

## INTERVIEW OF EDWARD C. & JOAN H. KING

by Howard P. Willens and Deanne C. Siemer

May 9, 1997

- Willens: We are in Honolulu, Hawaii, with Edward C. King and Joan H. King, two friends who at various points in their careers have held positions engaged in Micronesian affairs. They have kindly agreed to be jointly interviewed on some of their experiences and reflections with respect to the development of Micronesia from Trust Territory days to its present status of four separate entities. Ed, if I could begin with you, could you give me a brief background as to where you were born and educated.
- King, Ed: Well, I was born in Indiana and lived in Indiana through law school. I went to undergraduate school at Indiana University and law school as well there.
- Willens: When did you graduate?
- King, Ed: In 1964. From there I went to Detroit and practiced with a law firm there. It was called Marco & Marco at the time that I arrived, and it's a bunch of different names now, but basically a corporate-type practice. I did that for about six years. This was the time in the world when we had Vietnam and we had a race riot in Detroit. I decided to get out of corporate law and get into something that seemed more pertinent and directly important, and I started running a program called the Center for Urban Law and Housing at the University of Detroit Law School and teaching there, corporations and partnerships, kind of an anchor to windward. So I was in corporate law from 1964 to 1970, and then started into that position in 1970 and was there until 1972. While I was there, I came across a notice in the Clearinghouse Review, which goes to legal service attorneys. The Center for Urban Law and Housing was part of the Community Services Administration, but was the offshoot of the old Office of Economic Opportunity Legal Services Program. Ultimately Joan and I decided to make this next move. We'd made one major move getting out of corporate work and into legal services work, and the second was to go to Micronesia, although we didn't know it was going to be very significant. We thought we'd be there a couple of years and that would be about it, and then we'd go back to life in Detroit.
- King, Joan: Except we did sell our house and get rid of everything in it, so I guess maybe we knew.
- King, Ed: Maybe we knew more than we thought we knew.
- King, Joan: Right.
- Siemer: Joan, why don't you pick up there and tell us where you were born and your educational background up to the point that Ed has described.
- King, Joan: Okay. I was born in Columbus, Ohio. I left when I was 10 and moved to California. Then when I was ready to start my freshman year in high school, my family moved back to Indiana. My father worked for a meat company, Highgrade. And he was transferred back to Indiana—Indianapolis. I cried all summer. Then went back to this little town, because my aunt lived in Little New Palestine, and started school. I was in a class of 350 in my eighth-grade class and our freshman year in New Palestine, there were 45 kids. Ed was one of them. And actually it was very exciting, because I was "that girl from California", so I was really exotic. I of course had an older boyfriend for a couple of years, but eventually before Ed and I graduated from high school we were going together. He was editor of the yearbook, I was editor of the newspaper in our little school. Then I went to DePauw

University for two years; he went to IU. Then I transferred, and then we got married after we graduated from college. Then he went to law school. We had two children while he was in law school. We moved to Detroit in 1964. But during these years while he was in corporate law, I became very active in the anti-war movement, and I was active in the welfare reform movement. My life was just more and more radical. I went to Paris in 1972 as part of this peace conference that was organized, I guess, by the Communist Party in France.

Willens: At what point did you become a journalist?

King, Joan: Back in high school my work on the newspaper was kind of journalism, and then I was an English teacher to make money while he was in law school. And then I did things like news releases and things. I was very active in the League of Women Voters in Detroit also. But not until I moved to Saipan did I actually become a full-fledged journalist. I applied for the *Pacific Daily News* Saipan job—Saipan bureau chief. And I covered all of Micronesia.

Willens: How many Indians did you supervise?

King, Joan: Oh, well, I think maybe one. For a while there was one other person there. Basically I just covered Micronesia for the *Pacific Daily News*, and that was when PDN was the Gannett paper on Guam. That's when PDN really cared about what was going on in Micronesia. That of course was during the status negotiations. I broke the Palau super port story. You know, it was just really exciting.

Willens: Ed, why don't you pick up then from your initial years in Micronesia.

King, Ed: What we did, of course, was to agree to go with Micronesian Legal Services Corporation. I was to be Chief of Litigation. Ted Mitchell had come to our house, and Ted has this marvelous capacity to be incredibly charming and sometimes incredibly bombastic, but the charm was what we saw completely during this period. And ultimately he asked that we come, so I was to be Chief of Litigation. Eventually that evolved before I arrived into Deputy Director of the program. But the basic understanding was that I was still to be Chief of Litigation. And I did that for those four and a half years. So my task was to oversee the litigation of the MLSC program. What that meant was that I went from place to place and provided support in most cases. I was the lead person in some litigation, but most of it I was kind of supporting people and counseling with them as to how to bring the litigation. So I guess the primary cases that have more or less stood the test of time have been litigation concerning Eniwetok, where an injunction was obtained to prevent or to stop high explosive testing that was going on in Eniwetok when a trip was taken back to begin to look into the possibilities of Eniwetokese going back to their island. Then after that, the Saipan Continental Hotel case was a major piece of litigation. Then the Micronesian Claims Commission program was another major on-going series of cases and struggles that consumed a great deal of my time. And I guess for your purposes, Howard, I was representing Carolinians at the time that the status negotiations were going on. They were very distressed about the direction in which matters were heading. I wrote a letter to Lloyd Meeds, the representative from the State of Washington.

Willens: Yes, we've interviewed him—Lloyd Meeds. He was active on the Committee during those years.

King, Ed: So I wrote him a rather lengthy letter questioning the ballot language on behalf of the Carolinians. The plan was to bring litigation challenging the ballot language because we felt it was quite skewed. Ultimately this led to an enormous internal struggle in MLSC,

and I came very close to being thrown out of the whole shebang and was not given the opportunity, the resources to move forward with litigation. So it just died at that point. But that was another piece.

King, Joan: Because of the Micronesians who were on the Board of the Legal Services.

Willens: We are aware, of course, that there was some concern about the language on the ballot. Could you explain to us with whom you dealt on behalf of the Carolinian community and what discussions developed within the Legal Services operation as to whether or not to bring a lawsuit?

King, Ed: There were a group of people, and they were identified in the letter that I sent. And as I say, I don't believe I have a copy of that letter anywhere. If I do, it would take me days to find it. But Felix Rabauliman was one of the leaders of the group with whom I was working, Abel Olopai, Joe Lifofoi, and some other people whose names I don't recall right now. But this was basically the leadership group of the Carolinians, and they were very concerned about the election.

Siemer: Do you remember who came to you?

King, Ed: Actually I think the way it worked was that Leno Olopai, who had been one of our named plaintiffs in the People of Saipan case, came to me and said that the Carolinian group wanted to meet with me. So then I met with that group of people.

Siemer: And how soon after the publications of the ballot language was that?

