

INTERVIEW OF WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEEEN, JR.

by Howard P. Willens and Bruce M. Kalk

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- Willens: We are here in Mr. Gleysteen's office on Friday, August 6, 1993. I'm joined here by Professor Kalk and we are going to begin an interview with Mr. Gleysteen. He was kind enough to agree to this interview and he was just about to tell us how it was that he got involved in some responsibilities relating to Micronesia in 1966 or thereabouts. Go ahead, Mr. Gleysteen.
- Gleysteen: Let me tell you the structure, then you can ask me the questions. I came to the issue cold in 1966. I'd been dealing with China and things like that all my life. I'd been at Harvard for a year before coming into the U.N. affairs, and the Trust Territory was one of my assigned duties. It was a fairly well-developed process that I came into. Don McHenry, whose name appears in some of the material that you gave me, was very intimately involved and actually was sort of my mentor even though he was my subordinate at the time. I learned much of what I knew from him. I dealt with Micronesia until I left U.N. affairs in 1969, and operationally had nothing more to do with it although I remained very interested in it. When I returned to Washington in the mid-1970s as a deputy assistant secretary for East Asia, I had some exposure to it again, but it was much less intimate.
- Kalk: When you returned to Washington in 1966, did you recall what month of the year you were returning?
- Gleysteen: I think around September in the fall.
- Kalk: Because there are some events that take place earlier in 1966 that we were wondering about as well and you were, I gather, in Hong Kong.
- Gleysteen: I had been in Hong Kong but actually I was at Harvard in between assignments. I left Hong Kong in 1965.
- Kalk: This was one of a number of significant issues before you and you worked, I suspect, rather closely with a number of other individuals, some of whose names figure prominently here, Assistant Secretary Sisco, Harlan Cleveland, Elizabeth Brown.
- Gleysteen: Yes. I was Elizabeth Brown's deputy.
- Kalk: Do you have recollections of any debates taking place within the State Department in terms of formulating overall strategy for the Department's approach to all of the affairs connected to the Trust Territory?
- Gleysteen: Strictly speaking, I don't. By the time I came in, I think the State Department's positions had been largely lined up. For example, Harlan Cleveland had already gone, Sisco was in the job, and these memos you've provided me suggest that there was kind of a consensus in the State Department. But that's a very broad statement. There was some debate in the Department and even within the bureau over the issues.
- Willens: How was the bureau organized at that time?
- Gleysteen: It was called and still is, I think, the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. Under it were a series of offices and one of them was the Office of U.N. Political Affairs, which was the one that I was in. Within that office, there was some reflection of arguments reverberating outside the bureau: how strict were you going to be about the U.N. Charter,

international law and procedures; how accommodating were you going to be to the more mundane interests of Defense and Interior? I don't remember particular battles over this, but people in the Department who were in charge of liaison with Defense, particularly the East Asian/Pacific Bureau, tended to be less U.N. oriented than we were. That was one set of tensions. There was also a New York reflection of this. Because of its responsibilities in the Trusteeship Council and General Assembly, our U.N. delegation in New York participated vicariously in this process, and its views were the "ultimate" in terms of U.N. preoccupation.

Kalk: Would you characterize that as in essence some dissent within the State Department—that there were those who were more focused on the United Nations and then those who were more preoccupied with inter-agency...?

Gleysteen: Yes. It wasn't really a sharp disagreement. It was more a matter where you were on a continuum. If you were on the U.S. delegation at the U.N. and you were serving with the Trusteeship Council, you would be at the high end of the continuum, favoring strict adherence to U.N. views because you were having these rubbed in all the time. But U.N. people were aware of other considerations and would try to accommodate them. If you were in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and you were concerned about security and political events in East Asia, you would focus more on these issues and would also be very interested in good relations with Defense.

Willens: Let me just interrupt a minute. Do I understand you to say that Assistant Secretary Sisco was there when you arrived?

Gleysteen: Yes, he was.

Willens: And Don McHenry was there also?

Gleysteen: Yes. One above me and one below me.

Willens: And Elizabeth Brown?

Gleysteen: Elizabeth Brown was there also.

Willens: And what was her relationship to you?

Gleysteen: Elizabeth was the Director of the office, and I was a Deputy Director.

Willens: I see.

Gleysteen: She was ill quite a bit of the time, and I was Acting Director part of the time.

Willens: Did you have any sense that the policy of the office with respect to the Trust Territory had changed as Assistant Secretary Sisco replaced Cleveland?

Gleysteen: I think it did to some degree. I don't know that it was a matter of personalities as much as a matter of time changing circumstances. There were disagreements, but these had been largely resolved—at least in theory—before I got there. How to deal with the Congress was a central problem, and most of us (certainly I) underestimated the congressional beast in its complexity. And there were lots of theories as to how we should deal with Congress. I remember that Joe Sisco was more practical and had much better sense of Congress than we younger officers.

Kalk: That would be to say that he was more preoccupied with Congress?

Gleysteen: Yes, in practical terms of how you deal with them. He was up there testifying and so on, while we tended to be more textbooky and simplistic. This tension in the State Department complicated our dealings with Interior and Defense when broader issues

were being discussed, such as how to deal with the House and Senate on the issue of status. It was a matter of approach, not objective. I think people shared the objective. At least the overall objective was no longer being disputed.

Kalk: How much you characterized those different approaches that those that worked more closely with Congress might have as against a career foreign service staff might have?

Gleysteen: Well, from my narrow vantage point, cautiously using Sisco as an example, I would say that he was more willing to cut corners than I was and more willing to deal with rolling logs. By the time I left the bureau, I had sort of come to that view too. I vaguely remember an example. By 1966 when I joined the fray, there was agreement in the State Department—and to a lesser extent in Interior and Defense—that in changing the status of Micronesia it would be necessary to have an act of self-determination and this would have to include the risk of an independence option. In earlier years this principle certainly was not accepted by Interior and Defense. By the time I came on board, at least lip service was given to it, but it frequently was shown to be lip service. The Congress sensed this divergence, and I found it very frustrating.

Willens: You mean lip service from the Interior and Defense side?

Gleysteen: Yes, but it's probably an overstatement for some people and an understatement for others. But it was no longer possible when I came on board for Interior to say, "Well, just hang on a minute, we haven't agreed to that." They had agreed to that. But we felt they were sabotaging it a lot of the time. I think sabotaging is probably a strong word but I think that's what was involved.

Kalk: Perhaps some attention to the differences between the Department of State and the Department of Interior on this one could be worth our time now. There is a morass of documents for this 1967-1968 period that shows a continuing impasse between the Department of the Interior and the State Department. Just to refresh your memory, I have a note on a document with regard to Interior's feeling that the Trust Territory was unprepared for self-government. This was a feeling not necessarily shared as I recall by people at the State Department. This comment comes from Undersecretary Carver at the Interior Department about a half a year before you joined the State Department. Carver says:

I'm convinced that any attempt to afford such status [that is self-government] politically feasibility within our own government structure apart would result in chaos and a great disservice both to the communities involved and the United States posture as the trustee of their welfare. To be any more blunt about it I would regard any such proposal at this point in time as highly unrealistic.

What are your initial thoughts and we'll perhaps trace this chronologically before you joined State until 1969 when you leave the Office for Political Affairs. What are your initial thoughts about this impasse upon your arrival?

Gleysteen: This was a very frontal disagreement. I shared the State Department view that although Micronesians were not well prepared for self-government, there were ways to cope with the problem. Moreover, we were convinced the lack of preparation was largely the fault of Interior. Almost everybody in the State Department was critical of Interior's management of the Trust Territories. Whether that was accurate or not I don't know, but I'm just telling you this is the way we felt. We felt that they ran the Trust Territories the way they ran Indian reservations at the time, which was very badly. We were convinced they had third-rate, not even second-rate, people out there, running it as a kind of state preserve. They

didn't want anyone else getting involved. They had their own Congressmen (Aspinall and others). They didn't want us nosing into this process in terms of the Congress, in terms of contact with Micronesians, or whatever. Obviously, our views at the time were excessive, but we felt that way and I still think we were at least half right.

