

INTERVIEW OF WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.

by Howard P. Willens and Deanne C. Siemer

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- Willens: Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr. has kindly agreed to be interviewed in connection with our project. Admiral, thank you very much for being available. Could you tell us the circumstances under which you first got involved in the Micronesian negotiations?
- Crowe: I was in Viet Nam and was due to be there two more months. I had no intention of leaving. Actually I had a very fine job there that I was enjoying. I received word that I was to come directly back to Washington immediately and report to the Department of the Interior, to the Micronesian status negotiations. As I understand the background (and I'm not directly knowledgeable on it), they were forming up this group. The Defense Department was a part of the process and was very concerned as to what the direction the negotiations would take. They had a little fight over whether the State Department or the Defense Department should head the Micronesian status negotiations. Finally the compromise (I don't know whether it was a compromise, but at least the outcome) was that State would continue to head it but that the number three man would be a military representative. At the time, Admiral Moorer was the chairman, and his special assistant was a Vice Admiral in the Navy by the name of Weinel, whom I'd known for several years. I had actually worked for him for a couple of years. Somehow or other he suggested my name in this process. I don't know that the Navy was too enamored with the idea. I know I wasn't because I was expecting to go to a major command when I left Viet Nam, and it turns out I was giving up a cruiser as a result of this. But Admiral Moorer insisted that they have somebody, and Weinel suggested my name, and they sort of imposed it on Zumwalt, I think. I'm not sure. Zumwalt was the CNO. The outcome was that I had immediate orders to lay down my duties in Viet Nam and fly directly back to Washington and report the next week.
- Willens: Approximately when was that?
- Crowe: Well I was due to leave in November 1971. It was about the end of August I think. Or early September.
- Willens: Was former Ambassador Hummel on duty at the time that you reported?
- Crowe: Yes, he was. Williams was not there, but Hummel was. Actually Williams cycled in and out of Washington. It was not full time for him. It was for Hummel. I'd never met Hummel before.
- Willens: Had you met Williams before?
- Crowe: No, I had not.
- Willens: What exactly were your duties then when you reported to the office?
- Crowe: I wasn't totally clear. Most people didn't know where Micronesia was. That's not true. They sailed in and around the islands and so forth. But they had never paid much attention to the governmental status of the islands. I met immediately with Moorer and Weinel, and the gospel was laid down that the Defense Department, ultimately the Navy, had deep interest in the outcome. They wanted some access at least and some say in how the foreign policy and the defense policy of Micronesia would be conducted ultimately. Any agreement for Pentagon to sign off on would have to include some recognition of our

interests out there. Now nobody said in specific what those interests were, and they really hadn't paid that much attention when all of a sudden this proposal to terminate the Trust came up.

Willens: Before your assignment to that office, in any of your previous duties had you become concerned about the Western Pacific and the planning for basing alternatives there?

Crowe: I was actually the head of the Navy's East Asia section for three years.

Willens: When was that?

Crowe: That was just before I went to Viet Nam.

Siemer: Was that on the Joint Chiefs' staff?

Crowe: No, that was on the Navy staff. I was on the Chief of Naval Operations staff. That included all the Western Pacific, as well as the islands. It included Micronesia and clear around to Pakistan.

Willens: Was there any defined interest in Micronesia generally and in the Marianas in particular?

Crowe: We were following events as to whether that Trust would be terminated—the debates in the U.N. and what the United States was doing. We actually turned out some papers on what we would like to see happen to the Marianas. There was really not much consideration of Palau or Yap or even Truk. Most of the thinking was how it impacted Guam, if at all, and also testing in the Kwajalein area. But it was very general, and of course the Navy's attitude was: "We own it. What are we talking about? Why should we give it away? Why mess with it at all?" The Navy didn't have much influence on the decision, and I must admit didn't fight very hard one way or another. They just thought that politics would ultimately do something and it would be imposed on us, whatever it was. I had a lot to do with Okinawa and had a very interesting experience in that period with Chichishima Island. I don't know if you know where Chichishima is but it's an island in the Okinawa chain, clear down in the south there, which the Japanese had taken over at the beginning of World War II. They actually had taken it over before then. But they declared it a military zone and moved everybody out of Chichishima and made it into a rather interesting base. When the war was over, we took over that base at Chichishima. When the pressure grew to return Okinawa, just out of the clear blue LBJ announced that he was returning Chichishima. I won't bore you with all the details, but it turned out to be terribly interesting. The U.S. Navy had been in Chichishima at that time about 25 years, and we had brought back the original settlers to Chichishima who were in Japan and were being discriminated against and not treated very well. They had agitated through the American Embassy there to get back home to Chichishima. In the 25 years, it became of very little use to the U.S. Navy, so the only thing our people did there was take care of these people. Talk about a beneficial monarchy. There were only 6,000 of these people. The Navy built a small community. They built their church; they built their bank; they built their co-op; they built their school. And if they had any problems, the Navy found it, and the Navy took care of it. So when we got ready to give this back, I discovered we had this U.S. Navy base out in the middle of the Pacific which was just not used at all. The commander of the base was a lieutenant commander or something like that, he fired in a message and said we have an obligation to these people, these 6,000 people, and the Japanese would mistreat them. He was dead right. So we took on what we could do about those 6,000 people, and that consumed a year of my life. I discovered that the State Department was not interested, and I could generate no enthusiasm in this town [Washington, DC] for doing anything for those 6,000 people. But finally the suggestion was made that maybe I could get a law