King, Ed: I would say it was fairly late in the day. We were moving up pretty close to the plebiscite.

Siemer: Had Erwin Canham already arrived in Saipan by that time?

King, Ed: No, I'm sure he had not. That was before then.

Siemer: Erwin Canham came in about April, and the plebiscite was that summer.

King, Ed: Of what year?

Siemer: 1975.

King, Ed: He came in April 1975. Well, maybe we had met him at that point. It's very hard; I mean, I haven't done any review in preparation for this, so it's a little difficult to say. It's possible that we had met him, but he came out one time without everybody being aware of exactly what role he was going to play, as I recall. Didn't he come out in two different roles?

Siemer: He was the Plebiscite Commissioner for the balloting on the Covenant, and then he remained as Resident Commissioner, and he also supervised the balloting on the Constitution and provided a sort of interim government before the first elected government. Earlier than that, though, the Micronesian Legal Services Corporation had declined to involve itself in litigation about the Covenant, hadn't it?

King, Ed: The program always tried to avoid Micronesian vs. Micronesian issues. So definitely the notion of our being involved in some way politically and leaning in any direction was anathema. So we probably had been approached a few times; I don't have any solid recollection of that, but undoubtedly we would have been. And we would have declined and never seriously considered taking on the case. The difficulty with the ballot language issue was that it seemed like a fairness issue, that it seemed skewed, and seemed actually to deprive Micronesians of their opportunity to choose. Our own sense too was that (and certainly the Carolinian sense) there was a lot of money being promised, a lot of pandering being done to some of the worst instincts of the Chamorro community, and

the Carolinians were being dragged right along with it, and they were defenseless. So what they were asking is the classic level playing field.

Willens: Do you recall whether they were opposed to the Covenant's definition of a commonwealth relationship with the United States?

King, Ed: No. Basically, "Are you for the commonwealth?" was roughly what was asked in the ballot.

King, Joan: It didn't give other choices.

King, Ed: And you say yes or no. And then the alternative was that I'm saying, "No, I'm not for the commonwealth, but I understand in making this determination I'm relegated for the rest of my life to live with all other Micronesians elsewhere and I'm going to be dealing with them and I'm going to be under that rubric, and that's the end of me." I mean, that's a little poetic license, but that was the concept. It was all being laid out like you've got this one thing where you can go with the United States and it's all really simple—it's commonwealth and you're okay, and the other alternative was you're doomed to hell and never more to be seen and you're going with the Micronesians and you're going to do what everybody says. And that's really the way the electioneering started running. I mean there were pictures—I remember pictures of Gerald Ford matched against Tosiwo Nakayama ...

King, Joan: In the White House.

King, Ed: And said, "Which would you prefer?" as though it was a rhetorical question, that everybody would clearly prefer Ford, and then showed a big traffic jam versus a thatched hut, and said, "Which would you prefer?" In the context, that was seen as self-answering rhetorical questioning.

Willens: Was it your feeling that the Carolinian leadership that came to you would have strongly preferred staying with the rest of Micronesia in some undefined status?

King, Joan: Absolutely.

Willens: And was it your opinion at the time that they were resistant to U.S. citizenship and affiliation with the United States as a commonwealth, or were they hopeful that they could achieve that status together with the other districts?

King, Ed: That wasn't entirely clear. I think they felt a strong sense of wanting to be bonded to the rest of Micronesia. And they had not worked out exactly where they were going to go. I don't think the issue was ever anti-Americanism versus Americanism. The issue was being overwhelmed by a much, much larger nation that was going to establish rules that are for its own benefit and think of these areas as an afterthought. I think those were the concerns that people had—the connection to the rest of Micronesia and the idea of just being overwhelmed, being glutted with resources and powers and values and media and everything that just would take things out of the control of people there.

Willens: Did the Board then decided not to authorize the lawsuit?

King, Ed: Really in many ways it came down to a big issue between Ted and me. It was more Ted's decision, but it did ultimately go to the Board. Herman R. Guerrero was the lead person on the Board, and Herman and Lucy, his wife, had been pretty good friends of Joan's and mine for years. It was off with my head as far as he was concerned. He had no difficulty in wanting me gone, and the leadership of the Chamorro community felt quite strongly about that. I had a lot of discussions with a lot of people. It is important to recognize that I did absolutely nothing to engender this. I didn't have any feeling about wanting to be

- involved at all. I was approached, and I was simply representing the clients, and I did have what I felt was really an important fairness issue on a critical decision involving the people of the Northern Marianas Islands. I really did feel strongly that the case should have been brought and it should have been pushed as hard as we could push it. But it wasn't at all my own personal agenda. Joan had a conversation with somebody that stuck in both of our minds in which a friend was saying, "Well, what do you think we should do?" And Joan was saying well, she's so glad that as an American she never had to make a decision that was so pivotal in everybody's life.
- King, Joan: Yes. "We only have to decide things like who we're going to marry and what college we're going to," I said. The idea that somebody would have to make a decision that would affect all the rest of the generations. That's just such a profound, overwhelming decision. But it was so interesting to talk to people, because so many people really didn't know what to do.
- Siemer: Had you written stories, or done research for stories, about this ballot question?
- King, Joan: Well, I'm sure I did. I mean I was only really doing hard news, and I don't remember.
- Siemer: Actually, from what we've looked at in PDN, there's very little about this.
- King, Joan: Yes. It's possible nothing would have been done about this, because this was kind of an internal thing that of course I knew about because Ed was with Legal Services.
- King, Ed: Well, certainly the struggle went on within MLSC. Actually, that was basically confined to Ted and me. Dan MacMeekin probably knew about it. Ted and I both had an enormous amount of respect for Dan, and Ted and I disagreed about quite a few things. And when we did, Dan would often get involved in serving as kind of a mediator about it.
- Willens: What was his position at the time?
- King, Ed: It wasn't entirely clear. He eventually replaced me. When I left, he became Deputy Director. But Dan was kind of our computer. I mean he had all these files, and Dan really has, even today, he has a lot of information from that time. He just was a bright involved person who was in the central office and played a significant role in everything.
- Siemer: One of the things that showed up in the documents that we obtained from the U.S. side is a letter to the Secretary of the Interior on behalf of the Carolinians outlining the arguments with respect to the fairness of the ballot, and it was signed by six or eight Carolinians, but it looked like it had been drafted by an American lawyer.
- King, Ed: That was me. That's the letter I am referring to actually, and I just was not remembering correctly. I was thinking of it as being important that it was going to Lloyd Meeds.
- Siemer: Well, copies of it went everywhere.
- King, Ed: Yes.
- Willens: It was the practice of the day to send copies of such communications to the U.N., to the Congress, and to the World Court on occasion.
- Siemer: Then what followed was a request for a response, and one of the subsequent documents that shows up on the U.S. side is a petition that was signed by close to 400 people, mostly Carolinians, that was subsequently forwarded to the Secretary of the Interior as temperatures seemed to begin to mount about this. Were you involved in sending the petition on?
- King, Ed: I don't remember. I don't think I was involved in sending it on, because I think by the time that petition came, probably it had been determined that we were not going forward