Willens: Did you deal personally with Mr. Carver with respect to this matter?

Gleysteen: I'm trying to think if I did. The person that I dealt with mostly was Ruth Van Cleve and her (what was it called) Office of Territories. Occasionally there was the higher-level contact, but she was my counterpart for these things. We would take Sisco or someone—one of the other deputies of Sisco—and see people at the higher level occasionally.

Willens: Do you think that the people at Ruth Van Cleve's level and in her office shared Mr. Carver's view that the Micronesians were not basically ready for a greater element of self-government?

Gleysteen: I don't remember clearly enough about her, but certainly many of the others did with vehemence, some probably less so. But our view was—I guess this is sort of a moral comment—yes, there was some problem with Micronesia's ability to administer itself, but the U.S. was partly responsible because we failed to nurture them in a way that developed self-reliance. So that there was some element of spiteful blaming people to make the argument even more vigorous. There was also the issue of what was to be done for Micronesia. The State Department was always pushing for larger appropriations, greater grants, greater efforts to try to as soon as possible spend more money, get more Micronesian involvement in the process and train more people so that they could conduct their affairs. And then finally and most significantly, there was the question of the risk of having the Micronesians go through the act of self-determination and opt hopefully for territorial and American status and not be capable of administering themselves. I felt, I will not speak for others in the State Department, that there were plenty of ways to deal with that problem. In the beginning stages, we could adopt *pro forma* self-government and then gradually move to more genuine forms of responsibility.

Kalk: It would seem, Mr. Gleysteen, that there's a very important question at issue here, which is that Interior in 1966-1967 essentially sought to continue the Trusteeship Agreement as the *status quo* indefinitely. Would you judge, and this is certainly a perception, a contemporaneous perception, it was 30 years ago, that this was because the staff in the Department of the Interior genuinely perceived that there was an inability on the part of the Micronesians to govern themselves, or that there was perhaps an element of bureaucratic self-interest in keeping the Office of Territories afloat and that the existence of the Trust Territory under the current status as a trusteeship certainly lent to that, or thirdly that there was almost a sense of disdain for people who were so remote by Western standards that one could presume they would never acquire a level of political efficacy where they might rule themselves?

Gleysteen: I think it was all of those, but I wouldn't want to accuse anyone of any but the first. Clearly they preferred to see the *status quo* continued. I think that they largely believed their own argument that this was necessary—these people for one reason or another were not capable of administering themselves. I doubt that many of them were as Machiavellian as holding this view in order to extend their own time in office, but probably subconsciously that played a significant role for some of them.

Kalk: On their part, the Department of the Interior made a number of claims with regard to the State Department, and I'm interested in your reaction particularly at the time to the ways in which this played out. First was that the State Department was overly attentive

to the United Nations—that in fact the State Department was overly sensitive—and that Interior claimed this was a matter that should be determined primarily within the United States, because of the realistic relationships with Congress being what they were, that fact was the only way this matter could be played. You're at the center of that since you were at the Office of Political Affairs. What was your sense of that at the time?

Gleysteen: I believe the charge about U.N. sensitivity is a fair one, but the State Department's defense against the charge was that doing nothing—just continuing the *status quo*—was going to perpetuate a situation which was putting at risk what the Defense Department felt was a vital national interest. That is that there were going to be political developments stimulated by the U.N. Committee IV process and activities in Micronesia which would create problems that we would have to deal with. So we didn't have the option of doing nothing, which was the preference of Interior. Moreover, if there were to be a change in status, it was the State Department, not the Department of Interior, which should interpret foreign policy requirements of the United States. There was absolutely no question about the State Department's position being correct. I mean there's never been any question about this; it is absolutely correct.

Willens: Let me just follow up on that. Yes, I think from the documents and the last 20 years it's quite clear that the State Department's legal interpretation of the Trusteeship Agreement and the Charter was correct. There seemed to be some difference between the agencies as to what would unfold if the United States recommended a change of status in Micronesia that would not meet U.N. standards but that would involve a status similar to Guam or the Virgin Islands. And to be fair to Interior, they were urging, I believe, that the State Department and the U.S. Government should settle for some lesser status even if it meant that the U.N. would continue to exercise oversight because only such a status would be accepted by Congress.

Gleysteen: I've been addressing a very broad question, and there were shades within this broad argument. For example, virtually no sensible person in the State Department felt that we could get through the Trusteeship Council all of what we wanted. We would end up having to shortchange something somewhere, so the general State Department view was that we would be as "correct" as we could be. We would either end up with a Soviet veto or decide, because there would be a veto, that we wouldn't go through the Trusteeship Council. But we would have followed all of the procedures, and we could defend ourselves in any court so to speak. Secondly, toward the end of the time that I was involved, we became more aware of the fractioning tendencies and the complexities of Trust Territory interests between the various islands. This lack of uniformity presented a real problem—that is, some people going in one direction, some people another, and so on. I never felt that the State Department people, myself included, had worked this one all the way through. In this sense, critics of the State Department in the Interior Department had a valid point.

Kalk: What about the deliberations within the Trusteeship Council? Were you aware of what was going on in any specific sense within the Trusteeship Council in 1967, 1968? What sort of criticisms were really being leveled behind closed doors and so forth?

Gleysteen: I was fairly well clued into what was happening, but I don't remember very much. But anyway, the U.S. representative to the Trusteeship Council was down in our office quite often and kept us well informed. A lot of the flack was being carried outside the Trusteeship Council and I am trying to think of the committees that existed.

Willens: The Committee of 24?

- Gleysteen: Yes. The Committee of 24 and this is where the radical troublemakers were. We worried about Soviet scholarships being offered to Micronesians of various kinds. We probably exaggerated that concern a little bit but Micronesia was sort of coming of age in dealing with us and also becoming prey to external forces. There was a new dynamic at work in the place and it was fairly apparent.
- Willens: Let me stay within the United Nations for just a moment. There was a visiting mission in 1967 and, as was typically the case, the members of the visiting mission would come to the Department in the early part of the year, typically January, in advance of going out to the Trust Territory to conduct their inspection and subsequently write a report. You remember participating in briefing sessions with the 1967 visiting mission?
- Gleysteen: I believe I did, but I had forgotten all about it until you mentioned it. I think McHenry went out with that visiting mission. I think I was supposed to go but couldn't.
- Willens: One of the specific issues that came up in those briefing sessions (as it had three years earlier) was an effort by the visiting mission to find out what U.S. policy was with respect to the future of the Trust Territory. There was a deliberate decision within the Department not to tell the visiting mission about the National Security Action Memorandum that was still guiding U.S. policy. What's your sense of that fact? Do you feel that there was any need for the visiting mission to be informed as to what U.S. policy was, or do you feel it was perfectly appropriate to do what was done?
- Gleysteen: Frequently in my career I was faced with a situation where you had an international, or at least a non-U.S. group, that you wanted to cooperate with fully but couldn't for national security reasons. I don't recall exactly how I dealt with it at the time, but I presume I would have straddled the issue. That is, it would have been quite inappropriate to tell them about a secret policy, but at the same time it would also be very wrong to mislead them about it. So you would try to convey our policy with some ambivalence and fuzziness. One would imply the national security interest without talking specifically about it.
- Willens: That's right. There was during the 1960s for several years an effort to organize U.S. programs in a way that a plebiscite could be held as early as 1968. About the time that you were there at the State Department that objective became closer to 1972. Do you remember any discussion within the Department or within Interior about the timetable that one might reasonably establish to work toward a plebiscite?
- Gleysteen: I remember the issue. I don't remember many details of it frankly. I think that I came in assuming that everything I was told was correct and being frustrated by not being able to meet every timetable. When I looked back at our record, I really thought we had been rather naive thinking we could move that fast. By the time I left U.N.P, I was getting quite cynical about the speed at which we could go, because I didn't see any consensus anywhere. There was a considerable amount in the State Department, but that was it. I mean there was an alliance with Defense on some issues, occasionally with Interior, but usually a strong division with Interior. And this very complex animal on the Hill, which had inherent rights, because there had to be acts of Congress and because Congress was involved in a wide range of issues from defense to administration of the Trust Territories.
- Kalk: While we're discussing the plebiscite issue, there is a point to be made on Interior's position with it and I think that in April of 1967 that changes. Prior to that time, Interior in its desire to continue essentially the *status quo* opposed an early plebiscite. The State Department and Defense felt otherwise. A so-called summit meeting was held in April of 1967, some seven months after you arrived at the State Department, and we managed to unearth another of these documents here. This one making a comment (just to refresh

you) that at this time that we were agreed that U.S. sovereignty should be extended to the Trust Territory promptly and that a plebiscite should be held without too much delay. In other words, that by April of 1967, finally the Interior Department comes around too. Do you know offhand, Mr. Gleysteen, what it might have been that prompted the Department of the Interior's position to change, having been so steadfastly held for so long?

