

INTERVIEW OF N. NEIMAN CRALEY, JR.

by Howard P. Willens and Deanne C. Siemer

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- Willens: We are interviewing Mr. N. Neiman Craley, Jr. about his experiences during his service in the United States Congress and in various positions with the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. I'd like to begin by asking you when and where you were born.
- Craley: I was born in Red Lion, Pennsylvania in 1927, November.
- Willens: Were you raised in that community?
- Craley: Yes, I was. For the first 30-some years I lived within two miles of where I was born.
- Willens: You were educated then in what schools?
- Craley: Several. First seven years at Red Lion public schools. The next three years at what was the old York Collegiate Institute, which was a private day school in York. Then my last three years at Taft School in Watertown, Connecticut. After graduating from Taft I went to Gettysburg College and graduated from Gettysburg College in 1950.
- Willens: What did you study in college?
- Craley: Political science and economics.
- Willens: Did you have any further education after Gettysburg College?
- Craley: Not in a formal sense. I took a couple of courses later at York College and taught for a while at York College in the late 1950s, early 1960s, but that was the extent of my formal education.
- Willens: Then after graduation from college, what kind of employment did you pursue?
- Craley: My family, along with another York family, had started back in 1907 the Red Lion Furniture Company. My grandfather and father had both worked there, and I joined that firm in 1950 after graduating from college. I remained with it until 1965, when I sold the company.
- Willens: Did you engage in any political activities during the period from 1950 to 1965 while you were in the private sector?
- Craley: Starting in about 1960, I was brought in to the 1960 Congressional campaign in our Congressional district here, the 19th. During that period of time I also served on the Charter Commission, which was established to write the city charter for the City of York. Pennsylvania had passed a law a couple of years before allowing third-class cities to rewrite their charters, and a Charter Commission was created and I served on that. We wrote the Charter. It was approved by the voters of York City. And in 1961 I ran for City Council, unsuccessfully.
- Siemer: How far is Red Lion from York?
- Craley: Eight miles southeast—just a very short trip.
- Willens: Was the campaign for the City Council non-partisan?
- Craley: No. It was a partisan campaign. We had opposition in the primary, which we successfully defeated, but I lost in the general election. There were two of us running for two seats. My

partner on the Democratic side was elected; I was not.

Willens: I gather then you were of the Democratic persuasion in those days?

Craley: Yes. And still am.

Willens: Albeit a minority.

Craley: Yes. A great minority.

Willens: What is the political complexion of this particular Congressional district?

Craley: Today?

Willens: Then and now.

Craley: Well, it's changed. In those days, it was still Republican, but by a very, very small majority—probably about 4,000 or 5,000. Today it's probably about 40,000 to 50,000 Republican.

Willens: A majority in approximately that order of magnitude?

Craley: Yes.

Willens: Now as I understand it, there came a time in 1964 when you were selected to run for Congress?

Craley: Yes.

Willens: How did that come about?

Craley: Well, I was York County Democratic Chairman at the time, and one of my responsibilities was to try to get qualified candidates to run for office, and I successfully interested a fellow by the name of Dave Baldwin to become our Congressional candidate in the 1964 campaign. Dave subsequently went on to become an Assistant Secretary in HEW. But York County was very proprietary about Congressional candidates and wasn't happy about having one from Cumberland County. Our Congressional district is made up of three counties—York being the largest and the most Democratic at that time, and Adams and Cumberland County both being Republican and considerably smaller. So York wasn't about to accept a Congressional candidate from outside of the county. So I instructed the Executive Committee that I had a good candidate, an excellent candidate, and if they weren't going to accept him, they were going to have to come up with one of their own. I guess because they got caught in a bind they selected me. I had to go back and talk to Dave and tell him what had happened. He very kindly stepped aside. I became the candidate. He went on to serve four years in the Department of HEW. I served two years in Congress.

Willens: During the two years in Congress, did you have any service on the Interior Committee?

Craley: Yes. My total time there I was a member of the Interior Committee and on the Subcommittee on Territories.

Siemer: How did you wind up on that subcommittee?

Craley: Not knowing much about Congress, I looked at all the various committees that existed at that time and all the Pennsylvania delegates that were in Congress. I made a list of the committees and a list of the Congressional representatives from Pennsylvania and found that there were only a very few committees that weren't represented by Pennsylvania Democrats. And I realized that I wasn't probably going to get on a committee where there

was already a Pennsylvania Democrat, so I took a look at those that were left and decided that Interior looked the most interesting to me and chose it and got picked for it.

Siemer: Who was chair of the Interior Committee?

Craley: Wayne Aspinall.

Siemer: And who was chair of the subcommittee?

Craley: I think Hugh Carey from New York started out as chairman of it, but I'm not sure. You're challenging me there and I'd have to look back in my books to make sure. I'm not sure. Haley was the second- or third-ranking Democrat on the committee. John Saylor from Pennsylvania was the ranking Republican member. Oh, I'm embarrassed to say I don't remember who was chairman of our subcommittee.

Willens: When you were designated to serve on the Interior Committee, did you also volunteer or were you designated to serve on the Territorial and Insular Affairs Subcommittee?

Craley: You had to pick three subcommittees. I think at that time we had either five or six. So every member on the Interior Committee was a member of three subcommittees, and I think I picked Territories, which was my primary one, Public Lands and National Parks.

Willens: Had you had any previous contact with the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands?

Craley: Not until my tenure in Congress. I attended the first United Nations meeting that came up during my term, which was in May of 1965, and got interested in Micronesia by having attended that session at New York.

Willens: What do you remember about that session that was of particular interest to you?

Craley: Well, the whole process was of interest to me because I'd had no experience or exposure to the United Nations or to the fact that there was even a Trusteeship Council. And it was a very brief exposure; it only lasted one day. The Trusteeship Council itself went on for a couple of weeks, but we only sent a member up there for one day just to participate and see what was happening and have a little experience and report back. The process was interesting to me. As I say, I'd never seen it before. It was interesting meeting the Micronesians, although I had met some of them in Washington because usually they would stop in Washington on their way to the United Nations, and sometimes even on their return, but that was kind of rare because once they had been away for a few days they were interested in getting back without any stops. It was a part of the world that I knew very, very little about, and it was an educational and a very interesting exposure.

Willens: Did Chairman Aspinall give you the benefit of his views as to the Trust Territory and what he thought ought to ultimately happen out there?

Craley: No, I don't recall him doing that. We had various subcommittee meetings from time to time on the territories, and there were discussions by other members, but many of them who had been exposed to the Trust Territory had not been exposed in recent years. The Congress at that time was in the practice of sending a visiting delegation every two, three, four, five years—however it worked out. Sometimes they would combine it with the Senate; sometimes they would do it just on the House side. We did go out again in 1965. I went out twice in 1965, once with Rogers Morton, for the opening of the first Congress of Micronesia when it was created in July 1965. Then I went back again with a larger House Congressional delegation in November-December of 1965, when we visited all the districts and went on to American Samoa.

Willens: You mentioned Rogers Morton. He was at that time a Congressman.

- Craley: Yes, from Maryland.
- Willens: Was anyone from the Executive Branch involved in that visit to the opening of the Congress of Micronesia?
- Craley: Yes. John Carver. He was an Under Secretary of Interior I think at that point.
- Willens: What do you remember about Mr. Carver and his views about the Trust Territory?
- Craley: I'm not certain. I don't know that we had any prolonged discussions about it, because I didn't really feel qualified or adequate at that time to participate in discussions. I suspect most of my effort was in listening. The first time, this was in July, we were going out strictly for the opening of the first Congress, and it was largely a ceremonial visit, because everything was laid on—the Congress was meeting for the first time, organizing, establishing itself. I think our visit there lasted two, perhaps three days at the very most. And at that point, I think John and Rogers headed back to Washington and I went on to South Vietnam since I was so far out. I'd never been in the Pacific before. I'd never been in Hawaii. And I figured since I'd gotten out that far I might as well go on to South Vietnam, which I did. We did not have a lot of discussions as much as we participated in and joined the ceremonies that revolved around the creation of the first Congress. I think the only conversation we had of substance was relating to the creation of the Congress, the fact that it was a bicameral body set up much along the lines of our own United States Congress, and meeting the members of it. I don't know that there was much of substance.
- Willens: Do you remember whether there had been any Congressional review of the Secretarial Order establishing the Congress before it was actually issued?
- Craley: No.
- Siemer: Did you have any impression back then about how much of his time Chairman Aspinall was spending on territorial matters as opposed to his other many interests in the Congress?
- Craley: That would have had to be a very small percentage. I can remember being out in Micronesia as an employee of the Trust Territory government, and when we would get very excited about certain battles that we felt should be fought with the Congress, my own analysis was—Udall is not going to waste a lot of chips. Udall, as Secretary of Interior, is not going to waste a lot of chips arguing with the Congress about Micronesia because he's got so many other things in his basket that he's got to fight battles on. And I think Wayne Aspinall was much the same. Micronesia was only one of many territories, and it wasn't really a U.S. territory, so on the pecking order it came out (I feel) at a very, very low priority except for John Taylor, who was a [Congressional] staff member. I think John was very conscientious about Micronesia and very much interested in it. I'm sure from time to time he got Aspinall and John Saylor's attention. But soon they moved on to other subjects, because they were much more important.
- Siemer: Were there any other members of your subcommittee who had a particular interest in Micronesia back at that time?
- Craley: They did, but it would be a passing one. In other words, Rogers went out with me in July of 1965. He did not join us in November and December of 1965. Ed Edmundson from Oklahoma, Dick Wright from El Paso, Texas, and Charlotte Reid, and Ruth Van Cleve went along on that trip. Tom Foley came out two or three times, at least two. Then later Phil Burton got quite involved. But with the exception of Phil Burton, I don't know anyone who had a continuing interest in the Trust Territory.

- Siemer: How about Congressman Morton? Had he been out to the Trust Territory before that trip that you took with him?
- Craley: I'm not sure about that. I think he had been to Antarctica during a previous term. I think he was only in Congress a term, maybe two at the very most, but I think only one before I got there. If I had to guess, I'd say no, he hadn't been.
- Siemer: Do you remember any of the Micronesians you met before you took that first trip?
- Craley: Oh, gosh, we met quite a few of them back in Washington. But I can't separate them out. They stopped on their way to the United Nations. There was only a very small group, because the practice I think had been started by Will Goding, who was High Commissioner before Bill Norwood, to bring a Micronesian or two with him.
- Siemer: When he went to the U.N.?
- Craley: Yes. And then that practice was continued and developed somewhat. I think they started out with one, and then eventually when the Congress got formed, the Congress of Micronesia, they brought one member from the House and one from the Senate. Eventually the Micronesians learned very quickly that this was a nice trip. They had a way of establishing what they called an ambassadorial per diem which exceeded any per diem anyone else had, plus the fact that they weren't too conscientious about attending meetings. So it became kind of a boondoggle in many respects. And we started to get more of them coming back after I'd gotten out there than we did when I was still here [in Washington].
- Willens: How would you describe the relationship between the Department of Interior and Chairman Aspinall?
- Craley: It was basically a good relationship. I keep looking back and thinking there was not as much divisiveness and antagonism between parties and between the Administration and Congress. It was more of a cooperative thing. Now it wasn't all peaches and cream, and there were disagreements, but they were usually disagreements on principles and on issues and not so much on personalities as I interpret there are today. It was a good working relationship. Ruth Van Cleve was quite good. John Carver was quite effective. We didn't see Stewart Udall too much in those days at the Congress, although he would come up from time to time, but again he wouldn't come up on anything relating to Micronesia. It was a good working relationship. And as a member (and again it was a very short tenure), I felt that I could call the Interior Department and if I had a thought or an idea, I could sit down and talk it over with them. And they could tell me what their position was or what they thought of it, or they could make some suggestions or what have you. I enjoyed that aspect of it because it was educational to me; it was informative.
- Willens: Were you aware when you were a member of Congress that President Kennedy had articulated a United States policy in 1962 designed to bring about the entire Trust Territory becoming part of the United States?
- Craley: I had some understanding of that, and I felt that that even existed during the first year or so that I was out there, which would have been calendar years 1967 and 1968. And there was in my opinion an excellent opportunity of implementing that had anything seriously been advanced on it at that time. The Micronesians were at that point (in my opinion) very amenable to becoming part of the United States.
- Willens: Is that a view that you think was shared through the districts of Micronesia?
- Craley: You mean by other Micronesians?

- Willens: Yes.
- Craley: Yes, I think so. Nationalism began to develop very shortly thereafter. It started out as a total nationalism, and then as it reached the final stages of it, it started to break down into a Marshallese and a Palauan and a Marianas I mean it went through an evolutionary process. The first phase of it that I was aware of it was becoming a part of the United States.
- Willens: And that was a phase that in your judgment existed during your tenure in Congress and in your first year or two in the Trust Territory?
- Craley: Yes.
- Willens: Were you aware as a member of the committee that the State and the Interior Departments within the Executive Branch had some differences as to how to achieve this national objective?
- Craley: Oh, sure. Well, they not only had some differences as to how to achieve it, but I felt there were differences as to what to achieve. And it was not limited to State and Interior. Defense was always a major player in it.
- Willens: Well, that would help us if you could sort of take each of those agencies in turn and tell us what your perception was of that agency's goals during the time you were in Congress.
- Craley: Yes, but insofar as I would know them. My observation was that Defense was very insistent that this was a strategic area. It had been identified as such in the Trusteeship Agreement. It was the only one of the trusteeships that was so identified. And Defense was not about to give up this area. They must retain control of it and control must be perpetual and they must have access to it, etc., etc. State was caught in the bind between Defense's ardent position (as I understood it) and what would fly or sail at the United Nations. And Interior was kind of the third man on the totem pole. I always had the feeling that Interior was a junior member of this triumvirate. State and Defense were the two senior members and Interior kind of walked along behind and saw what the other two were talking about and moved accordingly.
- Willens: What was your sense as a member of Congress as to the State Department's concern about the United Nations?
- Craley: Well, State was always concerned about the Trusteeship Agreement and the perception of what we were doing on a world-wide basis—how would this be perceived? I think State was considerably concerned with the Soviet Union at that time, which usually made speeches at the United Nations that we were trying to make a colony out of this. We were moving against the Trusteeship Agreement and we were trying to bring these people in and make them all U.S. citizens and extend the U.S. curtain, so to speak, out into the Pacific and take over the three million square miles. State was always sensitive about that. I don't know that I was privy to knowing what their plans were. Most of these agencies played it pretty close to the belt, and as a freshman, I don't know that I was that much a participant in any of these discussions. If they took place at all, in any substance, I suspect they took place with the Chairman and perhaps John Saylor.
- Willens: The documents do indicate that Representative Saylor, in particular, at executive sessions criticized the State Department in a traditional conservative way as being too subservient to U.N. concerns. And I'm wondering whether you were aware of those kinds of sentiment.
- Craley: No, I wasn't. But I can see how he would have done that based on his political background

and philosophy. I think State was always somewhat concerned about whether this package, whatever it was, would flow through the United Nations smoothly or whether there would be waves created.

Siemer: What was your own sense from being at the U.N. as to the level of opposition that U.S. policies might create?

Craley: I don't know that I had enough knowledge of what U.S. policy was. I never had the feeling when I was in Congress or for the first two years that I was in Micronesia that there was a firm U.S. policy. I always had the feeling (and of course the last two years in Micronesia I was way out there, and even the first two years I was still a freshman member and not party to a lot of discussions) that the U.S. was struggling with developing a policy.

Siemer: Was there any White House involvement in those days?

Craley: Oh, I suspect there was, but I was not knowledgeable about it. It was very rare as a Congressman when I had any contact with State or Defense. My contact was exclusively with Congress. My feeling about State and Defense became more accentuated when I got out to Micronesia and talked to Interior about certain things and realized that they were waffling until they could talk to State or Defense or find out what their position was. When I was in Congress I didn't have any of those concerns because I was sitting just as a member of a committee. We said what we thought and Interior reacted, but I didn't get into the negotiations or the machinations among those three departments.

Siemer: When you went out for the opening of the Congress of Micronesia, did you meet Professor Meller or any of his team?

Craley: Oh, yes. They were all there, and they were advising the Congress. They had been actively involved in establishing the format for the Congress and the rules, procedures, and all that type of thing. He was quite active there for I would say at least for a year or so before the Congress came into being and for a couple of years after it did.

Siemer: What was your sense of that team and their effort? Were they the right people for the job?

Craley: I wouldn't have passed judgment on them at that point, because they knew far more about Micronesia than I did. I guess if I had anything to say to that question I would say I hoped that they knew what they were doing. I think he was approaching it as an academician, and I don't know that that was a weakness or a fault. The Micronesians were struggling with something that they knew very little about. And it was only as the process unfolded and as the Congress started to operate that it started to find its strengths and its weaknesses.

Siemer: What was your sense at that time about how the team was working with the Micronesians?

Craley: Oh, I suspect it was working well, although again I was not in a position to evaluate that or judge it. Certainly not on the first visit there. And when I went back the second time, it was not so much to work with the Congress as it was to just make a tour of the whole Trust Territory, [focusing on] the administration primarily. The Congress activity was confined to that July visit. When we went back in November and December the Congress was not in session. So we were working just with the administration.

Siemer: When you went back in November and December, what was your sense of the relative level of development or political sophistication among the different districts that you visited?

- Craley: If judged against our system, almost none existed. They had operated under a chieftain setup before. Now they had a council back in I guess the early 1960s which was kind of the forerunner of the Congress. I was not familiar with that because that had come into existence before I got involved. They were experimenting, and there was experimentation at various levels and based on their cultures. I think Yap, for example, had a very laid-back approach. Saipan and Palau were probably the two most ardent about doing something, because they always seemed to be more organized and more committed to a formal structure.
- Siemer: Even in those early days?
- Craley: Yes. The Marianas, and Palau to a degree too, felt they were superior to the other islanders. They felt they were much more developed, in certain respects more civilized. I remember the Marianas particular in getting incensed one time when one of the local papers put a picture of a Yapese man in a *thu* [loincloth] on the front of it. They almost ran the publisher off the island, because this was not their concept of Saipanese, and they didn't want the world thinking that it was. The other districts were much more laid back—Yap, Truk and Ponape. Kosrae at that time was a part of Ponape. The Marshalls, of course, were way out there all by themselves, and they didn't much care about what the others were doing.
- Willens: Well staying with that same visit, when you went around to various districts—did you form any view at that time as to the effectiveness of the Trust Territory Administration in performing its mission?
- Craley: Yes. You know, I've always said and felt this, that the first trip you make you're an expert, and the next trip you're a little less of an expert, and as you're there after three or four years you begin to know that you don't know much about it at all. But yes, the early observation was that there was a lot of inefficiency and a lot of incompetency. Power plants didn't work, water systems didn't work, schools weren't equipped, hospitals were inefficient and didn't have supplies and medicines, and there were no roads. It was a pretty sad thing. You had a good feeling about the people and the area. Everybody was very nice and it was fun being there and you were royally treated in terms of luaus and all that kind of thing. But in terms of a well-run place—that it wasn't. I mean it was pretty loose.
- Willens: Well by that time, there had been a few years of increased funding for the Trust Territory.
- Craley: Yes. I think it had started either the year before or that year. It had gone up considerably at that point.
- Willens: Did you see any evidence that the increased funding was being spent on infrastructure or schools in particular?
- Craley: Well, yes, but it was still at a very, very early stage. I can remember we dedicated the power plant in Ponape. Those were some Caterpillar generators that were put on line. They were brand new and just had come from the States. And there was a hospital in the Marshalls that was dealing with—I don't know whether they were dealing with polio now or some illness of that nature. There was kind of a quarantine set up. And you found spots of projects that had either been accomplished or were in the process of being accomplished.
- Willens: Were you personally an advocate at that time for substantially increased funding?
- Craley: I think I probably was, yes.
- Willens: Was there any resistance within the House Committee to the Administration's request for

increased funding?

Craley: I think at that point it was such a small figure in terms of their total budget consideration that no, there wasn't. You always have the members on the committee who are opposed to any kind of an increase, and these increases at that time were percentage wise quite large. The amount of money wasn't all that great, but we had gone from I'm going to say \$3 million to \$11 million or \$3 million to \$17 million, something like that, which was a big jump. Members who hadn't been out there (and I was one of them up until I made my November-December trip) didn't realize the magnitude of the place. You're only talking about 72 square miles of land, but you're talking about 3 million square miles of area. And you've got to build six hospitals, you've got to put in six airfields, you've got to put in six docks, you've got to put in six power plants, six water systems. It was just overwhelming. They were operating with pennies at that point in terms of what ultimately came down the line. You had manpower problems. The Micronesians were not accustomed to dealing with equipment. Maintenance was almost a concept that they didn't understand at all. I mean you plug it in and you walk away from it, and when it burns out, why you get a new one. I can remember, I don't know whether it was my first or second visit to Rota, the Public Works had gotten a brand-new grader, road grader, a big monstrous piece of equipment. They were grading these roads out to the airfield in Rota. Apparently at some point the air filter vibrated loose and fell off the engine. And the guy picked it up and put it back on, and it vibrated loose and fell off again. About the third time he just stuck it down in the cab. Well, he's going along grading this coral and of course he's creating all this dust which is getting sucked into the engine, and ultimately it stops. And there it sits alongside the road. And it sat there for months, because the engine was absolutely ruined. It had sucked in all this coral dust. And typewriters—even when I was out there—if a typewriter didn't function properly they'd put it on the floor and get a new one. The concept of maintenance just was beyond them. And I don't know that we did very much in helping it. I'll give you one example. We were in Palau one time. I think I was traveling then with the United Nations. There was a Van Camp fishery down in Palau. I can remember when we were there in 1965 we went through their facility. They had several generators that produced power for them. We saw their plant and we also saw the Palau power plant. When I went back at this time with the United Nations, the Van Camp generator was still functioning. The Palau plant had been down for quite some time, and they were making emergency repairs. One of the Palauans said to us that when the Van Camp power plant has a problem, the fellow who is responsible for it, if it's found to be his negligence, he gets fired. When the Palau power plant has a problem, the fellow who's responsible for it gets overtime to repair it. The one ran for a good many years. The other one was always down. And that was the solution to things. When things go wrong, you send fellows in there, you give them overtime, and they tear it apart and see if they can put it back together again. And then if they don't oil it or grease it or anything else, it goes down again and they get overtime again.

Willens: How did you come to be appointed to the Trust Territory Administration after you left the Congress?

Craley: Well, I guess it happened before I left. I was deeply interested in Micronesia as a result of the U.N. exposure in the spring of 1965, my visit out there in July, my visit again in November and December and then subsequent meetings on the Trust Territory. And at one point I said to Ruth Van Cleve, knowing I came from a very Republican district, "Ruth," I said, "if I don't get reelected, which I'm going to try desperately to do, but if I don't, I would be very much interested in serving in Micronesia or working in it."

She remembered that. And either before or after the November election in 1966, John DeGroot indicated that he wanted to leave Micronesia. I think he had two choices. One was to come back to Interior, and the other was to go to the South Pacific Commission. He had been there for a good many years before I went there. And when I didn't get reelected, I guess Ruth talked to him and said: "Would you like to come back?" And he said he would. I'm sure Interior would have his name, because he served with them, both in the TT and back at Interior. And he came back and I went out and took his position as one of the four commissioners.

Willens: What were your responsibilities?

Craley: There were four commissioners there at that time—one for administration, one for resources and development, one for health and human services, and one for public affairs. I was the Commissioner for Public Affairs and had under me the division that was responsible for all political and civil matters. I had radio broadcast, I had the print shop, I had community development at that point, which I subsequently gave up, and there were one or two others. I can't think of them at the moment.

Willens: Do you remember how early in 1967 you actually went out to assume these responsibilities?

Craley: About the 16th of January in 1967.

Willens: And just to give us an overview of your tenure with the Trust Territory, when did you end up leaving the Trust Territory?

Craley: I left there in April of 1985. Early April.

Willens: How long did you stay in this position as Commissioner for Public Affairs, approximately?

Craley: I would say for probably four or five years.

Willens: That would have been to 1971 or 1972.

Craley: 1972, yes.

Willens: And what position did you then assume?

Craley: I was Special Assistant to the High Commissioner for Legislative Affairs.

Willens: Approximately how long did you stay in that position?

Craley: I stayed in that until I went to the Marianas in 1975 with the Plebiscite Commissioner.

Willens: And following that experience, what did you do?

Craley: Then I became Special Assistant to the Resident Commissioner for the Marianas until it achieved self-government.

Willens: What did you do then?

Craley: Then I came back to the Trust Territory, which was sometime in Adrian Winkel's tenure. I kind of bounced around for a while, because Adrian and I, we had known each other for many years, suddenly lost what friendship or I hate to use the word respect that we had for each other. I found that if I made myself kind of invisible I had a little happier existence there for the balance of his tenure. Then when he left, Janet McCoy came on board.

Willens: Was that at the change of the Administration?

Craley: Yes. Dan High was Deputy High Commissioner. Dan had anticipated becoming High

Commissioner and, when that didn't happen, he found it advantageous to leave. Then I got pulled over into the headquarters building and assumed his responsibilities.

Willens: Did you have the title then?

Craley: No. We decided we didn't need a Deputy High Commissioner in title.