with the case. My own view always was that Ted was the Director of the program. Ted had never been somebody who had been seen as wanting for courage and the willingness to take on unpopular causes, and so while I disagreed with him, there was no fight about it. The theory wasn't that there was going to be some kind of rebellion and I was going to be working in any way going on and pressing on with it. I don't believe the Board was ever making a decision as whether we were going to represent the Carolinians. I think at that point, as far as I can recall, the decision had been made. I think what happened was that Herman R. Guerrero just simply brought up the idea that I should be gotten rid of. And I don't think he understood too much about what was really going on. I think that probably what happened (and this is kind of speculative memory) is that at the time that that original letter was sent out, I was saying to them that the number of people who are signing this letter isn't enough to really get anybody's attention and you probably ought to be getting a broader petition going if you want to follow up on this. Almost certainly they must have known that there was a real question as to whether we would go any farther than writing that letter. So I suspect all that came after. I don't have any recollection of having sent that petition on. If a lawyer was involved in sending it, I almost certainly would have been. But the reason the clients signed the letter in the first place was that we were having this difficulty about whether we were going to step forward and represent them, and we never did. I don't think our name ever did surface in connection with it, but that's what was happening.

Siemer: What was Oscar Rasa's role at that point?

King, Ed: Oscar, as far as I was concerned, never had anything to do with any of that. I never talked with Oscar about it that I recall.

King, Joan: Oscar had a paper of course then. I don't know what he was doing though.

King, Ed: Oscar was a classic loose cannon as far as I was concerned. He never had any clear view of what he was saying about anything, I don't think. And I certainly don't have any recollection that he was involved in any way with this group that I was working with.

Siemer: Shortly after that, about a month before the plebiscite, Canham finished getting voters registered, and he published a list. There were a number of immediate challenges to the qualifications of some of the people who had registered. Did you folks get involved in any of that?

King, Ed: A challenge to voter qualifications?

Siemer: That's right. There were residence requirements and citizenship requirements and age requirements, and there was a concern expressed in the Chamorro community that Micronesians would try to register. They were present in Saipan in sufficient numbers that if they successfully registered they could affect the outcome. So there seemed to be a good deal of focus on weeding out persons who might not be Saipan-, Rota- or Tinian-based Chamorros. Those challenges came very quickly and were very well organized.

King, Ed: Almost certainly we would have been involved in it, because this was a lower-profile fairness issue. I don't really have a good recollection. I probably wasn't directly involved in it in the way that I was in the ballot language issue. But almost certainly we would have been the only mechanism for anybody raising those kinds of issues. It probably came out of the Marianas office. You know, we had a lot of trouble representing Filipinos in those days, and people used to call us Filipino Legal Services. The whole concept was to try to develop structures, institutions, that were fair and responsive to what was going on and

allow people to work out their own destinies. So I have no doubt we were involved, but I can't give you anything specific.

- Siemer: Erwin Canham, who was the Plebiscite Commissioner, was quite a talented writer and had had a long career at the Christian Science Monitor. He wrote numerous dispatches back to the State Department, the Interior Department, and all other departments with which he was often at odds. He thought they were too slow, too uninformed, too insensitive and generally not able to deal with things, as is reflected in his various communiques. But one of the things he says he did was to interview personally all of the significant entities in the Northern Marianas to understand their positions. Do you recall him ever doing that with Micronesian Legal Services?
- King, Ed: No, but I don't know how formal he would have said that with me. I certainly talked to him a lot. Joan talked to him a lot. He almost certainly talked to Ted. There were many contexts in which he was available. He was around; he was a person that was part of the general dialogue at that point. So I would say that he did in fact do what he said he did, even though I don't have any specific recollection. I don't recall any kind of formal meeting, but of course that's not the way those things were working then, and they still don't work that way entirely.
- Siemer: Did you get any sense of how Canham related to the Carolinian community in that process?
- King, Ed: Canham definitely felt that this was a problem. Joan actually had more dealings with Canham. Joan always liked Canham a lot.
- King, Joan: Yes, I did. I thought he was a wonderful person—a person of integrity and intelligence.
- Willens: Did you ever have the occasion to discuss this fairness issue and the ballot wording with him?
- King, Joan: I don't really remember, though I must have felt that he had an understanding. I felt he was sympathetic I think. On the other hand, I guess he also made it clear (as everybody did who was representing the United States) that they were representing the United States.
- King, Ed: My own impression was that he felt this was a wonderful thing, that it was wonderful that the United States was willing to take on the Northern Marianas and it was just wonderful in every way. I don't think he was open very much to concerns that the Carolinian community had, although I don't have any specific recollection of talking with him about it. But I just think he felt that people wanted this to happen, and it should happen, and his job was to kind of help it happen and then to make sure that it in fact did work and filled out its promise.
- Siemer: Do you recall a lawyer showing up from the States to represent Canham in the various legal issues that were arising, starting with the ballot language?
- King, Ed: I don't, unless it would be Howard Willens.
- Siemer: Let me see if I can refresh your recollection a little bit. This is one of the instances in which Canham had a great deal of impatience, it appears from the written record, with the State Department. When the ballot language issue came up and when the letter came to the Secretary of the Interior, apparently Canham knew about it, and he issued an alert and said, "Where is my lawyer?" And the State Department said they'd think about it. So he wrote back and said, "I respectfully refer you to my request of two days ago for a lawyer. When is my lawyer arriving? This is fraught with lawyers, and where's mine?" And the

State Department said they were thinking about it, whereupon it appears that Erwin called a friend of his in Kansas City and said, "Get your butt on a plane out here, I need a lawyer." And this guy from Kansas City, whom nobody in the record ever seems to have known, arrived in the Marianas, stayed for a month, and Erwin professed his complete satisfaction with whatever services this person rendered, and then he went home.

King, Joan: That's interesting. It seems as if I do remember somebody from Kansas City being there.

Siemer: Apparently he was a pillar of the Kansas City legal community ...

King, Ed: Right.

Siemer: ... knew relatively little about any of the subject matters, but was a loyal Canham supporter and donated a month of his time. When the State Department told Canham that they were still busy getting him a lawyer, he said, "Oh he's here and everything's working out fine and don't bother." He seemed to be (and maybe you can tell us something about this) quite good at the bureaucracy despite not really being a bureaucrat himself. Did you have a chance to see him working within the bureaucracy at all?

King, Joan: Well, not really, but I'm sure I figured out that he was able to do that. Personally, I can't remember. Ed probably remembers better than I.

Siemer: Did you report on his activities in the journalistic sense?