Gleysteen: I don't think I do.

Kalk: Well perhaps another way of asking the question, what pressures did the State Department bring to bear on Interior in order to require leverage for it to change its position? Perhaps you were able to find allies outside of the Department.

Gleysteen: I think someone like McHenry who was probably more involved would have a better recollection of that. But as we talk, I now remember Katzenbach's involvement.

Willens: Was he active on this subject? We see several memos involving memos to him and he participated in several meetings. What is your recollection of his level of involvement?

Gleysteen: It was not great, but it was sufficient, and it contrasted with the successor regime when Nixon and my friend Elliot Richardson who ended up in that position. I thought that he would be very easy to brief. He seemed sympathetic and he listened to it all, but then he sort of laughed us down. Katzenbach was more supportive. But in addition to Katzenbach's role, I suspect the change occurred because of changing of circumstances and shifts in people. Although I forget the names, there were some important shifts in Interior.

Kalk: I think Charles Luce became Under Secretary.

Gleysteen: I believe that that was a significant factor. Secondly, during the time I was there, State and Defense brought their positions closer together to the point where there was some sense of our ganging up on Interior. And I think a third thing, which would be the hardest to demonstrate, was just the passage of time. At the beginning, all of us were somewhat ideological in our positions. Later there was more common ground. There may also have been some specific events that brought it about—I apologize for not remembering.

Kalk: How did State and Defense become closer? How did those differences get worked out?

Gleysteen: Well, I can give you an example of myself. I had been dealing in all my career rather closely with Defense, and my position with Defense was that we fully agreed we should extend American sovereignty and so on. I think we were able to convince Defense that we were on their side, that we were talking about modalities not objectives, and that we knew our way around well enough so that the risks of doing it (*i.e.*, self-determination) the right way were manageable. I think that was one very significant thing done at the working level and also at the Katzenbach level, because we used these same arguments there. So I think that was a powerful influence.

Willens: I'd be interested in your views about how the position of the U.S. government during the period that you were there changed because of the Vietnam War and the increasing pressures on the Defense establishment to perform its responsibilities there and have a variety of fall-back bases available for its purposes. Would the trends in the late 1960s in the Western Pacific on the military front have influenced Defense's desire to resolve this matter?

Gleysteen: Without a doubt. I'd sort of forgotten all about that. But by the time I came into the UNP, that was already very much at work—in 1966. There was a major upgrading of defense

interests in Micronesia, not only for the traditional testing reasons but also thinking of base structure, relations with Guam, and so on and so forth. And also another facet of this same thing was growing concern with Soviet capabilities. So both the desire to have a kind of logistic strategic facility and the preemptive aspect to keep the Russians out had grown distinctly greater than the earlier period. This did not change while I was there, it was already in place, I saw it constantly manifested. In 1966 we were well engaged in Vietnam, and the concerns about the Soviets and the Chinese had been very great in the earlier 1960s.

Kalk: Is it fair to say then that one reason explaining why Defense became closer to the State Department is that they were eager to resolve the issue and perhaps had the most to lose by the status quo remaining.

Gleysteen: As a general factor, yes.

Willens: There is some indication within Defense Department documents that, if they had their druthers, they would keep the trusteeship in place forever. But there seemed to be at the political level within the Defense Department an awareness that that was not an alternative and that they recognized that you had to have a status in Micronesia that the people approved of, otherwise you could not rely on them for military bases. Does that strike you as an appropriate statement of what they were mulling over?

Gleysteen: I think so.

Kalk: Another aspect of the impasse between Interior and State was the claim on Interior's part that the State Department was unrealistic regarding Congress, that by adhering to an overly purist view of the Trusteeship Agreement, in their mind, that that presented an impossibility of achieving Congressional approval. What would you say were the strategies on the part of the State Department in trying to reconcile that, particularly since Wayne Aspinall's committee was beholden really more to the Department of the Interior—a committee that I gather few in the State Department had much dealings with.

Gleysteen: The issue was a real one. To this day I think the State Department was correct in saying one way or another you had to convey to the House and the Senate that, if we were going to incorporate Micronesia under American sovereignty, the only way you could do it legally was through an act of self-determination. If you didn't, you would be subject to very costly problems in the U.N. and elsewhere, and probably eventually within Micronesia itself. While this was a correct view, it still left the question of how best to convey this message to Congress. The real problem for the State Department was, "Okay, so what? How do you do this?" In the case of Interior, however, they didn't fully agree with the statement I just made. In fact, they started out believing it wasn't true. They may have come around to accepting it later, but I'm not sure they ever really believed it. So they were a very weak instrument for conveying messages to Wayne Aspinall, who had been fed their line about Micronesia for a very long time and who in return took care of them—it was a feed and counter-feed operation. They could say almost anything they wanted to the Congress.

Kalk: They had substantial leverage.

Gleysteen: They had substantial involvement in the process. It was very frustrating to us. This I do remember. I don't remember exactly how it worked out, but I kept feeling that if there were some way to get a friendly hearing, I mean a neutral friendly hearing, that these points that I was trying to make at the beginning could be made sensibly. I actually went up one time. I did appear, I've forgotten when it was, before the subcommittee, and I

think I came away feeling it probably wasn't possible. I was very discouraged. I remember Governor Carey, Koch

Kalk: Hugh Carey.

Gleysteen: Hugh Carey and others, not just Aspinall. It was just impossible to get them to talk about the issue. Conversation would be distracted to the Bronx or whatever. It was rather standard American committee style but much worse than usual.

Willens: Was that an official executive session or was it an informal meeting with the committee?

Gleysteen: It was a formal session. I think it probably was an executive session.

Willens: Was there one of these occasions when Assistant Secretary Sisco went up, because I know we provided you with some briefing materials that were prepared for his appearance?

Gleysteen: Sisco went up, but I know that I was in the chair at some point. I remember trying to talk to Ed Koch about Micronesia, and it was virtually impossible.

Willens: Was there disinterest in the subject matter that you were there to discuss?

Gleysteen: I can't prove that point. All that I can say is that it was impossible to engage.

Kalk: What about Aspinall personally? He has a reputation as being so powerful with regard to issues of this nature, anything affecting the Department of the Interior. Did you get the feeling that at least you could strike a responsive chord with him on that level?

Gleysteen: I had been led to believe that Aspinall was sort of a terror, and he'd been made into more of one than I found him to be. He had been to the territories and knew something about the place, and had a strong point of view. So at least he had focus. He was very defensive of Interior's position and very suspicious of the State Department. That I was prepared for. But there were other members of the committee who should have been responsive to the kind of strategic discussion we had in mind, yet were not. I found them very frustrating. Coming back to the point of your question earlier, a very broad one, regarding what was wrong with our approach. I think that the State Department was correct in saying that we had to get to the Congress and convey this strategic picture of the pressures that we were under and how we could best resolve them. But the way we did it was very ineffective. The State Department has to take some of that blame along with Interior and Defense. As I reflect back, I think our little office of UNP was living in a sort of dream world on this issue. I certainly was. I didn't understand all the cross currents and where all these various Congressmen were coming from. I had very little knowledge of that. Interior had a better idea, but they were very cagey about letting on what they knew.