Willens: And then you worked in that capacity until you left?

Craley: Yes.

Siemer: Where was your office physically located during those years?

Craley: It varied. My first office was up on the second floor of the headquarters building close to the High Commissioner's office.

Siemer: In Saipan?

Craley: Yes. Always in Saipan. And I was up in that same area as Commissioner for Public Affairs and as Special Assistant for Legislative Affairs. Then of course our Plebiscite office was down at Hamilton's. Then I moved down to the Marianas Civic Center where the former DistAd was. When I came back to headquarters, I found that Adrian Winkel and I weren't getting along too well. I arranged that I could move over into what used to be the warehouse building behind headquarters. Out by the service station there. And then when Jan McCoy came on, I came back on the headquarters and occupied the Deputy High Commissioner's office.

Willens: Let's turn then to the years when you served as Commissioner for Public Affairs. As you got involved in your new responsibilities, did you become aware of what the Micronesian leadership was thinking of with respect to future political status?

Craley: Yes. And I'd like to explain if I may. I went out there in January of 1967. My wife and I got a divorce shortly after that. She never went out with me. In May 1968, I remarried, and my new wife went out with me. Upon arriving there, she immediately took a job with the Chief Justice as his secretary. Through my efforts, he gave her an absence from her duties to serve as journal clerk for the House of Representatives [of the Congress of Micronesia] when it met in July of 1968. She was the journal clerk for them for that session, and she fell in love with the Congress, and I think they fell in love with her. They offered her a position as journal clerk, and she became journal clerk for the Senate. She served in that capacity up until about 1978. It was one of the best things that could have happened for me. I was there as a representative of the United States government, but I also had very strong feelings about Micronesia and the Micronesian people that didn't always correspond or jell with the U.S. position. I was always concerned how valid were my positions, how sure could I be of what I was saying or thinking. She worked for them and had a very excellent relationship with them. She worked with their Status Commission for all the time that it was operating. She traveled with them through all the districts and on some of their foreign trips—to Korea and the Philippines and Japan. We would have discussions at home. I would get disturbed about some of the things they were doing or she would get disturbed about some of the things the Administration was doing, and we'd talk. And I realized (which I knew) that there were two sides to this thing, and that most of us in the Administration were looking at it from the U.S. side and from our culture. Their culture was entirely different from ours, and their experiences were entirely different from ours. I began to see that while their ideas didn't reflect our culture and our system, it was probably more plausible for them. This is a long answer to a question, but I began to understand that we're dealing with people that are totally foreign to our system, to our background, to our language, to everything else, and they have ways of looking at

this themselves. I feel that during those early years I became kind of a link between the Congress of Micronesia, which was a totally Micronesian body, and the [Trust Territory] Administration, which was at that time a totally American body. I feel I made some contributions in attempting to get the two parties to come together on a lot of issues that they might not have come together on and to resolve them in a way that everybody could walk away from. Otherwise, we had a lot of polarization if that didn't happen. A large part of this came from the contribution Janet made in bringing to me her reactions to the Micronesians as a result of working with them on a day-by-day basis.

Siemer: Did you have Micronesians working for you in Public Affairs?

Craley: Oh, yes.

Siemer: Do you recall who some of them were in the early days?

Craley: Strich Yoma was my first. Strich is dead. Luke Tman was a very brilliant young fellow from Yap. He was a Palauan but he lived in Yap, grew up in Yap. Strich Yoma was from Ponape. Strich became the first Micronesian Director of Public Affairs. He was the first Micronesian to succeed one of us Americans. And I had Raola Chung. The Americans out there started to drop off in my area relatively quickly, except for radio broadcasting, in that division. Another division I had was public information, and that we kept Americans in there for a while. In the political affairs division of my area, it became all (except for one or two) Micronesians.

Siemer: Several people have commented to us that Public Affairs was a place that Micronesians first began to make inroads, and a number of people like Ben Fitial and others have recalled an openness to Micronesian employment there.

Craley: Well, all the leaders in Micronesia in the early years had worked in Public Affairs. Bethwel Henry, T. Nakayama, Amata Kabua, Lazarus Salii, John Mangefel, and Bailey Olter. They were all people who had been either in Public Affairs at headquarters or in Public Affairs at the district level. As a result, these were all people who I had worked with and met with all during those years. We had excellent relationships. It was always a pleasure. I enjoyed those years. You could not NOT enjoy them. I mean they were delightful, even though you got mad as the devil sometimes at them because they wouldn't do things. It was a consensus type of resolution, and consensus didn't work in our system. I mean you didn't talk about something today and then talk about it six months from now and then try to implement it a year later. That wasn't our system. I used to get frustrated, and Janet used to tell me: "Just cool it a little while, because they have to go back, they have to talk to their people, they have to formalize the thing in their own minds, and it takes months sometimes for this to happen." But all those people [Micronesian leaders] came through Public Affairs largely. Public Works was construction and engineering, and they didn't have training in that. Education—we were trying to instill our own educational system. That required Americans. Mine was the only area that was oriented toward the Micronesians and it was natural to get them involved. It didn't do any good to bring Americans out there to build a Micronesian system, because we were going to walk away and they were the ones who had to run it. So you let them kind of develop the thing.

Willens: Were your views about bringing more Micronesians into the Administration shared by High Commissioner Norwood?

Craley: He wasn't there that long. Bill left in the spring of 1969 very summarily. That was one thing that Rogers Morton and I disagreed on. Rogers had become Secretary of the Interior at that point, and he said to Nixon if you're going to get rid of him, get rid of him now.

He did it without having anybody lined up, so we went for a period of time without any leadership. Bill was very sympathetic to that, yes. He was excellent in that respect. He was a Hawaiian, and he had a feeling for islanders and for the Micronesians. He used to go downtown in the evenings and play pool down there. He pitched horseshoes. He had a horseshoe ring built up at the High Commissioner's residence, and fellows from the Marianas would come up and throw horseshoes with him. He had a Saipanese who was his cook. He was very amenable to that. Marty Mangan, who was the Deputy High Commissioner, was strictly a U.S. type. Marty was involved with the Interior Department and oriented to the Congress and Interior. He saw things strictly from the U.S. viewpoint. Bill was much easier for me to approach. I could approach Bill, and a lot of times Marty complained about the fact that I was misleading Bill and taking him down the wrong road.

Willens: I'd like to focus on that first few years of your time out there, before 1969, when you began to assume your responsibilities in dealing with the Congress of Micronesia. What was your assessment then of the leadership in the Congress and their particular grievances were with the Administration?

Craley: Dwight Heine had been the first Speaker of the House, and I think Amata Kabua may have been the first President of the Senate, but I'm not sure. I know Amata was President for a while, then Nakayama became President. John Ngiraked was a Palauan. I don't think he was ever President. He was somewhat active in the House, but he and Lazarus were on different wavelengths. Chief Petrus from Truk was a member of the House. He was a traditional chief in Truk and was an older man, one of the few older men. Most of the members in Congress were young Micronesians who had been educated in the United States, and they were picked by and large because they were articulate in English and they could represent or speak well. But there were people back in their districts that did the talking. And that's why a lot of action in Congress took so long. When issues would come up that they would recognize as being of significant importance to them, they had to go back and talk throughout their districts. The only way you could do that was to wait until the end of Congress came and they adjourned for the year. Then they'd go back and they'd talk about it. When they came back next year, they knew pretty well how they were going to handle that. I was quite impressed with the leadership—not in terms of their accomplishments but in terms of their motivation and their sincerity. Now you recognize that they had provincial plans and objectives that didn't always work well for the whole territory. But they were a good bunch to work with. There were some oddballs that you felt you could have gotten along without, but by and large they were a good group.

Willens: What do you remember being the principal issues that the Congress addressed in those early years that you were there?

Craley: Well, I think that they were interested in the establishment of their own institution and making it work well, which was largely their own project. They were interested in getting the Administration to be more responsive to what they'd like to see happen, and that was not always an easy thing.

Willens: Did the Administration have a practice of proposing legislation to the Congress of Micronesia?

Craley: Oh, yes. We did that.

Willens: Do you recall any complaints from the Congress of Micronesia that its authority under the Secretarial Order was too limited?

- Craley: Yes, of course. The High Commissioner had a veto, and even if they passed it over his veto, it went to the Secretary of the Interior. And the High Commissioner's veto was usually upheld. That was always a grievance with them, I'm sure. It was a growing process for both of us. We in the Administration were trying to do what we had been doing for years and years and years. At the same time, we were trying to make this young organization function and have some legitimate meaning. But you don't want to give them too much responsibility because they're not quite prepared for that. They were always eager for more than we were eager to pass on to them. I think that was probably the biggest difference between us. They wanted another step down the road and we were only prepared to make these little steps.
- Willens: Were there differences within the Administration as to how much authority they should have?
- Craley: Oh, sure. There were people out there who were very adamant about—these people can't do this, they can't do that, they don't know how to do this, they shouldn't be able to do that. There were Americans who were very protective of their turf. My area was the only area that got involved with Micronesians by and large. If you were in Public Works or Resources and Development or Education, you were working within a stateside structure, and the Micronesians who were in it were strictly laborers. In my area, they were more or less equals.
- Siemer: You mentioned the provincial tendencies of some of the members of the Congress of Micronesia back in the 1967-69 period. What was your sense about how the Marianas leaders were getting along with the leaders from the other districts back then?
- Craley: They never got along very well. They tolerated each other. The Marianas always had a superior attitude over the rest of the Micronesians, and the only other group that came close to them was the Palauans. The Marianas just kind of tolerated them. They weren't excited about the Micronesians, the rest of Micronesia. These were people who were kind of uncivilized. As I told you before, the men went around in thus [loincloths], and the women went barebreasted. I mean that was the generalization; it didn't apply to all of them. But they kind of felt that they were all in that group even though it didn't apply to all of them. The Marianas was always a little superior, and they had the home government eventually. The government wasn't on Saipan until I guess about 1963 or 1964. It had been on Guam before and then had been in Hawaii before that.
- Willens: Did you become aware as you assumed your duties out there that the Marianas had this long history of requesting reintegration with Guam and becoming part of the United States?
- Craley: Oh, yes.
- Willens: What was your reaction?
- Craley: Well, you see, that was contrary to the U.S. policy as I understood it at that time. The concept was to keep all of Micronesia together and to not allow it to fragment with even a part of it becoming part of Guam. So that was kind of (as far as I knew back in Washington) kept down, put aside.
- Willens: But when you got out there and you saw that the Marianas adhered to that position, did you think that the other districts might be persuaded to agree with the Marianas and become part of the United States as a single entity?
- Craley: Yes. But not precisely as you're saying it. The Marianas was always interested in becoming part of Guam because they saw that as a way to move on. When the Congress was created,

now they had a new vehicle, and they weren't quite sure how this vehicle tied into that approach. So for a while, they were willing to work with this new vehicle and they let this other idea kind of simmer on the back burner. It was only after maybe three, four, five years that they determined that this new vehicle wasn't going anywhere as far as the Marianas was concerned, because now they're starting to talk about nationalization and becoming independent countries.

Siemer: Once that talk started, what was the Marianas reaction?

Craley: They kind of started to look back toward the Guam affiliation again and the U.S. affiliation.

Siemer: In that initial period when you were out there in 1967 and 1968, were there resource allocation issues in the Congress of Micronesia about who was getting a larger share?

Craley: Oh, sure. Always.

Siemer: What effect did that have on the relationship between the Marianas and the other districts?

Craley: Not any more so than anywhere else, because the Marianas always got more. If it didn't get it from the Congress, which it probably didn't, it got it from the Administration. We had roads, we had telephones, we had power plants that operated, we had water systems that operated.

Siemer: And those were outside the Congress of Micronesia's appropriations?

Craley: Oh, yes. The Congress of Micronesia's appropriations were rather small, very small. And they attempted to dole them out district-by-district on a fairly fair basis. Now nobody ever got what they felt they should have out of the pie. They wanted bigger than what they got. And the Marianas was no different than anyone else. But the Marianas couldn't complain about the money that came down, because the headquarters was there, the High Commissioner was there, anyone who came to the Trust Territory came to Saipan first, the hotels started to be built there, we had paved roads when the other districts didn't have them for 15 or 20 years, and the airport and the harbor were developed. So yes, they would have liked more, but the gripes that they had about what they got from Congress were small by comparison to what they got through the Administration.

Siemer: When you took over as Commissioner for Public Affairs, were there any means of distributing news in private hands?

Craley: Yes, I think there were a couple fledgling efforts made. We started the Micronesian News Service. That was a creation of the Micronesians on my staff. They approached me with the idea that they'd like to put out a news service to tell people throughout the Trust Territory what was happening at the Congress of Micronesia. So I think it was the first year I was there, 1967 (although it may have been 1968), we turned out a Micronesian News Service program for the Congressional session. It was strictly confined to that. It worked so well and they liked it so much that they said can we continue it? And I said why not? And we tried it and did it. I had some hassles with the High Commissioner and others because every once in a while they would report some things that the Administration didn't particularly like to have reported and in a way that they didn't like reported. I had to defend it on many, many occasions, not only on Saipan but more importantly back in Washington. But it kept going; we kept it going. That's not private, now, that's the government. But there were other newspapers that started to come about. Some lasted very short periods of time. Joe Cruz had one. I don't know whether you can find any of those old newspapers.

- Willens: It was called The Free Press?
- Craley: Yes. And oh, they talked about Mt. Olympus and the gods of Mt. Olympus.
- Willens: That was you.
- Craley: Oh, everybody up on the Hill. I don't think I came out of that too badly.
- Willens: What was your assessment of Joe Cruz?
- Craley: Joe was a good fellow. I enjoyed working with Joe. He was a bombastic type fellow and kind of showy and loud mouthed, but he had some good points. He had some good ideas. A lot of these people did. I can't even remember the fellow's name that used to drive around with a Russian flag on his antenna which infuriated the State Department and some of our people.
- Willens: Was that in the early years or later on?
- Craley: Yes, in the late 1960s, early 1970s.
- Willens: Williander?
- Craley: No. Hans Williander was from Truk.
- Willens: What was your assessment of Senator Borja?
- Craley: I'll tell you a story about Oly. Oly was on the Status Commission when it met with Haydn Williams. The Status Commission was made up, as you know, of two members from each district, and Oly was one of the two from the Marianas. Haydn used to try (as most Americans did) to pressure them into resolving issues. "Let's resolve this," he'd say. "We've had this in front of us, we've discussed it, now what's your thinking about it? Can we vote on it?" Well they're not about to vote on anything. They want to go back and talk to their people and think about it. And he would press and press and press. "I don't want to leave today until we get this resolved [table pounding]." The hour would get down around 4:30 or 5:00 and they knew that he wasn't about to get up from the chair and leave until he could get a vote on this. So finally they would turn to Oly and they would say, "Senator Borja, what's your position on this?" Well, Oly could take this much . . .
- Siemer: Two inches of text.
- Craley: . . . and say it 13 times. And keep it going for 30 minutes. He could go over it, say it again, and resay it. Haydn would sit there, and after a while he'd take his glasses off, and Oly was still talking. After a while longer, he would start to swing his glasses. (I can't do it the way he did it.) And when he did that, they knew they had him. And finally he would say: "Senator, I appreciate what you've said. Let's adjourn for the day and come back tomorrow." And the meeting was over. So Oly had his 15 minutes, which was actually 30 or 35 or 40, and he went out of there, oh, he was feeling great, because they had recognized him and they had allowed him to speak. Oly was the, "Let's kill the meeting," guy. But he never knew it. He never knew that this was his role. I'd sit there and watch this and just smile. The biggest mistake we [the Americans] made [in the status negotiations] was changing people every two years or every three years. The Micronesians kept basically the same Status Commission from the beginning to the end. They saw these guys come; they saw them go. They saw new ones come; they saw them go. And they just wore them down. Not only that, but they knew it. They knew it from the beginning. They were great at negotiating because they just outlasted the U.S.
- Willens: Do you remember Benjamin Manglona?

- Craley: Oh, yes. Ben was great.
- Willens: What was your assessment of him?
- Craley: Very bright young man. Very conscientious man at that time. Ben was very great. He was good. He was conscientious. He was dedicated to his people. When they had typhoons in the Marianas, he would be out building houses back up again and pouring concrete and doing things. He was good. He was very good.
- Willens: How about Dr. Palacios?
- Craley: Frank Palacios—very good also. Frank was part of the Territorial Party and had views that were quite different from the Popular Party, but he was very dedicated also. A lot of his thoughts I didn't agree with, but you could always talk to Frank. You could sit down and have a conversation with him and he would hear you out. And he would not only hear you out but he would consider what you were talking about.
- Siemer: Were there any radio stations in private hands back then?
- Craley: No. We [the TT Administration] had the only radio station.
- Siemer: When did the TV station get set up?
- Craley: I would guess very late 1960s, early 1970s. Scott Kilgore set it up. It was kind of a cut and paste setup, but it was strictly for the Marianas. The radio station was one of the divisions that I had under me. That was initially headed by Americans and then eventually was turned over to the [Marianas] district and the district [government] operated it.
- Siemer: When did the *Marianas Variety* become important?
- Craley: It was started a couple of years after that. The *Marianas Variety* and *News*. That was started by Abed Younis and his wife Paz.
- Siemer: Was that the first newspaper that had any staying power?
- Craley: Well, there was one in the Marshalls. It had been started by the Peace Corps. The Peace Corps came out and they helped get these kind of things started. I don't think the Peace Corps was involved in Joe Cruz's paper. But I'm sure the Peace Corps was involved in most of the other newspaper efforts throughout the Trust Territory. Some of them started out as quasi-government publications.
- Siemer: Newsletters coming out of the DistAd's office?
- Craley: Yes, but they were developed by Peace Corps volunteers. Some of them were strictly private operations with Peace Corps involvement. But we started to have newspapers popping up all over the Trust Territory in the late 1960s when the Peace Corps came out.
- Willens: What was your assessment of the Peace Corps program in the Trust Territory?
- Craley: I was positive on it. It was quite a confrontation there between John Pinsetich and Bill Norwood. Both of them were Hawaiians. John was the first Peace Corps Director for Micronesia, and he was from Hawaii. And Bill Norwood was from Hawaii. John had the perception that the Peace Corps was there to save Micronesia from the incompetent people who couldn't do anything right in the United States who got sent out to Micronesia. That's what we all were. John came out with that attitude, and I'm sure that he instilled that concept in the minds of the volunteers. You're going out there to save the place. You're going out there to right everything that's being mishandled. I had the responsibility for liaison between the TT government and the Peace Corps, which I enjoyed.
- Willens: You served that function?

- Craley: Not on paper. Jim Hawkins, who was the Commissioner for Education and Community Services, I guess it was called, he was the contact. But I was involved in the orientation programs. I traveled to some of their sites and met with the volunteers before they came out to Micronesia and, as a consequence, I maintained contact with them after they got there as I traveled through the districts. I did a considerable amount of travel during those first three or four years. I would always meet with Peace Corps volunteers every time I was in a district. And we would have one or two or three meetings based on how many they wanted to have. Then at one point John Pinsetich got the idea that we should establish a communication system in the Trust Territory in terms of newspaper, radio, and television. So he recruited I think it was some 42 Peace Corps volunteers. Fred Kluge had a Ph.D. in Journalism. We had other volunteers that had Masters Degrees. We had a lot that had Bachelor Degrees. And we were going to have in each of the six districts six media type volunteers plus six at headquarters. So we were going to end up with 42 Peace Corps volunteers who had come from this communications program. Now he didn't get 42.
- Willens: That was the proposal that he made to the Interior Department or to the Trust Territory Administration?
- Craley: I think he made it to the State Department and to the White House. Somebody bought it, because it came into being. I was not involved in the original planning or concept of it. I got involved after it had happened. We had all these volunteers. This group in particular came out to Saipan and spent about two weeks with me, understanding our radio broadcast setup and our public information broadcast. They were the ones that then went out into the districts and started to carry these programs out. They went to work in the radio stations which were all ours, and they went to work with individuals in getting little newspapers going.
- Willens: What prompted the controversy about the Peace Corps?
- Craley: Well, it was the fact that John took the position that Norwood and his people didn't know what they were doing and didn't know how to do it and that the Peace Corps was the only thing that would do it and do it correctly. I mean this is like having two High Commissioners. One of them had 500 and some volunteers, and one of them had the rest of the organization. And a lot of times they worked at cross purposes.
- Willens: Can you give us any examples of working at cross purposes?
- Craley: Well, the agricultural officer [for the TT government] says we're going out and we're going to raise lima beans, and the Peace Corps says no, you don't want to raise lima beans, you want to raise cauliflower.
- Siemer: Approximately how many employees did the TT have out there at the time?
- Craley: Well, if you took the whole Trust Territory, you had about 12,000.
- Siemer: But having 500 Peace Corps volunteers would give the Peace Corps Director a fair amount of horsepower.
- Craley: Oh, yes. Because these people were out working with the people. Except for Public Affairs (and maybe I'm being somewhat prejudiced here), the rest of the TT government was working with TT programs as they saw the need for them. The Peace Corps was out there saying to the people: "What do you want?" And, "Let's do it."
- Siemer: They were able to come back and say: "The people don't want lima beans."
- Craley: Well, they didn't come back and say it, they just went ahead and did it. And the Agricultural fellow came back and he reported to us that we've started a sweet corn project. And when

you went out to look at it, it was lima beans, because the Peace Corps had come along and said: "Sweet corn isn't the thing to raise here; you've got to raise lima beans." This was going on all programs—Education was the same thing. You know, we're going to teach this, we're going to teach that. And it took a long time before the two of them started working together.

Willens: Did there come a time when they started working more closely together?

Craley: Ultimately, yes. Bill Norwood left, and Pinsetich left. You still had spots where the old friction carried on or the old independence carried on, but gradually everybody realized Peace Corps was going to be here. Plus the fact that Peace Corps started to taper off in terms of numbers. I understand we got such a large influx because about the time Peace Corps came to Micronesia, certain other nations had decided they weren't going to take Peace Corps, and they suddenly had these volunteers that had been recruited into the system and they weren't quite sure what to do with them.

Willens: I have provided you with a document dated April 5, 1967 which is a letter from Ruth Van Cleve of the Department of the Interior to Miss Brown of the Department of State reporting on some conversations that members of the U.N. mission had in early 1967. There is reference in the letter to a quote from Mr. Norwood's letter to the effect that the Peace Corps volunteers "Are feeding the flames of Micronesian nationalism by counseling the Micronesian people that it is not certain that United States efforts are anything more than another exercise in 'developing an empire'." Do you have any recollection of discussions at about this time with members of the U.N. mission or Mr. Norwood on this subject?

Craley: Yes. I'm sure that this came up in our briefings with the mission during and at the time they were leaving the Trust Territory. Yes.

Willens: Did they tell you and other members of the Administration that Peace Corps volunteers were taking an activist role with the Micronesians on the subject of political status?

Craley: Yes. As the U.N. mission visited through the Trust Territory, they would make themselves available to not only groups that they wanted to see, but any other group that wanted to see them. And I think mutually they both wanted to see each other, that was the mission and the Peace Corps, and they always had, as I did when I traveled through the districts, a very receptive group of volunteers that would come and talk to you.

Willens: What was your general assessment of the role of the U.N. visiting missions that came out there every three years or so?

Craley: Well, they were helpful in the fact that they gave the Micronesians an outlet for some of their frustrations, concerns. If you had difficulty getting them to speak to you about some of their ambitions or concerns or whatever, you could always go and sit in on the U.N. meeting and hear them talk to the visiting mission. It sometimes created problems for you, because they brought up things that weren't fairly represented or inaccurately represented, and the mission would go off sometimes half cocked because they would presume that the way it was explained was the way it really was. But I always felt that the missions, that the visits of Congress, and as I said earlier the Peace Corps, were always very helpful because it was another voice. Let me give you an example of why this was useful. Early in my tenure in Micronesia I would go back to the U.N. and to the U.S. Congress from time to time. I remember leaving one time while the Congress of Micronesia was in session, and I told the Congress of Micronesia that when I returned I would report back to them on my visit and what had happened. When I returned to the Trust Territory, and

eventually you could come back through the islands instead of going out to Guam first, I stopped off in Truk. And I met with Tosiwo Nakayama and Chief Petrus and about eight or ten of the Trukese leaders. We met in one of their classrooms (it was in the summer and the classroom was empty). We went into this room, and I sat at the end of the table, and all the Micronesians sat along the table. Chief Petrus was down at the very end, and I think Tosiwo or somebody else was over on this side at the end. I gave my little talk on what I had been doing and where I had been, and I said I would be very glad to discuss any of these matters or answer any questions that you might have. And I stopped. And for the first time in my life (I'd been there about a year and a half at that time), I waited. And we sat there at that table for about six or seven minutes—and I mean it seemed like an eternity—without a word being said. I didn't smoke; some of the other members lit up cigarettes and smoked. And the whole group of us—there were about 12 of us in the room—sat there. Nobody said a word. And for once in my life I didn't say well, thank you very much, and get up and walk out, which is what I probably would have done six months or a year before. I sat there. I didn't have anything else to do except just sit there and kind of look around. After about six or seven minutes, I saw Chief Petrus make an eye movement to Tosiwo, and a few moments later Tosiwo asked a question. And we sat there for another two hours and talked. Micronesians were not prone to talking. Now the Saipanese are a little bit different; they'll tell you what they're thinking pretty quickly. But the rest of the Micronesians—Trukese in particular, and Ponapeans as well—aren't too prone. Most Americans didn't hear Micronesians because they never took the time to listen. They made their presentation, they pushed for some kind of an answer, and if they didn't get an answer they'd accept silence as consent, and say "Well thank you very much, I appreciate it," and get up and walk out. The U.N. and the U.S. Congress, to a degree, gave the Micronesians an opportunity to talk. They would talk to strangers quicker than they would talk to those of us in the Administration. Their tendency with us was to tell us things that they thought we wanted to hear and to tell it to us the way we wanted to hear it. So if you said: "Here's my proposal; do you think it's a good idea?" Well, if they didn't say anything negative, then Americans assumed they thought it was a good idea and just said: "Well, let's get out of here."