passed allowing them a waiver to come into the United States if they chose. Of course the big problem was that the schools [in Chichishima] were English. They just went through grade school, and then they went to Guam to high school. So all the younger generation was educated in English. The Japanese were going to wipe that out. There was no question about that. So it took me a year to get a law passed in the Congress. Nobody else was interested. State wasn't interested. Defense wasn't interested. The chiefs weren't interested. They said it's a Navy problem. If you want it, you do it. I fought for a year in Congress and got a law passed allowing those people to immigrate to the United States. I have no idea how many of them did. I think very few. Somebody said they might give me a piece of land out there if they'd known what I'd done. But by the time we'd gotten it passed, the Japanese had been on the island for a year. They threw away all the school books, changed the whole curriculum, everybody went to school in Japanese. They did everything these people told us they were going to do. I guess I've misled you. It wasn't 6,000 people. It was 200 people. When they took over Chichishima at the beginning of the war, about 6,000 people lived there. They were mostly Japanese. And they absorbed these 200 people who were descendants of the original whalers. Some were Americans. And they had interesting names, like George Washington Eba, Abraham Lincoln something or other. Well nobody in this country knew anything about them, including the U.S. government. After the war one of these people, who was living in Japan, was a chauffeur at the U.S. Embassy. One day he drove for Alexis Johnson and started telling him that his relatives were whalers, came to Chichishima in 1876, and how mistreated they were in Japan. And Alexis Johnson started the process of getting those 200 people back to Chichishima. Then we took over and had a dole economy for 25 years. They were doing very well out there until LBJ gave them away. And you know, the way the U.S. Government worked constantly amazes me. We went through this elaborate fight of whether to return Chichishima or not, and finally the decision was made that we had to do it. And we wrote papers, and we did this and we did that, saw people. Nobody had ever been to Chichishima. I discovered that there was a young man out there, a junior lieutenant, who was executive officer of the station. There were only two officers on the station. He was receiving orders back to flight training and was on leave when I found out about it, getting ready to go to Pensacola. I got hold of him on the phone, and he said, "Yes, he'd just come from Chichishima." I said, "Well, I'd like you to come to Washington to talk to all these people that are in on this." And he said, "Well, I've got a bunch of pictures; would you like for me to bring those?" And I said, "Sure." So we rigged a big picture thing, and, I don't know, 50 people came. In the front row was the Assistant Secretary of State (I forget who he was) who had been the number one mover in all of this. We get ready to go, and the first picture is a picture of Chichishima from the air. And he said, "So that's what it looks like." All these decisions had been made by all these people. And he said, "So that's what it looks like." Nobody had ever been there. I still haven't been there. This guy was the only man in the room that had been there.

Willens: The first of these documents we sent you was a letter to Haydn Williams in September 1971 from Secretary Laird sort of laying out the military interest in the Trust Territory and spelling out with some specificity the importance of the area. Just a few specific questions about this. He makes the point that these are minimum requirements and that they are not predicated upon the loss of existing U.S. bases in the Western Pacific. In the literature and the documents there's a lot of talk about possible withdrawal from Okinawa and the Philippines and so forth.

Crowe: Well that all changed in the course of the negotiations.

- Willens: As of the time that you reported for duty, was there an interest in having the control over the Trust Territory and specifically was there interest in building a base on Tinian?
- Crowe: I don't know about that. I don't think there was any real interest in a base on Tinian. Some vague interest, but, number one, the general attitude in the military (I'm not talking about what Laird says in his letters or anything), but the general attitude in the military was—now you're talking about a World War II generation here that was running things—we had to shed a lot of blood and we had to fight a protracted campaign to retain or to capture those islands. And we should under no circumstances allow them in any fashion to go back to Japan. As far as I know, there wasn't a single dissent on that view, at least in the military. Now I didn't do a lot with the Secretary of Defense. As a matter of fact, I think after that letter was written, the Secretary of Defense was sort of out of the problem until we began to get near some real achievements. Then we'd go back and say, "Didn't you approve this? Didn't you approve that?" But the work on the Trust Territory stuff, very little of it was done in the Secretary of Defense's office.
- Siemer: Would that policy letter or the draft of that letter come from the Navy to ISA to the Secretary?
- Crowe: Probably not.
- Siemer: How would that go in those days?
- Crowe: That was probably written by the East Asia Section up in the Defense Department's office who were liaising with the Navy. They would have written the letter. I don't think they would let the Navy write it. Your question about Tinian is an interesting one. My memory's not real good here, but there were a lot of other things going on the world simultaneously to this. Occasionally something would happen which would impact our view on Micronesia. There was a lot of talk about going out of Japan at that time and out of Okinawa in particular, and whether we could retain our future there. We weren't exactly the picture of confidence on that subject. That's when the Air Force begins to talk about doing something in Tinian. And as I recall, we lost access to quite a bit of land in Okinawa and maybe some in the Philippines when somebody said, "Well we can use Tinian as a training area." And then they began to talk about a large amount of space on Tinian, which I think ultimately ended up as part of the agreement.
- Willens: Do you have any recollection as to the extent to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff in its planning mechanism was involved in developing the Department's positions and specifics?
- Crowe: They would probably have been in on that, yes.
- Willens: What would you say was the relationship between the ISA on the civilian side and the Joint Chiefs with respect to protection of these interests in the Western Pacific? Who carried the lead?
- Crowe: Well I think the Joint Chiefs. Moorer had some very specific ideas. He would have expressed the view I just expressed about keeping control of the islands. He was the one that put me on the group. I would think that the Chairman's people probably took the lead. I just don't know what ISA's real interest was. Every time we went to a big meeting or something, ISA had somebody there, and when we negotiated, somebody came in from ISA. But once we got started, I was the Defense representative. I got blamed for most of the things that happened out there—and I'm talking about things that the Defense Department didn't like and so forth—because our positions and our attitudes changed a lot from the beginning to the end. Of course I was only there two years, and they were still

- messing around when I left. They hadn't achieved anything when I left.
- Willens: At the time you got involved, Haydn Williams had a session with the Joint Committee of the Congress of Micronesia in Hawaii in the fall of 1971.
- Crowe: I don't know if I was there or not.
- Willens: You were there.
- Crowe: I don't remember that meeting.
- Willens: Do you have a recollection of the subsequent meeting in Palau?
- Crowe: Well I remember a negotiating session in Palau.
- Willens: The negotiating session in Palau in the spring of 1972?
- Crowe: Oh, yes, I remember that very well. It opened up on Easter morning. The reason I remember it is that Ambassador Williams had written some remarks, and the first thing [the remarks] said was, "On this beautiful sunshiny Easter morning it's pleasant to begin our talks. I wish you a happy Easter." We got up in the morning, and it was raining like hell. It was driving rain. And I said, "Haydn you've got to change your speech." He said, "Why? Nobody will know it was raining back there. Hell no, I'm not going to change my speech." So he read through this sunny sunshine in Palau, and the weather was terrible.
- Willens: How would you describe Haydn Williams' management of that whole process?
- Crowe: Well I imagine you got a few groups out of Art Hummel.
- Willens: A few what?
- Crowe: A few comments from Art Hummel on Haydn's management.
- Willens: Hummel was reasonably guarded, but he basically viewed this as an interruption in his career.
- Crowe: He did not like it at all.
- Willens: He was very anxious to leave?
- Crowe: He wanted to leave.
- Willens: He was well regarded though by the Micronesians he met.
- Crowe: I think that was by accident. I don't think he worked at it very hard. He was very unhappy through the whole process.
- Willens: The paper record suggests a fairly detailed process for putting together position papers and preparing Haydn Williams.
- Crowe: Well first of all, Haydn was very bright. And number two, he's very, very patriotic. He's very loyal and American, and I don't mean that other people aren't. But I mean that he was that way in the 1940s sense. He was very much like that. He was very bright. Unfortunately he was very energetic, much more so than most the people who worked for him. He was very interested in details. He was a micromanager. That used to drive some people up the wall. In particular, when you'd get out in a place like Hana, Maui, and there was nothing going on in Hana, Maui, and we had these long negotiating sessions, and we'd end up eating tapa root or something, tempers would get shorter and shorter. Haydn would stay up all night before a session. That didn't bother him at all; he worked all night long. So he was a little tough to live with. He was very particular. He always wanted to say the right thing. He wanted to do it right. He was very conscientious.