Willens: On the one point that was of interest to the members of Congress, and that was distinguishing between Micronesia on the one hand and the territories or possessions of the United States like Guam and the Virgin Islands and American Samoa on the other hand, and there is much discussion in the documents about "leapfrogging" and the fact that the Interior Department and the subcommittee did not want to give the Trust Territory a more attractive political status than Guam, Virgin Islands and American Samoa. The State Department seems to have focused on this issue and changed its position over time. Do you have any recollection of that issue?

Gleysteen: I do. It was a problem. As time went on, it became less of one. The problem was created not so much out of theory but out of procrastination. I mean that the self-governing schedule for the Virgin Islands and others was lagging. And therefore the schedule for the Micronesian status was getting in the way. One of the ways to cope with it was to try to get the movement on the territories sped up again. There was, as I recall, some success in

that. I think it was the Virgin Islands—anyway there was an elected governor there. And the State Department tended to push that way. But I think we recognized this as a real problem.

Willens: There is some suggestion that within the State Department during the years you were there the Department recognized that it had to reach some accommodation with Interior, and it looks as though the Department of State gradually came to the position that it should reach for self-government, but perhaps not try to accomplish self-government all in a single package. There were proposals, for example, with respect to a presidentially-appointed commission that might move toward self-government over time. Do you have any recollection of discussions along that line?

Gleysteen: Yes, I do. I don't remember the details and if I leaned that way myself.

Kalk: I might be able to refresh you a little. Mr. Willens doesn't know that I've picked this section out of the manuscript to help out on this matter, but I ran across a reference to another memo you wrote that may help out a little bit. This is dated January of 1967, January 27th. In this memo there is mention that State believed that failure to spell out the political and economic advantages of free association as a political status would probably lead the people of the Trust Territory to choose the *status quo*—a result which would in large part defeat our purpose. So it would appear as if here you are articulating for the Department of State that free association would be the best viable option with respect to the U.S. Government.

Gleysteen: The nature of the exercise was to try to improve on the *status quo*, because we felt the *status quo* was threatened and of course there was a great interest in establishing American sovereignty in Micronesia. So that meant you had to go through an exercise which had to meet certain minimum standards. I don't remember the State Department position as it retreated, but my own feeling always was (because I had not been brought up with the Trusteeship Council as mother's milk) that it was possible to have our cake and eat it too. That is, to have a free association meet the requirements of self-government and so on but still have something that would work in terms of our practical needs. We went through all sorts of arguments and papers on this, but it was never resolved while I was there basically. But I just give you that as a personal statement—my own view.

Kalk: Given the latter history of the development towards independence for most of the islands in the Trust Territory and the emergence as early as 1966 of a status commission by the Congress of Micronesia, it would seem as if the position of the Department of the Interior as being beholden to the *status quo* of the Trusteeship was shortsighted and that in effect they were through their shortsightedness preventing the possibility of changes taking place before the political climate in Micronesia became even further alienated from that of the position of the U.S. government. How would you respond as someone who was a policymaker in the State Department at the time that perhaps Interior was being shortsighted and in effect lost what could have been preserved by acting sooner?

Gleysteen: I'll give you a careful answer to that, because it would be easy to misconstrue the response. Moreover, strictly speaking, we can never really know the answer to the question. As far as I'm concerned, if I had been answering your question at the time, I would have said, "Yes," it did show how wrong Interior was. If I were answering you now, which I am, I would answer somewhat differently. As I began to meet Micronesians, I began to realize that there was a much greater diversity of views among them, because they'd been drawn from the different parts of the territories. And I felt that in some cases there was more risk than I had felt there had been and I therefore could understand Interior's concern and so on.

Willens: What kind of risk?

Gleysteen: Risks? I mean of Committee of 24, of decolonization, essentially an anti-American act—trying to break away from the United States in some way. This was a minority trend, but it was something that I hadn't been conditioned for. Most important, I became aware of the difference of opinion as to what would be an appropriate status for the different groups. I learned that many people in the Marianas apparently wanted the status of Guam. I had tended to think of that as being someone's propaganda until I actually talked to these people. So I had some sense of that complexity as I left—far more than at the beginning. That's the one thing that I'd say. The other is that we can never really know how all these interdependent factors would have interacted if we had taken a different course. Because the thing dragged on for so long, for at least 10 years or longer (well, it's still going on), that much of the environment also changed. I just don't think that one can use today's environment to fault anyone too strongly for actions taken under different assumptions. Yes, the easy answer is, "Interior was wrong." But I see it as a rather complex process. History has shown that there was something right about everyone's position and quite a bit wrong about everyone's position.

Willens: I think that that's a very important statement in view of what's happened out in the Trust Territory and, as you suggest, even the situation in Palau is not finally resolved now. But as it happened over the last 25 years, four separate political entities have emerged from the Trust Territory. There undoubtedly would be those who say that was a result of deliberate U.S. policy to fragment Micronesia. There would be those who would say that it represented the diverse interests and aspirations of different people. What do you think would have happened, and this is truly a speculative question, if U.S. policy had been successful in the 1960s and there had been a plebiscite agreeing to be incorporated in the United States as a single entity in the late 1960s. Do you have any view as to whether that would have served the test of time?

Gleysteen: In the late 1960s I did believe, on the basis of everything I heard, that if there had been a relatively early test and if we had prepared for it properly by effectively spending more money in the Trust Territories, we would have gotten a positive answer in the act of self-determination. So we would have been successful in that sense. I would have to add, however, that the fracturing within Micronesia would have occurred fairly quickly. How it would have happened I don't know, but I would have bet that the Marianas would have broken out in some way, and I think that other fissuring tendencies would have shown up, just as they did without that general act.

Willens: We do have a memo suggesting at one point you entertained several Micronesians for dinner. I think it was fairly late; it was one of the latest documents we have bearing your signature. It's dated June 7, 1969.

Gleysteen: That's when I was beginning to get this much more complex view, when I was mentioning my contacts among Micronesians. That was a very interesting set of contacts. Everything that I'd had up to that point had been vicarious, and these were direct contacts, face to face with people.

Willens: Who was with you at this dinner? You spoke about "we" entertained.

Gleysteen: Oh, I'm sure that Don McHenry was there, but there were probably—I don't remember.

Willens: Do you have any recollection of Olympia Borja, who is now deceased, and is someone I knew very well for several years. He was a very gregarious, outspoken political leader in

the Marianas, and I wonder whether you have any recollections of how he impressed you that night.

Gleysteen: I really don't remember, to be honest.

Kalk: You mentioned ideology a bit earlier, and this is a matter of some particular interest to me, particularly toward the end of your tenure in the U.N. Political Affairs Office. In the dawn of the new Administration in January of 1969, the Republicans under Nixon are taking over control of the government and obviously the political appointees are going to be of somewhat a more conservative ideological stripe than the Johnson era appointees. Did you detect with reference to the policymaking toward the Trust Territory any sort of finer shades of ideological change that would reflect that new Administration?

Gleysteen: Yes. Ironically I refer to the conversation with Elliot Richardson. I didn't know him at the time, but I've seen him a lot since then, and worked with him and traveled with him and so on. I feel I can be frank with him. He's a liberal Republican, sensible, very internationalist. And I knew then of his liberal reputation, and I thought that if we could get at him that we could get around a lot of the problems that we were having. If we had him on board, we could then work on Defense and Interior and resolve these questions that had been festering away. I didn't think there was anything to be ashamed about; I thought we had a very convincing argument. And I remember, that while I wasn't laughed down, I was very disappointed in the outcome. I don't remember all the content of the discussion, but these I do remember. First, it was a very low priority for the new Administration.

Kalk: Less so than under the Johnson Administration?

Gleysteen: Much less. I mean within the State Department, it just simply was going to be a back burner issue. The new Administration was preoccupied with the war and so on, they were going to be more conservative, and in terms of defense they would be (I recall a little bit of this in a conversation) more deferential to Defense. I think that they were also less inclined to try to tackle Interior or the Congress. In other words, they were more inclined to let things alone. So what it amounted to was that we weren't going to go anywhere, and that was the conclusion I reached.

Kalk: Was one of the reasons for that that a conservative might be less beholden to pressure from the United Nations?

Gleysteen: I think the answer is yes, but I'm not sure that I could establish any connection.