Siemer: How did you deal with that problem with the people who worked for you?

Craley: I had the same frustrations initially. I think to a degree I retained that frustration longer with them than I did with the members of Congress, because the people that worked with me were my employees, and I expected something more from them. Perhaps I was a little more intolerant of them than I was of the members of Congress, plus the members of Congress were my equals. So I might have been a little bit short with them and not as tolerant, not as willing to sit back and listen. But I think also over the period of time they came a little bit toward me and I came a little bit toward them, so we eventually established some kind of a reasonable communication. But I'll never forget that meeting in Truk, and I'll never forget sitting at that table for what seemed like an eternity. I know it was every bit of ten minutes. It had to be. And nobody said a word; nobody made a sound. Cigarettes got lit, cigarettes got put out, cigarettes got lit again, cigarettes got put out again. And finally Chief Petrus made some eye movement to Tosiwo, Tosiwo asked a question, and from there on we had a dialogue. And it wasn't me talking; I mean it was a dialogue. They were telling me what they thought. They were reacting to what I had said to them earlier. And I would have never gotten that had I not sat there. I learned from that meeting that whenever I went out and met with a group of Micronesians I was going to sit there as long as it took to have them start talking. Otherwise, all I was doing was telling them what I thought. I wasn't learning anything from that experience.

- Willens: Did you share the view that is set forth in this letter of April 5 that the United States should consider proceeding unilaterally to invite the Micronesians to associate with the United States without any other formality? There's a suggestion in here that you tended to support that course of action.
- Craley: Yes. I did at that time. When I went out there, I was of the opinion that the Micronesians were at that stage in the political evolutionary process interested in becoming affiliated with the United States. They were looking for some indication that the United States was interested in bringing about such an affiliation. Nothing ever came from the United States during the Johnson Administration. We couldn't get anything going. Everybody was working on it. Interior was working on it; State was working on it. This is what we were being told, but nothing ever came forth, and the Micronesians were getting frustrated. My feeling was, if you're going to do it, you've got to do it, and do it now.
- Willens: The second document that we've provided you does refer to the effort within the Executive Branch to get a joint resolution sent up to Congress to create a Commission. It happened to be a Bureau of the Budget memo as I recall dated June 1, 1967. Were you aware that there was this proposal for a presidential commission that never got adopted by Congress?
- Craley: Yes. We heard ripples of it out there, yes, that there was something like this going on and it was going to be forthcoming at a certain time. Of course, it never came forth.
- Willens: Did you think that using a presidential commission for this purpose was a good idea?
- Craley: I did, because I felt that you had to have it at a presidential level to get these three departments to work together. Otherwise you were going to keep this rivalry or friction among the three departments. The three departments couldn't agree—Defense, State and Interior—never could agree at this stage. My feeling was it would only come to be if you had a presidential commission that pulled the three of them in and said sit down, we're going to work this thing out. This is the White House talking, and it's going to be done. Yes, I did concur with that.
- Willens: Did you think it would be necessary to have Congressional participation in such a commission?
- Craley: I didn't see that, because Congress would only introduce five, six, seven more variations. I felt if you got your presidential commission and got the three departments finally agreeing to something that they could sign off on, then it would be taken to the Congress. But if you tried to throw the Congress on it initially it would be just some more elements there that would have to be satisfied and pacified.
- Willens: There was a reference in this memorandum at the bottom of page one that you were in Washington on your way to a U.N. Trusteeship Council meeting and that you would probably be meeting with Chairman Aspinall or other members of the Interior Committee to discuss political status issues. Do you have any recollection whether you did in fact have such meetings?
- Craley: I paid courtesy calls on them, but there was never anything of substance. I was not at that stage at any level in the Administrative hierarchy that they would sit down and spend a lot of time with me, no.
- Willens: Do you know whether Congressman Aspinall in fact favored the creation of a presidential commission or opposed it?
- Craley: I'm not sure at this point.

- Siemer: What did the State Department do, if anything, to prepare you folks in the TT government for the visiting mission visits?
- Craley: We would go back to Washington first, stop there on our way to New York. Most of our meetings would be with Interior. We would probably have one meeting with a representative from the State Department who would tell us in essence what subjects we were to defer to them on or they would respond to, and otherwise we would respond to things that were not off of our list.
- Siemer: When the U.N. would send its people out to the Trust Territories, they were almost always different members?
- Craley: Oh, yes, always, with one or two exceptions.
- Siemer: What did the State Department do to help you get ready to deal with them?
- Craley: Very little. We would have met them probably the year before.
- Siemer: When you were in New York?
- Craley: Yes. At the U.N. And the State Department and Interior would brief us on the delegation that was coming. The [U.N. mission] staff was many times consistent, not to the members of the mission.
- Siemer: How about State Department people? Did somebody come with the mission?
- Craley: There was always a person from the State Department that accompanied them, but it was usually somebody different, because they came out about on an average of every three years, so the State Department escort this year was different from the one that came three years before. But a lot of the U.N. staff remained fairly constant over the years.
- Siemer: The TT government seemed to have a focus on agriculture and fisheries programs at the time. There seemed to be a considerable amount of interest in agriculture and fisheries programs in the TT. Was that the case when you went out there?
- Craley: It was in agriculture, yes. There was a very good agricultural program. I say good because it looked good. I don't know how good it was in terms of ultimate production. But when we traveled to the Trust Territory in November and December 1965 and then when I got out there in 1967, there were agricultural experimental stations in Ponape and in various parts of the Trust Territory where they were doing things like raising coconuts and breadfruit and taro and other vegetables. And they even had a small piggery. They had a lot of agriculture programs. We were heavy on agriculture in those years. Fisheries came in I would say in the middle 1970s. I don't recall too much in the way of fisheries. Now this was an area that I wasn't personally involved with.
- Siemer: I understand.
- Craley: And I only remember seeing these programs as I traveled through the Trust Territories.
- Siemer: Both agriculture and fisheries involve a lot of hard manual labor.
- Craley: And that didn't happen.
- Siemer: Why was it that the Trust Territory government thought that that would happen?
- Craley: Because at the time they thought that that was about the only thing that was feasible for the Trust Territory. They weren't looking at so much as the end result as to whether it would happen, but if something was going to happen, this would probably be the most likely thing. There was no manufacturing and there was no tourism at that time. Transportation to the Trust Territory was limited in the early stages to a DC4 and an SA16. You flew from

- Guam out to the Marshalls and then you had to come back to Guam again. Agriculture seemed to be the thing that if anything was going to happen it would be agriculture.
- Siemer: Well, given human nature and your own knowledge of how much hard work there is in agriculture, I wondered if that was ever practical. It's very hard to get people who do not grow up in an agricultural tradition to go into agriculture in the United States because it is very, very hard work and in many areas not particularly looked up to.
- Craley: True. I guess one of the things we grasped onto, and I say we, although I didn't have any involvement in this, was the Japanese had raised sugar cane in a lot of the areas.
- Siemer: Using whom for labor?
- Craley: Using some Micronesians but mostly the Orientals, yes. But we simplified it. I mean if it could be done under the Japanese, it could be done by us. Not looking beneath the surface to see who was doing it.
- Siemer: So people had not focused on the fact that it was Okinawans and other non-Micronesians who had been actually supplying the labor?
- Craley: I think we just said they had it here before, we can do it again. Nobody went the step or two further that had to be done to say who did it. It wasn't the Micronesians.
- Siemer: I had the same question about fisheries. The conditions on commercial fishery vessels are very, very difficult.
- Craley: Sure they are. And there was no commercial fishing.
- Siemer: Why did the TT government think that Micronesians would flock to this calling?
- Craley: Well, that was a later development that took place sometime in the 1970s, and the Micronesians were the ones that kind of encouraged this. Certain nations came forward and offered them fishing vessels, and they got involved in the Law of the Sea thing where it went way beyond the U.S. concept of what's the [territorial] boundary. They saw these islands getting connected and they would own all the fish that are in these waters. The Japanese were coming in, and the Koreans were coming in, and the Chinese were coming in, and fishing, and boy, if they can do it, we can do it. So it was kind of an exaggerated viewpoint of their potential, and they were the ones that pushed that more so than the Administration.
- Siemer: That's helpful. It was a Congress of Micronesia vision that Micronesian-manned boats could sail out and bring back tuna and other valuable fish?
- Craley: And this new area under the new Law of the Sea thing would be restricted to them.
- Siemer: Well, that's a different point. If you can charge license fees, that's a very lucrative business.
- Craley: Oh, sure.
- Siemer: What I was focusing on was whether their vision was Micronesian-crewed boats going out for weeks at a time living under very difficult conditions and getting Micronesians to become involved in that sort of economic activity.
- Craley: They thought they could do that just like they thought they could sail these field trip vessels through the islands and maintain them, and they couldn't. You take a fellow away from his home for more than a week or so—he wants to go back home again. They got out on these field trip vessels and all they were thinking about was getting back to home. When somebody said we've got to go on to another island, they sometimes quit and just

turned around and went back. It was very unrealistic, but it prevailed, not successfully, but it prevailed.

Willens: In 1967 the Congress of Micronesia created a Future Status Commission. It issued an interim report in 1968, got an extension for a year, and then it issued a report in 1969. Did you have any working relationship with the Commission?

Craley: I was the liaison between the Executive Branch and the Status Commission, and I met with them on frequent occasions. I did a little traveling with them, not to the extent that Janet did. And I guess if I had to weigh it, it was more through Janet than through me that we kept up with their activities, although there were times when I was invited by them to meet with them. The first such meeting came when they met with the Interior Department back in Washington, and I came back to Washington with the Micronesians as part of their delegation.

Willens: What was the purpose of the meeting?

Craley: This was to get things started. We were going to sit down around this table and nobody was going to leave Washington until we had an agreement.

Willens: We're talking about 1969? Are you talking about an earlier stage?

Craley: No, it would have been 1969.

Willens: When did you first become aware in the 1967-1968 timeframe that the Commission was thinking of recommending free association, that is to say something different than being permanently affiliated with the United States?

Craley: They weren't at that stage. I didn't feel they were. They had this as one of the six or seven things that were being thrown in the pot, but I'm still convinced that in 1967, 1968, and even into the beginning of 1969, maybe we're pushing it at that point, but there was still a concept of becoming part of the United States. But about 1969, that started to wash away. And then they started to envision something other than affiliation with the United States.

Willens: Did you have any dealings with Professor Davidson?

Craley: I knew him. I didn't have too many dealing with him, but I was in meetings that he attended. He was concentrating on the Congress. Those people that came out in that capacity avoided the Trust Territory Executive Branch. They just felt, you know, I don't want to have anything to do with them.

Willens: I've sent you this letter to the President from Congressman Morton that attached to your three-and-a-half page memorandum dated I think in either February or March of 1969 that reflects some concern on your part as to what the United States should be doing in the Trust Territory.

Craley: Well, I was still hanging on to the concept that if the United States wanted to accomplish a permanent affiliation with Micronesia they had to do it now, and if they didn't do it now it was going to escape them.

Willens: Was there something specifically that prompted this letter or memo?

Craley: I don't know. I'd even forgotten writing it until you sent me this. I think it was Rogers who asked me to do it.

Willens: You think he solicited your views?

- Craley: Yes. He says in here, “Recently I asked a long-term personal friend to prepare for me a brief synopsis of his thoughts.” I didn’t even remember this thing existed.
- Willens: Do you recall in early 1969 any visits to the Trust Territory by people representing Secretary Hickel to prepare for a visit by Secretary Hickel?
- Craley: Oh, yes.
- Willens: What do you remember about these visits?
- Craley: Ron Walker came out. Edgar Kaiser came out.
- Willens: How early in the Nixon Administration did Secretary Hickel’s representatives come out on a fact finding kind of mission?
- Craley: Very early. Do you know the background of Edgar and how he got to Hickel?
- Willens: No.
- Craley: Edgar was a White House fellow, and he was attached initially to the White House. Lyndon Johnson took a liking to him. And when Johnson went out of office, Nixon didn’t want to have anything to do with Edgar Kaiser. So he got put out into Interior. I don’t know who made that selection or how it happened. But Hickel took a liking to him, and he became Hickel’s boy. One of the most embarrassing things I ever experienced was this meeting when I went back to Washington with the Micronesians in mid-1969 to meet Hickel (I went back at their request). We were escorted up into Hickel’s office to meet the Secretary, and Harrison Loesch, the Assistant Secretary for this program, was there, and Edgar Kaiser was there, and all the Micronesians were there, and I was there. This was a social greeting kind of thing—we all stand around and talk and chat and laugh a little bit. They’re here to sit down and do this meeting around the table. Nobody’s going back to Saipan until it’s done. And Hickel ends up by saying well I’m here to help you and I’m here to do what I can for you, and if there’s anything that you need in any way while you’re here, see my good friend Edgar. And he puts his arm around Edgar Kaiser. Harrison Loesch is standing next to him. Harrison is the one who is responsible for the program and in charge of it. And Hickel doesn’t say: “See Assistant Secretary Loesch.” He says: “See Edgar.” And Harrison never, I think (of course I wasn’t there except for that meeting and I don’t know what happened after that), really got a hold of the Micronesian negotiations. Edgar was the one who ran with the TT program for the longest period of time until he left there in the fall of 1969.
- Willens: What preparations were made in advance of the Hickel visit in May?
- Craley: Edgar would come out sometimes two times a week.
- Willens: And what would he do?
- Craley: He would meet with me, and meet with the High Commissioner and other people, primarily me, in setting up for this Hickel visit. And then Ron Walker came out, who was an advance man for him. I think Walker had been an advance man for Nixon. He came out, and we had two or three other people who came along. They set up the Hickel trip. Everything had to be run just like it was run for the Presidential campaign. I mean that was the whole system.
- Siemer: What was Edgar Kaiser like back in those days?
- Craley: This is my analysis of him: Edgar had grown up in the Kaiser industry setup, where the old man said we’re going to do it this way, and it’s going to be done, and that’s the end of it. Edgar had come out to meet with the Micronesians and he’d say this is what we’re

going to do, and this is our time schedule, and do you have any questions about it. And as I told you, if you don't sit there for ten minutes they're not going to say a word. Then he'd say: "Well, I appreciate that, and we're going to make this program work, aren't we?" And finally he got to the point where he'd say: "Tosiwo, we're going to make it work?" "Yes." "Bethwel, we're going to make it work?" "Yes, sir." And he'd get up and go. And as I drove him out to the airport (he was flying back to Washington, he'll be back on Friday but he's gone home today), he'd say, "Now I want to hear from you what they're doing." And he'd come back three days later and he'd say: "What's happening?" I'd say: "Nothing's happening." "What do you mean nothing's happened? I had it all arranged when I left here. What happened?" And after about the third or fourth visit, he'd say: "What are you doing to this program? Every time I leave here it's all set up. Every time I come back nothing's happened." And I don't think that Edgar ever reached the point where he understood that things were not going to happen in Micronesia that way. And he finally just kind of gave up, I guess. Well, his White House fellowship ended and he went on to other things. I've lost track of him.

Willens: Do you know whether Hickel himself made the decision to come out or whether he was directed by the President?

Craley: I don't know that.

Willens: Did you learn in the preparation for Hickel's visit that the new Administration was re-examining policy for the Trust Territory and trying to develop some new position?

Craley: Yes. We were more or less told that by every Administration. Each Administration was going to do what the other one had failed to do or was going to do it better, sure. But details—no. I didn't have any details.

Willens: What is your recollection now of the Hickel visit?

Craley: It was a show and tell thing, dog and pony show as we used to call these things. They'd come out with their groups, and we'd have big meetings and parties. The Marianas Legislature would throw a luau one night and the High Commissioner would throw one the next night and then the Saipan Municipal Council would throw one. They would go around and visit the hospital and see the dock and go out and see some agricultural program. You know, the days went by and the parties came at nighttime and then two days later they were off.

Willens: Hickel gave a speech in which he announced for the first time that the United States wanted to explore a permanent relationship with Micronesia and invited a delegation of Micronesians to come to Washington later to discuss that matter. He also announced an action program of various steps. Do you recall the speech that he made and how the Micronesians responded to it?

Craley: No, I don't. I'm sorry, I don't. The only thing I remember is I have a framed picture from Walter Hickel: "To Neiman, one of my team—Wally Hickel." And I don't even know where it is any more.

Siemer: Were there other things that you recall about Hickel personally when he was out there?

Craley: The sun always shined where Wally was—that's what his wife kept saying. The sun always shines where Wally goes. No, I don't recall much. We had so many Secretaries of Interior during the Nixon Administration that it was kind of hard to keep track of them. And of course being out where we were, sometimes we wouldn't find out. Well, I'm sure others found out through the High Commissioner, but we didn't find out for a day or two or three or four after it happened.

- Willens: The document dated June 13, 1969, is a Department of State document that suggests that you and High Commissioner Johnston were coming in for a conference. There's a reference here to the preparation of an organic act and that Congressman Aspinall wanted to have an organic act enacted by Congress as a way to resolve the status issues in Micronesia. Do you recall any discussions in which you participated in that subject?
- Craley: I recall the events but not the details. About the only thing that I can recall is that they got hung up on how this was going to relate to other U.S. territories. It got bogged down very quickly. As I remember, you couldn't do something that hadn't been done in Puerto Rico or hadn't been done in the Virgin Islands or American Samoa or Guam. And until you tried to satisfy all those areas in terms of this new one—nothing ever came of it that I know of. These were exercises that were initiated, but you never saw anything coming out of them, because at some stage they got bogged down back in Washington. We never saw the product. At least at my level we didn't.
- Willens: Do you have any recollection of Mr. Kaiser coming out in the summer of 1969 with a draft organic act to show it to the Micronesian leaders?
- Craley: No. Edgar made so many trips out there. And usually he would arrive on the first flight one morning, and he would leave either that night or the first flight the next day. These were such fast trips, and he always was selling something. He was selling the program, and he was selling it just as I indicated—by having a meeting and telling these people what he was going to do or what the United States was going to do and asking their reaction and not getting any and concluding that that was a positive reaction and leaving. It was like a storm. You got the feeling after a while that a little cyclone had come through. And there would be another one—he's going to be back on Friday or next Monday. And you just kind of took it for the day it was there, and you went back to what you were doing the next day, and then two days later he'd come out again. He was an interesting fellow, but he would drive me nuts, absolutely nuts.
- Willens: Did you participate at all in the preparations on the U.S. side for this first round of negotiations that took place?
- Craley: No.
- Willens: Did you know what the U.S. position was going to be when you attended that first round of negotiations with the Micronesians?
- Craley: No. I was invited back by the Micronesians. You see, I was a Democrat, a former Congressman, in a Republican Administration. And they didn't want to really acknowledge me, but they felt that they either had to or the Micronesians wanted me there. So I was kind of tolerated.
- Willens: Well, did you participate with the Micronesians in preparing their positions for the negotiations?
- Craley: No. And I didn't consider this a slight. I mean they were doing their thing.
- Willens: What did they do, if you know? What did they do to prepare?
- Craley: Well, they would meet with people like Davidson or Meller or anyone else that had been a consultant to them. I was not a consultant to them. I was a friend, but not a consultant. And their meetings would be private. I was on standby. If they wanted me, I was available. I would do whatever they wanted. And I served largely as a liaison between them and the Interior Department or the group that they were meeting with. And I was kind of comfort factor. We just had a good relationship. I didn't play a vital part in it at all.

- Willens: At the time they came to Washington for the first set of negotiations with the federal government, do you think they were still prepared to negotiate some permanent relationship under the sovereignty of the United States?
- Craley: I think that had become less of a factor than it had been six months or a year before. I think it was still on the table, but it had kind of been pushed over toward the side. And they weren't quite sure what was here, but they hadn't thrown this off yet.
- Willens: What is your recollection of the way in which those discussions unfolded?
- Craley: Oh, well, see they had these advisors that were giving them advice on these various issues. They would find issues that were of a troublesome nature, and these usually popped to the top very quickly—land and finances and citizenship. Land was very important—whether Americans would have the right to move out there and buy land, whether the U.S. could condemn land, take land. These were matters that were of importance to them to be dealt with and resolved before they looked at the future status. Until you resolved these issues that were of importance to them, they weren't about to contemplate the final picture
- Willens: What was your evaluation of the United States delegation headed by Assistant Secretary Loesch?
- Craley: Loesch got a bad deal in this process. I told you the story in the Secretary's office where Hickel said, if you have anything you need or want, see my friend Edgar. I think he cut the ground out under Loesch. The Micronesians attached a lot of the significance to this: "If you got a problem, don't worry about going to the Assistant Secretary; call Edgar Kaiser." And from there on out, Loesch never got a real crack at it. I don't know that he ever got a firm position from the other three departments, and I don't think that he got the support that he needed from Hickel. Eventually it was taken away from him. That's when Haydn Williams came on board. And Haydn came on with an entirely different set of ground rules than Loesch ever had. Loesch was a nice guy, but he was never really a player in it.
- Willens: Was it your understanding that the United States wanted the Micronesians to sign up to an organic act?
- Craley: I think they wanted the Micronesians to sign up to some document that would make them a permanent part of the United States.
- Willens: Was the United States prepared to compromise on the issue of eminent domain?
- Craley: I don't think they were.
- Willens: There is some suggestion in the documents that Secretary Hickel tried to work out a compromise after the negotiations; namely, to try to persuade State and Defense that the eminent domain power would be deferred or restricted and that he represented to them that the Micronesians then might agree to a permanent relationship with the United States. Did you hear about any discussions along those lines?
- Craley: No.
- Willens: Do you think that was a line of a compromise that might have been acceptable to the Micronesians?
- Craley: No, I'm not sure that it would have been. At that point they were still grasping. And I think if you resolve one of these issues with them, they would have said well what about this one and this one. They weren't solidified in their own minds as to what they wanted and what was best for them. They set up these straw men to get them knocked down, if any of them ever did get knocked down, and I'm sure as soon as you knock one of them

down, if you ever did, they would still say well there's still this, this, this and this over here. The Micronesians weren't about to be pushed, and nobody on the U.S. side recognized that this was going to be something that was going to take years. You weren't going to do it that one week in Washington, and you weren't going to be doing it the next time you met. The U.S. kept thinking we have got to get this thing together and go out there and get these fellows to sign off on it. And I don't think resolving one of these things would have brought it about.

Willens: One of the issues that was discussed was the desirability of having a constitutional convention for the Micronesians. That was on the list that the Micronesians wanted the United States to agree to, and the United States at this first session did not agree to permit the Micronesians to have a constitutional convention. Do you think it would have been a good idea at that stage to have let the Micronesians conduct a constitutional convention?

Craley: Probably so, but I think the United States was afraid of it. They were afraid of having anything formal come out that they didn't have input or control over, so they wanted the status quo until it was able to be changed according to their plan. They didn't have a plan, and they weren't about to let the Micronesians develop one.

Willens: With the benefit of hindsight as to what happened in 1975 when there was a constitutional convention, do you think a convention five years earlier would have revealed the same differences among the districts that emerged in 1975?

Craley: Perhaps only if you were very perceptive, because their differences didn't start to manifest themselves until they began to realize that at some point in the near future the United States might not be around anymore.

Willens: What point was that?

Craley: It was a slow evolving development that I think took place over a period of three or four years. As they looked ahead, they realized that it was no longer we the Micronesians versus you the U.S., but it was we the Palauans versus you the Marshallese, and we the Trukese versus you the Saipanese. They suddenly realized their unity over the years had been because there was a third party there. Once you start to remove that third party, then they started looking at each other, and they realized they didn't have a unity anymore.

Siemer: Was it your sense that the Micronesians in that critical turning point period, 1968, 1969, 1970, had the sense that the United States needed that strategic location?

Craley: Oh, yes. There were people that came out and said this. The Trusteeship Agreement said it was a strategic trust. We had military people coming out there all the time and going through the islands. And you know I remember one group in particular—purple suit group—that came out with representatives from all services.

Siemer: Purple suit group?

Craley: That's what they called them when it was all the different military services.

Willens: Is that the one where Lt. General Walt from the Marine Corps came out?

Craley: No. He came out all by himself. Mensch was the head of this purple suit group. He was a colonel at the time. He was Air Force, and he was head of it. Then there was a top-ranking officer from the Army, one from the Navy, and one from the Marine Corps. And they had various staff. It was all the services.

Willens: About when would that have occurred?