Willens: At the time you became involved, there was an objective of trying to keep all six districts together?

Crowe: We went into the negotiations with that view.

Willens: And also to bring them under the sovereignty of the United States if that was possible?

Crowe: Yes, I think that was the original idea. Anybody involved in the thing came to the conclusion very quickly that we couldn't get sovereignty at least for all of Micronesia.

Willens: What led you to that conclusion?

Crowe: Just my visit out there, my travel out there, and participating in the negotiations and hearing them express their views and how deeply they felt. I came to the conclusion very quickly that we probably couldn't get a complete sovereignty. Although it wasn't totally clear what they wanted.

Willens: Did you come to know Salii and the other members of the group?

Crowe: Yes.

Willens: Did you have some sense of what they did in fact want?

Crowe: Well I'm not even sure that they knew what they wanted. They were very naive in certain respects. I mean they had gotten quite used to this expenditure of U.S. funds. I used to hear a lot of talk about, "We had this idyllic way of life and you've spoiled it, you've come in and destroyed it, and we want to go back to that way of life." You'd say, "Well that's a very interesting view. I guess that's possible, I don't know, but there won't be any airlines coming here, and we'll probably have to take away the U.S. school system and all the money that goes to the school system, and I don't know how you're going to fund your hospitals." So, "Well, we don't want to get rid of any of those things. We just want to go back to our way of life." Which meant to them, "We have everything we've got now and nobody disturbs or interferes with us. And nobody tells us how to spend the money." Free association (you used to hear that term quite a bit) seemed to me free association with the U.S. Treasury was what they had in mind. Now, having said they were sort of naive about that kind of thing, they had a basic canny way that seemed to me was very useful in negotiations. They were very good negotiators.

Willens: Do you have any specific examples that come to mind?

Crowe: I remember that, on specifics, they'd negotiate us right into the ground. In many respects they were more patient than we were, although I think as things dragged on we became patient. But at first we thought this was absurd. And incidentally, they constantly changed their minds. They would get something from us and would say, "Well that's okay, let's move on." The next day they'd come in and say, "Well, we've been thinking about it, and we don't like that, we'd like to go back and do that again."

Willens: Did their negotiation strategy change once they brought Paul Warnke in as counsel? Do you remember him?

Crowe: Yes, I remember Paul Warnke. In fact (I hate to say this) I was sort of responsible for getting him in there. I had a very good friend who I'd gone to school with that was a law partner of Warnke's. He and I were talking one night about this business, and he suggested that we retain (or that somebody retain) Paul Warnke. I remember he had a lunch. I went to the lunch and met Paul Warnke. My friend's name was Tom Finney.

Willens: Finney at that time was a partner with the Clifford firm.

- Crowe: Yes he was. And I'm sort of fuzzy exactly what happened then, but we put him in contact in some fashion and they retained the Clark Clifford law firm. Now Warnke came to some of the sessions. But there was an assistant of Warnke's that really did the work.
- Siemer: Jim Stovall?
- Crowe: That probably is right. Jim Stovall, yes.
- Willens: And he has actually remained over the years.
- Crowe: Has he?
- Willens: He still represents the Federated States.
- Crowe: Still involved?
- Willens: Yes.
- Crowe: That's interesting.
- Willens: When you first met the negotiating team from the Micronesian side, did you become aware that the Marianas representatives had somewhat different interests? Specifically Ed Pangelinian and Herman Guerrero.
- Crowe: Yes. I think at first they didn't suggest that. They sort of stayed on board. But as the negotiations actually got off the ground, it became clear to the Marianas people that they were dealing with some people whose views didn't exactly accord with theirs, and then we began to get feelers. And the first reaction was to turn off the feelers. "No, we're talking to the whole Micronesians, we're not talking to individuals." I was against that. I thought we should be talking to individual states.
- Willens: What led to the change in the United States position?
- Crowe: I think pure frustration, just to think we're going on and on and on.
- Willens: There's some suggestion in the documents that the Defense Department was particularly urging that action be taken to respond to the Marianas.
- Crowe: I think they felt that their chances of getting something out of this were better with the Marianas than with the other sections. Of course they were very interested. It was close to Guam. They had actually been in Saipan at one time, and they had some land on Tinian. There were two or three schools of thought. I think the Defense Department (and I'm sort of hazy on this), but the Defense Department just felt that they had a better chance of getting some of their interests protected. There were many people that thought this would spur the rest of Micronesia to move out and quit marching up and down. I think they misestimated the Micronesian character. They can march up and down indefinitely. I mean, you talk about patience. They're in no hurry.
- Willens: Were there any people within the United States Delegation that wanted to stick to the position of trying to deal with Micronesia as a whole?
- Crowe: Well that's a good question. My instincts tell me there were, but I don't know what I remember. I think somebody like Whittington probably did. And some of the Interior people. I'm just guessing now.
- Siemer: Was Haydn concerned about the reaction back here, either in Congress or elsewhere?
- Crowe: Constantly.
- Siemer: If he stopped negotiating with the whole group?