Kalk: Perhaps less international?

Gleysteen: Yes. If you asked Elliot Richardson about this, he could probably never recall it because in his life it would be a little dot. In the meeting with him this was only one of a number of issues that we were covering. People such as Richardson would in their self-defense say, "No, I understood the U.N. problem perfectly well." But on the other hand, there were others who didn't. So I don't know how to add them all up. Certainly, Mr. Nixon would have dismissed the problem with a snap of the fingers.

Willens: Let me follow up. What you say is an interesting perspective on what actually happened in early 1969. There was under the aegis of the Under Secretaries Committee a review of policy with respect to the Trust Territory and a set of recommendations made to President Nixon. He acted on those recommendations and subsequently Secretary Hickel went to the Trust Territory in May of 1969 and announced in essence U.S. policy to make an offer to the Trust Territory, which was in effect a draft organic act. A draft organic act is exactly the kind of status that Interior had been pressing for, and it was at the far end of the continuum from what State for many years had been striving for with respect to

self-government. Yet in 1969 that was the first presidential-level examination that we can see in the documents since 1962 when President Kennedy issued his important directive. Does that trigger any recollections as to deliberations of the Under Secretaries Committee and the draft organic act?

Gleysteen: There was some progress in the sense of the getting the issue into the right channels. So in that way it was a positive development. But I think that what you describe—and I had forgotten the shape of it—that is the process of deciding it would not have happened under Katzenbach. Essentially the State Department bowed out of that act. I realize I'm overstating the case.

Kalk: Are you saying that under Katzenbach that would not have happened because he would not have been that deferential?

Gleysteen: Yes, the organic act approach would have been modified. In the Kennedy Administration, there was recognition of the problem and a somewhat simplistic view of extending sovereignty. In the Johnson Administration, the status question had seesawed through a period of debate where U.N. consideration weighed heavily—what we're talking about today. During the early days of the Nixon Administration, this debate ended, and a different route was taken. Actually the new route caused less of a problem than it might here because of the way history has turned and the way U.N. issues evolved and so on. So as I said in my earlier answer to you, the fact that we have gone these other routes, the fact that Micronesia has been split up and that there has been no overwhelming protest led by the Soviet Union pounding the table—all these things have happened, the world has changed a great deal from the one that we felt we saw in the late 1960s.

Willens: One thing we haven't mentioned, neither Bruce nor I, is that the Micronesians did appoint a Future Status Commission that issued a preliminary report in 1968 and then a report in 1969, where it rather clearly set the objectives of either independence or preferably a free association relationship. The documents suggest that intimations of the commission's report were known to U.S. government policymakers and they felt some urgency in developing a U.S. position to deal with this. Do you have any recollection of the influence that the Micronesian Future Status Commission reports might have had on U.S. policy?

Gleysteen: I think the way you stated it is correct.

Kalk: A follow-up to that. In 1963 a commission was established, the Solomon Commission, which issued a report. It was a study based on Kennedy's directive to investigate political and economic development in the Trust Territory. One of the many outcomes of that was an assessment that there was practically no sentiment for independence as late as 1963 within the Trust Territory. The commission estimated between two and five percent, at most, of the residents in the Trust Territory would opt for an independent status. Further, that there was practically no recognition of this as an issue—political status. The 1964 U.N. visiting mission makes a similar comment that there does not seem to be a coalesced movement for independence in Micronesia. Now within five years that changes very appreciably, and, in fact, what Mr. Willens has just suggested, the two options of independence or free association, are essentially what's brought to the table of the U.S. government by the Micronesians themselves. Did you have a recognition within the State Department of the movement towards this growing awareness within Micronesia during that 1965-1969 period?

Gleysteen: I think I said earlier. The answer is yes, whether it was accurate completely I don't know, because I wasn't there. But when I came in, as part of my orientation, it was natural for me to want to know what we were worried about, why this concern. And there was a

substantial concern and I mentioned a couple of ways that it had manifested itself. These were small things, but they had a dramatic impact. The Soviet Union was trying to get fishing boats and things like that into the area. They were extending Moscow scholarships to people; I think they'd actually succeeded in a couple of cases. They were using surrogates also. Very petty things, but if you remember the atmosphere at the time, these things were always taken as the tip of the iceberg. And in fact I think they were. The iceberg may not have been very important, but they were part of the Soviet effort. That was one source of concern. The more common way the issue arose was here in New York at the Trusteeship Council, the Committee of 24, and there were a couple of other U.N. committees. It's very hard to convey to people today that atmosphere that existed. It was the U.N. at its worst, but these rather crazy aspects of the decolonialization movement caused concern and greatly complicated our internal consideration of the status question. The extremism really bothered the hell out of us. If you looked in the files you would see that many of us wanted the U.S. to leave the Committee of 24. We were not pansies in this process at all because we really felt that we needed to get out of this trap, could get out of this trap, and we believed in what we were telling everybody. Whether we were right or not is another matter.

Kalk: What do you think changed in Micronesia itself during that six-year period?

Gleysteen: To put it in a very general way, an enormous increase in external influence within the area. For example, American lawyers were getting out there, some of them with agendas of their own, very strong political agendas, some not.

Willens: You're talking about the Peace Corps sponsored programs?

Gleysteen: Yes, very much so. I forgot about the Peace Corps as a source of the lawyers. The Peace Corps actually should have been the first part of the answer.

Willens: Did you have any personal experience or familiarity with any single incident involving the Peace Corps volunteers or Peace Corps lawyers that you can remember?

Gleysteen: I remember a couple of instances where Interior wanted to take disciplinary action against them. I remember I thought they were justified. I don't remember what we did. I think we went along with it. There was egregiously political interventionist action by some young attorneys out there, who were not responding to local feelings but were trying to create a new assertive mood among Micronesians.

Willens: One of the other factors frequently singled out is the creation in early years of the Congress of Micronesia, namely, that that provided a training vehicle for political leaders and a mechanism for articulating Micronesian objectives. Do you have any recollection of the influence the Congress of Micronesia might have had in the changing Micronesian sentiment during these years?

Gleysteen: I think the answer is yes. Many times we would hear about significant things which would then be surfaced in the Congress of Micronesia or by someone who was in the Congress speaking somewhere else. In fact I would say that very often that was the case. But views were not uniform; there were differing views in the Congress.

Willens: One of the things happening during these years as you suggest was the infusion of a good deal of additional U.S. funds for education programs, health programs, and the documents and the reports suggest continued controversy about how effectively those funds were being spent. Did you have any sense at the time as to how the funds were being used and supervised?

- Gleysteen: Well, this is sort of the catch 22 problem. Generally, the State Department felt that if we went through an act of self-determination for Micronesia with the traditional Interior management and no additional economic effort, the risk of failure was substantial, how big I wasn't sure but it was uncomfortable. It was important that more money be introduced. We were always on the side of trying to do this and urging an improvement in the local administration. So we were also very concerned about who was to be the governor or High Commissioner?
- Kalk: High Commissioner.
- Gleysteen: And that was an issue. We did know some of these people because we saw them back in Washington and I must say I was unimpressed with some of them. I don't want to say very much about it because I was judging them on the basis of hearsay and in a rather shallow context. But these were very real issues.
- Willens: The documents
- Gleysteen: But anyway the catch 22 part of this was that if you pushed this very far, you antagonized Interior, but if you then got yourself past Interior to the Congress, they would say: "We're doing pretty well out there. How do you know it's not so good, you haven't been out there? And why should I, representing New York City, agree to this extra appropriation for Micronesia? I need this money back here." It was put just like that. I had never had an experience dealing with this. I wasn't a politician. I didn't have an answer, except to make my statement all over again. Toward the end of the Johnson Administration, I sensed we were running out of steam.
- Kalk: There were no new strategies to try to circumvent that problem?
- Gleysteen: Well, I mean they're always trying to get the package together, always getting it moving, always trying to reach new compromises, but we were not going anywhere.
- Willens: One of the strategies that the Department of State followed for several years was to try to get White House attention and the appointment of a special assistant in the White House to coordinate and direct U.S. policy toward Micronesia. Do you recall that kind of proposal being made within the Department and the Interior reaction to it?
- Gleysteen: I do. I mean obviously I had forgotten about it. The interest we had was hopefully that we would get a czar who would be on our side, and I think after a while I wasn't sure that that assumption was necessarily going to be correct. But I don't remember a great deal about it except there was enormous resistance to it. Periodically there was White House involvement, and usually it would lead to one of these stages that you reminded me of. It would lead to heads being knocked together; we would agree on a piece of paper; and we would make some apparent progress, but it was paper progress.
- Willens: Who do you remember being involved in the White House?
- Gleysteen: I don't remember.
- Willens: Mr. Nitze?
- Gleysteen: Was he there? Paul Nitze. I saw his name on one of these papers that you sent me. I had had some later involvement with Nitze in other contexts. I don't remember it in this case. I really don't. At this time, I had dealings with the White House and the NSC with the East Asia people because I was actively involved in the China representation problem, but I don't recall dealing with him on Micronesia. I'm sorry; it is just a gap in my memory.