King, Joan: You know that better than I. You looked at...

Siemer: Well there's some question as to whether what was written got printed.

King, Joan: Oh, okay. No, what I wrote certainly...

Siemer: Got printed.

King, Joan: Yes. But I really can't remember, because I was reporting also on everything else that was going on. I mean it wasn't just the status negotiations, so I'm sure there was a lot on status negotiations that I didn't report.

Siemer: Do you remember anything about the advisory committees that Canham used?

King, Joan: Well, when you say that, it rings a bell, but I don't remember specifically, no.

Willens: You covered the negotiations during the years 1973 onwards until the plebiscite...

King, Joan: Until the plebiscite, yes.

Willens: One of the big developments that featured the PDN was a headline at the beginning of the May 1973 session to the effect that the U.S. Navy seeks the entire island of Tinian for military bases.

King, Joan: I was not reporting in 1973, so that would not have been mine.

Willens: You were not reporting in 1973?

King, Joan: It was 1974 when I started.

Willens: This apparently was the result of a leaked document, and there was considerable consternation as to where it came from. Do you have any personal knowledge as to how the PDN got that story?

King, Joan: No.

Willens: As you got involved in covering the negotiations, what was your assessment of the

mechanism of the formal meetings and the joint communiqués? What was your assessment as a reporter of how the negotiations were being conducted?

King, Joan: Well, of course it was very difficult to get information. I couldn't go in the negotiations. It was a matter of getting whatever came out, whatever kind of bureaucratic memo was issued.

Willens: There were joint communiqués that were issued.

King, Joan: Yes, and I never felt that I was getting very much information. So I would have to go talk to people. Of course, I talked to you. I would go talk to Eddie Pangelinan. I talked to everybody. And I never felt that I was getting very much information that way either. I remember I just kept feeling this way the whole time I was involved in this whole process—it was a steamroller. I just felt the United States was like a giant steamroller. There was no way to stop this. One of the big issues was the education program, you know—whether there was ...

Siemer: The political education program?

King, Joan: Yes. The political education, right. I remember spending a lot of time talking to people about that. Of course, I knew everybody that was working for the Trust Territory. But I remember there was always this question as to what kind of political education it was. It wasn't adequate. It didn't really do what it was supposed to do. And I can't remember all the sides and who was saying what, I just remember that was definitely one of the issues.

Siemer: Was there the sense of a steamroller during the negotiations or after the Covenant was signed onward to the vote?

King, Joan: That whole process.

Siemer: The whole process—including the negotiations?

King, Joan: Well, mostly after the negotiations were over and in the period before the vote. Yes. Because the negotiations, as I said, I really didn't know at the time what was going on. Now later it seems clear to me that the United States wanted the Marianas, and the Marianas was kind of separated off from the rest of Micronesia, and all that happened. But at the time, it wasn't that clear. You're just kind of reacting to what's going on. But yes. During the process, the whole "education" process and all that—that's when my feeling was that it was just like a steamroller. I mean I just remember thinking this is incredible.

Willens: Did you have particular people on the U.S. delegation who were more accessible to you than others?

King, Joan: Oh, yes, I'm sure that if there were people I talked to.

Willens: Do you remember any of your sources on the U.S. side?

King, Joan: Well, nobody that was really involved in the negotiations, but there were certain people within the Trust Territory government that would talk to me, because they knew me from having covered other things. But I certainly don't ever feel that I had an idea of what was happening in the actual negotiations. Did you?

King, Ed: No.

King, Joan: I mean did you think I did? I don't think I did.

King, Ed: Well, no, I don't. I guess I wouldn't say that you ever focused on the details of the negotiations and really tried to ferret out what was going on. I think that's probably right.

- Willens: While you were on the island, but I guess before you started covering it for the PDN, three members of the Marianas Political Status Commission gave an interview to the *Marianas Variety*. The three were Dr. Palacios, Felix Rabauliman and Joeten. They gave the interview in about June of 1973, and they complained publicly that they didn't feel as well-prepared as the U.S. delegation—that they were being out manned and out prepared and that the negotiations were proceeding too rapidly. Did you ever have the occasion to talk about the status negotiations with any of those three?
- King, Joan: Well, I talked quite a bit with Dr. Palacios.
- Willens: What was your assessment of him?
- King, Joan: Oh, I really liked him. He cared so much what happened to the Marianas and of course to the Carolinians. I remember once saying something to the effect of, "Can't you do more?" and he just looked at me and said, "This is the United States that you're talking about. This is a huge country. What can I do?" I came away from that conversation just thinking, "Wow." Of course, as I said I was very active in the anti-war movement, and knew about what was happening in Vietnam. But just to have somebody say to me, "Well, what do you think we can do? We're just a few people. What do you think we can do against the United States?"
- Siemer: Did you do any reporting on Tinian and on the reaction of the people on Tinian to the military's proposals with respect to taking a portion of the island?
- King, Joan: Well, a little bit. I'm sure there were some stories there, because I went to Tinian one day and did some stories. But generally no. I mean generally it was the Marianas.
- King, Ed: Jose Cruz was from Tinian, right?
- King, Joan: Right.
- Willens: Do you have any recollections of dealing with Joe Cruz?
- King, Ed: He was very gung-ho. I remember Joan telling me about him.
- King, Joan: Yes, he remembers . . .
- King, Ed: Joe would get up and starting singing "God Bless America" and all this kind of stuff at the meetings. These were not meetings that I was ever at, but . . .
- King, Joan: But I was there.
- King, Ed: I heard about them, yes.
- King, Joan: I ask Ed, "Did I ever take this course?" Then he'll say, "Yes." Then I'll say, "Did I like it?" He's kind of my memory.
- Willens: You'd better keep him around.
- King, Joan: That's why we will always be together.
- Siemer: Do you recall any other sources that you had on Tinian aside from Joe Cruz?
- King, Joan: There was a woman, right?
- Siemer: Do you remember any of the Hofschneiders?
- King, Joan: Somebody that I used to talk to occasionally.
- Siemer: Florine Hofschneider?
- King, Joan: It was somebody that didn't feel the way that Joe Cruz did, right?