- Crowe: And of course the people with an immediate interest in this were the Hawaiian Delegation. They were about the only people who ever really listened to us when we went over there. I mean with some care.
- Willens: When you went to the Hill?
- Crowe: Yes. And they had very strong views. I don't remember what their view was on this subject, but I do remember that Inouye's interest was constant. And he was a very good contact for us when we were trying to sell something in the Congress or get some movement.
- Siemer: Had you known any of them before?
- Crowe: No, I had not. That was really my very first brush personally with the Congress. I'd had some, like my Chichishima experience, I'd had some when I was a Captain. But that was I think my first direct testimony before the Congress, when I was in the Micronesian business.
- Siemer: Did Haydn have some good friends on the Hill from his prior government service?
- Crowe: I think he did. The California group. He was constantly aware and sensitive to the Congress, as well as to the National Security Council. His desire to do a good job was ever present. He wanted to satisfy the President. In his own mind he had real trouble understanding that the whole world wasn't interested in Micronesia. I can remember one time when we had a problem (I forget what it was), but he said I'm going to take this right to the top. I'm the President's personal representative. Back then, taking it to the top was to go to the Action Officer in the National Security Council. Well hell, it was like going to an Action Officer in the Pentagon. That guy didn't know where the top was either. You know, Haydn was a little naive too. He had a conversation with Henry Kissinger before he went out there. Henry Kissinger said, "I'll support you all the way." And Haydn was saying, "Well, I don't seem to be able to get much out of Henry Kissinger, but, you know, he said he was going to support me." And I said, "Haydn, that isn't it at all. He said he was going to support you, but that isn't what he meant. What he meant was, 'Will you please take this damned problem and solve it, and don't bother me again.'" Well, there's a certain amount of truth in this. But Haydn would not accept that. He told me that was not right. Of course it was right. Henry Kissinger couldn't have cared less.
- Willens: Do you know whether Kissinger ever personally focused on this?
- Crowe: Not that I know of.
- Willens: There was an NSC staff person named John Holdridge who seems to have participated.
- Crowe: He wasn't the original staffer on this, but by the time I left he was there, and he was focusing on it. I forget who preceded Holdridge. Really a piece of work. John Holdridge was a little kinder with Haydn and so forth.
- Willens: When Haydn wanted to have a revision in his instructions, he was always successful. He seems to have mastered the technique of working the agencies and staff.
- Crowe: First of all, he did one thing right. He was persistent. On a subject like this, that's really worth a million dollars. Pretty soon they'd say, "Give him what he wants and get him out of here." Let's be frank about it. You're just going to generate a certain amount of interest in these islands in the U.S. government, and I'm afraid that's it. You're not going to get much more than that. So your best protection is to get a guy like Haydn doing the job, and in the end you'll probably get a pretty good solution. But the U.S. government was not willing to follow every dot and comma. The longer I served in the U.S. government, I discovered that applies to most subjects. Not all, but most. The U.S. government has

always got some really hot stuff on the front burner, and everything else is left behind. If you really want to get ahead in the U.S. government, probably the best thing is not to mess with the hot stuff, because that's all focused on by the guys at the top. They take it right out of your hands. If you can get some peripheral subject that they're not terribly interested in but they want to come out right, that's easier to do.

Siemer: Make it come out right.

Crowe: Yes. And they'll give you a lot of leeway and they will support you in lots of respect. Particularly if you don't bother them. And you can make a lot of decisions that nobody really messes with. Now occasionally that's wrong. I think we had a couple of instances where we did something and you thought the world had come to an end. But generally if you're really conscientious and making sense, and they don't have time to mess with it today, they just say, "Fine, take it and carry the ball."

Siemer: Did Haydn have a good understanding of the Defense bureaucracy?

Crowe: Not particularly, and that's what I was for. I'm not sure mine was that deep either, but I could get to Moorer whenever I wanted to, and I could get Haydn in to see Moorer whenever I wanted to. It wasn't that easy for us to get in to see the Secretary of Defense. And I could get Moorer behind me as long as we weren't worrying about defense interests. When we traveled, CINCPAC always treated us well, and I could get him into every military command out there without any hesitation. What I couldn't do was the kind of thing he was worried about, and that's the National Security Council and even in the Secretary of Defense's office. I subsequently had a tour in the Secretary of Defense's office, but I hadn't at that time.

Siemer: How about State? Did he understand the State Department's bureaucracy?

Crowe: Yes, but State wasn't too damned interested in it. State didn't like what had been done, creating a special envoy. State was against that, as I recall. Maybe I'm wrong.

Willens: Interior was very strongly against it.

Crowe: Well it would normally be the State Department's position to be against it. Just having come from an ambassadorship, I was against all special envoys, no matter what. And I would think that State didn't like Haydn taking that thing over. And of course he had that title: the President's Personal Representative. What I've described to you as to what it meant or didn't mean was not the common understanding. I will say one thing about titles like that. He'd say, "The President's Personal Representative," and people would say, "Well, I'd better be careful. This guy might be a friend of the President's." The fact that he never sees the President doesn't matter at all. And Haydn was not above using that stuff. He was pretty canny. Of course he had worked in the Pentagon and knew something about it from that experience.

Siemer: Many civilians who work in the Pentagon never really understand it.

Crowe: Well that's true. But not many people in the world really understand the Pentagon. We got along pretty good with the Pentagon. We were really looking after their interests. The only thing that really would have excited the Pentagon is if we'd just failed completely. And of course there was a weakness in the Pentagon's general position which was very difficult. We won all these things, but we had no real plans to use them. On the Tinian agreement, we had to pay so much money as a result of the agreement. I forget what the sum was. I was out of there by then. I was in the Defense Department's ISA office when that happened. I tell you this thing has dogged me all my life. Haydn came in to see me and said, I can't get anybody to pay this money. I've negotiated the money, we've got agreement, we've signed

it, and nobody in the U.S. government will pay this damned money. State and Defense were both saying it's the other guy's problem. And Interior's out of it. We got that through. I remember because I was there in the office, and I went to great efforts to help Haydn out.

Willens: Did the Defense Department at that time have any interest in the Tinian property at all?

Crowe: Well they had a lot of interest in saving all these rights, they just didn't want to pay anything. That's a very typical Defense Department view. Incidentally, it's typical of every office in the U.S. government. They liked the agreement. They didn't want to give up the agreement. They just didn't want to pay any money. What they wanted was a special assessment out of the Congress for it. They weren't about to get that.

Willens: I've heard (and I don't know whether it's true or not) that Congressman Burton was sort of instrumental in enabling that payment to be made because of some representations that he would find a way to replenish the Defense Department's budget.