Willens: Near the end of the Johnson Administration, Interior came up with a proposal for a Presidential commission that would be presented to Congress and if acted upon would provide a vehicle for ascertaining Micronesian sentiments and making recommendations. The State Department, according to the documents, seemed to oppose that.

Gleysteen: What was the date of that?

Willens: This is in 1967, 1968. One of the papers that we've provided you sort of outlined the State Department's concern that putting a commission before Congress and having Congress then staff such a commission is not the way to handle the problem. Do you remember any discussion about the use of a commission for such a purpose?

Gleysteen: I remember it as one of many such things. I wish I could remember more. Yes, I remember it, in having that general reaction to it.

Willens: There was testimony on it during 1968.

Gleysteen: It's fairly clear from almost everything I've said today that, if you allowed the Congress or if you allowed any group—for example a committee of Congress, the concerned officers of Interior or Defense—to go to Micronesia and take soundings, they were going to come back with a skewed report or one which would be considered skewed by U.N. circles. Our concern in any such proposal (whatever the format would be) was that there would have to be some way of keeping the process honest. So whether it was a commission or a White House intervention or whatever, that would have been our real concern. The concern wouldn't have been the objective at the end; it would have been the methodology. Many and many an idea was tossed out as to how to first poll Micronesian sentiment, make a reasonable proposal and sort of forget the fine points of the U.N., and as these things came up the State Department generally opposed them. While I was there the process was wearing down. Then it stopped basically in the Nixon Administration.

Kalk: Would you characterize the events from your arrival at the Department of State in Washington in 1966 through the end of the Johnson years as one in which relatively little actually happened with regard to changing policies that were directly affecting the future status of the Micronesians and that rather much more was taking place at the level of disagreements between agencies that were ultimately bickering over some of the finer points of the matter? I might phrase that another way—that relatively little happened that changed that political apparatus within the Trust Territory itself.

Gleysteen: I have no problem with that. It's the second half of your comment that I was thinking about. I would agree very much with the characterization that we didn't go anywhere during that period. The Kennedy decision was kind of a wake-up call for the problem. They had a simplistic answer, but at least they addressed it and you could say that they took some action. I came in on the end of that phase, and we made basically no progress. In one sense our positions were coming closer together as you pointed out in your question, but they never really did, at a political level.

Kalk: To the East Asian Office?

Gleysteen: Well, I moved to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in charge of East Asia as a whole.

Willens: Do you remember approximately when that transfer took place?

Gleysteen: I think it was in the early fall or summer of 1969.

Willens: In that new capacity did you have any dealings in the normal course with Micronesia?

- Gleysteen: I still had oversight on it in terms of intelligence, but I no longer had operational responsibility.
- Willens: Did you have any involvement in the period from 1969 to 1972 in the Micronesian negotiations that took place?
- Gleysteen: I did not. I left Washington in 1971, went out to Taiwan. But I'm just trying to see if I could characterize.
- Willens: There were some new people at the Department of Interior who came in with the Nixon Administration. Did you have any dealings with Secretary Hickel, for example?
- Gleysteen: I did not, although I was still in UNP when Hickel came in.
- Willens: Do you have any recollections of Undersecretary Luce who was there near the end of the Johnson Administration?
- Gleysteen: I've seen the name, and I remember the man, but as I recall, he was helpful.
- Kalk: He had a public power background in Washington state and then had moved in to become Undersecretary of the Interior.
- Gleysteen: I think there was some fairly senior person who came into Interior, it may have been Luce, who was interested in talking to us. We went over and saw him, and I vaguely remember that he gave an impression of a refreshing new point of view, not radically different, but we were able to communicate with him.
- Willens: How about DePalma in the State Department? Was he a political appointment?
- Gleysteen: No, he was a career officer.
- Willens: Did he replace Sisco?
- Gleysteen: He replaced Sisco.
- Willens: Then he was a career officer.
- Gleysteen: That's right. He had served under Sisco in a number of capacities, including I think at one point the capacity I had. Sisco also had had my job, they'd all gone up the ladder that way.
- Willens: I forget whether we know where he is now.
- Gleysteen: Well, he was in Washington.
- Kalk: I didn't get to follow up on him.
- Gleysteen: Have you talked to Sisco?
- Willens: No, not yet.
- Gleysteen: Sisco is a good person to talk to because Sisco was in UNP during the Kennedy Administration and he probably had my job in UNP at the time, and he has a good memory for these things. McHenry, I've mentioned. McHenry's going to be more focused on the New York end of this problem, but he has a very good memory too. Two people who worked for Sisco—Bill Buffum, who was here quite a long time in New York and retired. I don't know where he lives now. I think he lives in New York State rather than in Washington. You'll find him very interesting to talk to.
- Willens: How about Mr. Popper?

Gleysteen: And David Popper. I think David Popper had less to do with this than Buffum. When I was there, Buffum was the responsible person if Sisco wasn't there. But that was the crew. And Elizabeth Brown. I should note that I was an "outsider," and the ones I'm just mentioning—Sisco, Buffum, Popper, to a great extent McHenry, Elizabeth Brown. They were careerists in the U.N. structure in the U.S. State Department. I was a career officer but I was an "outsider."

Kalk: You were a specialist really in the Far East?

Gleysteen: Right.

Kalk: This brings an interesting comment I think from your perspective as a specialist in East Asia. If you were to look at the strategic significance of the islands and questions about strategic denial to other world powers, the course of history of the Trust Territory and its evolution into the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas and the Federated States of Micronesia and so forth, would you have any very general comments, not so much from your experience, but from the training that you've had in your specialty?

Gleysteen: Yes. I came in on the basis of my total experience at the time. I would have accepted the underlying premise of the Kennedy decision, ultimately on the grounds that it was not I who could judge our defense requirements. I would have done it as a good soldier and would have very loyally tried to carry out that policy and never would have wavered in that. And I would never have had any doubts about the potential mischievousness that might be expected from the Russians. At the same time, I do remember, and still believe (I am and was a very cynical person), that there was great exaggeration on all these things. I had dealt with military a lot and found they always overstated things—usually ten times more than needed. I might challenge them around the edges of things, but I didn't think it was my place to really take on the whole thing. Where was the exaggeration? Well, the legitimate concern would have been to preserve the testing grounds (missile testing), to have fall-back base structures (way back there we were already interested in that if we had to leave the Philippines or whatever), and Guam was very important. I accepted that. That was not questioned. But the concern about Soviet fishing boats in the Pacific Ocean, that was a great exaggeration. There were many ways to cope with that sort of problem. And the threat that the Chinese would somehow start marching into the act was silly. So that's about where I would have come out on defense considerations. On the other side of this argument, being an outsider looking at the U.N. issues, I took some of the extreme State Department views of U.S./U.N. sphere with a few grains of salt. Yes, we should try very hard to do as much as we could to follow all of the standard decolonization procedures and follow the U.N. Charter. But these were complicated by the Soviet veto, for starters, and there were many other problems along the way. In my opinion, the main thing was that we should do what in the eyes of the people of Micronesia, our own people and our allies, would have appeared decent. And if we gave it a good college try, it might not look terribly good by the U.N. lexicon, but it would still work. So I had some skepticism in both directions. I don't know if the record reflects it or not.