- Craley: Well, I went back to the Air War College in 1972 as a result of Mensch's visit there, so it would have been sometime in late 1971 or the early spring of 1972. And we had other groups. He wasn't the first one, but he was the biggest one that came out there. They came out with briefing books that had been prepared in anticipation of the invasion of those islands, and they talked about the monkeys and types of snakes that we had and all this kind of thing. I said to him, "Where did you get this stuff?" Well, this is what they found in their archives that were briefing materials for the invasion of these islands. And they had no information on these islands after about the middle of the 1930s when the Japanese sent them down. They were still working off of those in the early 1970s. I mean they had the area for 20-some years at that point—more than 20 years.
- Willens: Did you become aware during those visits that there were plans to build a military base on Tinian?
- Craley: Well, Tinian was the biggest one, although at that stage, 1972, this wasn't an announced thing. But we'd always visit Tinian. The military writer for Reader's Digest came out. I forget who he was. He was supposedly the Reader's Digest military expert. He came out. Everybody that came out that had some kind of military training or military exposure, either in the civilian sector or in the military. Everybody would always go to Tinian, and they would always look at the docks, and they would look at the airstrips. You couldn't help but from osmosis realize that if we're ever going to do anything in the Trust Territory it's going to be in either Tinian or in Babelthaup, and Babelthaup didn't have any infrastructure. So Tinian was the logical place. Babelthaup didn't have a good harbor. Of course, Tinian's harbor wasn't all that great either, but it had been built to accept ships.
- Willens: After your participation in this first round of negotiations, did you play any similar role in subsequent negotiating sessions that the Micronesians had with the federal government?
- Craley: Yes. I was back on one more session. Janet and I were on home leave, and we were up in Maine. Somehow they got word to me (I think either through my mother or my sister-in-law), and I called back to Interior and found out that there was going to be a negotiation in Washington and that the Micronesians wanted Janet to be there.
- Willens: Would that have been in May of 1970, which is when the next round of negotiations took place?
- Craley: Probably, although I'm a little bit vague on it at this time. But I remember we came back from Maine and went down to Washington. She stayed for the full negotiations as the verbatim recorder. I remember also that the State Department had somebody there, and of course he was a professional steno typist, but he had never heard Micronesians, and you had Roman Tmetuchl, who was a Palauan, and Roman used to say that none of the Micronesians could understand him except for Janet. The steno typist would sit over there at his machine doing this transcription and she would take it down in shorthand. Then after the meeting he would come over to her and ask her if she would provide him with a copy of her transcript, which she kindly did. And the next morning he was as well informed as anyone else . . .
- Siemer: As to what Roman had said.
- Willens: It was about this time that the Micronesians had rejected a so-called Commonwealth Proposal.
- Craley: That was more or less the end of Harrison Loesch's involvement. You're right. I'd forgotten about that. Harrison Loesch kind of dropped that one at a meeting, and that just turned them off totally.

- Willens: Did you hear about their reaction?
- Craley: Oh, yes. Oh, sure.
- Willens: What do you recall specifically?
- Craley: "No way. That's not going to fly."
- Willens: Who did you hear it from?
- Craley: From the Micronesians.
- Willens: Anyone in particular that spoke to you about it?
- Castro: I would say almost universally. I don't know that the Saipanese were very vocal about it, but the Trukese and the Ponapeans and the Marshallese and the Palauans were, yes.
- Willens: By that time, was it clear in your mind that they had crossed the line and were looking for something other than an affiliation with the United States?
- Craley: Well, they had crossed the line on what they interpreted a commonwealth thing to be. And they were rapidly phasing out of the idea of a U.S. affiliation. But that was the first time that there was something concrete mentioned with a name, and they just didn't buy this at all.
- Willens: Shortly afterwards they announced something called the Four Principles that emphasized sovereignty, self-determination, constitutional government and unilateral termination. Do you know where those Four Principles came from?
- Craley: Oh, they probably came from some of the advisors that they had acquired. You know they had advisors from different countries. Some of them were English-oriented or Australian, and these people were always feeding information into them regarding alternatives.
- Willens: Did the enunciation of the Four Principles come as a surprise to you?
- Craley: I guess in a sense it was a surprise, because they would have these meetings within their own organization. I guess Janet sat in on a lot of them, and I would probably learn about some of them prior to their being enunciated. I had the very difficult task of not talking about these things ...
- Willens: With the High Commissioner?
- Craley: Yes. Because if things that we talked about (we being Janet and I) in the evening got carried on to the High Commissioner, she would be out of it and I would lose whatever credibility I had with him. So there were a lot of times I was in a difficult position. I was getting information about what the Micronesians were thinking, and I didn't feel that I could convey that, and I didn't.
- Willens: Was there an official Trust Territory Administration position as to future political status at this time?
- Craley: No, because we couldn't get one coming from Washington, and we couldn't develop one on our own.
- Willens: Once Haydn Williams was appointed, what kind of relationship did the Trust Territory Administration have with Ambassador Williams?
- Craley: He would come out and meet with us and brief us, and that was about it. We were not an equal partner.
- Willens: Was that a problem?

- Craley: It wasn't a problem with me.
- Willens: Was it a problem to the Administration of the Trust Territory?
- Craley: I don't think Ed Johnston had a problem with it, because Ed kind of enjoyed his job and enjoyed what he was doing. He was willing to let these Washington types and Haydn Williams types do their thing.
- Willens: I've seen some reference in the materials that High Commissioner Johnston did make some overtures to the Congress of Micronesia to provide them with more of a role in reviewing proposed budgets, for example. Is that your recollection?
- Craley: Yes. Both Bill Norwood, Ed's predecessor, and Ed were basically amenable to working with the Congress of Micronesia. Ed relied on the Congress to keep his job. When Ed got appointed High Commissioner, some people said (and this is Edgar Kaiser talking), this guy was not going to be around long.
- Siemer: You told us that you had come back to the War College in 1972?
- Craley: The Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama.
- Siemer: What did you do there?
- Craley: All these various war colleges hold a seminar every spring to which they invite people from all across the United States. I'd been to several at the Army War College in Carlisle starting in 1965. Colonel Mensch had come out in either the fall of 1971 or the spring of 1972 as head of this purple suit group. He went back and talked to the Air Commanding Officer in the Pacific at that time who was stationed in Hawaii, Hickam Field. And I found out shortly thereafter that I was appointed to that seminar as one of the participants, and I attended it just as I had previously at the Army War College. The only thing that I contributed (if anything at all) was when they were discussing the Pacific, and if they got around to any discussions on the islands of Micronesia or the Trust Territory, then I became kind of a momentary source of information.
- Siemer: Did you see any increase of the level of sophistication in the military's approach to the Trust Territory over the time that you were there?
- Craley: The last exposure I had was in 1972. It was about that time, 1971, perhaps back as far as 1970, that I began to see and realize that the students at the college were now beginning to be non-World War II veterans, and I detected a difference between those seminars that I had attended in 1965, 1966, 1967 and 1968 versus 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972, because during the early stages this area was absolutely essential. No question. I mean there was no debate, no discussion. As it began to evolve that they had colonels and lieutenant colonels and captains and commanders who had not been in World War II, they weren't that convinced about it, and they were more open-minded. That was the major difference that I saw between the earlier years that I'd attended and the later years.
- Siemer: How about the TT government's relationship with CINCPAC? How did that work?
- Craley: Very closely. Whenever the High Commissioner, or in many cases myself, transited in Honolulu, we would always pay a visit on CINCPAC and meet with the Admiral who was stationed there at the time and discuss things at a very surface level. The military was very much involved with Micronesia and ultimately they had civic action teams coming out. Then later they had military liaison stationed on Saipan with the TT government.
- Siemer: When did that start—the military liaison?
- Craley: It started about 1972 or 1973, because it was just about that time that my involvement

with the military began to diminish. Of course it diminished as soon as they appointed a liaison. Then they had their own liaison instead of relying on the TT to provide that service.

Siemer: Was there a particular precipitating event that caused them to assign a liaison to Saipan full time?

Craley: I had a feeling that it kind of evolved along with Ambassador Williams. I'm just guessing; I don't know. There was nothing that I was advised of.

Siemer: Was that also true of the State Department status liaison officer that showed up about that time?

Craley: Yes. John Dorrance was the first one, and I think that was probably also at that time, yes.

Willens: What was your understanding of what John Dorrance's role was?

Craley: John was to keep the State Department advised as to what was happening in the Trust Territory, I guess primarily as it related to future status and the relationship with the United States. John was a very interesting character and played his role in a manner that I'd never seen anyone else play it.

Willens: How would you describe it?

Craley: Do you know John at all?

Willens: No. He's now deceased.

Craley: John was very young and in command. He could do anything and perform anything. He regarded himself as very competent, very expert in his field, and he wanted to relate to the fellows, the Micronesians. And he had an unusual way. I think he was part of the Dorrance-Campbell Soup group, I think; I think that's his background. He didn't relate to the Micronesians any more than Edgar Kaiser understood their method of operation. He would kind of push them in what he thought was a very sophisticated, subtle way. "Well now what do you think about this? Do you think they'll do this? Do you think they'll do that?" And they started to play the game with him. They started to tell him things. Of course, he would go back and send off dispatches to the State Department. "I've talked with Senator so-and-so; I've talked with Congressman so-and-so; and they're thinking about doing this; and they're thinking about doing that." They found out that these things were getting sent back to Washington, so they started to tell him anything and everything. And the more ridiculous, the more fun they were having.

Willens: Who were the principal players on the Micronesian side?

Craley: Almost anyone that he could talk to, of the Congress primarily. And when they were on-island, why they were a very willing group to kind of feed him a little something. One time I think it was some of the Saipanese that told him there was going to be a revolution on Saipan and that guns were being shipped over from Guam. Of course he kept pursuing this, and he finally got from them the day (and we only had one or two flights a day in those days). He got the day, so he sent back this dispatch that they were thinking of this, and everybody in the military on Guam should be advised of this and should check the planes and everything else and that he would be out at the airport to make sure and all this type of thing. Then of course when these things didn't happen, why then he would kind of send back dispatches that through his intervention and efforts this effort was abolished—I mean they gave up on it. He was always creating these crises that were about to befall us, and then they never did. Of course he was the one that had put them to rest. I just used to sit back and look at him; I couldn't believe first that he would believe all this stuff they

were telling him, and then I couldn't believe that he would send it back and then go along and tell them that no, he had corrected it, it had all worked out now.

Willens: Did anyone in the High Commissioner's office review his cables back before they were sent?

Craley: No. At one point (and I don't know exactly when it was, and I guess it was during the status negotiations), they put in a direct telephone to Washington so that they could pick up the phone just like I could here and dial a seven digit number and they'd be connected with an office back in Washington. Before they did that, they had their own equipment down in the status liaison office. It didn't go through the TT at all; it went from Saipan directly to Guam to the military, and then from there over secure lines to Washington. So it didn't go through us. Now I'm sure the High Commissioner was briefed from time to time when it became necessary to do so, but I don't think unless those briefings took place he really knew too much of what they were doing.

Willens: John Dorrance was succeeded by Mary Vance Trent. What is your recollection of her performance of those duties?

Craley: Mary was much more realistic than John was and much more laid back. You could get John excited in a minute. All you had to do was tell him that in a couple of hours there was going to be a truck coming down here with some bazookas on it, and he would be out there in the woods waiting for it to come. And then of course when it didn't, why they saw him and they went on by—something to that effect. She was much more realistic about it.

Willens: Did she have the same access to the Micronesians as he did?

Craley: Yes. Because his only access was to go to see them. I mean they wouldn't come to see John. I think (and I may be very unfair to him and I shouldn't be) they kind of regarded him as a joke in a sense. I mean he was so intense, and he was looking for things so intensely, and he kept pressing them and pressing them, "Are you going to do this, are you going to do that?" And a lot of times, these were crazy things to do, and he was trying to find out whether they were contemplating that, and they'd never thought of these crazy things. "Oh, yes, yes, we might do that." Then he'd go back and he'd say they might do this. She was much more realistic about it. I mean she was more professional in my opinion.

Willens: Did you ever read any of the study that Dorrance wrote during 1975-1976 when he was at the National War College in Washington?

Craley: No.

Willens: One of the points that he makes in that volume, which I guess was recently declassified, was that the Department of Defense had exaggerated the strategic need for the Trust Territory or for continued U.S. presence in the Trust Territory. Do you recall any conversations with him as to the military and strategic importance of the Trust Territory?

Craley: No. John and I didn't have a great number of conversations, because he was so intense on analyzing what he thought might happen, and I just felt I didn't have time for all this ridiculousness. I mean he was talking about weapons and they're going to join the Soviet Union and they're going to do this and they're going to do that. John and I did not have a very satisfactory relationship or dialogue, and we didn't spend a lot of time talking together. I don't recall our discussing the U.S. military role, although by that time, by the time John was out there, I think many of us felt that the old concept of a strategic trust was kind of outdated, and that there wasn't a military requirement for keeping the Trust

Territory as a part of the United States.

Siemer: Where was the LNO's office actually located?

Craley: Right inside the entrance at the Trust Territory Headquarters, as you walk in the main door. It used to be our mail room at one time. Then they took that over.

Siemer: Off to the left?

Craley: To the left. The door opened right off the lobby.

Siemer: Where was the military liaison officer located?

Craley: He was up on the second floor, as I recall, in part of the AG's corridor, which as you went up the steps to the second floor and came out, you'd turn to the right and go down toward the AG's office, and I think the AG's office gave him an office down there.

Siemer: Was there any other military group stationed in Saipan in those days, in the early 1970s?

Craley: No. We had civic action teams there, but that was later I think. No, it was strictly the military liaison and the status liaison.

Willens: In February 1971 the Congress of Micronesia buildings were burned. It was generally accepted that this was a work of arson and done by someone or some people from the Marianas.

Craley: That was the perception.

Willens: What was your understanding at the time as to the significance of this event?

Craley: Well, it was one of the steps in the process of separating the Marianas out from the rest of the Trust Territory. The Marianas at that time was beginning to show some disregard for the rest of the Trust Territory as being inferior, being not of the same status level that they were. There were differences that came up.

Willens: Was the incident investigated by the Trust Territory Administration?

Craley: That would have been under the Attorney General's office.

Willens: Do you know what the results were in terms of identifying the culprit?

Craley: No. They came away with (as I remember or as I know) no resolution to it.

Willens: What was the reaction within the Administration?

Craley: The reaction within the Administration was not as significant as I thought it should have been. The Congress was actually in session.

Siemer: They were almost finished, weren't they?

Craley: Yes. It was very close to the end. My wife was up at Roman Tmetuchl's house playing poker along with eight or ten other members of Congress. I had bowed out and gone home, and suddenly the power went off around one or two o'clock in the morning. I stepped outside to see what was happening and suddenly began to see flames coming up the Hill. We rushed up immediately and were the first people there. By the time we got there the thing was well under way.

Willens: Was it one building or more than one building?

Craley: Well, there were joint chambers—Senate on one side, House on the other. Then off of that were two buildings, the Senate office building and the House office building. They had set the fire in the chambers. They had tried to start it also in the Senate office end.

Both offices were down at the end closest to the chambers. We got that out without any problem, but the chambers had burned down. There was just no way of controlling it. They must have used gasoline or something on it, because there was such a heat and such an intense flame that you couldn't get anywhere near it.

Willens: Did the people who went up with you include the Micronesians who were at the poker game?

Craley: Yes.

Willens: And that included some members of the Congress?

Craley: Yes.

Willens: What was their reaction?

Craley: Oh, they were horrified.

Willens: Did they make any assumptions as to the cause for the flames?

Craley: Yes. Immediately the assumption was that it's the Marianas.

Willens: Do you recall whether there were any particular issues at the time that might have precipitated this?

Craley: Yes. I'm trying to think what some of the issues were at that time that brought about these differences between the Marianas and the rest of the TT, and I can't at this point. But there was an obvious ill feeling on some issue between the Marianas and the rest of the Congress, and I think there may have been some words spoken at one point in a session where you can go home if you don't like it here or something like that. I mean something dumb like that. And this fire happened a couple of days after that. There was some friction between the Marianas and the rest of the TT, and at this point, I can't recall what it was.

Willens: Were the Micronesians who worked for the Trust Territory Administration principally from districts other than the Marianas?

Craley: Mostly, yes.

Willens: And as a group, did those Micronesian employees of the Trust Territory have any sort of view about political status, if one could generalize about it?

Craley: I suppose they did. We didn't discuss it with them, because when it came to matters of status, we were not supposed to be involved. This was between the negotiating committee and the Congress of Micronesia. People at the Executive Branch were supposed to stay out of this.

Willens: Let me come at it this way. There was a perception among some of the Marianas leaders that the Trust Territory Administration was not in sympathy with the Marianas separatist movement and that this was caused in part by the fact that the Micronesians there were very influential policy makers. Do you have any recollection as to that concern?

Craley: Well, up until things started to fall apart so to speak in terms of unity, we weren't supposed to be in support of any separatist movement. The thrust was to keep the TT together. And while we didn't play any direct role in the status negotiations, we were always kind of under the gun to not do anything to break up this unity. So to that extent, you might say that yes, we were opposed to the separatist thing because we were supposed to keep the TT together.

Willens: When issues of taxation and allocation of resources were discussed in the Congress of

- Micronesia, would you be in attendance at those debates?
- Craley: Yes, because I sat in on all of the sessions. Yes, I was.
- Willens: Were there any efforts that you can recall within the Congress of Micronesia to try to deal with the issues that divided the Marianas from the other five district?
- Craley: Yes, I think there were. My recollection as you ask these questions is that the Marianas were a little more intent on resolving these things than the rest of the Micronesians were. When these discussions came up, the Micronesians would be inclined to want to discuss at this session, go home, and come back and talk about it next session. The Marianas got very annoyed with this approach and many times would kind of walk away from it. I think there was a possible tendency on their part to think that the rest of Micronesia was thwarting them by not resolving it, when in my opinion that was just their way of resolving things. The Marianas would have been much more inclined to get in and do something, and the rest of Micronesia didn't work that way. So you had two different cultures working there. I think the Marianas could very easily consider they're not being very cooperative, they're not being very sympathetic, anything of that nature, they won't resolve this, when in reality that was their way of doing things.
- Willens: Another issue that came up from time to time was economic development in the districts and what the role of foreign investment might be, for example, the extent to which funds should be made available for economic development. Were there differences among the districts with respect to economic development and, for example, the growth of the tourist industry?
- Craley: Yes, oh sure. The Marianas was very pro that and so was Palau, and to a lesser degree but more so than the rest of the TT, the Marshalls. Then you had Ponape, Truk and Yap who didn't really care about tourism and weren't prepared for it.
- Willens: Why were they either opposed to it or not prepared for it?
- Craley: Well, there was no infrastructure in their areas that would have made it possible. The Marianas was way up on this issue. Palau was very eager to get involved and to do something, and the Marshalls kind of figured that was about the only arrow in their quiver. The only arrow that they had was tourism, but they were out at the end of the line. They were farthest from Japan. They were closer to the United States, but there wasn't much U.S. tourism out there. And the other areas had nothing. Yap had a lot of picturesque area and charm to it in terms of quaintness, and they had some little hotel rooms there, but they weren't set up for any major tourism development.
- Willens: After the burning of the Congress of Micronesia buildings, the Congress held a special session in Truk in the spring of 1971. Did you go to that session?
- Craley: Oh, yes.
- Willens: Do you recall any boycott by the Northern Marianas representatives?
- Craley: I think there was, and part of it was planes, and part of it was other commitments.
- Siemer: There had been a typhoon right at the time, hadn't there?
- Craley: In Truk, yes.
- Siemer: Just before the Congress met?
- Craley: Yes. There was. Janet was down there at that time.
- Willens: Felipe Atalig, who was a Congressman from the Marianas at that time, did not comply

with the boycott and showed up. The others then came in three or four days later or whatever it was. Do you have any recollection of Congressman Atalig?

Craley: Oh, yes.

Willens: Can you share that with us?

Craley: Well, he was not one of the heavyweights in the Marianas at the time. I think he was trying to make a position for himself by acting independently from the rest of his delegation. I'm not aware of his motivation, why he decided to come and why the other ones didn't. I guess the other ones hung back because of the fact that there was going to be some hostility there on the part of the rest of the Congress as a result of the fire.

Willens: Was there?

Craley: No, I don't think there was. Micronesians were basically pretty polite, and I don't recall any hostility at all, that I know of.

Willens: Did you hear of the appointment of Ambassador Williams before it was made public?

Craley: I don't remember.

Willens: Did you have any impression at the time as to whether the appointment of someone like Ambassador Williams was a good step for the United States to take?

Craley: Well, in the absence of knowing anything really about it, Harrison Loesch was not really performing, or his organization wasn't really doing anything. There was kind of a hiatus there for a while. And the fact that somebody had been appointed at an ambassadorial level to move this thing forward, I guess I felt was probably a step in the right direction without even knowing who the individual was or what his program was. But it just seemed to me that we were getting it off the dime again and getting something going.

Willens: After the Congress of Micronesia announced the Four Principles that we referred to earlier, there was more or less of an impasse between the Micronesians on the one hand and the United States agencies on the other hand. Do you recall being queried by the Federal agencies as to whether the Micronesians were fully committed to these Four Principles or to express some other opinion as to how best to conduct the negotiations?

Craley: No. You've got to remember from my viewpoint that we as the Trust Territory Government were not directly or even indirectly involved with the status thing. And you didn't go and talk to a carryover Democrat in the Nixon Administration. I mean that Administration was very partisan, and I was only tolerated—be seen but not be heard a lot of times.

Willens: After Ambassador Williams began negotiations with the Joint Committee on Future Status, did the Micronesians consult with you at all?

Craley: No. By that time, I played a very small role in terms of the status matter. You had a State Department liaison out there at that point. They had gone through one or two rounds with Loesch and were starting to get familiar with Haydn Williams. My perception of Haydn was that he didn't want any outside interference, particularly from the TT. Both he and Wilson were what I would call kind of stuffed shirts. Now Admiral Crowe, or Captain Crowe at the time, was a much more relaxed and amenable guy. You could sit around the pool and talk with him. But the other two were above communicating with the hoi polloi. So I didn't have anything to do with it.

Willens: One document that we provided you is an MNS report from Saipan on June 19, 1972. It refers to a special report from the Joint Committee on Future Status for the Congress of Micronesia calling for a major new approach to government in the TTPI. The report was

prepared by four people—three Micronesians and an American. I think it may be that you were the American involved.

Craley: Yes.

Willens: The report apparently included many ideas based on a visit to New Guinea and other countries. Can you recall how it came to be that you got involved in this field trip?

Craley: Yes. Lazarus Salii and Carl Heine were invited by the University of Papua, New Guinea to come down and participate in a seminar that had to do with self-government or something closely related to that. Either they requested that Dwight Heine and I accompany them, or else somebody decided that we should accompany them, and I don't know quite how I got there, but I got there. The four of us went down to Papua, New Guinea, and Carl Heine and Lazarus both presented papers on future status of Micronesia I suspect. After the seminar ended, they decided to go on to Kuala Lumpur and examine some other emerging governmental possibilities. I stayed in Papua, New Guinea and did a rather extensive tour, meeting with Australians and Papua New Guineans. They were in the very early stages of developing their own government, and I was interested in seeing what they were going through and how they were doing it and what success they were meeting. Dwight and Carl and Lazarus went on to Kuala Lumpur, and then I guess Lazarus and Carl drafted this document.

Willens: Could you give us your assessment of Lazarus Salii as a leader in the Congress of Micronesia?

Craley: Lazarus was a very intense individual. He had very strong feelings about things. He and I ran into each other a couple of times because I did not necessarily agree with his positions and he took offense at that. I can remember one hearing we had when I differed with him, which was not the practice. You weren't supposed to do these things because Micronesians didn't like to be confronted face to face. I'm talking now not about Saipanese but about the other Micronesians. Lazarus got very offended and walked out of the meeting. I think Andon Amaraich was chairing the meeting at the time. He tried to, well he did, quiet me down or calm me down somewhat. Lazarus was very intense. He had very strong pronounced views, and he was just going to keep pushing those and moving them until they came through. In that sense he was a very effective leader because he didn't give up. He just kept moving, moving, moving on it. He was the principal on most of their status negotiations. He was one of the three or four strong people on that. Andon Amaraich was another. Amata Kabua to a degree. And then you could name several others that I'd have to go back and look at.

Willens: There came a time in 1972 when Andon Amaraich and Nakayama formed what was called an Independence Coalition, and it looked as though independence as an alternative was gaining support within the Congress of Micronesia. Did you have the sense at the time that there was a strong movement toward independence?

Craley: I think on the part of the Trukese, particularly.

Willens: Lazarus Salii has been described to us as someone who tried to stay in the middle and support the free association even though there were people who were advocating independence?

Craley: Yes, I think that's correct. And I guess if I had to say why, I think Lazarus still saw some kind of unity there. I think Lazarus was ambitious enough that he would rather be the president or the vice president of a unified Micronesia than what he ultimately became in

Palau.