- King, Ed: There was a King family over there that seemed to me that you— It seemed to me there was a woman named King.
- King, Joan: Yes, I remember a woman, okay.
- King, Ed: Who was somebody that talked to you some.
- King, Joan: I think so too.
- King, Ed: That's quite a while ago.
- King, Joan: Talk about out of the past.
- Willens: Joan, did you have the sense as you watched the negotiations unfold that the Marianas Political Status Commission was not representative of the people?
- King, Joan: No, not necessarily. What most people were concerned about was the educational system. They wanted their children to do better than they did, and they figured that if they were part of (this was Haydn Williams) the American political family, they would better their lives and better the lives of their children. Of course, being in a position to see what has happened to the Marianas after all these years, you know we have a Micronesian son-in-law, it's very interesting. People certainly do have more money, and there's drugs and there's crime. All the things that go along with being part of the American political family certainly are in the Marianas. And when people said to me, "What would you do?" that's why I said, "I don't know." It would be very difficult to have to make that kind of decision. Of course, the people that lived in the rest of Micronesia didn't have it terribly well. I don't know. There are probably people in the rest of Micronesia, if they had been singled out, one of those islands had also been singled out by the United States, I'm sure the whole thing would have happened the same way wherever. It's just that the rest of the FSM, specifically, was left to be the FSM.
- King, Ed: Let me just jump back to another piece of the story. This relates both to what you're talking about and to what we were talking about a few moments ago about the ballot language issue and my dealings with the Carolinians. An incident that gives you an opportunity to check some of these dates that I'm trying to pull in, if you want to do so. It was practically on the eve of the plebiscite, as I recall. Ambassador Williams was there [in Saipan], and he wanted a meeting with the Carolinians. They called me and said that they wanted me to go with them to meet with him. And there was a fellow who came on the island in the last couple of weeks before the plebiscite whose presence there was never explained to me very fully—Ed Archer. Do you know Ed Archer?
- Willens: I met Ed Archer, from the State Department.
- King, Ed: So he was there during that time, and he (I would say in retrospect) made a point of befriending our family. And Ed Archer started calling me after the Carolinians had apparently gotten word to Ambassador Williams that they wanted me to go to the meeting, and had left a message that Ambassador Williams did not want me to go to the meeting. So there were a whole series of phone calls that were supposedly not relayed to me but were in fact relayed to me making clear that Ambassador Williams didn't want me to go to the meeting, which made me feel I really must go to the meeting. What was the date of the plebiscite?
- Siemer: June 17.
- King, Ed: It wasn't right before the plebiscite.
- King, Joan: It wasn't your birthday. Whose birthday was it?

- King, Ed: It wasn't my birthday. It was one of the kids' birthdays.
- King, Joan: Well, their birthdays are April 27, May 11...
- King, Ed: May 11 would be the closest.
- King, Joan: Yes.
- King, Ed: This was the night before one of ours, so it isn't going to help you I guess on determining exactly whether I would have been involved in that petition. But it was the night of one of our three daughters' birthdays, and somehow the meeting was to take place that night, and the idea was that I wasn't to go. Ed Archer wanted to talk to me before I did go, and I supposedly had not received that message. And what I wanted to do was go home, have birthday cake with our daughter and our family, and leave. And I walked in the door, and there was Ed Archer sitting in the room playing a guitar. He had tracked me down to the point of being in my house and being at the birthday party. I didn't say anything to him about this meeting.
- King, Joan: He had become a friend of the family. I mean he of course was always in talking to me. I knew him very well. I went out dancing one night with him. He brought his guitar, and the kids really liked him because he came and played the guitar. But it is interesting. Of course, later they were all saying he must have been CIA.
- King, Ed: Well, when I started to leave, he said, "Where are you going?" I was pointedly not discussing what I was doing or anything. I said I have to leave, and he said, "Where are you going?" I said, "Well I've got something to do," and he said, "Are you going to meet with the Ambassador?" I said, "Yes," and he said, "Well the Ambassador doesn't want you to come." At that point, Vicki, our oldest daughter, said, "Are you here just to tell Dad that?" and it was just one of those awkward and disturbing events. Now I did go, and it wasn't confrontational. I mean my style is not to be confrontational, at least unnecessarily confrontational. We had a meeting in which we discussed the facts, and the Ambassador basically was promising to the Carolinians the American Memorial Park. Now how that actually fit in with anything that had to do with the Carolinians' wishes, I cannot bring back effectively at all.
- Siemer: It was for the Carolinians?
- King, Ed: Yes, that's right. The idea was that it was to be something the Carolinians would have accessible, and it would be something that would be essentially seen as Carolinian property, something somehow special for them. But the idea was that it wasn't going to be developed, and there was something for them in that. Now of course as a lawyer I was saying well, what exactly are you asking from them and how do we know that you're actually going to do this, and he pooh-poohed all that like, "Well that's silly lawyer talk.
- Willens: Who had requested the meeting?
- King, Ed: He had.
- Willens: And his principal purpose was to explain that the Memorial Park was designed in large part to meet Carolinian needs . . .
- King, Ed: The needs, that's right. And to respond to the importance of Carolinians in the island. And he wanted, I think, just to sit down and tell them that and he didn't want anybody asking questions like I was asking, like well, "Are you going to sign a letter that says you're doing this, and what do you expect in return," and so on.
- Siemer: Where was the meeting?

- King, Ed: You know, that's very interesting. I've thought about where that meeting was. I cannot recall. I can recall seeing him, but I can't recall for sure where it was.
- Willens: They usually stayed in those days at the Saipan Continental.
- King, Ed: I could not tell you for sure where the meeting was. And I'm not sure you could even refresh my recollection as to where the meeting was. I think it probably was the Continental. My sense is I got in the car and I turned left when I was going there, so that would have been toward the Continental Hotel, and it wouldn't have been toward where more of the Carolinians would likely have lived.
- Willens: Do you remember which Carolinians were at the meeting?
- King, Ed: Well, I'm sure it was basically the bunch that I've already mentioned. Yes. This was the top of the line. This was the same group that we'd been dealing with. And of course they didn't know what to make of any of this. You know, I mean they went, "Oh, well, an American park, and—"
- Siemer: Had there been any discussion among the Carolinians about wanting a park or thinking that that park was theirs?
- King, Ed: That was to me, that was totally his initiative. I mean even in retrospect, it really had very little to do with Carolinians, and in some ways it was still an assertion of U.S. ability to determine what was going to happen. It wasn't really like saying to the Carolinians, "We will let you decide." It was just one of these . . . . It was a political/diplomatic kind of thing to do.
- Siemer: Was Canham there?
- King, Ed: No. Canham was not . . .
- King, Joan: It doesn't seem to me he got involved in that. . . .
- King, Ed: No. Canham was not. Well, I do believe his mind set was as I've described, Canham was never a person that was out there politicking for it. As far as I'm concerned, Canham was trying to do the same thing Micronesian Legal Services was trying to do—make sure that this was all . . .
- Siemer: It was done right.
- King, Joan: Yes.
- King, Ed: Maybe what Canham was doing was naive, and maybe what Micronesian Legal Services was doing was naive, but we all were looking at it the same way. We were just trying to do this thing, make sure it was done fairly, if it was going to go that way, have it done in such a way that you could sit down around the table years later and talk about it and say yes, it was our responsibility to do this and we did it the right way.
- King, Joan: And I'm sure Canham, I mean I presume Canham felt . . .
- King, Ed: That he did.
- King, Joan: That he did, yes. Because he did. Personally, I think he did.
- Siemer: How did people feel about it—the Chamorros and Carolinians—after it was all over? Did they have the same perception—that he did it fairly?
- King, Joan: Well, I presume, as far as he was concerned, yes.
- King, Ed: We weren't there at the end of the Resident Commissioner piece, so we don't really know about that.