Kalk: I have one more question. Howard may have a follow-up as well. That is, a number of times you've characterized President Kennedy's directive as perhaps a simplistic call to arms but one nevertheless that focused attention on a problem that had been ignored for too long and therefore would be of some note and beginning the process of State, Interior and Defense analyzing policy toward the Trust Territory. I wonder how you would characterize the leadership or lack thereof from the Johnson White House. Is it perhaps fair to say that there was a lack of interest and coordination on the part of the Johnson White House

and that if a finger is to be pointed for delay, if a finger is to be pointed for an almost irreconcilable impasse, that it might be at the upper echelons of the Administration?

Gleysteen: I think that that is more or less true. I would say to some extent the same thing was true of another issue that I was dealing with. But I would have to say that while there is a substantial element of truth to blaming the White House, as much fault has to be laid at the feet of the secretaries who were involved—Rusk, I forget all the people in Defense and Interior, and at us, too, down in the bureaucracy. I think I've suggested where our weaknesses were. Down in the boiler department, where we were, we were very slow in recognizing that we were dealing with a more politically complex issue than our memos suggest. I mean the Micronesians were not as simple-minded as we made them out to be and the Congress certainly wasn't. And therefore we should have spent more time and been more deferential to people who could have helped us get through that thicket and we should have tried to get help in that department.

Willens: I don't understand that. Help from what kind of people?

Gleysteen: Well, it leads to the other group we're talking about. We should have gotten access to our secretaries (in the State Department to Rusk) and said, "Now here's the problem, what are we going to do about it?" I mean these were people who were handling the Congress all the time and, because of the panoply of issues they were dealing with, had leverage they could use and chips they could call—as opposed to us. So I think that there's fault at all those levels, and I wouldn't just single out the White House. If there'd been someone in the White House who had been particularly concerned with this thing, if there had been as much concern as there had been in the days of the Solomon Commission and that sort of thing, yes, it would have been helpful in the Johnson Administration. They would have banged heads together. Rusk would have realized it. He would have done something, he would have banged our heads, and we probably would have done a better job. I don't know if we would have reversed history. I don't like to blame anybody, but it's not a glorious moment in our history—for the bureaucracy.

Willens: I think you're right not to blame anyone. It was a very complicated problem, and it's interesting as a case study of a complicated problem involving multiple agencies and diverse cultures, both in Micronesia and on the Hill, that one had to deal with.

Gleysteen: And changing assumptions....

Willens: But there were several other reports, the Solomon Report predated your involvement in the U.N. office. Nathan & Associates did an economic study that was produced in about December of 1966. It was the most thorough going review of Micronesian economic status and potential that there had been or probably has been since. It made the point that unless the political status issue is resolved promptly, there's going to be uncertainty that has great repercussions in terms of economic development. Did that provide any stimulus within the department?

Gleysteen: Yes. It surely did with me. Had a lot of impact. And I think my comments have reflected that it was cited as kind of solid evidence. We may have overrated it, but it was a very influential document.

Willens: One of the themes that came up repeatedly in dealing with the United Nations visiting mission and Trusteeship Council relates to sort of a catch 22 problem of the kind you made reference to earlier. Many U.N. delegates from other countries commented in meetings with State Department personnel that spending U.S. funds in Micronesia was tantamount to prejudging the outcome of a plebiscite—in the sense that the Micronesians

had become increasingly independent economically on the United States and therefore when the vote was put before them, they really had no option but to vote for integration with the United States for some close and permanent relationship. So we had United Nations representatives complaining on the one hand of not sufficient funds and at the same bemoaning sort of instinctively about the consequences that were going to flow from the use of increased funds. Do you have any recollection of that, any reaction to that kind of sentiment?

Gleysteen: I hope I'm not reading my later views in here at the time. I remember those comments frequently from what I call "the Committee of 24 types" and others around the U.N. like the Political Committee of the General Assembly, many Africans, some of the Asians and the Indians of course—all of those people, yes. That was a fairly standard kind of response—that you were going to buy your way out of the problem. Occasionally some groups more friendly to us would take that tone too. I think maybe the New Zealanders sometimes did, and some Australians. My own reaction to that was, "Tough luck." Our policy made utterly good sense and we would never do it any other way. I mean it would be foolish for us not to do it, not to ask any mayor of any city before an election to pave the roads. I mean to me it was "political mother's milk" that one would have to do a much better job economically before putting the options before the people.

Willens: Another issue that came up regularly in discussions with U.N. representatives was the question of Marianas separatism. The State Department throughout the 1960s was very firm in its view that the Trust Territory had to be dealt with as a single unit, notwithstanding the legitimacy of these Marianas views, and as you know ultimately it was decided in 1972 to accede to the desire for separate negotiations. Did you have any feeling during the time that you were involved in these matters that the State Department had a choice to make here with respect to treating the Trust Territory through individual districts as distinct from the unitary administrative structure?

Gleysteen: I do remember it, not with great precision, but I remember it very much was an issue. Because I was sort of puzzled when I came in as to why we couldn't deal with it separately, because it didn't make good sense from an abstract point of view. Then I discovered that it was what I called part of the U.N. culture. Don McHenry felt very strongly about it and influenced me. I was a good boy scout on this issue, but I was never fully convinced.

Kalk: You remember a bit of the history of the separatist movement?

Gleysteen: The issue had been joined before I came in, resolved in the State Department that we would deal with it jointly. As I left UNP it was really reappearing because of the Marianas. When I first learned of this, I thought that there might be a considerable degree of manipulation going on with Guam over this issue. There was some suggestion of this, but when I left UNP I felt that it was sufficiently substantial that that issue had to be looked at it again. I don't remember what I wrote and said about it. It was sort of parting thoughts.

Kalk: You had come into this, well, I'm sorry to interrupt you, on meeting some of the Micronesian representatives later in your tenure and acquiring a sense that there was a genuine *bona fide* movement for separate negotiations from the rest of the Trust Territory. Did you have any comments to elaborate on that?

Gleysteen: Not much. This was the one that I was thinking of mainly. But there were differences in that evening when I was talking to the Micronesians from the Status Commission. There were other signs of differences as well which gave me a new-ish view of the Marianas issue, realizing there wasn't just one set of islanders.

- Willens: Did you know of Haydn Williams when he was serving as head of the Asia Foundation and then as a part-time ambassador for this purpose?
- Gleysteen: I do.
- Willens: Do you have any . . .
- Gleysteen: I had some dealings with him. Most of my dealings with him were over getting funding to the Asia Foundation rather than for Micronesia. And who else? Let's see—the lawyer, Paul Warnke. I was a Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia at the end of the Kissinger period. I was then in the NSC. I was in the NSC for six months at the end of the Ford Administration. I don't recall any significant Micronesian developments, but I remember Asia Foundation discussions with Haydn Williams. And then I was back in State as Deputy Assistant Secretary, where I had broader responsibilities as Senior Deputy. While I was there, we brought in a new deputy to deal with Micronesia, a friend of mine, Evelyn Colbert. So 1969 was my last active involvement.
- Willens: Did you have any general assessment as to how the United States ultimately organized itself to deal with Micronesia through the appointment of Haydn Williams? It seems to have several years later been the embodiment of what the State Department had urged for many years, namely someone with the requisite stature and White House support to coordinate the government agencies. Is that the way you would perceive it?
- Gleysteen: Yes. I knew about it and I looked on it that way. But I had no basis for judgment. I was extremely preoccupied when I was at the NSC, and I can't stress too strongly, even in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs we (and I personally) were involved with the Arab Israeli War in 1967; the Chinese representation question. These took priority because they were urgent and there were deadlines. When I was in the NSC, we had the results of the Vietnam War, trying to repair the damage in East Asia, and stabilize our overall security position, and dealing with the new entity, not new entity, but the new interlocutor for us of China. And there was also a considerable pitch-up in terms of our concern about the Soviet Union. All these things really pushed Micronesia very far down the track. And when you talk about why the Rusk level didn't deal with these problems, that's why.
- Willens: The documents suggest that under the Nixon Administration the mechanism of the Under Secretaries Committee was used seemingly more regularly and that Dr. Kissinger's office did get involved at least as an intermediary and evaluator of what emerged from the Under Secretaries Committee. He was faulted for an offhand comment he made once about Micronesia, and we've not yet interviewed him. The documents do suggest that there was perhaps greater involvement by the NSC in those early years of the Nixon Administration.
- Gleysteen: Well, I think I'd have to let others speak to that, but I can make a couple of comments. If you talk to him, I doubt he will make belittling comments when the historical record is being compiled. The NSC structure had its good points, in the Under Secretaries Committee and the other new machinery that was set up. And it did address some mediumly important problems. But the really important problems were short-circuited out of the NSC system, for example, China. I remember working for many many days of my life preparing papers on China for those NSC committees, but they were not the focus of decision making. Kissinger's attitude toward them was utterly cynical. If Kissinger had said, "Hey, this thing could get to be a mess, you should do something about it," he could have been very effective. I'm quite sure he would have gone the route of thumbing his

nose at the U.N. then, but he would have been very conscious of at least being sure that we were riding with Micronesian sentiment—whatever it was.