Crowe: I don't know. You have me there. I remember that Haydn liked Burton very much. Didn't like him personally, but he felt Burton was an ally. Of course Burton was from San Francisco. He called on Burton religiously. I thought Burton was close to being certifiable.

Willens: I've had my experiences with him as well. He was colorful, as we say.

Crowe: The name seems to persist. We've got one up there now. When I was the Ambassador to Great Britain, one of my biggest worries was the Helms-Burton legislation. Boy, they beat me up on that all the time. I thought, are we never going to get rid of the Burtons around this place?

Willens: You mentioned that Defense did not have any plans. But you were at the Marianas negotiations (where I was) in the spring of 1973. And there was this very specific detailed presentation by Joint Chiefs of Staff personnel and others about the plans for the Tinian base and all the conflicts that would result.

Crowe: By then we had generated some interest. I used to say this to the Defense Department. I'd go over there and say, "Okay, this is what you want but I can't sell that. What are you going to do with it?" "Well, we want the freedom to do something with it someday." And I would say, "That's not good enough, I'm sorry."

Willens: Do you think they made this up then just to respond to your questions?

Crowe: No. The things that you're talking about at that presentation really amazed me. That was the Air Force. We had evidently helped them a little bit, but the Air Force really had drawn up a whole plan. I forget exactly what the pressures on the Air Force were at the time. But that representative, what was his name, McCarthy?

Willens: McCarthy was one of the colonels out there at that time.

Crowe: He later became a four star general in the Air Force. I used to do some work with him when I was Chairman. They were trying to sell the Air Force the plan that you heard briefed. McCarthy was a pretty slick article. He was really driving hard. I think the Air Force was serious with what they said there, but they had not done the homework on the money yet. They never got the money for it.

Willens: Why not?

Crowe: I don't know. There wasn't any money, that's why not. At that period of time, the money was going south.

- Willens: Were you aware of any debate from the other services that the Air Force plans were unnecessary?
- Crowe: No, I don't remember that.
- Willens: Did you participate in any debate as to whether there should be a base on Tinian?
- Crowe: No, I wasn't in the push and pull every day that was going on in the Pentagon, because I just wasn't there. I wasn't in the office. Of course we welcomed the Air Force initiative. It just appeared on the horizon, and they came out there. We had separated the Marianas, and it became clear we could get some of Tinian. Then the Air Force all of a sudden climbed on board with a rather expansive and elaborate plan, as I recall. I don't recall much about it. And then I left. I was not in for the rest of that.
- Willens: Would something be presented of that kind by the Air Force without some measure of clearance by OSD?
- Crowe: No, it was cleared.
- Willens: What would that mean in terms of clearance? That it was a Departmental decision to go forward if the land could be obtained?
- Crowe: Probably the decision to go forward with a couple of qualifiers on it.
- Willens: What are the qualifiers?
- Crowe: I don't know. I'm just guessing now. I'm suspecting that we still had a bureaucracy to go through to get this money. This is what we'd like to do and plan to do subject to approval of the U.S. Congress or something like that. I don't know. You're milking my mind here as to what I'm speculating on. But it was not a dodge to get something. They just didn't fabricate that out of whole cloth and go out there and make it go away and burn it. They didn't do that at all.
- Willens: I'm sure that's true, and I'm just trying to see to what extent it really represented a firm departmental decision.
- Crowe: Of course it happens every day in the U.S. military.
- Willens: What does?
- Crowe: That you've got plans and you do this and you're driving forward, then all of a sudden the budget comes up for the next year, and a CNO or the Chief of Staff of the Air Force or the Chief of Staff in the Army, the budget is presented to them, and the last thing is presented. "We've got several issues here. We've got a big bag of projects and a little bag of money. You're going to have to cut something." And that's the number one thing the chiefs of staff of service do. When they cut, you know, everybody's wringing their hands and tearing their hair and saying it's the end of Western civilization. "Look at all the effort we've put into this. Look at all the stuff we did. Look at all the plans we've made." What they're really saying is, "Look at all whose career depends on this project." The chief of staff says, "I understand that. I'm sorry." And when the Secretary of Defense cuts a weapon system, you know, that's even worse.
- Willens: Even though this was a short assignment, it has kept reappearing in your various jobs.
- Crowe: Well it's really interesting how that worked. I had two or three things come together. But number one, those two Admirals sort of drove me into this—Moorer and Weinell. They felt a sort of a sense of duty that, "Okay, we can't let this ruin him. He was there because we think it's important." And their fitness report said that. In fact, Zumwalt's fitness, I

thought, was very interesting. I told you I had these orders from the pipeline about a cruiser, and Zumwalt put in the report that I would probably have received orders to a cruiser. But, he says, "My reasoning was that I've got 200 captains that can take cruisers but I only have one that can go into a Micronesian status negotiation with any background and that this, in the long run, is much more important than a cruiser." He said that in a fitness report, which is almost heresy, even if he believed it, to say that. Then he gave me a really fine fitness report, which I don't think he did personally. I think Weinel battered him into doing that. And what Zumwalt did do, he happened to be the CNO, the only one we ever had, that was very interested in getting what he called iconoclasts into the admiral ranks. He directed the board to select at least a few admirals that could think out of a box and that were not necessarily conventional. And I think that really saved me. That helped me.

Willens: All of those decisions to go to various educational institutions proved ultimately to be the right ones.

Crowe: Well I had a lot of friends that that argument appealed to and thought that was all right, but in the Navy conventional wisdom is you didn't promote people that hadn't been to sea, you know.

Siemer: Right.

Crowe: I had a major command, but it was a strange one, created by Zumwalt, to get people to go to Viet Nam. I had a major command in Viet Nam, but it wasn't a seaborne major command. But Zumwalt honored that, because he believed strongly that what I was doing in Viet Nam was very, very important. And he turned that into a major command. But whether a board would accept that or not was another question. They're not obligated to accept it just because a CNO says it. But he was pushing hard on the board, not to select me personally but, "Don't just give me a bunch of those people with a standard career pattern."

Willens: Do you know whether Haydn Williams pitched in to help your promotion?

Crowe: He did. I had one other thing. I actually knew the head of the board pretty well, which I didn't realize at the time. His name was Admiral Cleary. I was a submariner by trade, but I wasn't a nuclear submariner. When my name came up on the board, the head of the surface part of the board was this guy that had been my commander in Viet Nam. Cleary had managed to keep my name on the list through all this. So he said to the submarine commander, "You ought to make space for Crowe," and they said, "No, we won't." This fellow said, "I'll give him a surface billet if he wants it. I worked with him in Viet Nam, and I'm happy to take him under the surface quota." So all those dreary little events came together. There was nobody more surprised than I was when I made it. I didn't think sitting over there in Micronesia was going to help very much.

