provide that would offer us more flavor for the

story, say interaction with Micronesian delegates of the Future Status Commission, the reputation of any particularly colorful individuals either on the Hill or in one or another of the interested agencies?

Brown: I don't think so.

Kalk: What about the Marianas Islands, in particular? Do you have any sense of the depth of their separate identity from the remaining Trust Territory Islands? At the time -- this is mid-1960s.

Brown: Well, I think we always thought that the Marianas were in a slightly different category, but to what extent, I can't say.

Kalk: How so? How were they different pre-1969?

Brown: Well, I think I just can't pursue that subject because I think anything I said would probably not be accurate.

Kalk: Do you recall them as being any more oriented towards the United States than the other island groups?

Brown: No.

Kalk: Did you have any interactions on this Micronesian issue after 1969 when you went to the senior seminar?

Brown: No.

Kalk: Do you have any final comments? Perhaps there are issues I didn't bring up.

Brown: No. My main comment is that everything I've said has been cast in relatively general terms because I wasn't that intimately concerned with the details of this issue. I knew always what was happening and was pushing where and when I could. I wasn't sitting writing all the papers and I was doing so many other things at this time, it's difficult for me to look back after thirty years and be very helpful.

Kalk: Nevertheless, you have been helpful and you've been very kind to participate in our project and some of our collective, hopefully 125, interviews should draw on each and every one of them, we hope. And I think yours will make a contribution to that, as well.

Brown: Well, however small, I hope so. But I'm not optimistic.