- Willens: What can you tell us about Carl Heine? Did he play an important role in the work of the Joint Committee?
- Craley: No, I don't think he did. He played a role from time to time. Carl envisioned himself as quite a writer and quite a creative person. He was Dwight's younger cousin. He had the Heine name, which was a very prestigious name in the Marshalls, and he regarded his education as being somewhat superior to a lot of the Micronesians that he was working with. He was a member of Congress at one point but then did not get reelected. But he still proceeded to develop position papers and write things which he shared many times with the Congress. Sometimes they accepted them; sometimes they just said thank you and went on.
- Willens: Was there any formal action taken by the Congress with respect to the report that is summarized in this document?
- Craley: No. It created some (as I recall now, but I'd forgotten about it until I read this) excitement back in the Trust Territory headquarters because my name was attached to it, and everybody felt sure in Washington and to a lesser degree on Saipan that I shouldn't have been involved in it at all, but it never came to any significance of any nature.
- Willens: The United States agreed to separate negotiations in April 1972. Did you have any particular reaction at that time to the reversal of U.S. position?
- Craley: Micronesians did.
- Willens: What was their reaction?
- Craley: They felt betrayed, totally betrayed. As I get the story, the Marianas was interested in separate negotiations, and they went to the Congress to indicate that they were interested in negotiating separately and to discuss the thing with them. The Congress was negative to it. They had this Status Commission composed of 12 members, two from each district, and they weren't about to see this Commission fragmented. They did as they always did—you had a consensus which took some time. And in the meantime, they say they went to Haydn Williams . . .
- Willens: The Congressional leadership?
- Craley: . . . and said: "Have the Marianas approached you?" "Well, yes, there's been a little conversation." "Well, what is your position?" "We're going to deal with the entity as a unit." "If they come to you, what will you tell them?" "You've got to work with the group." Now I don't know the wording and I don't know how strongly this was expressed, but that was their understanding. So they went back, and when the Marianas came to them and said: "Well, what do you think?" "Well, if you want to do that, go ahead." And the Marianas did it, and Haydn Williams said: "We'll meet with you." And the consensus in the Congress was we've been shafted.
- Willens: So as you heard the story, the Congress of Micronesia leadership was surprised at the time the United States agreed to this.
- Craley: Absolutely. Surprised. Flabbergasted. Disappointed. Betrayed. These were their words. They felt they had a firm position from Haydn that there would be no separate negotiations. And that if the Marianas came to the U.S., they would be sent back to the group and told that they've got to stay together. That's why they gave their approval to the Marianas to go to Williams, because they were convinced that Williams would shoot them down and send them back. And when he didn't . . .

- Siemer: And you don't recall any contingency discussions about what they would do if the Marianas were able to elicit a serious interest from the U.S. in separate negotiations?
- Craley: No. I don't think they arrived at that point, because they were so convinced that there wouldn't be separate negotiations. Now once that became a fait accompli, then there was a difference.
- Siemer: Once they did understand that there was the possibility of separate negotiations, did they then revisit what they might do to hold the Marianas within the group?
- Craley: I don't think so. Now again, I don't know these things.
- Siemer: I understand that.
- Craley: But my feeling was let them go, we're done. We had a fire, you burned our Chambers, you want out, go.
- Willens: As I recall, you continued to have liaison responsibility with the Congress during the 1971 to 1976 period. Is that correct?
- Craley: That is correct. I was serving as a Special Assistant to the High Commissioner for Legislative Affairs, which was basically a liaison role between the Trust Territory Headquarters Administration and the Congress.
- Willens: During that period of time, were there any changes in the Congress of Micronesia that you recall as being of particular significance?
- Craley: A few, and I hadn't ever thought about this, but I think that we began to see some new faces emerging from the Congressional districts. There was a period of stability for a couple of years after the Congress was formed, and then gradually there was some competitiveness in terms of elections in the various districts. Every once in a while a new Congress would meet with one or two new faces. That would be one of the changes that I saw. And of course they started to put a major emphasis on status negotiations with the creation of their committee. That basically remained pretty stable in terms of make-up. Every once in a while there would be one member going off and one coming on. But that was pretty constant.
- Willens: Did you have the sense that the members of the Congress were becoming more comfortable with the legislative process?
- Craley: Oh, yes. But they took that on very quickly at the beginning. Micronesians, particularly Palauans and Saipanese, were not reluctant to assume that they could do almost anything they wanted to do. There wasn't much reluctance on the part of the members. They weren't very shy about assuming their responsibility and obligations, and they were always very willing to test the Executive Branch and see just how far they could push it.
- Willens: Was the Executive Branch becoming more amenable to letting the Congress of Micronesia deal with important matters such as the federal monies that came for the Trust Territory?
- Craley: Not necessarily so, no. The Executive Branch was committed to the concept of allowing this legislative body to grow and to develop, but there were still certain areas that they felt were theirs. They got a little bit ruffled every once in a while when the Congress would enter into those areas, and not only enter into debating them, but passing legislation that would affect them.
- Willens: What were the areas that the Executive Branch was most protective of?
- Craley: Well, I think you've touched on it basically when you talk about financial matters, because

the concept was this money was coming from the United States Congress and that the Executive Branch had the responsibility of seeing that it was administered properly and divided up among the districts in a reasonable manner and not misspent and not misused, not abused.

Willens: There was an issue in the early 1970s with respect to the return of public land by the United States to the Micronesians. What is your recollection of the way in which that issue was handled?

Craley: That was a matter that was more handled by the Department of the Interior and appropriate agencies within the U.S. government—the Department of Justice, than it was by the Trust Territory government. This was land that the United States government felt it had some jurisdiction over, and they more or less took this from the Trust Territory government and reserved it under their own doing. This was handled more or less like status, outside of us.

Willens: Did you think that return of the public lands to the Micronesians was an important U.S. initiative?

Craley: It was an important matter, but it had a lot of problems with it because in many cases it was extremely difficult to track this land back. Japanese records were not adequate in many cases. A lot of this land had been taken by the Japanese and had therefore been assumed by the United States government, as it was Japanese government land, and therefore it is now U.S. government land. In trying to discuss and determine what was going to happen to it, how it was going to go back [to the Micronesians] you had to find out who actually lived there. There was a period of time when the Chamorros were taken off of Saipan and moved to places like Yap and Guam, and the Carolinians moved in and took over a lot of the land that the Chamorros had had. When the Chamorros were allowed to come back, there were Carolinians there. So there were a lot of land disputes. I think in certain respects I for one was thankful that the Trust Territory government wasn't responsible for resolving those, and this was a matter that the U.S. government felt it was going to resolve.

Willens: Was there a man named Maynard Neas who worked for the Trust Territory in this area?

Craley: Yes. He worked in land management, and Maynard had had probably more historic information on these matters than anyone else did.

Willens: Was he consulted to your knowledge with respect to these land issues?

Craley: I don't know that. I'm sure he was, but I don't know to what extent.

Willens: During the early 1970s, the Congress of Micronesia considered on several occasions a proposed constitutional convention bill, and it was not favorably acted upon for a few years. Do you recall hearing any debates about whether or not a constitutional convention for all of Micronesia should be authorized by the Congress?

Craley: Yes, there were discussions on that, and it was one of the matters that they were interested in. But I get the feeling in retrospect that they were a little bit sensitive about this because while they wanted to create a status that was different from what they had, they weren't quite sure how they were going to work it out amongst themselves. It was something like saying, "Let's have a party but I want to make sure that I get a little bit more of the cake than somebody else does." They kind of wanted the party, but they weren't quite sure they wanted to really formalize it, because they weren't quite sure how they were going to handle things or resolve a lot of their problems. So there was always an interest, and they

desired this, but they didn't quite know how to conclude it.

- Willens: Did the Trust Territory Administration have a position with respect to whether the Congress should enact a constitutional convention authorization bill?
- Craley: I don't think this was one of our major concerns, because again this kind of went back to Washington as a status matter, and the direction and the control of it would have come to Washington rather than from us. We were pretty much told to stay out of the status matter. I'm sure Ed Johnson was instructed that he would not do anything in terms of status without being instructed or directed from Washington. So while I would have worked with the Congress in helping them to formulate some of their concepts or ideas, it wouldn't have been as an advocate but as a person who was working with them and helping them, not promoting the idea but assisting them.
- Willens: During the early 1970s, a group formed within the Congress of Micronesia that became known as the Independence Coalition. It appears to have been led by Andon Amaraich and Tosiwo Nakayama from Truk. What is your recollection, first, of those two individuals?
- Craley: Oh, I have very strong recollections of both of them. They were both very strong leaders. Andon Amaraich particularly—very strong individual, a very firm individual in terms of his ideas. He and Tosiwo, as two Trukese senators, worked very, very closely together, not always in total harmony because they were both strong leaders and there were times when their views moved apart. I liked and respected both of them, particularly Andon, because he was a person that you felt when you were discussing matters with him that he was genuinely interested in your views as well as developing his own. In my opinion, a very fine individual. Tosiwo was equally nice. I never had quite the relationship with Tosiwo that I felt I had with Andon, but I enjoyed both of them and they were both excellent leaders.
- Willens: Did you ever discuss with either of them their apparent desire for independence?
- Craley: Not particularly, no. I had a lot of meetings with them and with others when they were present, but I never quite played the role where I would act as a Davidson or one of their advisors. They had people that they were hiring and they were consulting with, and I never quite stepped into that role. I was still a part of the Trust Territory Executive Branch and therefore a part of the U.S. government. Bailey Olter, who was a senator from Ponape at the time, would always, whenever I came up or approached, he would always say, "CIA, CIA, calling CIA." And I realized that I still had some of that image in their minds, so no, I moved in as they invited me to move in, and these were not matters that they were about to discuss with me. We might talk about them, but only in passing, not in any deep discussions.
- Willens: Based on your attendance at Congress of Micronesia sessions, did you form an opinion as to whether those who argued for independence truly thought that independence was a viable and practical alternative?
- Craley: I think there was a period of time there where those who were advocating it felt strongly about it, but I think in the process some of the others began to talk to them about a money problem and economy and subsistence. I think for that and perhaps for some other reasons, that it started to go by the boards. I think they realized that they were going to need, they were going to have to have outside support. There were statements made from time to time about defining independence—what is independence? Is anyone totally independent? I can remember a couple of discussions where people thought even the United States is not totally independent. So the idea was more of an idealistic concept

rather than a real concept.

Willens: There's been some suggestion that the independence alternative was viewed as a bargaining tactic. Did you have that opinion?

Craley: Oh, yes, sure. They were always pushing the U.S., either the government or the Micronesian Status Negotiations Office. They were always pushing them by going way beyond where they really expected to be in hopes to get the U.S. side to move a little more toward where they'd like to end up. So they used any ploy that they had. And as I indicated the other day, one of their successes was that their group remained basically constant in terms of membership, and the U.S. kept bringing on new people all the time. They would constantly walk the new people through the same exercise, and in the process keep gaining inches and feet in terms of moving toward their goal. But they were always doing that. Danny Muna I guess it was who drove around on the island with a Russian flag flying. I think it was Danny who did that. That was just meant to keep the pot boiling.

Willens: Was it successful in keeping the pot boiling?

Craley: Oh, it was with (as I indicated) John Dorrance who was the State Department rep at that point. John got very excited, and a few of the others did, about this. You know, we were very sensitive to any things like that. Oh, my gosh, we've got to do something about this. My opinion was if you let them go, it's going to quit in a short period of time. As soon as they figure they don't have your attention any more, they'll go on to something else.

Willens: What was your sense of the leadership from Palau in the Congress?

Craley: Well, Palau had Roman Tmetuchl and Lazarus Salii. John Ngiraked was there for a while. Polycarp Basilius was also.

Willens: Can you give us sort of a vignette of each of those four?

Craley: Roman was an exceptionally strong Palauan leader.

Willens: What do you mean by strong?

Craley: Strong in getting things done. He had an organization; it was almost kind of a Mafia of sorts. Johnson Torbian was a nephew of his, I think, and Johnson was one of the first lawyers from Palau. Of course, Kaleb Udui was Palauan, and he was the legislative counsel or the director of the Congressional staff. The Palauans, Roman particularly, were very strong individuals. He was wealthy, he owned a lot of enterprises in Palau, he was a major player in the Palauan government. Lazarus was a young, bright Palauan who moved up by his own maneuvering. Roman was already there. He was established, and he kept as much control as he could. Lazarus kind of moved up through the system. John Ngiraked was always trying to move up, but he would move up so far and then come back down and then have to come back up again. He was always running into some difficulties of sorts. Polycarp Basilius was similar in certain respects to Roman Tmetuchl. He was a businessmen but at a more local, smaller level. Palauans were very interesting people and were always some of your more colorful people in terms of their abilities.

Willens: Did you think that the Palauan leadership that you've just described was a force for the free association alternative that the Micronesians explored during this period?

Craley: I'm not sure. I think they had ideas that had some elements of independence. They were a little more realistic than the Trukese at the time in that they realized that it couldn't be achieved as easily as the Trukese thought, because it didn't have the elements of support. They wanted independence, but they wanted some kind of support along with it, and they were smart enough to realize that as long as you had a major source of support

you didn't have true independence. The Trukese were more or less idealistic. "We want independence and we'll work it out." The Trukese had less to lose in the system than the Palauans did and the Marianas. The Marianas had the most to lose.

Willens: What do you mean by that?

Craley: Well, if the whole area went independent and achieved true independence and cut their ties with the United States and said, "We don't want your money, we don't need your money," the Marianas had the largest infrastructure and the largest economy, largest standard of living. If things went down the drain, they would have had the most to lose. When you don't have much, why you don't have to be too much concerned about whether you lose it all. But if you've got something, which the Marianas had and the Palaus to a lesser degree, why, they were a little more protective of it.

Siemer: Were any of the four Palauan Congressional leaders important as clan leaders as well as political leaders?

Craley: John Ngiraked's heredity came down through one of either the Ibedul or the Reklai. I think it was the Reklai. I don't know that Roman had that. I think Polycarp had a little of it. There were 16 chiefs in Palau and two primary chiefs. I think John Ngiraked was the closest to being part of that royal heredity. Roman had achieved it largely through I think his own doing, although I'm sure there was family involvement there too, but it wasn't as pronounced, and he didn't play it up as much as John did. I think Lazarus probably had the least in terms of lineage. Polycarp had some. You know, you have 16 clans, why, there was a lot of it existing.

Willens: What were Salii's principal characteristics that you recall?

Craley: Well, as I said the other day, he was very intense, very ambitious, very committed to his concepts, his ideas and his approach. And very intolerant of any disagreement or sometimes even intolerant of any discussion other than in the way that he wanted the subject to move.

Willens: How did he relate to the Trukese leaders who were taking a significantly different view?

Craley: I think Lazarus felt superior to them in many respects and tolerated them because they were the largest district, the most heavily populated, and he was dealing with two strong individuals in the form of Andon and Tosiwo and he couldn't bully them aside. Amata Kabua was another individual that he felt I'm sure superior to, but at the same time he recognized that this was another person that he couldn't roll over.

Willens: Senator Kabua served as President of the Senate for many years, did he not?

Craley: Not many. I think it was either two or four years.

Willens: What is your recollection today of him?

Craley: He was a very interesting, I think probably the most stateside-like person. Janet, as I indicated before, was the Senate journal clerk, and as such she worked for him when he was president, as she did for Tosiwo later when he became president. He was always very polite, very courteous. He would call her in from time to time and discuss certain things with her. I remember (if I can tell you a little anecdote), while he was president there was a discussion on a particular piece of legislation. I don't remember at the moment what it was, but Eddie Pangelinan got very emotionally involved in the debate on the Senate floor. I think he ended up by making a speech in which he said that we are no longer interested in doing things for the people, by the people, etc., but this is a government that does things to the people instead of for the people. And he ended up by saying, "And fuck

the people.” He said this on the Senate floor, and everyone was just shocked. And Janet was sitting up there at the table taking this down in shorthand. She goes into the Senate chamber afterward and types this thing up, and when Amata comes in the next morning, the verbatim of yesterday’s session is on his desk. He looks it over and calls Janet and says, “Janet, come in a moment.” She comes in. “Shut the door.” He said, “I’ve just been looking over Senator Pangelinan’s remarks here, and I think there’s a slight mistake here. I think he said ‘and fluck the people.’” And she said, “Yes, Mr. President.” He said, “Will you see that that gets changed.” She went out and redid that page and went back in in a minute. He was a gentleman in certain respects. He was also kind of a Mafia-type person, but he had a little more class to him than Roman had. Roman was a little rougher, a little sharper edges. Amata was a little smoother.

Siemer: Some of the speeches in the Senate, particularly during that period of time, had kind of a rough flavor of give and take, and others had a very polished sound to them, as if they had been written by somebody who was a native English speaker and who had a good deal of ability to write. Were there any instances in which speeches were written for these leaders by others?

Craley: Yes. Mostly by Peace Corps. The Congress always had a certain amount of auxiliary staff that came in at every Congressional session. The Trukese would bring in two or three people, and the Palauans would bring in some, and the Yapese one or two. You had a large group of people assembled that were working with the Congress, and many of them were young American types. Plus the fact that Janet would take down their speeches, which she took in verbatim, and in typing them up she would polish them a little bit in terms of plurals and other grammatical things.

Siemer: Verb forms.

Craley: Verb forms and that type of thing. And one of the things that always interested her was that when they came in each day for the session, there was the transcript of yesterday’s Senate on their desk, and they would all turn to it and follow it. You know in the United States Congress nobody walks in the next day and reads the Congressional Record. But these guys loved it, and they would all look it over, and they would tell her, “You make me sound so good.” I mean this was universal; it wasn’t just one or two of them; they all liked to read the next day what they had said, because it read so well, it looked so good, and they said: “You make me look good.” But beyond that, there were people that were writing things for them, yes, there was a lot of that. But you could rarely slide something in on them if you were one of these volunteers who were helping them. The idea had to be there. You might turn it into nice prose and well laid out language, but you couldn’t go off on a tangent, because they’d say: “No, no, I didn’t mean that.” So while the language certainly indicated that somebody else might have written it, it was still what they wanted to have said, and it was said in a way that they thought was superior to what they could have done working in a second language.

Willens: Did you have the sense in the early 1970s that Senator Kabua was committed to a united Micronesia?

Craley: No, I have no strong recollection there one way or the other. The Marshalls was, of course, the furthest out and the most remote. I don’t know that Amata and the Marshallese had determined whether their future rested with the rest of Micronesia, which was foreign to them in many ways. Culture was different. Land was certainly different. They were kind of an enigma. I don’t quite know what their feelings were.

Willens: Do you recall having any reaction when the Marshall Islands formed their own political

- status commission?
- Craley: No, not in retrospect.
- Willens: Were there any other leaders from the Marshalls that played an active role in the Congress that you can recall?
- Craley: Oh, Charlie Dominick from time to time.
- Siemer: Any of the DeBrums?
- Craley: Oh, Tony DeBrum was very active in many respects. Oscar DeBrum was Amata's man, and Oscar ran the Marshall Islands after Oscar became the first Marshallese DistAd, and he never did anything that wasn't approved of or authored by Amata. Tony was a little more of a loose cannon, and Tony was pretty much of a free wheeler.
- Siemer: The DeBrums were a fairly wealthy family as well, were they not?
- Craley: I think historically under German times, yes. I don't know that they retained that during the Japanese times, but they certainly were. The Heines, the DeBrums, the Kabuas, Dr. Lanwi, he was a player too. He was less stable than Amata, and he would go off on some pretty wild tangents from time to time. I'm sure there were others. I'd have to look back over the names to refresh my memory as to a lot of the Marshallese.
- Willens: Turning to the Marianas negotiations then just briefly, do you recall that the United States was interested in purchasing or leasing most of Tinian for military purposes?
- Craley: That came out at certain times to varying degrees. This purple suit group that I've told you about, they were the first ones to come over and (as I recall) make a public display of being here primarily for the purpose of looking at Tinian. Of course, that sparked a lot of interest on the part of the Saipanese people on Tinian, and people started to buy land over there in anticipation that the United States government would move in and they would get beaucoup millions for the land that they had bought. Yes, Tinian was always the goose that was going to lay the golden eggs at some point.
- Willens: Did you sit in on the briefings that Ambassador Williams provided from time to time to the High Commissioner?
- Craley: No, not on those matters.
- Willens: Did you have any information as to whether the United States in fact intended to build a base on Tinian if the status agreement could be negotiated?
- Craley: There was that assumption or illusion. Whether it was created by the *Pacific Daily News* and other newspapers, whether it was moved along by scuttlebutt, by remarks of certain U.S. Congressmen, I don't know. But there was always that feeling that just across the channel, that's where things were going to happen. Sitting here on Saipan as the seat of the government, why we're going to benefit from what goes on over there.
- Willens: Did you ever see any of the presentations by the military people as to what kind of base would be built and what kind of benefits would result for the Marianas people?
- Craley: No. I participated in some of those trips to Tinian with various people who went over there, and of course they looked at the docks, they looked at the airfields, they looked at other portions of the island, but never in terms of saying this is what we're going to do, this is how we're going to do it, this is our plan. But there was always a lot of activity and interest in it.
- Willens: The status agreement reached with the Northern Marianas gave the future Commonwealth

control over immigration until the Trusteeship ended and then provided they it could continue to exercise that unless the United States Congress acted otherwise. Do you have any recollection now of how the Trust Territory dealt with alien laborers that were brought in to work on various construction or other projects?

Craley: If they came in under the TT jurisdiction, they came in with an entry permit that had a specific time attached to it. You were here for three months, six months, or whatever the period of time was, and when your entry permit was up you had to go back. And if you came in as an employee of the District Administration or the Trust Territory headquarters, and it probably would have been the District Administration, they would have held your return ticket and sent you back. As the Marianas began to evolve in terms of self-government, as the relationship of these districts started to fall away a little bit from the jurisdiction and control of the headquarters, they became more independent in terms of these arrangements. We got the information a lot of times that these regulations were not enforced and were not upheld. A lot of these people didn't have return tickets, and the money that had been held back to buy the tickets wasn't there anymore. I think we started to get the feeling at TT headquarters that this system was beginning to crumble somewhat.

Siemer: Had there been some planning within the TT government for political education and transition before the Covenant was signed?

Craley: There had been some discussion but not in any depth, no.

Siemer: Where did that fall in the TT government structure? Whose responsibility was it?

Craley: It would have logically fallen in the area of Public Affairs. At that time, Strich Yoma was the Director of Public Affairs.

Siemer: Do you recall the TT sending a request to Congress for transition money in 1974 before the Covenant was signed?

Craley: Vaguely.

Siemer: There were some opponents in the U.S. Congress, Senator Hart being one of them. It appears from the record that your advice had been sought about how to deal with this. It was a small amount of money—only \$1.5 million—but people in the TT government seemed to be worried about the Congressional opposition.

Craley: I don't remember much about that, to be honest with you.

Siemer: When did the education for self-government program actually get under way?

Craley: It got under way once we understood that there was going to be a plebiscite, and it kept developing as we finally got word that there was going to be a Plebiscite Commissioner and that there was going to be a Plebiscite Office.

Siemer: Before you moved over to be the Executive Director of the Plebiscite Office, did all that fall under your jurisdiction?

Craley: No, I wasn't Commissioner of Public Affairs at that point; I was still Special Assistant for Legislative Affairs. So there really wasn't a structure at headquarters that had an American at the head of it. Strich was a Ponapean, and the U.S. was very sensitive about keeping this kind of thing within U.S. control. There was no structure at headquarters that fit. I think that's why I was contacted a couple of weeks before Spike Canham came out, and I was instructed to get on with it, get it going.

Siemer: Who instructed you?

- Craley: The call I got was from Haydn Williams. That's the first I knew about it.
- Siemer: Had you known Williams when he was out there?
- Craley: Oh, I knew him, but you never got to know him very closely. I mean, Bill Crowe you could sit and chat with, and he was a regular fellow, but Williams and Wilson could walk right by and not say hello. They were pretty strange individuals. Williams eventually loosened up a great deal, but it took several years before that happened.
- Siemer: What do you recall about the initial conversation with Williams?
- Craley: It was a telephone call.
- Siemer: Was he in the States at the time?
- Craley: Yes. He was in San Francisco or Washington, I don't know which, and I was in Saipan. And this call came through. I was in my office. He came on, identified himself, and he said that there will be a Plebiscite Commissioner appointed in the very near future, and I'm not at liberty to tell you who it's going to be at this time, but we would like you to serve as executive director and more or less head up the thing because he won't have any knowledge of the area or the people and will need somebody out there that knows these people and has worked with them. I'm sure you'll find him to be a very wonderful person to work with, very qualified, and you'll enjoy the experience, and I want you to do it.
- Siemer: Who was the "we" when he said we want you to do this?
- Craley: Well, I'm assuming he was referring to himself and whoever else he took in with him. I don't know.
- Siemer: For whom would you be working?
- Craley: I was not going to be detailed to anyone. I was going to be kept on the Trust Territory payroll just as I was—detailed in terms of responsibilities and duties but not detailed in terms of position, status or anything else. In other words, I was given a sabbatical in a sense or an absence to do this, but my paycheck kept coming from the TT government.
- Siemer: After the call from Ambassador Williams, did you go to talk to the High Commissioner about this assignment?
- Craley: Well, Williams indicated in the telephone call that this matter had been discussed with and cleared with the High Commissioner and the High Commissioner was amenable to it and, "Yes, you might go and chat with him if you're so interested. But actually he's not going to have anything to do with it. I mean it's going to be the Plebiscite Commissioner and you're going to be working for him and the High Commissioner's agreeable to this."
- Siemer: When did you find out who the Plebiscite Commissioner was going to be?
- Craley: Oh, I suspect it wasn't more than a few days or a week thereafter the word came out that it was Erwin Canham. I remember going up to the Congress library and looking him up in the Who's Who. There was some scuttlebutt going around at the moment that he was the father or uncle of Carol Channing, and it turned out that she does have an uncle who has a name very similar to his and is also in the newspaper business, but it wasn't Spike Canham. That all happened within the next week.
- Siemer: So it was about two weeks before he actually arrived in the Marianas that you had the phone call from Ambassador Williams?
- Craley: I think I got the telephone call on the second of April. I'm not exactly sure. But I saw from

going through my notes here that he came out sometime on the 18th.