- King, Joan: See, we left in 1976, the end of 1976.
- Siemer: No, I was just focusing on the plebiscite. Once the results were in and the plebiscite was over, were there complaints about the way things had been done?
- King, Joan: Well, there wouldn't have been complaints against Canham. But like I said, the whole Haydn Williams thing and the whole process had some critics.
- Siemer: Did you hear any of Canham's radio addresses?
- King, Joan: Yes, I'm sure. I don't remember right now.
- Siemer: How about his TV appearances?
- King, Joan: Well, we didn't have a television, so we didn't probably see him on television. But I'm sure I heard him. I mean I know I would have been aware of him, but I can't remember.
- King, Ed: That's all part of the composite view, I guess.
- King, Joan: Yes, but he wasn't advocating. I mean if he advocated he was very smooth in doing it.
- King, Ed: I think he was even-handed.
- King, Joan: Yes, he was even-handed. I certainly always felt he was even-handed.
- King, Ed: I do think he thought it was a foregone conclusion. It was going to work out. I do think he thought it all would work out and that any rational person would see that it was a good thing. But within that framework, he did not want to be aggressively pushing it or seen as doing that. And I don't recall these addresses much at all.
- King, Joan: Well, that's what you were saying basically.
- Willens: Was that your only personal encounter with Ambassador Williams?
- King, Ed: I believe it was. I don't believe I ever had any direct dealings with him aside from that.
- Willens: How about you, Joan? Did you have any personal dealings with him?
- King, Joan: Yes, I had quite a few.
- Willens: What's your assessment today of how those interviews went?
- King, Joan: Well, I just thought it was always very difficult to deal with him. Personally I certainly didn't like him, but I can't tell you any specifics. All I can really do now is tell you what I remember. I can't tell you why I remember it, just that I know. I just thought that he certainly was one of the more difficult people that I've ever dealt with.
- Siemer: Difficult in what sense?
- King, Joan: Well, difficult in not being cooperative, in being very arrogant, just you name it, he was difficult. Whatever the situation was, he was difficult.
- Willens: You mentioned earlier you did know people in the Trust Territory government and to some extent they were not involved actively in the status negotiations either with the Marianas or the rest of Micronesia. Do you have any recollection today of how the people in the TTPI government thought about these negotiations and the Marianas desire to go separately?
- King, Joan: Well, I think it depended on where they worked. But generally they stayed out of it.
- Siemer: Had you left Saipan by the time the Marianas Constitutional Convention happened?
- King, Joan: The Marianas? Yes. We were there for the 1975...

- Willens: Micronesian Constitutional Convention.
- King, Joan: Micronesian Constitutional Convention, yes.
- Willens: Let's talk a little bit about your experience subsequently. Could you just briefly tell me what jobs you had, Ed, after you left Saipan in 1976?
- King, Ed: Well, I went to Washington, D.C. I became the Directing Attorney of what was called the National Senior Citizens Law Center, which is still in the legal services framework. It's a support center that provides support on appellate matters generally for issues involving attorneys who have a case from anyplace throughout the United States legal services programs. So I was the Directing Attorney of the Washington, D.C. office from 1976 to 1980. And then I became the Executive Director of the program. And I don't know if I said—we had offices in D.C. and Los Angeles. So I was doing that and enjoying that, and then Petrus Tun from the FSM came (he was the Vice President of the FSM) and told me that the FSM had become self-governing, and he asked me to come and become the first Chief Justice of the FSM. Then I did that from 1981 to 1992 and also sat on the CNMI Supreme Court and the Republic of Palau Supreme Court on a part-time basis. I continued to do that up to the last couple of years. My connection with Micronesia from 1976 through 1981 was a dwindling one, but Micronesian Legal Services subleased some space from the National Senior Citizens Law Center which I was running, and so Ted Mitchell, for I would guess a year, year and a half, something like that, was spending most of his time in Washington, D.C. operating out of that office. Also I was asked to do some work from time to time for Micronesian Legal Services. So I had continued with that. People came through, of course, that Joan and I knew, and they would stay with us or come over for dinner or that kind of thing. So we continued to have connections. But we actually had finally gotten to the point of freeing ourselves of this Micronesian connection when Vice President Tun came in and asked us to do this other thing, which was really more than we had in mind.
- King, Joan: Tun came to visit us, and Ed said no, he certainly didn't want to leave. I mean we were there, our one daughter was in college, two daughters were . . .
- Willens: Were you in L.A. or Washington at the time?
- King, Joan: No, we were in Washington. Actually the headquarters of the office had been in Los Angeles, but we didn't want to move to Los Angeles. We had a very nice life in D.C. By this time I had become Assistant Director of Public Affairs for the Legal Services Corporation, interestingly enough, since I'd been covering their issues. I worked for Capital Publications, which was a public publications company that published weeklies and dailies on various things, and I was writing for Older American Reports also. So it was funny. We were both kind of involved for a while in senior citizens type things. But then I started working for Legal Services Corporation. When Vice President Tun asked Ed if he was interested, he said no. We had a very nice life in Washington. But this I guess must be the irony of our life. Ed, ever since he had left in 1976, was hoping to go back. He and Dan MacMeekin had set up a really ambitious training program for Micronesian legal counselors. It was like a law school education. Dan worked on all the materials, and Ed did the teaching, and that's what he was doing when we left in 1976. He was trying to get a grant from the Legal Services Corporation, and it took until 1980 to have this grant come through, and so he was asked to go back and do a training session in Saipan in 1980. I went back with him. We had not been back since 1976. I went through Ponape on the way, and as I was going through Ponape people said, "Oh, you're coming here because your husband is being considered for Chief Justice." And I said, "No, I'm just coming

through because I haven't been here for so long." And then we got to Saipan, and people were phoning him saying, you know, former Legal Services attorneys, you have to be the Chief Justice. We were there on Easter. We called our kids. Then we went back to D.C. While you were in Saipan, T. Nakayama called you, right?

King, Ed: Right.

King, Joan: He got a call from the President of the FSM saying, well, saying what?

King, Ed: Well, he just wanted to know if I was going to do it, and I said no, and then I said you ought to get somebody else, and he said we don't want to do that, why don't we give you more time. So ultimately, I then said okay.

King, Joan: Yes, he said okay because of me.

King, Ed: I didn't say it in that conversation; I said it about a month later.

King, Joan: I mean, I said you're the most qualified person in the whole world to be the Chief Justice of the Federated States of Micronesia. To think there's a country that would figure that out—you have to do that. So we did it.