Kalk: He certainly would have been supportive of the sorts of programs, for example, an increase in funding.

Gleysteen: Sure. And he would have said, “Let’s be sure, you know, that they’re going to accept what we’re planning for them.” But he would have just dismissed the U.N. concerns as being frills that we could cut off. And by his time this was becoming true at times. The Committee of 24 had become a comic opera. And we finally did withdraw from it.

Willens: Wasn’t the United States actually a member of the Committee of 24?

Gleysteen: I may have the committee name wrong. In any event, we were a voluntary member of the Committee of 24 or something like it, where we did not have to be a member and where we should have been off. We just got pasted every day. I think it was the Committee of 24.

Willens: The documents as you know are a very incomplete record.

Gleysteen: McHenry can straighten you out on that. McHenry didn’t agree with me at the beginning. I think he did at the end. I felt that it made no sense to just sit there and be insulted by these people, who were so far gone.

Willens: I forget the timeframe but there was a point at which there was an internal State debate between, I think the East Asia Bureau on the one hand and the U.N. office on the other, and there seemed to be some competition for who prepared the briefing papers for the Under Secretary or who was entitled to have input to that. Who would have the line authority for forming policy with respect to the Trust Territory?

Gleysteen: I don’t remember. I saw this battle between bureaus on many issues, so it’s like saying which scar hurts. I do think there were instances where we fought over precisely that question, and the IO Bureau under Sisco was a great warrior for these things. He probably would have won, at least up until the Nixon Administration, on the grounds that this was a Trust Territory where we were reporting to the U.N. and therefore an IO issue. In any event, we still had to agree on the content of the damned thing. So who signed the memo to the Secretary was not very important. Although we used to fight such battles, such arguments were not a big thing. EA largely went along with IO on these things.

Willens: Did the Legal Advisor’s Office play any particular role that you can remember?

Gleysteen: Yes. Very strong. Excessively religious role.

Willens: They were fairly supportive, as I understand the documents, of IO submission.

Gleysteen: They were well short of Committee of 24 standards, but they were very far out in my opinion.

Willens: Who was it? Was that Mr. Meeker’s time? Abe Chayes wasn’t there anymore, was he?

Gleysteen: It was Meeker, but he wasn’t the ideologue, it was

Willens: Steve Boyd was there for a while.

Gleysteen: Herb Reis was one person, but I remember him as quite sensible.

Willens: He came over from the Justice Department with Mr. Katzenbach.

Gleysteen: The guy we sent up to the International Court in The Hague.

Willens: Riesenthal?

- Gleysteen: No. But anyway he was the legal adviser dealing with these issues when I was there. Very nice person, overly strict and I would say parochial.
- Kalk: You mean essentially that he took a literalistic reading of the Trusteeship Agreement?
- Gleysteen: Well, that's right.
- Kalk: Excessively so.
- Gleysteen: He failed to take into account the need to accommodate a lot of other interests. But they held our feet to the fire to the point that we had a lot of battles—unnecessary battles. Interior didn't realize how many favors we did for them. We should have subjected them directly to these guys.
- Willens: Were there any things in the documents that we made available to you that struck you as inaccurate or wrong, I mean as a general proposition when you skimmed over these documents?
- Gleysteen: I read them, actually very carefully.
- Willens: Was there anything there that sort of came as a surprise to you?
- Gleysteen: No. I thought that this one here, the last one
- Willens: What's the date on that document?
- Gleysteen: Briefing materials for Sisco's appearance before the Aspinall Committee hearings. March 15, 1968 is circled. I mean I'm down as the drafter. I probably was. It sounds like my drafting. I certainly went over this carefully. Anyway, I felt very comfortable with this. It's a very good description and conveyed the flavor of the period I'm talking about.
- Willens: Do you remember whether you went with Mr. Sisco?
- Gleysteen: I'm sure I did. Here's the drafting date.
- Willens: That was where we got the date from. It looked from the next document from May 13, 1968 involving a short report on hearings before a Senate Committee that the Senate seemed somewhat more sympathetic and rational on this subject.
- Gleysteen: Yes, that's true. And Mansfield, I'd forgotten that, Mansfield was the person who understood the issue. I don't know exactly where he was coming from. I think he was less concerned with the extension of sovereignty than he was with doing the right thing in terms of national determination, but he was very enlightened about such things as let's clean up our act in Micronesia and let's do a better job of administering these people.
- Kalk: He was part of a congressional delegation that went to Micronesia, I think in 1968.
- Gleysteen: But I think he was included for that reason.
- Willens: You made a comment earlier that people who went to Micronesia tended to bring back confirmation of their previously held views. I don't want to overstate what you said, but the members of the House committee went over. Did you feel that these visits to the Trust Territory changed the views of any members of Congress who participated in them?
- Gleysteen: I can't recall enough to really answer that intelligently. I had a strong impression that most members of the Aspinall committee, because they were providing funds for this particular office of Interior, had been given a nice guided tour of the territories and had views that reflected Interior's views unduly. But that is an overall comment, and there were people on the committees and subcommittees who didn't fit that category. I don't remember their names any more, but there were people who I thought were more objective. The

committee was dominated by Aspinall in an extraordinary way. He was not as bad in my opinion as some of my State Department colleagues felt. But perhaps I didn't see him enough.

Willens: One of the documents was dated May 31, 1969. It's a memorandum for you, and I don't see a signature on the page, but maybe you can identify for us who might have written it.

Gleysteen: He doesn't identify who

Willens: No. Usually those documents do have some initials or signature. I mean it's not terribly important. I just thought that you might recognize the substance or style.

Gleysteen: But I don't quickly. That was I think near the very end.

Willens: All right. Why don't we leave it there then. And that's fine. I don't think there was anything particularly new in that document.

Gleysteen: My memory's very fuzzy on those specific things.

Willens: This memo is about a month after Secretary Hickel went out to Micronesia and laid the groundwork for presenting the draft organic act that I mentioned earlier, and there was a good deal of effort afterwards to follow up on these commitments.

Gleysteen: The whole process of the organic act reflected a kind of failure in the State Department's strict U.N.-oriented position. It really wandered very far from the U.N. concept. Yet it was still better than a lot of other possibilities. It was not extreme. Anyway, that's why I characterized the new Administration as having gone through a real shift in gears.

Willens: All right. Do you have anything else, Bruce?

Kalk: I do not. I've very much appreciated the time you've been willing to give us, Mr. Gleysteen.

Gleysteen: I have to caution you that there may be things where I have misspoken, and if you have records written by me that contradict me, please correct my remarks.

Kalk: We will next be transcribing the interview, and edit it for as much accuracy as I can in terms of my recollection of the interview itself. Sometimes a transcriber misses a word or there's an error that I can catch. Then once that is completed, we will send that to you so that you can look through the transcript to see if it accurately reflects your views.

Gleysteen: Yes, maybe there will be things that will occur to me during the process of recall. This has really been pretty far out of my mind.

Willens: Thank you.