Siemer: Right.

Craley: And by that time we had the facilities set up. I had hired certain people subject of course to his concurrence, and we had the structure pretty much in shape when he arrived.

Siemer: There's a cable back from Mary Vance Trent in late March which assumes that you are going to be the executive director. Would she have had that information before you did?

Craley: Oh probably so, yes. I found out on I think April 2 or thereabouts, because his instructions as I recall them were, "This is effective now, get going on it. Now things aren't going to happen formally for the next week or so, but get started." In other words, I had the feeling—put your stuff together and walk out of the office.

Siemer: Is that what you did?

Craley: That's basically what I did, yes.

Siemer: Where did you walk to?

Craley: Well, I didn't walk too far at that point, because I had no place to walk to, and that was one of the tasks I had. I immediately started to go out and see what I could find in terms of an office. They didn't want anything associated with Trust Territory headquarters, nor did they want anything associated with the District Administration headquarters.

Siemer: That was instruction from Williams?

Craley: That was instruction that I got from some source, and I would assume that it came either from Williams or in subsequent information, yes. But it had to come fairly quickly, because the first thing that I did was to try to locate a facility, and I would say we located that within the first day or two.

Siemer: What did you find?

Craley: Well, we ended up in Hamilton's. It was an area that he had developed for Friday night barbeques and that type of thing, and that had run its course and kind of closed down, and this facility was sitting there. It was all open.

Siemer: Was it the main building at Hamilton's?

Craley: Oh, no, no. Hamilton's main building was a small enclosed building, and then as you faced Hamilton's, off to the right of it was this large enclosure (I mean it wasn't totally enclosed; it was open on the backside, totally open) that had louvered windows on three of the sides. He used to hold barbeques down there. The place was filled at that time with picnic tables, and across the back, which was open, he had his barbeque set up. This place was just sitting there and hadn't been used for quite some time. He was very agreeable to having it used, and we agreed on a certain amount of rent and I paid him for it.

Siemer: Which people did you contact to work on your staff?

Craley: Thankfully your notes have refreshed my memory on that. George Callison was brought in in terms of radio. Azalea Weaver was the wife of one of our agriculturalists (I think he was an agriculturalist from the Marianas), and she did our secretarial work. Without seeing other names, I'm not exactly sure who else we got, but there was some small support staff there.

Siemer: What was Callison's background?

Craley: George Callison had been brought out by me to head up our radio division at the Trust

Territory government. He was more or less in charge of operating the six radio stations throughout the Trust Territory and working with the Micronesians who were basically running them by that time, and working up format and procedures and how you went on the air and kept things on and kept stuff going out over the air for 12 or 14 hours a day.

Siemer: Once you had Callison and Weaver on the staff, what other steps did you take before Canham arrived?

Craley: Supplies. I didn't have too much guidance until Spike got there as to what he was going to want or need, so I was basically getting ready so that when he arrived we could start immediately with whatever it was that he needed or wanted.

Siemer: Once he was named, did you have any contact with him before he arrived?

Craley: No.

Siemer: What happened at the first meeting that you had with him?

Craley: Well, we went out and met him at the airport and got him and Sue settled in a hotel. Of course he was interested in seeing where he was going to operate out of and what had been done, and he came to the office and we started working at that point.

Siemer: What kind of a person was he?

Craley: Fantastic person. He was a perfect person to be given that assignment, and I may sound somewhat egotistical when I say this, because he was perfectly willing to let me do the things that I did, and he did the things that he did, and he did them so well, so much better than I could have done them, and on the other hand he let me do the things that I could do better than he, and we were a good team. He worked with the Marianas people to a far better degree than I would have. I had known these people at that point for six or so years, and I was not very tolerant of them longer than that. Some of them were in my opinion just rascals. Oscar Rasa and Alfonso Rasa and Herman Palacios and Dan Aquina were just wild men. And I would have told them where to get off at very quickly. Spike was very good with them. I sat there and just watched him massage these guys and rub the backs of their necks. This hostile group that came there with spears and machetes just kind of turned around and walked out. Now it wasn't all peace and harmony, but he just kept them moving, kept them going.

Siemer: Did he tell you anything about how he came to be appointed?

Craley: I think Mary Vance Trent played a large part in it. She seemed to have known him. I don't know whether she was of the same religion or not, but she obviously knew him. I don't know any more than that. I'd always assumed that it was Mary Vance Trent that had led the authorities to him.

Siemer: What did the two of you turn to first?

Craley: Well, establishing these different boards that we had to get—an advisory board and voter registration board.

Siemer: Well let's take the voter registration board first. Did you have people in mind for that by the time Canham arrived?

Craley: No. We talked about it. I don't think I had any firm knowledge of what all was going to be required. I might have some indication of areas of responsibility that he would have. I knew that we were going to have to do a total registration drive for the whole area. There were certain thoughts that we might take the registration list as it existed and work off of that and refine it and purify it and clean it up, sanitize it. But that got dropped very

quickly, and the decision was made that we had to start from scratch.

Siemer: Why did you decide from scratch?

Craley: I think two reasons. One was that it was going to be safer than taking what existed and purifying it. And the other was that if we started from scratch, there would be nobody on it except people that came on through the program. I guess it was just determined that this was going to be a pure list when we finished rather than a sanitized list or a sterilized list over here that may have some impurities in it.

Siemer: Had you worked in any election matters before this?

Craley: Oh, yes. Our office, Public Affairs, played a role in all the elections that took place. Now I was not personally on the ground, but our public affairs offices in each district handled all the elections.

Siemer: Handled the ballot boxes and things like that?

Craley: Everything, yes. Now this wasn't done at headquarters because the Truk District Administrator with the Truk Public Affairs Office did the Truk election, and Palau District Administrator with the Palau Public Affairs Office did the Palau, but this was all under my jurisdiction in my department, and ultimately if problems came back they would have come back to me.

Siemer: How about Canham? Had he had any experience with elections before that?

Craley: I don't know. I don't think so, although I don't know what his background in that respect was.

Siemer: When you selected the voter registration board, had Canham met all of the people selected before they were picked?

Craley: I don't remember exactly. I think there was consultation there with various and sundry people in the Marianas on an informal basis. We kind of developed this thing collectively, the two of us. I would give him names, and he would meet these people or he would talk to other people about these people, and it just came together.

Siemer: Was he good at soliciting advice?

Craley: Oh, yes. He had certain talents that I just marveled at. His ability to meet with people and talk to them and have them become a part of what he was proposing was magnificent. As I said, I would have blown up six or eight times, because some of these guys would say things that weren't very nice at all. I mean they were very derogatory, and he just would say: "Well, now, let's talk about it." He had that ability. I'd have just said: "What the hell are you talking about." I would have felt much like I did last night listening to Pat Buchanan. But he had the ability to massage them and get the most out of them. It was a tremendous trait.

Siemer: You talked earlier about the difficulty sometimes in getting Micronesians to say what they mean and say what they're thinking. How did Canham overcome that?

Craley: This was not a problem with the Saipanese, and it wasn't so much a problem with the Palauans. Saipanese first, Palauans next. But you get down into Yap and Truk and Ponape, and there you had a problem. I never went to a meeting that I didn't get more reaction than I had asked for from the Saipanese.

Siemer: You decided to put two very outspoken opponents of the Covenant, Alfonso Rasa and

Abel Olopai, on the voter registration board. Why did you decide to do that?

Craley: Well, I suspect Abel Olopai was one of my recommendations. I certainly would not have recommended Alfonso. And I think Canham kind of decided that that was a wise choice, because we didn't want this thing to be a one-sided operation. We wanted it to represent all the various factions. There weren't just two groups in the Marianas. There was a group that was for it; there was a group that was against it that kept changing all the time because they'd pick up some and lose some; and then there were some out here that weren't sure where they were or what they wanted. So we wanted to try to get all of those various elements in there, at least one person representing each of those various groups. This was also true on the advisory committee, and it was true on all the committees that we had.

Siemer: The voter registration board was a particularly crucial operation, though, because they were going to be the first to decide challenges with respect to registration, and they were also going to decide questions of policy with respect to registration, so it seemed like that was an important group of people. If it were too fractious or too much a forum for speech-making, you couldn't get your job done.

Craley: That's true, but Canham was extremely effective in keeping these things operating along the lines that they should be. The voter registration group was important in terms of historic identity in the district. You had to be domiciled there, and we had a lot of Micronesians from other districts who were living on Saipan. We had to determine whether they were domiciled there or whether they were there for their employment or for some other reason—education or whatever. And while we felt, maybe optimistically, that we were in a position to make some of these decisions, we recognized that the Saipanese or the people living there were in a better position than we were. So we were looking for people who were knowledgeable about whether this family over here was really considered part of the Mariana Islands or was still a Ponapean or a Trukese.

Siemer: Was the legal concept of domicile one that was readily understandable to the Marianas folks?

Craley: They grasped it pretty quickly. We had some friction on the people who said they were domiciled there and lived in government housing, because government housing was something that you got if you were an off-islander. But then of course you have to realize that there were some Saipanese who got government housing because they lived on Rota and Tinian. So it wasn't a clear-cut thing that we could say anyone that had government housing is not domiciled here, because you had these exceptions and then you had to look into it on a case-by-case basis. Eusebio Rechucher, who was Martha Recucher's husband, was a Palauan, and they lived on Capitol Hill, and she owned a store on the island. She said this is her place, and, "If Eusebio goes back to Palau, I'm staying here, the kids and I are staying here." It got down to that kind of a thing. There was still a lot of finessing with it and, as I say, Canham was excellent at that. He did a magnificent job.

Siemer: Maybe you can describe how the board generally operated when it met.

Craley: As I recall, some members, I think two members of the board, went out at each registration drive. I don't know. You're asking me questions now that I haven't given any thought to for so many years.

Siemer: Where did the board meet?

Craley: If the board met en masse it met at the office of the Plebiscite Commissioner. They spent

a lot of time in the field, and they participated in the various registrations. We had a lot of registration places.

Siemer: When they went out to the field, would two of them always go together?

Craley: There would always be a certain number of them there. I don't know whether the number was constant. There had to be I think a minimum number and then they could have more than that. I don't know that we had many more than the minimum because this was being done all the time, and sometimes all over the island.

Siemer: Did you and Canham go with them?

Craley: No, we didn't go with them, but we went around to check on them during the day. If we were going to hold a registration drive in three or four places on Tuesday, we would visit each place and spend some time there and see how it went. We may even come back again. Now if it was on Tinian, then we went over to Tinian and spent the day there, or Rota. Yes, we did that.

Siemer: Were there many domicile questions or problems on Tinian?

Craley: There were some. There were some all over.

Siemer: Some on Rota as well?

Craley: Not so much Rota. Rota was pretty pure in terms of outsiders, although up until the CIA gave up Saipan, Rota was the District headquarters, so you had a little infiltration of outsiders in Rota. But Rota was perhaps the purest community in the Marianas.

Siemer: When registration activities took place on Rota or Tinian, did you typically send the Rota or Tinian board members there to work on that?

Craley: I think that was probably the case, yes, because these people were supposed to be knowledgeable. But I don't think it rested exclusively with them. They were the primary people that were involved in it, but then the whole board could also review these things.

Siemer: Did Canham go to Rota at one point?

Craley: Oh, yes.

Siemer: Was it early on?

Craley: We were all over the place, yes.

Siemer: Did you go with him?

Craley: Oh, yes.

Siemer: Do you recall anything about the relationships with the leadership on Rota at that point?

Craley: Nothing sticks out in my mind either good or bad about it. He did well with all of them as far as I could analyze. There were conflicts that arose, and there were threats, and there were some hot periods. But he seemed to be able to quiet them down and kind of restore peace and tranquility.

Siemer: Let me just go back to Alfonso Rasa for a moment. What sort of occupation was he pursuing at the time, do you know?

Craley: Alfonso was into everything, primarily education of some sort. He had gone to the Soviet Union to the Patrice Lumumba University or something like that. He and Oscar both were Ponapeans to start with, and they were never really accepted by some of the

more serious, stable Saipanese. Their base of support was more or less in the Carolinian community, and even there there were some questions about them.

Siemer: Was their base exclusively Saipan, not Rota or Tinian?

Craley: I don't know that.

Siemer: Alfonso quit the voter registration board at one point. What was that dispute about?

Craley: Oh, there were several threats in terms of quitting. I think he quit once or twice. He might have quit once and came back on and decided that he'd quit again. I don't remember anymore what the issue was. If I had to take a guess, I think he saw that things weren't going the way that he had hoped or anticipated them, so therefore he was going to disassociate himself with it. That's just a guess. I don't recall.

Siemer: What about Abel Olopai? What occupation was he in back in those days?

Craley: Abel, I think, was part of the educational system in the Marianas. Abel came from a good family. The Olopais were respected Carolinians, and they had a certain degree of standing in the community, and Abel was somebody that you could talk to and talk with. He didn't necessarily agree with you, and even after you would spend time talking with him he wouldn't agree with you, but at the same time he was willing to listen to you and he was willing to discuss things with you. He had a cousin, Lino Olopai, who was an exceptionally fine person. There was a lot of family influence there that kept Abel from going off as Alfonso or Oscar did.

Siemer: Was he close to Felix Rabauliman?

Craley: I would have to guess yes, but to what degree and whether it pertained to political objectives, I don't know. But I think culturally and socially, yes.

Siemer: Did Canham work with Felix?

Craley: Oh, yes. We worked with all of them. I mean there was nobody that Spike excluded. Again, as a comparison, there would have been some as to whom I would have said I don't want them anywhere near me, they're nothing but trouble. I know what they're going to do, they're just bad apples. But Spike, there was nobody that he'd shut the door on.

Willens: You used the nickname Spike to refer to Mr. Canham. Was that a nickname that he came to Saipan with?

Craley: Yes.

Willens: Do you know where he got it?

Craley: Yes. When I met him at the airport, I called him first Mr. Canham, and he said: "No, we're not going to go that way." He said: "My name is Erwin." Well Erwin is not a name that I'm immediately accustomed to. I didn't know any other Erwins. I gather that he felt within a few minutes that I was going to have trouble getting accustomed to Erwin, and he said: "If you like you can call me Spike, which is a nickname that I was given by Damon Runyon." He said: "A lot of people in the newspaper business call me Spike." And I said: "If you don't mind, I like Spike." So I called him Spike all the time. Sue always called him Erwin. She did not use Spike. I did. We got along fabulously. He was a fine person to work with and to work for, and I enjoyed not only my working with him in the plebiscite but when he was Resident Commissioner.

Siemer: Did anyone else other than Alfonso Rasa threaten to resign from the voter registration

board?

Craley: I can't recall that at this point, but I think we experienced a couple threats that there were going to be two or three people or a group leave the board, but these things never materialized. Yes, I would have to say there were times when certain factions threatened to leave, but to the best of my recollection they did not.

Siemer: How about the plebiscite advisory board? What was it supposed to do?

Craley: To meet with us on a continuous basis. We would have meetings and we would review with them and go over things. They would get copies of the minutes. We could keep them informed and get feedback from them as to how things were going and whether we were accomplishing what we hoped we were accomplishing, or whether we were dreaming, or whether this whole thing was going to collapse.

Siemer: Were there members of that Board that you recall being particularly effective or particularly helpful?

Craley: I'd have to look and see who all was on that. Eddie Pangelinan, Herman Q. Guerrero, Ben Santos.

Siemer: You had people from the District Legislature. You had people from the municipal councils.

Craley: They were basically a pretty good group. Spike was able to keep them working together. You had some people with great differences of opinions sitting on that group, and if they'd been down in the legislative chambers they might have been shouting at each other. He kept them all talking at a moderate level of conversation. No shouting and no threats or anything of that nature. And they were all very helpful, yes.

Siemer: Did they give advice with respect to the political education materials?

Craley: Oh, yes. They reviewed all the educational materials. A lot of the educational materials were transcribed into the vernaculars.

Siemer: That's a continuing problem in the Marianas.

Craley: It is. And then Spike had a question and answer document. I wish I'd reviewed these, because it would help me. He developed this question and answer thing and reviewed that with them. There was some give and take on that—whether his answer met the issue or whether it favored the issue or opposed it or whatever. But yes they participated, not so much in the writing of it but in the review of it and commenting of it and editing of it so to speak.

Siemer: What else did they do besides the educational materials?

Craley: Oh, the whole conduct of the plebiscite—the voter registration schedule, the way in which the voter registration would be done, the election process, the way in which the election would be done, the dipping of the finger into the ink for identification purposes. They were in on every phase of it.

Siemer: How often did they meet?

Craley: At least weekly; I know weekly. And I think that unless there was some special issue came up, we stuck to the weekly schedule.

Siemer: What about Haydn Williams? Did he come out during this period when you were working with Canham?

Craley: I do not remember him as being a factor on the island at that time, although he may well

have been.

Siemer: Do you recall a meeting where he came out to talk with the Carolinians about the American Memorial Park?

Craley: I don't recall that personally, because I would not have been involved with it. But I'm not surprised that there was such a meeting.

Siemer: Was Williams asking you for reports as your efforts were going on?

Craley: No. Alf Bergesen, who was the status liaison officer at that point, was more or less responsible for keeping him informed, and Alf would come down almost every day, two or three times a day, to see what was going on. Alf and I lived beside each other on Capitol Hill.

Siemer: And you were his principal point of contact?

Craley: The office was, yes.

Siemer: Did he serve in that position throughout this period?

Craley: Yes. He served in it particularly right up to the end, because I can remember when the United Nations visiting mission was there, he was their escort person.

Siemer: Did Mary Vance Trent work for him?

Craley: Oh, no, they were colleagues, equals. He succeeded her at some point. I think there might have been one or two in between. I don't know that order. But each one of them came out for a specific period of time, and then they were succeeded by another one and another one and another one. Mary Vance Trent was in that line, and Alf was another one. Now whether he followed her or whether there was somebody in between them—I think he might have followed her, because he occupied the house that she had. I can't remember there being anyone in between them. There were people there after Alf left, State Department people, but I don't remember anyone between the two of them.

Siemer: What was the policy that you developed with respect to access to radio and television for the proponents and the opponents of the Covenant?

Craley: The radio was no problem. We controlled the radio station. We operated the radio station. "We" being the Marianas District. And it was under TT headquarters and policy. But at that point we kind of took it over in terms of time, and we made a certain amount of time available to anyone who wanted to use it. A certain number of hours during a certain period of the day. They all had to schedule it through the Plebiscite office. We went to the television station, which was privately owned, and got them to make a certain amount of public service time available, again being scheduled through us, so that we were hopefully ensuring that there would be some kind of equity among the various factions.

Siemer: Was this under George Callison?

Craley: Well, it was more or less under the Plebiscite Commissioner. George was responsible for keeping the log, but he did not pass judgment on who wanted to use it. That was Spike's prerogative.

Siemer: How did that work? Did people have to sign up?

Craley: Yes. They had to come in and say they wanted to use the radio station.

Siemer: So they'd come to your office at Hamilton's?

Craley: Yes. And we had a log there of each day and the hours available. I think the radio was

divided in 30-minute and the TV in 15-minute cycles. We'd say okay, there's some time here and here. "I'll take this one." So their name would be written in.

Siemer: What were the ground rules on who could sign up?

Craley: Anyone. That was the whole part of the thing—that we weren't in any way going to say yes to this group and no to that group.

Siemer: Did it have to be a person qualified to vote in the Northern Marianas?

Craley: Oh, yes.

Siemer: It wasn't available to the Congress of Micronesia.

Craley: No. We weren't letting outsiders use it. It was strictly people who were registered voters and had a direct interest in it. Yes. I'm quite sure of that.

Siemer: But as to them, it was a first come, first serve as to time slots?

Craley: Basically so unless we saw that this faction was taking up all the time. In other words, the purpose of having it come through the Plebiscite Commissioner was to make sure that one group didn't get blocked out by another group just filibustering the thing. But that never happened. We never had a situation where anyone was denied time. If they couldn't get it at 11:00 o'clock on a certain day, they could get it at 2:00 or 3:00 that day. We didn't have a situation where somebody said: "I can't get on the radio" or "I can't get on the TV."

Siemer: How was it used? How many people would you have a week, and what was its impact?

Craley: I don't know what the impact was. Television was not used quite as extensively as radio was. But it was used. I suspect (and I'm just guessing here now because I don't have any of this data available any more) that the Marianas Political Status Commission used more time over all than the opposition did. But the opposition was so fragmented at various stages that it was hard to keep track of where some of these people were at the time. I mean at one time they were a part of this group, and then suddenly they were outside of that group. The opposition to the Covenant suddenly became the movement for a better commonwealth, and the lines started to wave. You didn't quite know where people were.

Siemer: Was some of the radio and television time reserved for Canham himself?

Craley: No. He had access to anything beyond the schedule. He did not use up any of the time set aside. But whenever he wanted to go on the radio, he was on the radio.

Siemer: What was his practice with respect to that?

Craley: He went on a couple of times where he felt as a result of the advisory committee and conditions in general that there needed to be some clarification coming from him. People were saying this and that and some were saying that he was saying this and that, and there were a couple of times where he just went on and said what he had to say.

Siemer: Was he good at that?

Craley: Oh, yes. He was a professional.

Siemer: How about television appearances? Was he good at that?

Craley: I would say so. There were some television appearances. There were not as many. Probably one or two. Yes, he was a professional communicator.

Siemer: Did the office try to advertise for example when he would be on the radio?

Craley: I would say yes, but I don't think that if I was talking about it in terms of today's

advertisements, that it would have been much. There might have been an announcement or two that Mr. Canham will appear at 3:00 o'clock or will be on the radio at 3:00 o'clock today or tomorrow. There were no big announcements or publicity or anything like that.

Siemer: What efforts did the office make with respect to the print media?

Craley: We had people coming to us all the time. I can remember one girl from the *New York Times* who was there. She turned out to be Fred Kluge's wife. She was a stringer from the *New York Times* and she was here to cover the Convention as well.

Willens: Yes, but the Micronesian Convention was in July of 1975.

Craley: She was there to cover that and to also cover the plebiscite, and she was here with her husband. She wanted to come by and to discuss things with the Plebiscite Commissioner or me, and I said feel free. And she met Spike and they talked. And I would subsequently see her up at the Congress with Fred Kluge.

Siemer: What other print media did you deal with?

Craley: Well, there were other print media out there. The *Pacific Daily News* reporter, Joe Murphy, would come over [from Guam] periodically. The Marianas papers would get involved, and we had some outside papers that came there, too. There was a certain amount of attention on the part of outside media. It wasn't an overwhelming degree of attention, but it did appear from time to time. Canham would meet with them. I would meet with them initially because I was there every day and most of the time. He was too, but they would go on to meet with him because he was one of their people.

Siemer: What did you think of Abed Younis at the time? Was he even handed in his treatment of the plebiscite?

Craley: I would have to say yes by virtue of the fact that I don't remember any major complaints that I had with him. He was always kind of walking a difficult line because he was trying to keep a business going and trying to kind of keep everybody happy with his coverage. His wife, Paz, would get involved with some of these programs, and he'd sometimes get swept in as part of that, even though he tried to remain somewhat neutral. He did a respectable job, I thought.

Siemer: Do you recall Joan King, the stringer for the PDN?

Craley: Oh, yes. Very well.

Siemer: What was your view of her coverage?

Craley: My recollection of Joan goes more to the time when she lived in Ponape and wrote the Micronesian Newsletter she put out monthly. I always felt that that served to keep me informed on what was happening in Micronesia after I left there. I think at the time in the Marianas I felt that she did a respectable job of trying to report things. She was somewhat, I'm sure, biased on some issues and perhaps tried not to show it to the extent that Ed [King] did. I thought she did rather well.

Siemer: Did you have any dealings with Ed King?

Craley: In a certain respect, but not in a day-to-day basis, no.

Siemer: Do you recall the issue raised on behalf of some Carolinians with respect to the language of the "no" option on the ballot?

Craley: I recall that from here, yes.

Siemer: What is your recollection of how that issue developed and how you dealt with it?