Willens: How did you in fact learn that you had made it?

Crowe: Well, they publish a list. The day it was published, I learned.

Willens: It was communicated to you through CINCPAC? Because you were in Micronesia at the time, were you not?

Crowe: Yes, but I was in Washington and I learned about it before you saw me there. I had some marvelous fitness reports. They just weren't sea. They weren't those conventional places where naval officers go. Usually that's sufficient to kill you.

Willens: There's some reference in the materials to an overall study that was going on in the 1971-

1973 period looking at the Western Pacific and basing alternatives. I've never seen the end product of that, and this is directly relevant to what we're doing, but some people suggested that the Defense Department should not be advocating a base in Tinian until that study of the Western Pacific alternatives had been completed. Did you have any recollection or understanding of that study?

Crowe: Well my intuitive reaction is, first of all, there's always a study going on as to the Western Pacific bases. Yesterday I got a call saying that they'd seen an item in a small professional journal that the U.S. government is forming a high-level committee for national security study to last five years, past the presidential election. We're always studying the hell out of everything. The problem is the studies that are outside of the mainstream of policies are damned near worthless. There's nothing that requires people to do what the study recommends or says or anything else, and yet to get the study made by the mainstream people at times is not that great. They can't do that sort of thing. As I recall that study (and I don't recall much about it), there was some talk in the study that in the future there might be, if we lost bases in the Philippines, etc., there might be some requirement to go to Palau. But it was sort of general like that. It wasn't planned or anything, and it certainly wasn't enough to base our negotiating posture on that. I mean you could say that the reason we need this is, sure enough, we may have to use it some day. But to take a piece of land and say nobody can touch it and so forth in the next 20 years on the thought that we might have to use it some day. That doesn't work very well unless you're willing to pay an awful lot of money. I don't recall that study coming out or what it said exactly. It certainly didn't have any influence on the Air Force. See, the guy running it every day, he's got these problems. He doesn't give a damn about these studies. These studies are talking about things that are not even going to be there when he's there. He's got a problem today. Everybody who does a study wants the whole world to stop until they're through, and then the world should reorient to carry out the study. That isn't the way the world works. The world is marching right along.

Willens: When you heard the Air Force colonels present that detailed picture, it was somewhat new to you.

Crowe: Well I had some inkling that something like that was coming. McCarthy and I coordinated quite a bit. But when the idea first came up, of course I welcomed it and I was amazed at how far the Air Force was thinking about going, how much detail they'd actually put into it, and they were really hoping to do it.

Willens: What was your assessment at the time of the likelihood of that happening?

Crowe: Well, now I guess that was colored by McCarthy, but I don't know how successful it was, if they really did divert the resources, that it would be beneficial to them. I'm always skeptical with things like that. I mean the whole story of the military was having a great idea but it never comes to pass because the budgeting is not done for strategic reasons. Look at what's going on right now in the bases in the United States. We have way too many bases. It makes no sense from a strategic standpoint, from a military standpoint, or from a money standpoint. But you can't get rid of bases. Congress won't let you. So the Congress has political considerations that outweighed all that, and we were saddled with an extensive base structure which cuts heavily into our efficiency, into our funding.

Siemer: Where did General McCarthy go after the Marianas assignment?

Crowe: That I don't remember. He spent quite a bit of time at the Air Force Academy. He was the Commandant at the Air Force Academy, and he was also in the planning business in the

Air Force staff. But I don't know much more about it than that. I didn't see him for many years. He sort of popped up one day.

Siemer: Is he around here?

Crowe: I don't know where he is now. I think maybe he's in Colorado Springs. He's retired. He loved Colorado Springs. You know, I knew him in the Micronesian business, then all of a sudden I saw him again. Maybe when I was CINCPAC or in the Pentagon.

Siemer: When you went back to the Pentagon, you were in ISA?

Crowe: Yes. I left the Micronesian business and went to the Navy staff for 18 months in strategic planning. Then I went to ISA.

Siemer: Who was the Assistant Secretary at the time?

Crowe: Morton Abramowitz.

Siemer: Who was his deputy?

Crowe: I was. He had a director who was his deputy, and the director sort of ran the shop for East Asia.

Siemer: How long were you in the job?

Crowe: Eighteen months.

Siemer: You were there when congressional approval was sought for the Covenant?

Crowe: Yes, I think I was in that office then.

Siemer: You testified a couple of times.

Crowe: Yes.

Siemer: Did you have anything to do with the plebiscite that was conducted in the Marianas?

Crowe: Not much, no.

Siemer: Do you remember a woman named Barbara White at the State Department U.N. mission? She was the U.S. delegate to the Trusteeship Council.

Crowe: I don't remember her.

Siemer: Do you remember anybody in the State Department who worked on that?

Crowe: I remember the closer we got to the end the more important that became—the U.N. involvement—and Haydn was in town quite a bit on that. Then of course we reacted to every noise the U.N. made.

Siemer: Once the Covenant was signed in February 1975, did Haydn come to find you with respect to the congressional approval process?

Crowe: Well I think he and I talked a lot about it, yes.

Siemer: What was the expectation at the outset about how difficult or easy it would be to get this through Congress?

Crowe: I think my general view was that we'd get it through pretty easily. But Haydn was not of that kind of mind. He was a worrier. He could always see the bumps in the road, and he really worried about them.

Siemer: Did you know Erwin Canham at all?

Crowe: Who?