King, Ed: But I don't think that's relevant here. They're doing the Northern Marianas thing.

King, Joan: Well, I know, but I can't help but get involved.

Willens: No, it is important, actually, to some of the issues that we're reflecting on. You mentioned when we were off the record that there was a perception by some of the other Micronesians that the deal that was offered the Marianas was there only for them and that the other districts would not have had the same opportunities if they had expressed interest in it. Is it your recollection today that there was any sentiment in the other districts for a commonwealth relationship with the United States?

King, Ed: No, I don't think so. The leadership of all of the other areas (I believe) wanted to be more autonomous than the Northern Marianas was choosing to be. But I think that what happened was that they all felt that the Northern Marianas was given a great deal. The Marianas had leverage that would have been very helpful to them, and they really . . . I think there was a real sense that the Northern Marianas was kind of bought off and peeled away from Micronesia.

King, Joan: Peeled off?

King, Ed: Well, bought off I think is more accurate than peeled off. Saipan always had so much better infrastructure than anyplace else in Micronesia did, and it was treated differently. It was just a whole different place to live.

King, Joan: Because it was the Trust Territory headquarters, of course. I mean, people understood that.

King, Ed: But the people of the Northern Marianas then would go to the other areas, and they'd say, "Look . . ." I mean it's kind of like one of these strange games . . .

King, Joan: Star Power.

King, Ed: You ever hear of Star Power? You start out, and people start out all these different situations, but then eventually start developing a sense that they are indeed superior because they've been given these advantages on a completely arbitrary basis. And in many ways, that's what happened in the Northern Marianas. At least I think that was a general perception—that the Northern Marianas had been upgraded in many ways; it had been selected as the area the Trust Territory was to focus on; it had received an infrastructure

that was well beyond anything that anybody else received; and then everybody [in the Marianas] decided we're superior to all those other people [in the rest of Micronesia] because they don't have all these things, and we must be a lot better than they are. And also the people of the Northern Marianas were a lot closer to people in the Trust Territory than anybody else in Micronesia was, and this too was because the majority of the people in the Trust Territory government lived there.

Willens: But many of them were Palauans, as I understand it.

King, Ed: Well, when we talk about Trust Territory, that's been an ambiguity that keeps floating around here. It is true that the majority of the Micronesians in the Trust Territory government were Palauans, I think. I've never done a complete study on that, but that's everybody's impression. But when I talk about the Trust Territory, I mean the Americans. And the Americans had their own views of all this and certainly fit more comfortably in the Saipan scene than they did anyplace else. And I think that was all a part of the reality that was hovering around all of this in some way. The real question is, was this done (and this is the thing that people that have lived in Micronesia used to talk about with great intensity; they've quit talking about it now because it's all getting, it's become even more complex subsequently), but the real issue used to be whether this was all done through some really marvelously clever approach the United States had taken or whether everybody had just kind of stumbled into this, and this is the way it was. But either way, it was all set up for the Northern Marianas people not to identify with everybody else and for the other people to ultimately feel betrayed by the people in the Northern Marianas, and that is the way it has played out. And of course it's very interesting, maybe it is just happenstance. It probably is, actually, as I look at it. There are also a lot of selfish motives on the part of Micronesians. But there are three areas that the United States has thought of as having strategical significance—the Northern Marianas, Palau, and the Marshalls. And those areas have all separated and they're on their own. The U.S. has a one-to-one relationship with each of those. And there's another cluster of islands that has never been thought of as being particularly important for strategic purposes, and that area just has its own deal and it's off by itself. So I don't know. I don't think it's easy to say. In some ways it may be pointless to go back and try to figure out how that all played itself out in that way, but that is part of the reality, and that's a perspective.

King, Joan: Well, it would be very interesting to see what Andon [Amarai] and T. Nakayama think about all that.

Willens: Well, we did interview Chief Justice Amaraich, but we didn't press him on this point. Many of the people we have interviewed have stressed the cultural and language differences among the districts and suggested that the imposition of an administrative structure on Micronesia was nothing that ever could have been sustained. What's your sense of that view?

King, Ed: Real strong I don't know. My tendency is to think it could have been done if there had been the will. It would have had to have been established very intelligently. The FSM is the greatest test of it, and the FSM as far as I'm concerned is not working well at all. It has some profound structural problems, and you could say it's those problems rather than the cultural differences of the people that predominate.

King, Joan: You say structural when constitutional . . .

King, Ed: Right, right. For example, in the FSM in particular the Congress there has disproportionate power. There's not a good balance of powers. The Congress names the President and the

President doesn't run on a national basis. There is no individual that runs on a national basis in the FSM, and so that just undoes the concept of national unity.

Willens: So they feel it necessary to delegate to the States of the Federated States all the effective executive power—is that what you're saying?

King, Ed: No. The executive power rests in the hands of the national government. But the way you become president there is that you run in your own State, and then you become a member of Congress, and then Congress in its first session in the new Congress decides who's going to be the president. Then the next time if you want to get re-elected, you go back to the Congress again and you ask them to re-elect you. Well, how can you be a balance to their positions if you're beholden to them? You can't. And how can you be a balance to their positions if you have no national constituency at all? That you've got three States that you've never run in that you can't show that you've got any support in? It's just unworkable. And some of the people that run for president in the FSM or that want to be president, the way that they get themselves elected to the Congress is to say that we're going to attack the other three States, and they want then to get into this position in the Congress that will allow them to be president, on the basis of their clout and their manipulations within the Congress.

King, Joan: Well, nobody runs against incumbents. I mean those are not democratic societies.

King, Ed: There's no national media there.

King, Joan: It doesn't work. I mean you can't just impose democracy where there has never been any democracy. The Congress people (of course, they're all men) have all kinds of power. They're like gods, and nobody ever even runs against them. It's just not done. You don't run against chiefs. It makes no sense.

King, Ed: The bottom line is that I don't think we have had a good test for whether that would have worked out, and it may not have worked out. But I don't see how it's going to work very well to split up all these islands. I mean if you really start going on cultural differences...

King, Joan: Well, Yap, those outer-islanders . . .