- Craley: I don't know anything about how it developed. It came to us as the official language. We certainly didn't have any input in it. I must admit that if I had been opposed to the Commonwealth Covenant, I would have objected to this strenuously. In the minds of the Saipanese, this was the strongest language you could put in to defeat a "no" vote, because that meant going back with the rest of the Micronesians. That they weren't about to do. And I think there was a lot of merit to Ed's letter in terms of objecting to that language. Why not have just a simple "yes" or "no" vote? That wasn't quite as threatening as, "no and you will remain part of the Trust Territory with the other Micronesians."
- Siemer: What happened in the Plebiscite Commissioner's office when you learned of this opposition to the wording of the "no" option on the ballot?
- Craley: I don't know what Spike's position was at this point, and I think he might have addressed this in some of the questions and answers. I kept my opinions pretty much to myself. But I felt that those who were in opposition to this "no" language were justified in expressing their opposition.
- Siemer: Did you think there would be an adverse effect if the language were changed in response to that?
- Craley: Adverse effect in what way?
- Siemer: Any way.
- Craley: I think there would have been a change in that some more people might have voted against the Covenant, but the choice of the Covenant or remaining a part of Micronesia with the Yapese and the Trukese and everything, that was just not something that they were going to consider at all.
- Siemer: Was there ever a point during the time that you worked with Canham on this plebiscite that you ever thought the Covenant was going to lose, that the Covenant was not going to be approved?
- Craley: No. I think I had times when I felt that the vote was going to be closer. But I still felt that the majority of the people were going to adopt and approve the Covenant. I didn't realize it was going to come out as heavily percentage wise as it did.
- Siemer: What was the situation with respect to the funding of your office? Did you ever have any problem getting funding?
- Craley: No, we didn't. Canham's salary we didn't pay. That was paid by somebody else; I don't know whether State paid it or Interior or who paid him. And the TT absorbed most of the expenses at the time, and then sought reimbursement from the appropriate authorities. So that was something that I didn't concern myself with. We did our thing, we processed our paperwork, and we kicked it up to the Trust Territory finance office and let them worry about it. That wasn't part of our responsibility to worry about the financial matters.
- Siemer: Did you ever bring anybody onto your own staff who had responsibility for handling those finance matters?
- Craley: I think we might have had some help from time to time of people who kept some records of costs and helped us file certain papers that they required, yes. I don't remember now who that was or how it worked. I think I did some of it, and I don't remember who else helped in that respect.
- Siemer: Some of the budget estimates had a position of secretary or an assistant with the voter registration board, and another one to assist with the advisory board. Did those positions

ever materialize?

Craley: I think they did, but I can't tell you who these people were anymore. They weren't certainly a continuous part of our organization. I think they came on for certain specific needs and then disappeared back into wherever they'd come from. I suspect that we got certain help from the headquarters finance department.

Siemer: You would have known all those people personally, wouldn't you?

Craley: Oh, yes. And they would have come down and assisted us in doing certain accounting or processing that we would have had to do, but they weren't attached to our office.

Siemer: Felipe Mendiola was mayor of Tinian at the time. Had you had any substantial contact with Mendiola before you went to work with Canham?

Craley: I'd had contact with him, but not anything substantial. In the years that I'd been on Saipan, I'd been to Tinian on several occasions, I'd say maybe a dozen in total, usually as an escort officer for somebody either the military coming out or I indicated this one writer for the Readers Digest and a couple of other occasions, and Congressional visits and U.N. visits, but that would have been about the extent of it.

Siemer: What was Mendiola's position with respect to the Covenant?

Craley: I don't know.

Siemer: Do you remember a dispute between Mendiola and his Municipal Council at the time?

Craley: I remember some disputes existing, but I can't tell you today what they were about or what the outcome of it was or between whom.

Siemer: There were some resolutions condemning Mendiola for various things and supporting Joe Cruz and things of that sort.

Craley: Tinian was a very small place, and with the alleged advent of the military, things became very polarized over there. Everybody suddenly realized that this sleepy little island with so few people was going to become a great big military base, and everybody was jockeying for position. But again, this was something that was outside of my concern, and I was only vaguely aware of what they were doing and who was doing it.

Siemer: Was there a concern in your office that there might be a substantial "no" vote on Tinian?

Craley: No. We deliberately did not sit down in the evening and try to figure out where we were in terms of a vote. We avoided doing that, because we didn't want even the appearance of operating a program based on whether we were here or here, whether we had enough votes or not. Spike and I both refrained from even talking about where we thought it was going to come out, because we were being accused, by usually the opposition, that we were doing everything possible to assist the Marianas Political Status Commission. I think both of us leaned over backwards to the point where in driving home, if we drove home together (as we did at noon times) we didn't want to even talk about it, because we didn't want to ever lapse into a conversation and have somebody say: "Ah, ha, I knew they were talking about this all the time." No, we didn't.

Siemer: Then the Rota Municipal Council sent you (and many other entities) a resolution saying that they had some demands that had to be satisfied before they could endorse the Covenant. Do you recall that?

Craley: Only now since you mention it. I think we went over and met with them or they came over and met with us. I don't know which.

- Siemer: I was going to ask you about that, because it seemed to die away very quickly.
- Craley: I can't tell you why or now, but I know that Spike (as I've said on repeated occasions) had the ability to sit and down and meet with groups, and I marveled at how at the end of the meeting everybody seemed to be good friends. They all walked out, and I thought, "gee, this is something that I would never have been able to do, because I wouldn't have had the patience to do it with them." And he did.
- Siemer: Was it primarily patience? Was it a tone of voice?
- Craley: Oh, both of these things. He just had a way about him, and he had the patience, which I never had. I had lived and I had worked with Micronesians for so many years, and I knew those who were reasonable and whom you could discuss things with. Andon was one of them. He wasn't always reasonable because he wouldn't budge, but at least he was courteous, and you could talk. But many of the Saipanese were not courteous, and I felt that there was a certain degree of courtesy that should be extended. I extended it to them, and I expected them to extend it to me. When they didn't, I just was prepared to say, "The hell with you." I don't have to sit here and talk. But Spike did. And he did it in a way that they got it off their chest. They made their speeches and ranted and raved and after a while they started to calm down. The first thing you know everybody's laughing and they all walk out together patting each other on the back. It was amazing to me. It was an ability that I did not have or didn't exercise.
- Siemer: Oscar Rasa emerged as one of the leaders of the anti-Covenant faction. Why do you think that was?
- Craley: He was a Carolinian, and I think he probably had a philosophical hope that the Carolinian relationship would continue to exist by virtue of the whole Trust Territory having a closer relationship than it would under the Marianas separating out. And he was on the other side of the ledger in terms of the Marianas. Oscar had a certain following, but he didn't have a large following on Saipan. I think he felt that once things got polarized and the Covenant came into being, that he was going to lose some of the leadership characteristics that he thought he had.
- Siemer: Was he an effective politician at the time?
- Craley: To a degree. He was effective among his own element. His own element, in my opinion, was largely the rabble-rousers, the malcontents, the discontents. Herman Palacios and Dan Aquina and some of the others.
- Siemer: Oscar managed to raise some money from the Congress of Micronesia at one point. What do you remember about that?
- Craley: Well, they kind of decided in all fairness this was kind of a one-sided campaign. They decided that the opposition group needed some assistance, because the Marianas Political Status Commission was getting funding or getting certain monies from the United States, either they were or they felt they were, and therefore to equalize things a little they'd give some money to the other group.
- Siemer: Was there someone in the Congress of Micronesia leadership with whom Oscar was particularly close?
- Craley: No, but I think that they kind of felt a closeness to him more so than they did to some of the Marianas people. He at least came from the Carolinian/Ponape community, so there was some ancestral relationship that you could trace back there.
- Siemer: Did you have any dealings with Felicidad Ogumuro at that time?

- Craley: Oh, yes.
- Siemer: How would you distinguish her position from Oscar's? Was she a follower of Oscar?
- Craley: No. Felicidad in my opinion was smart enough not to be a follower of his, but she used him, just as I'm sure he used her when it was convenient. Cisco, her husband, was a Palauan. But she was pretty solid in her positions and much more reasonable, much more thought out than Oscar. Oscar's was a gut reaction. He was all action. He wasn't about to sit down and debate things. He would yell at you or scream at you. But she was much more (in my opinion) reasonable about things.
- Siemer: Back at that time, did the fact that she was a woman affect how much she could do in the political arena?
- Craley: Yes. These women were important, but in the opinion of the men they were important in their certain positions.
- Siemer: What was that?
- Craley: Well, I mean if you were involved in the hospital—stick to the hospital. If you were involved in education—stick to education. Don't get into the things that we're into. We're running things. We're running the whole thing. You stay in your kitchen or wherever it was. But these gals were good. They were very good. I always felt that I got more results, better results, from the women in Micronesia than I did from most of the men. They were more serious about things, they were more conscientious, they would show up. The men might not show up for two or three days and not think anything of it. All things being equal, if I had a choice of hiring a Micronesian woman or a Micronesian man, I would pick the woman every time, because you got much better production and results. And you got somebody that you could talk with. Maria Pangelinan, people like that, to me, they were the cream of the crop, always.
- Siemer: There was a group of women that Felicidad Ogumoro, Agnes McPhetres, Paz Younis, and Bennet Seman formed that seemed to become active at the time of the plebiscite and that seemed to be primarily opposed to the Covenant. What do you recall about that group?
- Craley: I don't recall too much about it except for the fact that they did get active in it and they did express themselves. They did go out and campaign. From my view, they were quite effective because they made sense. It made sense in the sense that you could follow them. It wasn't this wild rhetoric that Oscar and some of those fellows were putting out. How much effect that had on it, I don't know.
- Siemer: Why do you think this group of well-educated thoughtful women wound up on the anti-Covenant side?
- Craley: I don't know, and I don't know that I ever really thought about it. I guess the only answer I could give you why I didn't think about it is because this wasn't part of our assignment. We were not to get involved in the campaign except to see that there was fairness and quality in the campaign. We did not get involved with either faction, or any of the factions, to any extent other than to keep them kind of all moving in the same direction.
- Siemer: When the documents talk about the education for self-government effort, was that the Plebiscite Office's effort?
- Craley: Yes.
- Siemer: So what started in the Trust Territory as an education for self-government program became your mission and that was the neutral program that you took over?

- Craley: Yes. There was a movement (and again you're bringing things to me that I'd long forgotten about) started about the time that Haydn Williams came on board to educate Micronesia toward self-government. This kind of existed but never to the extent that it became universally effective. When the plebiscite came up, why then a lot of the effort was siphoned off into this program. By the time the plebiscite was over, the Micronesians were doing their own thing, and we were relieved of that responsibility, although we still did a certain amount of it. But our efforts at that point became more involved with translations than with the creation of the material.
- Siemer: Did you think that the translation of the materials into Chamorro and Carolinian was important?
- Craley: Political appearance. People who read, read English. A certain percentage, smaller percentage of them, read Chamorro or Carolinian. Most of the campaigning was verbal, and either in Carolinian or Chamorro.
- Siemer: Did you have any difficulties getting the materials translated?
- Craley: Yes.
- Siemer: Why?
- Craley: Well, as I recall (and again you're opening doors that I'd forgotten about), we would sometimes get two or three translations. We would go out to three particular people and give them this document and say will you translate this. And they'd turn it in, and we would look at the three things and there were obvious differences. Then we'd go back to the advisory committee or to some other sources and say here are three translations—which one of these do we accept? And there was never one that came out of it that was: "Oh, that's it, no question, no change." Because no matter what you ended up with, there was always going to be another group that said: "No, no, no, this isn't quite right, that's not it." And we just had to shut down at some point on that document and say this is it and go on to the next one. The Carolinian was the toughest of all.
- Siemer: Why was that?
- Craley: Well, we had a hell of a lot more Chamorros on the island than we had Carolinians, so the number of people that we drew from was considerably smaller. You could get three Chamorros to do translations quicker than you could get three Carolinians to do it. You could usually get one. Sometimes you were lucky and got two, and on rare occasions you might get three. We just didn't have as good a feel for the Carolinian translation as we felt we had for the Chamorro, even though we didn't feel that either of them was totally accurate.
- Siemer: Was part of the problem the opposition of the Carolinian leadership to the Covenant?
- Craley: There might have been some of that, but that would have been in the fact that that person wouldn't have volunteered to do the translation.
- Siemer: There seemed to be some controversy over Gus Tagabuel who was asked to do translations and said he would do them and then didn't do them.
- Craley: Yes. We had that problem. We had Carolinian things that didn't come in. I mean we were going to translate this particular document or this particular epistle or whatever it was, and we'd get the Chamorro translation in these various variations which we would then try to condense into one, and the Carolinian stuff wouldn't come in. We had deadlines, and finally on some of things we just got to the point where we've got to go to print. We've got to get this stuff printed and disseminated. You can't pass it out on the day that they're

voting. It's got to be out at a certain time in order to get distributed and get read.

Siemer: Was your office responsible for getting the Covenant translated?

Craley: Yes.

Siemer: And what about the Analysis?

Craley: Yes—all of those documents.

Siemer: How far beyond the Covenant and its analysis did you go? Did you have translations of everything that the Plebiscite office put out? Your question and answer booklet, for example?

Craley: No. I think we had Chamorro and English publications of that. I don't think we ever got the Carolinian. There were certain documents that we didn't get the Carolinian translations.

Siemer: You went with the Chamorro anyway?

Craley: Yes.

Siemer: Were there ever criticisms of your translations?

Craley: Oh yes, sure.

Siemer: What would you do about those?

Craley: Well, we would deal with them first when we got the documents in, and then we would try to put together, from the different variations that we got, one that the most people would accept as being the best of the three, or the composite of the three. But the fellow who wrote this one still stuck with his, and the guy that wrote that one still stuck with his. So after we published this one, which was kind of a composite, if some of his stuff didn't get in, they were still saying it wasn't right.

Siemer: Were there demands from the Carolinian community for translations?

Craley: To a certain degree, but I think everybody realized in honesty that these translations weren't as important as the United Nations and as certain purists felt that they were.

Siemer: Let me shift gears for a minute and ask you about John Rosario. Did you work with him back then?

Craley: Oh, yes. John was part of my staff at headquarters. He worked in our public information office.

Siemer: Was John an opponent of the Covenant back in those days?

Craley: I don't know. This may sound ridiculous, but I made an effort not to be overly informed about who was on whose side, because ever since the moment I was picked to become the executive director and told that we were supposed to be totally removed from either position, I tried to do that. I didn't say John, how do you feel about this or what side are you on?

Siemer: John wasn't writing or speaking, so far as you recall, on Covenant issues in those days?

Craley: Oh, I suspect he was at various meetings and in various groups, yes.

Siemer: What about the Territorial Party? What position did the party take with respect to the Covenant?

Craley: I think initially and basically they were opposed to the Covenant, because they felt that

the Popular Party was more—Eddie Pangelinan, Herman Q. Guerrero and some of those people were more in favor of it. But not everybody in the Territorial Party was against it. I think Frank Palacios kind of swung over to it after a while. They made up part of the opposition group, as I reconstruct it.

Siemer: What is the issue that came up briefly about Carolinians not being able to own land if the Covenant were approved?

Craley: I don't know how that evolved or what the significance of it was. There was always a certain amount of friction between the Saipanese and the Carolinians. As I said the other day, the Saipanese were by and large moved off of the island at one point. And in their absence, the Carolinians kind of moved onto it. I think the feeling might have been that if they ever become self-governing, the Chamorros are the majority, and they just might take our land away from us.

Siemer: Somehow.

Craley: Yes.

Siemer: But there wasn't a particular flaw that they were looking at in the Covenant itself that—

Craley: I don't think so. I think it was just a fear of the minority that the majority was going to make them second-class citizens.

Siemer: What did you think was the most effective argument that the opponents had?

Craley: I think the language of the "no" vote and probably the land issue, although I did not get involved in these various meetings. We didn't attend any of these meetings where they were out campaigning.

Siemer: Let me put it this way then. What was the most serious piece of misinformation or wrong fact that you had to overcome in trying to put out neutral materials about the effect of the Covenant and the effect of the plebiscite?

Craley: I'd have to go back and read some of these documents to refresh my memory on that. There were a couple, and I can't at this instant tell you what they were. But there were a couple that they felt that Canham had really taken the wrong position. He would invite them to come in, and they would discuss them, and he would tell why he took this position or why he took that position, why he made this statement. They didn't like it and they didn't quite go along with it, but they weren't going to make a big stink about it.

Siemer: One of the things that Canham seemed to talk about was the argument that Congress could unilaterally change the Covenant and the Marianas wouldn't have anything to say about that. Where did that come from?

Craley: Well, I think Phil Burton made certain statements from time to time that if the U.S. Congress decided something, that was going to be it. Then you got into this issue, is the Covenant going to be the document, or does the Congress have the authority? And I think Phil's quick answer to anything like that was the Congress does. Again, this is something that we weren't involved with. This was a matter between Williams in the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiation and the Congress. Spike probably had the problem of trying to respond to this, which I guess he might have done in his question and answer document. You've got to understand that the opposition was always looking for any incident, any remark, anything that happened that they could put into their bow because they didn't have all the arrows that the other side had. So if somebody in Congress like Burton, who was quite outspoken, not only outspoken but made loud comments, they would grab onto it immediately and use it to whatever advantage that they felt they had

with it.

Siemer: When you finished your first round of registration, you still had people in the Northern Islands, people in Guam, people in Hawaii. How did you go about getting those off-island people registered?

Craley: Well, a field trip vessel went up to the Northern Islands and did registration right on the spot, so that when the vessel pulled away from the Northern Islands and came back, the registration was done there. They had a registration group that went over to the University of Guam and to Guam itself, and I think they did a two- or a three-day registration drive over there. I think it was two. They also sent a group to Hawaii. They operated out of the University of Hawaii, and anybody who was domiciled on Saipan as a Marianas person could appear and register there.

Siemer: Were there any registration activities conducted on the mainland?

Craley: Not that I know of. That was something that we tried to do by mail, and it met only with minimal success. The request for registration form, and the same thing with the ballot, there was too much delay time in getting this thing in and getting it back. There was an effort made, and there was a certain degree of accomplishment, but it was probably a 25%, 30% at best.

Siemer: You did get a very high number of people registered.

Craley: Over in the U.S.?

Siemer: I mean overall.

Craley: Oh, yes. The registration drive on the three islands, the Northern Islands, Guam, and to a degree Hawaii, the further you started to get from the Marianas, the more the percentage started to drop off. But yes it was a good registration drive. We were quite proud of it.

Siemer: Then how soon after the registration drive were you able to publish the voter list?

Craley: Very soon, as I recall.

Siemer: Could anybody get a copy of that list?

Craley: I would like to say yes, and I'm sure they could, but if you ask me how it was done I can't quite recall at this point. But if they couldn't get a copy to take with them, it was at headquarters, at the Plebiscite office. We had to have lists out to each polling place because you were required to vote in the precinct or the area that you were registered in. We had some cases as I recall now where somebody who lived here went and wanted to vote over here. And they were told no they can't vote over there, they've got to vote where they're registered. That created some problems.

Siemer: You had quite a large number of challenges fairly quickly after you finished the registration process.

Craley: Yes.

Siemer: How were those challenges dealt with by the voter registration board?

Craley: They met and reviewed the challenge and made a decision. In some cases those decisions were challenged, and they went on to court.

Siemer: What was your sense of the acceptance of that process in the community?

Craley: 60-70%. I mean it wasn't total acceptance by any means, but it was pretty substantial.

- Siemer: A fellow named John Craft arrived at some point. How did he get involved in this process?
- Craley: There were certain issues that arose, and I can't remember now what they were exactly. I think they were more in terms of how the United States would respond to certain of these issues. They were out of our expertise, so we turned to, I guess it was Haydn Williams or somebody, and said look, these are questions that are being asked about how will this work with the United States. We don't have the expertise to answer this. They said, we'll send you somebody. And they sent us John Craft. He became the legal authority on those issues.
- Siemer: Did he have any background in these issues?
- Craley: I don't know.
- Siemer: What kind of a fellow was he?
- Craley: Nice, easy-going guy as I recall.
- Siemer: Had Canham known him previously?
- Craley: No.
- Siemer: Had you?
- Craley: No.
- Siemer: Had he been to the Marianas before this?
- Craley: No.
- Siemer: Where did he come from?
- Craley: He came from Missouri, as I remember, and I don't know where.
- Siemer: How long did he stay?
- Craley: I guess up until pretty close to the plebiscite. He may have even stayed past the plebiscite, but he left very shortly after that and we never heard from him again.
- Siemer: Did he help you with any of these challenges to the people who were registered?
- Craley: No, not basically. As I recall, that was not his objective in being there.
- Siemer: Who represented the voter registration board when one of its decisions was challenged in court?
- Craley: Interesting question. I don't know that I know. I guess they had to be represented, but I don't know who. It might have been some member of the board. I don't know.
- Siemer: Tell me what you recall about the U.N. visiting mission that came out at or a little bit before the plebiscite.
- Craley: Very interesting group. They came out and boy they kept busy. They went everywhere and did everything in the five, six, seven days they were there, however long they were there. And of course they met with all of the various people that wanted to meet with them, and they would constantly come back to us and say we hear this, we hear that, what do you have to say about this, what do you have to say about that? And it kind of doubled our time, because we were not only concerned with bringing the plebiscite to fruition and conducting the vote, but we also had to spend time meeting with these people and answering all their questions which were questions that had been raised at last night or yesterday afternoon or this morning.

- Siemer: You had to do that rather than Bergesen?
- Craley: Oh, yes. I would spend most evenings back at Plebiscite headquarters catching up with things that I should have been doing during the day but didn't do because people were coming in or the U.N. was coming in. There were just 100 things going on. So in the evening I would go back down to headquarters or to the Plebiscite office and get caught up with the paperwork that I felt had to be done that day. I was down there one evening. The United Nations visiting mission was out at a public meeting. Something came up that just got them all disturbed, and I can't remember anymore what it was, but got them all disturbed and excited, and I guess Alf said let's go see Neiman. We'll find out. I guess he didn't want to bother Spike. So since he and I shared the same joint driveway, why they came back up to the house. He must have gone into his house with the visiting mission and sent his wife Bobbie over to our place. Janet had gone to bed, not that she was sleeping, she was back reading in the bedroom. We had the air-conditioner on; we had started to put some air-conditioning in about that time, and I guess we only had it in the bedroom. She was back there, she had bathed and was in her nightgown and in bed. And Bobbie had come to the kitchen door, which was the primary door everyone went in, and knocked on it, and nobody answered her because Janet was back in the bedroom at the back of the house with the air-conditioner on. So I don't know whether she said to Alf: "I can't get any answer," or whether she decided on her own, but she opened the door and walked in and came through the house and down the hall and opened the bedroom door. Janet looked up to find Bobbie coming through the door, and she said, "Where's Neiman," and Janet said, "How the hell do I know where he is? What are you doing in my bedroom?" She finally calmed down enough to tell her that I was down at headquarters. So they came down to get me. But Janet said: "From now on when you leave here, I'm going to lock that damned door so nobody walks in on me." She was most upset about this intrusion. Apparently, the State Department didn't think there was anything wrong about coming right into your house and into your bedroom to get whatever they wanted.
- Siemer: Was it your sense that you were able to deal satisfactorily with the questions that they raised?
- Craley: Yes. By and large.
- Siemer: Do any of those concerns stick in your mind?
- Craley: No. I can't even recall what the issue was that brought this situation to the floor. But they were always hearing things as they went out to these various meetings, and somebody would say to them: "Well we were told this," or "We were told that," or "They did this," or "They did that," so their first reaction was to come back and hear what we had said or find out what we had done.
- Siemer: What was your sense of them? Were they reasonable people?
- Craley: By and large. Murphy was kind of a character. He was a Scotsman and he reveled in the fact that he wore a monocle and a felt hat.
- Siemer: In the tropics?
- Craley: In the tropics. And a suit and a cane; he had a cane. Some of these U.N. types enjoyed the role that they played in these visiting missions of having people stare at them. Of course they were God in a sense. This was the final authority—the United Nations. This was the institution that was going to ultimately accept what we'd done. But by and large they went away kind of patting us on the back and telling us that they felt we had done an admirable

job.

Siemer: What did they actually do on election day?

Craley: They visited all the polling places that they could get to. They even split up. As I recall, one of them (I think there were three) went to Rota, one of them went to Tinian, and they kind of divided their staff, too. I think one member and one staff went to the outer islands and then the rest of them were on Saipan. They visited all the polling places.

Siemer: How did you organize for election day? Where did you get your poll workers?

Craley: From the District government. They had an election structure that was established and used in every election time. They all came to the Plebiscite Commission at 6:00 o'clock in the morning. The policemen were there, the constables and everything else. They picked up their ballot boxes.

Siemer: At 6:00 a.m.?

Craley: Oh, it was early in the morning, between 5:00 and 6:00. Some of them were there at 5:00 or so. I think we got down around 4:00 or 4:30 to make sure that everything was ready for them, and we were there when they got there. They'd come in and you had to open each box and make sure that it was empty and lock everything in at that point. It was to remain locked until it came back and it was officially opened. Everybody went out; the polls I think opened at 7:00. They ran from 7:00 in the morning until 7:00 in the evening. Then everything was brought back into the old court house, the court house down at the District Center. Then they were opened there that night.

Siemer: Was the opening and counting procedure the same as had been used in the District as well?