- Siemer: Erwin Canham, the Plebiscite Commissioner who then went back out to the Marianas as Resident Commissioner. He was editor of the Christian Science Monitor.
- Crowe: I did go back to Micronesia when I was CINCPAC.
- Siemer: When was that?
- Crowe: I was CINCPAC for two years, 1983-1985. I went all through there.
- Siemer: When Haydn was working on the congressional problem and you had to get it through both the House and the Senate, what was the situation with the House Armed Services Committee? Do you remember?
- Crowe: I don't remember a lot of static about it.
- Siemer: Do you remember Chairman Price being concerned about this at all?
- Crowe: Oh hell, Chairman Price wasn't even in the game.
- Siemer: Is that right?
- Crowe: Well he was senile. Now maybe his staff was concerned about it.
- Siemer: Well Burton seemed to think that there was not going to be any problem with the House Armed Services Committee but that the Senate Armed Services Committee might be a problem.
- Crowe: Well they're more powerful really, the Senate Armed Services Committee. I testified, you probably have seen the record.
- Siemer: I have.
- Crowe: Did I get a lot of static over it?
- Siemer: It was interesting. Somehow it went through the House Armed Services Committee with an informational hearing, and there's no record of it. No one seems to remember it and no one was there. It's hard to figure out exactly what happened. You don't have any recollection about it either?
- Crowe: No, that term, I've never heard of an informational hearing. I've heard of a consent calendar. I got into that on Chichishima.
- Siemer: That's how Burton got the Covenant through as well in the House, on the consent calendar.
- Crowe: Best way to get things through. Not always possible, as I discovered. We never got Chichishima through that way. A man by the name of Gross from Iowa always stood up and said they were flooding the American labor market with people from Chichishima. There were only 200 people on the whole island. He was a farmer, he had big red suspenders, and my God he was worried about the Asians coming into this country. And he laid me out when I went to see him. Boy, he got all over me.
- Siemer: When you worked on the congressional approval for the Covenant, did you meet with Gary Hart at all?
- Crowe: Well I sort of think that we did. I don't recall, but now that you mention the name I sort of think we did meet with him on it.
- Siemer: Gary Hart got himself deeply into opposing the Covenant. What was it that got him started?
- Crowe: I don't know. There were lots of currents and counter-currents.

- Siemer: Do you remember a staffer of his named Ed Miller?
- Crowe: No, I don't.
- Siemer: How about Senator Pell? Did you work with him at all?
- Crowe: Yes, I think we did a little. I apologize for my memory. You've got to understand that in the job I was in at that time, this just sort of came up and was on the scope for two weeks and even then the bulk of the work was handled by Haydn. He was very active. He was busier than hell on this. I don't know if you've been following Haydn on the World War II memorial.
- Siemer: Oh, yes, we have. He thought he had that absolutely wired when we talked to him. Then it all fell apart.
- Crowe: Well if he's nothing else, he's persistent though.
- Siemer: He thought there was not going to be any vote against it. He thought he'd talked to everyone.
- Crowe: I think he's got it now.
- Willens: With the revised plan? Is he reasonably happy with it?
- Crowe: Yes, he's ecstatic.
- Willens: Well, that's good.
- Siemer: How about Senator Church?
- Crowe: I don't know. I do remember it a little. I think I went with Ellsworth up to testify.
- Siemer: You did, before the Senate Armed Services.
- Crowe: Who was the Senator from Virginia? Dumbest man in the Senate?
- Siemer: Harry Byrd or . . .
- Crowe: No.
- Siemer: William Scott.
- Crowe: Scott. Of course he told it on himself that some newspaper called him the dumbest man in the U.S. Senate. Scott asked me a question in that briefing. He said Admiral (of course he had this strong southern accent), he said, "Admiral, is there any iron on Saipan?" I couldn't understand what he was saying. He was saying iron. Is there any iron ore on Saipan? It took three times to say it before I could understand him. He put great stress on that. I don't even remember why he was so worried about it.
- Siemer: He wanted to demonstrate that there was absolutely nothing there that we had any interest in. There was no coal, there was no iron, there was no ore of any kind, and you would say, "No, I don't think there's any ore of any kind there, Senator."
- Crowe: Well I had a real problem keeping a straight face, because several of the other Senators laughed when he asked that question. I had another experience with Scott. We were in the law of the sea, that same job, and all of a sudden out the clear blue they got the word that the Congress was going to extend the territorial sea limits from three to 12 miles. The Navy had fought this for years. And it hadn't been up for consideration. Then all of a sudden they mustered every Admiral in Washington to go see so many congressmen today because tomorrow they were going to pass this. And on my list was Senator Scott. I went in to see Senator Scott, and he said, "Admiral, what are you here for?" I said, "I want to

talk to you about this extension of the territorial sea limit.” He said, “Admiral, I appreciate that you know a lot about that and you’ve got a deep interest in it and your motivations are pure. But I must tell you, Admiral, that I got a lot of fishermen down in Norfolk in my constituency and you’re wasting your time to talk to me, and since time is limited for you, you ought to go see somebody else.” I said, “Thank you very much, Senator,” and walked right out. At least he was honest. That hearing didn’t go so badly, though. In the first place, I was amazed at how much at home Ellsworth was.

Siemer: I was going to ask you, how was Ellsworth on this issue?

Crowe: Well I don’t know, but in front of the Congress he was great. He was very much at ease. He didn’t go in there with any prepared remarks. Sort of like Lincoln at Gettysburg, he had an envelope with a bunch of notes scratched on the back of it.

Siemer: Every time he had to give a point he’d load the record with something else. He seemed to be quite good at making a good record.

Crowe: Yes, he was really good at it.

Siemer: They would ask you the specific things, though, you may recall. Someone would say, “Well why don’t we do Truk? What are we doing the Marianas for? The Japanese really liked Truk, Admiral. Tell me why the Marianas are better than Truk.” And you would answer that question and then they would be on to some other subject. Then Ellsworth would gracefully say, “Well Admiral Crowe will answer that question for you.” It was clear that you were sort of the clean up hitter of all questions that Ellsworth didn’t personally wish to deal with.

Crowe: But he was really good at it. They didn’t buffalo him for a second. They scared me to death, but they didn’t buffalo him.

Siemer: There seemed to be a problem at those hearings that Ellsworth did not want to concede that the Defense Department had any contingency plan to fall back from the Philippines or Korea or Japan or anyplace else and that he wouldn’t concede that it was even a contingency plan. Why was that?

Crowe: The reason was that he didn’t want it to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Siemer: That if we said we were going to fall back, then the Philippines would keep pressuring us to go fall back to someplace else?

Crowe: That was the theory. I don’t know if it was right or not.

Siemer: Senator Byrd tried to get you coming and going with respect to that and kept pushing about. “Well, are you going to fall-back or are you not going to fall-back?” And you and Ellsworth seemed to be quite skillful at the fall back or not fall back argument.

Crowe: Well the answer was we didn’t know. It’s like these newsmen. This bombing the other day. What are you going to do now? How soon will you have these guys in jail? God almighty. If we could predict all that stuff, I guess it would be a more orderly world.