King, Ed: In Yap, for example, every island would have to be taken as a separate state. The Yapese, the people in the State of Yap, who have done a fairly decent job of relating to each other and working for a long period of time, don't even speak the same languages, and they certainly don't have the same customs. Yet they've figured out ways to work together in a system. So I don't think cultural difference is a key thing. I think how you develop institutions to make people work together is the most important factor. Really the same theme I was talking about back in the Marianas in the ballot issue. I think institutions are everything. I've had tremendous acrimonious battles with people in the Trust Territory High Court as the Chief Justice of the FSM, which I think never would have occurred except for the structures, the institutions, and the situations we were placed in. I didn't have any dislike for those people at all. It was just that we were put in a situation where the Trust Territory High Court was trying to retain as much jurisdiction as it could, and my strong view was the FSM Supreme Court had to exercise jurisdiction and had to push out any outside force. And so there we were. And people were always saying well, you know, there are these personal struggles between King and Munson at one point and King and Burnett before that and King and Gianatti at one stage. These were not personal at all. I didn't know those people well, and what I did know of them, I could see how each one of them had a likable streak there. So I think institutions determine these matters. I don't believe Rwanda and Burundi are founded on the basis of histories of dislike. I think what you're going to find

in Rwanda and Burundi is that you've got national leaders who are pandering to the worst instincts of the people, and they've been able to get the people to respond, to find within themselves the evil that was already there, that was latent. And the same thing, as far as I'm concerned, in Bosnia and Croatia. I mean that's just my view of the way life works. And I think people can work together across ethnic and language lines if there is a wish to do it. But it's not easy. I know that. I mean blacks and whites in America have never solved that problem. But we do keep it in some kind of balance. We do function. We have been able to keep a country going for a long period of time with a lot of ethnic differences, and we're bringing in even more ethnic differences because we think we can do that, and we can. And that's the way institutions and societies have to work. So I don't give much credence to the notion that the ethnic differences made it somehow essential. I mean you have the problem in Rota that you alluded to earlier—Rota and Tinian and Saipan.

Siemer: How about economics though? If the economics of the former Trust Territory were a zero sum game, so that any gains by the other islands came at the expense of the Marshalls, Palau, the Marianas, as an economist probably would say it is, is a fair system able to overcome that?

King, Ed: Maybe not. You're going to need to be more specific about how you would lay that out. Who's going to benefit and who's going to lose.

Siemer: Let us assume that the Marianas has an economy such that taxes imposed equally across the Trust Territory would always cause a significant outflow from the Marianas to the more populous Truk or Ponape. If there's always going to be an outflow, can fair political organization overcome that problem?

King, Ed: Well, to me, some of that is the U.S. role as a former trustee. I'm not sure that it could be undone or overcome, and one of the big problems I know in the Marshalls was the Marshallese didn't want to let go of any of the revenue they were receiving from Kwajalein. And it's hard to believe if the Palauans had had a super port that they would have ever been willing to let go of their additional revenue. It would have been a problem. And Truk itself is a major problem today within the FSM. So those are real problems. I tend to look at these things, always really as a United States citizen, and the role I would have liked for the United States to play would be the benevolent parent who was trying to help make this thing work and is saying, "Look, you may not like this, but this is better than the alternative, and we're going to work with you this way, and if you can't make this work out, then what's going to happen?" But the U.S. chose not to do that. It chose to respond to its own needs. And you know, maybe it's a level of sophistication that I'll never get to in my life that says these things don't work, you may wish they'd work, but they really won't.

King, Joan: If you look at the entire former Trust Territory and look at the fisheries, you know, the 200-mile archipelagic economic zone, it has potential. If you look at the entire former Trust Territory as an economic cell, there were certainly people that felt that made a lot of sense—fisheries certainly has potential. If you're looking at a 200-mile zone [around all of Micronesia], that would be apparently one of the biggest fishery zones in the world. I mean there's land, but Micronesia had those little islands with 200 miles around the entire periphery of the entire Trust Territory. And that would have been a huge fishery zone. To have control of both your own fisheries and other ships coming in, see, that's where the FSM is trying to make that work. But it's difficult. The FSM doesn't have those kinds of resources, and of course it's not as large as it would have been, to be able to license fishing vessels. Even if you weren't going to do your own fisheries, which is a very difficult thing to have your own ships and your own people working—it just requires more resources

really, more expertise than the FSM has, but to be able to license other countries' ships to come in and fish, in that very, very bountiful area would have been good. That's one of the things that the people who were working on the Law of the Sea stuff always emphasized. Did you interview them?

Willens: No.

King, Joan: Okay. See, Fred Ramp is somebody of course. He was a staff attorney during those years of the negotiations. He was the first attorney general in the FSM, and he's very involved with Law of the Sea. I know he was very close to T. Nakayama, to Andon [Amarai], and I'm sure that would be how they would have envisioned a potential economic resource.

Siemer: Let me ask you about another factor. We'd talked about the institutions and cultural and language differences, and we talked about economics. Another factor is if one group of people perceives an advantage in U.S. citizenship, and another group of people perceives advantage in a nationality—Micronesian nationality or Palauan nationality—is there a way to bridge that?

King, Joan: Well, the reality was that the people in the Marianas were persuaded that if it made sense to be part of the American political family, they would all be U.S. citizens. But obviously, people in the rest of Micronesia didn't feel that being U.S. citizens was more important than being Micronesians.

Siemer: But Ed's theory is that there are creative ways to bridge this.

King, Ed: Right.

Siemer: But if you have a perception, whether induced by the U.S. or induced by other Chamorros, that U.S. citizenship has enormous value, as you and I think it does, you are not going to become a Rwandan.

King, Joan: No, no.

Siemer: Well, if a Chamorro thinks that, is there a way to bridge that with someone like Andon Amaraich or T. Nakayama who believe that Micronesian nationality is an important value?

King, Ed: Well, I can't give you the bridge itself.

King, Joan: I mean not the way it was done.

King, Ed: But I think process is important in a situation like that—that you get the people to wrestle with it, and then the United States itself commits itself to solving that problem. The notion of free association is essentially a new concept, and it does not provide U.S. citizenship to people of Palau or the Marshalls or the FSM, but on the other hand it gives them something a little closer than non-citizenship and maybe something even more could have been done if the U.S. put more oomph behind that. In some ways, this is all wasted verbiage. I mean I don't think there's any point, and I doubt that anybody else thinks there's any point about standing up and complaining too much about the way it all played out, because who knows how it should have played out, and a lot of people were hurt on the issues. But I think that the problem could have been solved. I don't think that was an irreconcilable . . . I don't think there were any problems that would have prevented the whole area from working together. Now let me just hasten to say that as I look at the FSM, I don't know if it's going to work out. I just think it's really not doing well. On the other hand, it doesn't have the kind of support and attention from the United States that it probably would have been helpful for it to have had through these years. And in some ways that's a byproduct of what transpired in the Northern Marianas. I'm trying to lay

out for you that perspective really. Deanne is asking, “How do you . . . .” She’s asking me to see if I can build something that would say how it could have worked in an alternative way. It’s not as though it’s my whole focus.

Willens: No, no, we’re putting to you questions that we’ve been thinking about for some time, and there are no certain answers to be sure. In fact, we have discussed among ourselves that if there had been maybe more imagination on the part of the U.S. policy makers and a little bit more willingness to give and share on the Micronesian side whether things might have worked out differently. We want to thank you both very much for your time and your helpful recollections and insights. We’ve enjoyed the interview very much.