Craley: It was similar to, but the U.N. was there. They were seated in the jury box as observers. Any other official representatives could be acknowledged and made a part of this process. But there was a certain specific procedure that had to be followed, and there had to be representatives from both segments (as I remembered) seated at the big table. They had cleared out the front of the courtroom. The judge's bench was up there; the jury was over here. Nobody was allowed inside this area except those that were involved in counting this particular box. They would open that box and take out the ballots, and then they would count them. There were people there from both factions who were making sure that it came out 75 to 41 or whatever the vote was. Then those were put back into the ballot box and it was locked and put aside, and then another one was brought in. This was the process until we had all of the ballot boxes. The boxes had to come over from Tinian and Rota. The box had gone up to the Northern Islands and had been voted on earlier and brought in and locked up until the night of the counting.

Siemer: Were there any extra steps to prevent fraud that were taken in this election that had not been used before? You mentioned the dipping of fingers into ink.

Craley: I think there were. I think somewhere I saw a sample ballot in here, and I think we numbered some of those, if we didn't number them all. We put on certain identification to make sure that nobody had duplicated these ballots or reproduced them. We tried to do everything possible that we could to discourage any kind of fraud, and by and large I don't think we had any complaints that I can recall about fraud. I think even the opposition kind of reluctantly came away saying that they thought it was a fair election.

Siemer: What happened after the election was over?

Craley: We had to do the absentee ballots, which took several days to do, until we got all those

in. Then we had to come back and meet with both the United States Congress and report and then go on to the United Nations and report to them.

Siemer: Did both you and Canham do that trip?

Craley: Yes. So it took us several weeks (it might have even taken longer than that) that we were out of the Trust Territory back in Washington and/or New York.

Siemer: Was there some kind of written report that was made?

Craley: Oh, yes. Well, we didn't make a written report, but all of these reports were transcribed verbatim.

Siemer: You mean your oral report to the Congress?

Craley: The Senate and the House both published reports of the Plebiscite Commissioner, and the United Nations did a verbatim too of our report.

Willens: To whom did you report in the United Nations?

Craley: The Trusteeship Council.

Willens: It would have been after their normal session. Did they have a special session for this purpose?

Craley: I think we went to the U.N., but I'm not sure. I don't know whether we went to the U.N. or the U.N. produced a report based on the visiting mission. I can't remember. I can remember distinctly appearing before the House Interior and the Senate Interior Committees. I'm a little vague on whether we went to New York or not, and since you raised the question we may not have gone to New York. But they published a report which we subsequently got which said in their opinion the election had been fair and handled properly.

Willens: Did you have any meeting with Ambassador Williams either on the day of the vote if he was there or shortly thereafter when the results were known?

Craley: I didn't. I didn't have that much contact with him at any time. It was only after the plebiscite was all over that he would even begin to acknowledge that I was around. I mean he was just a guy that would walk by you and not say anything. But later after the Marianas was under his belt, why he became a hell of a lot more civil.

Siemer: Did anybody else go with you on the trip to Washington?

Craley: Mr. Canham and myself.

Siemer: Did anyone join you at the hearings—anyone from Williams' office or Interior?

Craley: Oh, I'm sure there were people there. They might have been part of the presentation, too, and I'd have to go back and try to get a copy of those verbatims and see who appeared. But I think your question is a good one. I think there probably was somebody there from the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations, Interior and/or State.

Siemer: Then what happened after that process?

Craley: Then there was a Secretarial Order I think which established the Resident Commissioner.

Siemer: Did you go back to Saipan?

Craley: Oh, yes.

- Siemer: And were you intending to go back to your Trust Territory job?
- Craley: I think that was my intention and what I did. Because this was 1975. Yes, that's what I did.
- Siemer: What was Canham's intention after the plebiscite was over?
- Craley: Well, he came back and had a certain period of time in which he was cleaning up his personal affairs there, and then he went back to his home. Then it was later when this Secretarial Order was created that he reappeared again as the Resident Commissioner.
- Siemer: Did you come back to Washington to appear before Congress with respect to the approval of the Covenant?
- Craley: I don't think I did because, other than the plebiscite, I wouldn't have had anything to do with that process.
- Siemer: Did Congressmen come out to Saipan?
- Craley: Concentrating exclusively in the Marianas?
- Siemer: Yes.
- Craley: Phil Burton came out on three or four occasions, and at this point I don't remember exactly what his cycle was and how it related to various events. But he (in my opinion) was probably about the only person. He might have brought one or two others with him from time to time. But I don't remember any group that came out for the purpose of reviewing what had gone on.
- Siemer: How did you come to work for the Resident Commissioner?
- Craley: Well, I was back at Trust Territory . . .
- Siemer: Back in your legislative liaison job?
- Craley: Yes. It was very shortly after that the Secretarial Order came out, and there was some discussion as to whether I would assume the position of executive director or not. Once Spike got back in business, he decided that it was better to let Frank Ada assume that position, and then I was asked to come on board as special assistant.
- Willens: Do you recall playing any role whatsoever within the Executive Branch and going up to the Hill and trying to inform Congressmen or Senators or their staffs about the Covenant?
- Craley: I don't recall any such formal responsibility, no. I got the feeling from reading a lot of this stuff (most of it which I'd never seen) is that I was constantly amazed to see documents referring to me, particularly about visits. I never had any idea or inkling that people were writing things and saying Craley's going to go see so-and-so and he's probably going to talk about this and that. I mean I was totally innocent of any of those things. I went back to Congress because I'd been a member and I'd known some of these people and I'd enjoyed them. There was always the statement, "Whenever you're back in Washington, come up and say hello," and I would go up and say hello and we would chat and renew old friendships and that was about it. I never took on any personal campaigns of any sort, either pro or con or anything. These were harmless visits, but somebody obviously must have always felt that I was up there doing something.
- Siemer: Well, this document from 1975 is about Senator Nunn. It says the Senator visited the Marianas and was briefed by Craley and the Marianas delegation.
- Craley: That's true. I remember we talked about the political election in 1976 and who I thought would make a good presidential candidate. No, I was not at the level at that point that

these people would consult me. I had deliberately taken myself out of this type of thing. We had nice conversations, and I remember Nunn—walking down to the beach one morning and just chatting. But there wasn't anything earthshaking in terms of what we were discussing. I'm sure we talked about things, but it was kind of in a conversational level—no great depth.

Siemer: Well, there was probably also some reassurance that if Senator Nunn was opposed to something, you would have divined that in the course of your conversation.

Craley: I don't remember anybody ever coming back to me and saying what did you talk about. I don't remember that.

Willens: Were you surprised that some opposition developed in the Senate to approval of the Covenant?

Craley: No, I don't think I was, any more than I would have been surprised that there was opposition in the Marianas to it. I didn't have the feeling that anything that was done out there had universal and total acceptance. There were always going to be some people that were going to question certain things on it. Jim McClure was one that had some reservations from time to time. And Bennett Johnson. John Culver—I don't remember that John had any in particular. You know, you weren't ever going to go up there and have everybody say, "Aye, aye, aye," all down the line, no.

Willens: When you came back after reporting in Washington to the Senate and the House Committees on the plebiscite, when you returned it was about the time of the Micronesian Constitutional Convention. Did you play any role, even as an observer, during the course of that Convention?

Craley: Casual. Our office gave them a certain degree of logistic support in terms of whatever they needed to make the Convention come off successfully. Janet, I think, at that point was working for them. And I would go down daily, once, twice, three times a day—whatever the occasion required—to drop in and see how things were going, to sit in on some of the sessions from time to time. Somebody would see me and ask me to do this or do that. It was strictly whatever we can do to help you let us know, and I'll be here from time to time and if you need me and I'm not here, give me a call. That was about it.

Willens: What was your overall assessment of the effort in that Convention to produce a constitution that might be acceptable to all the remaining districts of the Trust Territory?

Craley: I felt that they would come up with something that would at least be a document that would go before all the various districts. I wasn't necessarily convinced that it would fly in all the districts, but at least they would reach the point that they would have something to present. I think that was about as far as I went in terms of speculation.

Willens: You mentioned that Joe Murphy from Guam was someone who visited Saipan from time to time during the time that the Covenant was being discussed, before the plebiscite. Did you ever discuss with Joe Murphy the political status that Guam had and whether Guam might some day have the same commonwealth status as the Northern Marianas?

Craley: No, I never had any such discussions, but there was a great deal of discussion on Guam about this. Guam became very, very jealous of the Marianas after they had accomplished their Covenant. There was an interesting poll that I think preceded the plebiscite where somebody decided (and I don't know who initiated the call) to poll the Northern Marianas people and the citizens of Guam about a political union of the two. On two separate days, the Marianas going first, Guam going second, they would have a straw vote taken.

The Marianas voted for political union with Guam, and a couple of days later Guam voted against it. That kind of frosted the Marianas and ended any such thoughts there. Then after the Covenant came into being with all the various features in it, why Guam immediately said hey they got a much better deal than we got. And they wanted the same kind of deal. But I never had any discussions with them on it.

Willens: After the Covenant was approved by Congress and enacted into law, there were a series of steps taken in the Marianas to prepare for constitutional government. Did you have any contact with the work of the Office of Transitional Studies and Planning headed by Pete A. Tenorio?

Craley: Oh, yes. We were involved with them. But again, basically as a support activity and not as an immediate part of it. I mean we didn't have the responsibility of affecting what it was, but we did have the responsibility of supporting them in their objective.

Willens: Did you look at any of the studies or materials that were generated by that office?

Craley: I saw some of them, a lot of them, but it was not my responsibility to review them and evaluate them or anything of that nature. So I looked at them just as a matter of if they were given to me, and some of them were, not all of them, as a matter of curiosity, yes.

Willens: Did you think that planning effort was worth the money spent on it?

Craley: I'd probably have to answer you by saying that I think there was a heck of a lot of waste in it in terms of money. Most Micronesians did things up right when they did them, and I use the word "right" not accurately. If you could buy a table for \$69 or you could get one for \$385, they bought the one for \$385. There was, in my opinion, a lot of waste in terms of the net product. They were approaching it on a very, very first-class basis and with a lot of overkill, I thought.

Willens: Do you know what happened to any of those plans when the first Commonwealth government took office?

Craley: No, I don't.

Siemer: When the separate administration was set up, how was it organized?

Craley: When the Marianas became self-governing under a Resident Commissioner?

Siemer: Yes.

Craley: Okay. Up until the Resident Commissioner came on board, the District Administrator was still the Chief executive under the High Commissioner. The High Commissioner was advised by the Secretarial Order that there would be a Marianas government headed by a Resident Commissioner and that the High Commissioner was responsible for providing logistic support—housing, any other needs that the Resident Commissioner had. That pretty much became it. Spike came on board. He was given a house, and he moved into what was the DistAd's office and become the Resident Commissioner.

Siemer: Oh, so you physically took over the District Administrator's office?

Craley: Yes. There were three offices in a row. There was the DistAd's office, and then there was Danny Aquino's office and a second office, and then the big outer office. Spike moved into the DistAd's office, Frank Ada moved into this third office, which was right adjacent to the outer office, and I took the middle one. We took over the responsibility of the Marianas government for that period of time.

Siemer: Were all the staff members who worked for the District Administrator retained?

- Craley: Yes.
- Siemer: About how many of them were there?
- Craley: You mean in the whole Marianas government?
- Siemer: In the whole Resident Commissioner's office?
- Craley: Oh, in that one building?
- Siemer: Right.
- Craley: Probably 30-40 people.
- Siemer: Did you bring anybody with you from the Trust Territory office?
- Craley: Yes.
- Siemer: Did Canham bring anybody in who was new with him?
- Craley: Wait a second. There was somebody that came down as a secretary for him, and I can't remember who that was.
- Siemer: How about Frank Ada? Did he bring anybody new in?
- Craley: No.
- Siemer: So you basically took over the existing machinery of government, and ran it?
- Craley: Yes.
- Siemer: Did Canham make any significant changes in the way that Frank Ada had run that office?
- Craley: Only his own style of operation, which was I'm sure a lot different from Frank's, but not anything that would tend to ruffle Frank's feathers. He didn't come in and say we're going to do things this way from now on. He was very astute and sensitive about these matters. He moved in and he did things his way. He brought Frank in on a lot of these things that came up from time to time for his advice and guidance.
- Siemer: How did he and Frank get along?
- Craley: I would like to think that they got along well. Spike certainly held him in great respect. There were certain things that, as an American, Spike would do his way, whereas Frank, as a Saipanese, would do another way, but they worked well together.
- Siemer: What were your particular areas of responsibility?
- Craley: To assist Spike and to work with particular problems.
- Siemer: You were the person who made it work?
- Craley: Well, no I won't say that. But look into this for me. Now here's a question that's come up. He would pull Frank in and ask Frank, and he would ask me then to also check on it and follow up on it. And if there was something to be done, I would sometimes be the one that would see that it got done.
- Siemer: Your office also had the responsibility for the election of the new government after the Constitutional Convention in the Marianas was held.
- Craley: We held the first election, yes.
- Siemer: Did you use the same methods that you had with respect to the plebiscite election?
- Craley: I think we did. I think we used that voter registration roll. I don't think we conducted

another voter registration drive. I think we used the voter registration drive that had been produced for the plebiscite and permitted people that had come of age or had become eligible to add their names to it.

Siemer: Were you also responsible for the election of the Constitutional Convention delegates in 1976?

Craley: I think we were responsible for everything that happened up until the time that the Marianas government took over on its own.

Siemer: Who came up with the idea of having the candidates for Constitutional Convention delegate draw numbers for their place on the ballot?

Craley: I have no idea.

Siemer: Did you actually have them come in and draw numbers out of a hat?

Craley: I don't remember the process, to be honest with you.

Siemer: Then what did you do after the first Marianas election and the constitutional government was installed?

Craley: What did I do?

Siemer: You personally.

Craley: I went back to the Trust Territory headquarters. We had then had a new High Commissioner. That was Adrian Winkel. He had come in during the time that I was not there. So there was no real relationship anymore, and suddenly he found this guy coming back. I've been here for x amount of time and I've gotten along without him, so what am I going to do with him? I went back there and did something until gradually it got to the point where it was obvious to me that we were seeing things differently. I just decided at that point that while I was still producing something or doing something I'd get out of his hair and move as far away from him as I could.

Siemer: So what did you do?

Craley: I moved over into the other building. I'm trying to remember now what the devil I did do. I think when I went back, I assumed the responsibility for finance and administration and a few other related matters. Then we brought somebody else in to take that over, and I moved onto something else. I kept moving from one thing to another until I finally ended up over in the building behind headquarters, where I stayed until Adrian left and Janet McCoy came on board. I'm a little bit vague about that period of time, because it certainly wasn't a very productive period in terms of my efforts.

Siemer: When McCoy was appointed, what position did you hold?

Craley: I was brought back over to headquarters and up on the High Commissioner's corridor, so to speak. Dan High, who was ultimately appointed Deputy High Commissioner, left shortly after that. Dan anticipated becoming High Commissioner and was not successful, so they offered him Deputy High Commissioner and he decided at that point that he was leaving. He left, and then Jan moved me into the Deputy High Commissioner's position and I assumed his responsibilities, as well as those I was doing at the time. I think that involved health and education largely.

Siemer: How long did you stay in that position?

Craley: Until I left in April of 1985. She came on board sometime in 1981.

Siemer: Then where did you go in 1985?

- Craley: Came back here to the States.
- Siemer: What were you doing then?
- Craley: I retired.
- Siemer: Back to Pennsylvania?
- Craley: Yes. Back to the house over here in Red Lion. A temporary move, because Janet and I had never lived in the States together, and we had no idea where we were going to go, but I had a house there, and we moved back into it with the idea that we would kind of allow ourselves to see where we were going to go. After a couple of months there, Janet decided it was quite comfortable and we might just stay there, and we did.
- Willens: During the time that you worked with Canham when he was Resident Commissioner, there was a question of registering some Filipinos to vote, and that involved their renunciation of their Philippine citizenship and the issuance of certificates of citizenship and so forth and so on. That became the subject of considerable controversy within the Marianas and was the subject of subsequent litigation. What is your recollection of your attitude and Canham's attitude to the request of these Filipinos to vote?
- Craley: Somebody convinced them (and I don't know who) that if they gave up their Filipino citizenship, renounced it, they could be taken in as citizens of the Mariana Islands. Some of them did, and some of them decided not to. I'm pretty vague on those details now without looking back at something. But I remember now that was a major, major issue, and it was badly handled in all respects. I can't reconstruct it enough at this point to tell you what I remember about it, except I remember it as being a badly-handled situation.
- Willens: Do you remember whether Mike White was involved in that effort?
- Craley: Possibly so. I suspect Mike might have been. There were some people in the Marianas who were promoting this. It sticks in my mind that there was some program that they had conceived that these people would vote the right way, and if they brought in enough of them they could be at least a factor in any forthcoming election. This was kind of (as I remember now) the motivation. We're going to bring in these various kinds of people and they're going to vote with us when the election comes up.
- Willens: What was your impression of the first six years or so of the new Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and in particular the way it handled governmental problems and economic development prospects?
- Craley: By that time, the infrastructure in the Marianas and on Saipan began to deteriorate. We went on water hours. We had blackouts. Things just didn't work as well as they had worked previously. At least that was the perception. In the Trust Territory headquarters, we were constantly reminded we are guests here, this is no longer part of our jurisdiction, we're not to be overly critical, we're not to be critical period, of the Marianas, just quietly endure what's going on and stay out of it. I was perfectly willing to do that and did so. But as a resident there, my observation was that things were beginning to deteriorate. Their judicial system wasn't working quite the way it should be. There was a lot of shake-down, kind of like a shake-down cruise. There were a lot of things, pipes bursting and steam going out. They were patching things up as they moved along. It wasn't the best of times.
- Willens: Are you suggesting that the failures of the infrastructure were due to less well-trained management, or was it a product of the age of the infrastructure?
- Craley: Both. The age was definitely contributing, and at the same time the maintenance and the

attention to them was not there. In my opinion it took them a while before they started to pick up on some of these things, but the age certainly was contributing to it as well. Plus the fact that they were beginning to merge systems. In other words, when I first went out there, Capitol Hill had its own water system, and the water that was produced for Capitol Hill went up to the reservoir on the hill and it served all of Capitol Hill. And it was that way with the telephones. The government telephones were government telephones. Nobody had telephones on the island except government employees. As they began to develop, or move towards self-government, and to assume it, why all these things were opened up. There was finally a water line connected to the Capitol Hill system which allowed water to flow down to the rest of the place. They started to move out and build in areas that hadn't been building before. The system just wasn't prepared for it. It was the age of it, the fact that this was all new to them, and the fact that they were expanding at the same time. These three events coming together were just too much for it. We had power outages. The last couple of years I was there I had a 5,000 watt generator that we bought collectively. The status LNO officer went over to Guam and bought a generator from the Navy and brought it over and I shared in the purchase of it. Then when he left, I bought his half of it. I had this big industrial generator sitting outside my kitchen door which I could throw the switch and have power. I was at the bottom of the system water-wise so that when they shut off the water, all the water on Capitol Hill drained down into my area, which was also incidentally where the Governor lived. Pete lived right beside me. And we had water when the rest of the people on the island didn't have it. But it was not the best of times in terms of creature comforts.

Willens: How about economic development?

Craley: It was beginning to happen. We began to see some movement in terms of economic development. We weren't quite sure what it was, because we weren't party to it and weren't consulted or briefed or anything of that nature. We just lived there.

Siemer: Why did the Trust Territory continue to be headquartered there?

Craley: They had nowhere else to go. We knew the Trust Territory was being phased down also, and it was only a question of time. I was trying to do everything that I could to bring it to a close. The other districts developed self-government a year or two after the Marianas, and there was some belief on my part that we should remain here for a limited period of time to assist them if and when they needed assistance. Initially there were some requests made. But with the passage of time, these requests became fewer and fewer, and the authority and the responsibility of the High Commissioner began to diminish. It was my feeling it's time to shut it down and get out of here and let them do their thing. It took us quite a long time to do that. Mrs. McCoy was amenable to that, and that was one reason why she did not have a Deputy High Commissioner—because she decided we're phasing down, "I don't want to bring on board a Deputy High Commissioner." This was a high-priced salary, and another person with a secretary and all that kind of stuff. So she asked, "Will you assume these responsibilities plus what you're doing," and I said, "Certainly, because what I'm doing is getting less and less all the time." We eventually got down to the point where, through her efforts, she was able to convince Interior that we needed fewer people and fewer responsibilities out there and that they were going to have to start RIFing people. And what happens from my viewpoint was that you always RIF at the bottom, and somehow you can get rid of everybody but the CEOs and the people at the top remain. So I thought I had a very crafty idea. I would put myself in the first RIF list, which would prove that we're going to do this thing from top to bottom. I sold her on the idea, which she reluctantly accepted, but she did accept it, and I was one of those that

was in the first RIF list. And I felt that if you do that, nobody's going to criticize you for getting rid of all the little GS 3s and 4s and 5s. And that's how it happened. She got rid of, I guess there were about 40 of us that went in that first group, and I was one of the 40.

Willens: Have you been back since?

Craley: I went back once. She invited me to come back and participate in her swan song through the Trust Territory.

Willens: Did you go with her through the Trust Territory?

Craley: Oh, yes.

Willens: When was that? Was that about 1988?

Craley: I guess 1987. I came across one of the programs the other day. I was looking through some documents to see if I could find some personal papers of mine, and I came across one of those programs. We took a flying trip through the Trust Territory. We started out in Honolulu to Majuro, Majuro to Ponape, Ponape to Truk, Truk to Saipan. I was the master of ceremonies. We had, I think, I remember facetiously counting up the number of stars we had on that flight. We had somewhere in the neighborhood of 21 to 24 stars.

Willens: Those are military stars? How many generals is that?

Craley: We had a 4-star admiral, we had one Lt. general, we had a score of 2-stars, and the Navy in those days I think still didn't have a 1-star rank, we had a brigadier general I think from the Marine Corps, and we had all the rest of the Navy fellows who were 2-stars. It was just loaded with military types. And then Mrs. McCoy. We had a representative from the State Department and a representative from Interior.

Willens: What was the purpose of this?

Craley: We went through and we took down the flag.

Willens: This was then after the Trusteeship Agreement was terminated from 1986?

Craley: Yes. Mrs. McCoy and Admiral Hayes, who was the CINCPAC at the time, made their swan songs as we moved through the districts. We ended up back in Saipan, and then the rest of us took off the next day and flew back to Honolulu. She stayed there and shut her operation down shortly thereafter.

Willens: You've been very generous with your time, but I'm obligated to and want to ask you in conclusion, do you have any sort of overall assessment of how it's worked out in the Trust Territory since you first appeared on the scene in 1967?

Craley: Well, I take some pride in the fact that I think we did a fairly good job in terms of bringing some form of democratic government into the area. Now there may be those who say that that's not very worthy, but we took them from a long, long history, from the days of the Spanish to the time of not being self-governing to returning them to self-government under a system that was different from their own chieftain system where it was pretty much of a benevolent dictatorship (if it was indeed benevolent), and we gave them a form of democracy. Now it came in various forms—the Marshalls has their particular unique form, the Federated States has their way of doing it, and Palau has its way. And the Marianas of course adopted a system that's very close to our own, both at federal and state level. I don't know much about the economic status today because I haven't been back to see it. I do receive the National Union, which is a publication put out by the Federated States of Micronesia periodically. I used to get at one time the *Marianas Variety*, which Maria Pangelinan sent to me as a gift for a year or two, but it got so costly that

I didn't blame her for dropping it, because it was by air mail and it got awfully, awfully expensive. And now I guess it's not quite as expensive, but in those days it was. I'd love to go back, and I'd love to talk to people who've been there and see what is happening, what's happening in Palau, what's happening in the Federated States. I learned very belatedly that Bailey Olter had suffered a stroke, and the first I knew of it was when the Congress of the Federated States of Micronesia passed a resolution appointing Jacob Nena as the Acting President. They didn't say anything about his having a stroke until they made the appointment of his successor. My daughter, who lives in the Washington area in Loudon County, faxes me stuff from the *Washington Post* every once in a while. I learned that Amata Kabua died and subsequently that Pete Coleman died, and I got the clipping a couple of weeks or months or so ago about George Miller's ranting and raving about the sweatshops in the Marianas. So I get little pieces of information, but I don't get a great deal, so I don't really know that much about what's going on.

Willens: Well, you know a great deal about what did go on, and for that we thank you very much.

Craley: I want to conclude by saying, as I said when we started today, that I'm not sure that I knew as much as I thought I knew. I had feelings, I had ideas, but a lot of what I'm saying I don't really know if that was the case—if that's what happened or if that was what was going on. That's what I thought was going on.

Willens: Fair enough.

Craley: And I say that because I don't want anybody to say: "Hey, what the hell is Craley talking about? That wasn't what was happening." That may well be. That's what I thought was happening.

Siemer: Well, as we've said, because there is not very much of a written record of any of these events, it's very important to collect the impressions of people like yourself who were on the scene and who have a background in the area. By comparing a lot of impressions, we can hopefully bring together some understanding of at least the various viewpoints.

Willens: We have interviewed 125 people on this subject, so your recollections and reminiscences will be tested against those of others. As those are all brought together, we're hopeful that a comprehensive and understandable account of what went on back in those days can be created.

Craley: Well, I appreciate that, and I look forward to your finished product, and I will read it with great interest.

Willens: Thank you, sir.