Siemer: Do you recall any efforts to get to the Chairman, Senator Stennis, about this issue?

Crowe: Yes, I think we did. I think we did quite a bit. In fact I think at one point we used Lou Wilson. He was a General in the Marine Corps and was friendly with Stennis.

Siemer: Do you know why Stennis was opposed to this?

Crowe: No, I don’t. I don’t think he was deeply opposed, was he?

- Siemer: Well it's a little hard to tell. Bill Clements got in to see him, but Rumsfeld couldn't get to see him about this issue. He just didn't want to talk about it, or he didn't want to meet about it. Did any of your folks do any work with any of the senators before the Armed Services Committee?
- Crowe: Yes, I think we tried.
- Siemer: How about after the hearings? Was there an effort with Defense Department people to brief the senators before the vote?
- Crowe: I don't really remember, but my instincts tell me that we would have stayed on the staff. We would have kept working on the staff.
- Siemer: What was your impression about the toughest issue that you faced in getting the Covenant through?
- Crowe: I guess the toughest issue was that it was hard for many congressmen who were not familiar with the Marianas to understand why we should pay Micronesia anything.
- Siemer: We already owned it.
- Crowe: Yes. That they should be grateful to us. Why were we so guilt ridden and so forth. It was hard to get that across, that argument. And of course the very idea of terminating the Trust, the Trusteeship, why were we so eager to get rid of it? It gives us what we want.
- Siemer: Do you remember any discussions with Senator Percy?
- Crowe: Yes, I do. Now Percy and Haydn were friends through an interesting connection. Percy's wife was on the board of the Asia Foundation. Haydn brought her on there. So he had known Percy for quite some time, and he used to go see Percy a lot.
- Siemer: Percy decided that he wanted an amendment that would delay the implementation of the Covenant until there was some deal with all of Micronesia. Haydn spent an enormous amount of time trying to talk him out of that.
- Crowe: I think he did finally, yes.
- Siemer: Were there others that Haydn had a personal relationship with? Senator Jackson or any of those?
- Crowe: I don't remember Jackson particularly. I was trying to think if he had known some of the other California senators. He'd had some experience. He may have known Jackson. He taught at Washington University there for a while when Haydn did. He may have known Jackson. I don't recall.
- Siemer: Do you remember Don McHenry's book?
- Crowe: I don't remember Don McHenry. I didn't go with Haydn to the Congress very much. Occasionally he'd ask me to. Of course by the time you're talking about, I was out of it. I was in the latter stages of that thing. We were getting close to passage and so forth.
- Siemer: In connection with the testimony that you did for the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee, did you take a look at McHenry's book? There was a draft that was being circulated at the time.
- Crowe: I do remember that Haydn was upset by it, but I don't remember much more than that. It was pretty easy to upset Haydn. There were two kinds of people in the world: those agin' him and those for him. I do remember McHenry and the draft, but I don't remember ever reading it.

- Siemer: Did you work at all in the final campaign to get it through the Senate? Once it got through the Armed Services Committee, it got through the Foreign Relations Committee, it got through the Interior Committee, then there was a big campaign to get it through the floor.
- Crowe: Well my instincts tell me that we were involved in it, but I don't remember very well.
- Siemer: It wasn't you personally?
- Crowe: No, I don't think so.
- Willens: Any other recollections you may have looking back on this? You know that we have a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, we have a Republic of Palau, we have a Republic of the Marshall Islands, and we have the Federated States that collects all of the have-nots.
- Crowe: Roman Tmetuchl is dead, isn't he?
- Willens: No. Salii of course you heard committed suicide. I guess the question is, there was this effort to deal with Micronesia as an entity and impose on it some sort of common status worthwhile?
- Crowe: Once the Marianas deal was completed, they did develop some of their own momentum, didn't they?
- Willens: In retrospect, is this the kind of outcome that you expected, and is it so far as you know an acceptable one?
- Crowe: Well I always felt after we busted the Marianas out I didn't think we had a very strong argument keeping everybody else together. As I recall we worked pretty hard trying to keep them together, but to put it bluntly, it didn't bother me one way or another, if they were satisfied when it was over. I always thought they did a pretty good job on us getting the money out of us. On the other hand it was worth something just to get it resolved. I always felt defense-wise that if it ever does become an issue we'll be in the middle of it one way or another. No matter what the arrangements.
- Willens: Well Defense is in the middle of it right now, because the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States are up for re-negotiation with respect to the financial arrangements. And the question being generally discussed by those who are worrying about this is, what currently are our military interests in that part of the world and how much are we willing to pay for it?
- Crowe: Well I hadn't heard of that, but my instincts are telling me we're not willing to pay very much.
- Willens: Have our interests changed in that part of the world in the last 20 years in ways that would influence your judgment?
- Crowe: It just depends on what you hypothesize in terms of the future. If you really feel that someday the time is going to come when we confront China head on, I'm not so sure it is, those islands could become strategically important.
- Willens: Some people say given the developments in technology and so forth, that really you can no longer represent that those islands are important to lines of communication or shipping.
- Crowe: Well there is lots of technology that can bypass islands in this day and age, but the military still needs bases. Take the Persian Gulf, for example. I've had a lot of experience in the Persian Gulf subsequent to the Micronesian experience. The fact of the matter is that

you can't fight a guy like Saddam Hussein from long distance. The Air Force will tell you can, but you can't. And if you really want to fight, no matter who challenges you, and I don't want to talk about world wars, but even regional wars, ultimately you've got to find someplace to stand that's close to them. Because there's just lots of little things that come up. Ultimately you're going to put troops in somewhere. You've got to have a base. And if you don't get it legally you'll take it militarily, which is a hard way to do business, and not the most satisfactory way to do business. In the end, look at Iraq, we didn't do it. And if you really want to change, remold, reshape, you have to occupy it. We didn't occupy it. And our man Mr. Bush must wake up every morning and say how come he's still there and I'm here? If we go back to Iraq, and they're talking about it, we're going to have to use some bases in the Gulf. The Pacific is such a wide-ranging area, and you never know what will happen. It occurs to me for years we talked about being pushed out of the Philippines, and what finally pushed us out was a natural event, not a political decision or anything else. A natural disaster just plain pushed us out of there. If we ever have to fight China, we'll probably go back to the Philippines. The Pacific may be important again then.

Willens: We appreciate very much the time you have given us for this interview. Thank you very much.

Crowe: Not at all. You're welcome.