

INTERVIEW OF HARRISON LOESCH

by Howard P. Willens

November 8, 1994

- Willens: Mr. Loesch, thank you very much for agreeing to be interviewed in connection with my Northern Marianas project. While we were off the record, I explained the background of the project and you were beginning to tell me how you first got involved at the Department of the Interior when you were appointed an assistant secretary. Could you tell me how that came about?
- Loesch: Sure. The way it was then (I don't know where it stands now)—in a new administration, the President, of course, picks his Cabinet and the higher elements in the sub-Cabinet. But then the senators get involved and sort of take turns getting assistant secretaries and REA administrators and that level. I think they used to call us Level 4, whatever that is. And my sponsor was Senator Allott, who had already shot his wad by getting the REA administrator appointed.
- Willens: Was that a position within the Interior Department?
- Loesch: No. That was Rural Electrification Administration.
- Willens: That was over at Agriculture or someplace.
- Loesch: It was sort of a separate administration of some kind.
- Willens: I see.
- Loesch: Anyway, when he had finished, the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Public Land Management position was under the aegis of a California senator (I forget which one). He proposed a very able lawyer from Los Angeles named Owen Phillips, I believe. Phillips was about to be appointed when the big oil spill happened out there, just five days after the inauguration. Phillips was a member of the firm that represented the company that had the oil spill (can't remember which oil company that was). So he got shot down and the floor came around to Senator Allott again. And he knew me. In fact, he had gone to school with my first wife. He knew I'd been practicing law for thirty years out here and so on. And he sort of thought maybe I'd be alright—I was from Colorado. The system was that the Secretary had his choice but only from two or three that the Senator proposed. And Allott gave Hickel a choice between me and a young lawyer from Denver named Jack Kelly. Hickel was a Catholic. He had eight children of his own and Jack Kelly was a Catholic with three young kids. I had no children—my son was grown and moved away. Hickel interviewed both of us and (what I heard from Jack) was that Hickel said: "Hey, this is a seven in the morning to nine at night, seven day a week job. You've got kids. It's not fair to your family." And, apparently on that basis alone, he picked me.
- Willens: I see.
- Loesch: But I was late coming aboard.
- Willens: Had you had any prior acquaintance with Secretary Hickel?
- Loesch: No. I never saw him until he interviewed me. I really just knew he was the Secretary, of course, by then, but I had no prior acquaintance with him at all.
- Willens: Had you been active in Republican Party politics in Colorado?

- Loesch: Just locally, in the town. I was the finance chairman at one time.
- Willens: So your acquaintance with Senator Allott was basically on a personal basis because he knew your first wife.
- Loesch: Yes, right. I was no wheeler in politics in Colorado at all. The only office that I ever had in the Republican Party was finance chairman for Montrose County here.
- Willens: When you became acquainted with the responsibilities of the new position at Interior, was the Trust Territory only one of several subject matters that you had to deal with?
- Loesch: Oh, yes. As a matter of fact, it started out as a minor one. I had under my wing the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Office of Territories, and the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, which was later folded into the Park Service. And, of course, with my Western living and upbringing and all, I was best acquainted with the Bureau of Land Management. I had had several to-dos with that Bureau and also with the Park Service from a legal standpoint.
- Willens: So you had some experience and views with respect to those aspects of your new responsibilities.
- Loesch: I didn't have any views and no experience at all with either the Territories or the Indians, the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
- Willens: You've heard the anecdote many times, I'm sure, about people being queried about Micronesians and responding, "Mike who?" How did you become familiar with Micronesia and the issues that were before the Executive Branch with respect to the Trust Territory.
- Loesch: Well, a young fellow walked into my office one day looking for a job, Tom Whittington. I was just then becoming acquainted with what we were supposed to do. He had been in the Peace Corps and had served in Micronesia for two years. In fact, I think he was the legislative counsel for the Marianas . . .
- Willens: District Legislature?
- Loesch: District Legislature, yes. And I needed him. I gave him a job right then and there.
- Willens: That was fortuitous.
- Loesch: Right. And he briefed me a lot. I had no idea—I really was totally ignorant of Micronesia. I knew about Guam a little bit, one of my brothers was stationed down in Guam for a time in World War II. But that's the only acquaintance I had with anything out there.
- Willens: When you assumed your position in early April 1969, had Ruth van Cleve already left her position as Director of the Office of Territories?
- Loesch: Yes, she had.
- Willens: Had she been replaced by then by Mrs. Farrington?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: Did you have any role in the selection of Mrs. Farrington?
- Loesch: No.
- Willens: There was another career person in that office named George Milner. Had he left by the time you came on board?
- Loesch: No. He was still there.

- Willens: Did you find that the Office of Territories staff was available to you to brief you usefully about what had gone on?
- Loesch: Yes. They briefed me.
- Willens: But you looked primarily to Whittington, I gather, to provide you with staff assistance?
- Loesch: Yes. I can't remember what title he had on my staff. I had a staff of about nine or ten, plus secretaries. But his role was to be my guy on Micronesia. And he did a good job on that.
- Willens: Do you happen to know where he is now?
- Loesch: Yes. I talked to him on the phone after I got your request. After I was fired, he was assigned to some activity with Alaska and native claims. And he was stationed in Seattle for a few years. But then he quit and just opened a practice or joined a small firm.
- Willens: Well, some of your predecessors had relied very heavily on the Office of Territories for staff assistance in connection with Micronesia. Without belaboring the point, did Mrs. Farrington play any significant role in the formulation of policy?
- Loesch: I don't think so.
- Willens: Was that by your choice or her choice?
- Loesch: Well, frankly, I never thought Mrs. Farrington was competent.
- Willens: Alright. That's a view that's been expressed to me before. But I did know from the materials that there were a few occasions on which her office through her expressed a view and I'll raise that as we come to it because, for the most part, they were views that you did not embrace. Were there other people within the Interior Department involved, other than Tom Whittington? Mr. Radewagen? Did he come to play a role in this area?
- Loesch: Yes. He played a certain amount of role. What was his first name?
- Willens: I forget.
- Loesch: I forget too. He thought that he should have Tom's job.
- Willens: Was he in the Office of Territories or was he at the assistant secretary level or the deputy level?
- Loesch: No. He was in the Office of Territories.
- Willens: I see.
- Loesch: But he came aboard just about the same time that I did. Oh, I guess he'd been there a couple of months. But he was new in Interior. He had played some role in the campaign—as an advance man or something for the President—and got a job as a result of that activity.
- Willens: I interviewed both Ruth van Cleve, whom I've known for many years, and George Milner. It was interesting that as soon as the election returns were in, they started looking for positions at the Federal Power Commission as some place that might not be as politically sensitive as the Office of Territories. Ruth, as you know, came back on more than one subsequent occasion.
- Loesch: She just retired last year, didn't she?
- Willens: Exactly right. She told me she had served in the Interior Department in five decades, going back to the early 1950s. Well then, beginning to focus on April 1969, you can see from the materials that at the beginning of the Nixon Administration there was growing concern both in State and Interior that there was need for some more definitive Executive

Branch initiative with respect to the Trust Territory. What is your recollection about the factors that precipitated that new concern? I mean, for example, there were reports of the Micronesian Future Status Commission going to issue its final report shortly; and its members were quite outspoken that they were going to be espousing something called free association or independence. Was that a relevant concern?

Loesch: Yes, it was. I believe it was a White House concern which was the reason for Secretary Hickel's early trip out there. I forget what dates he was out there, but it was

Willens: It was right about the first week of May and I'm interested that you came in as early as April 1 because the decision to

Loesch: Fred Radewagen. That is his first name.

Willens: The NSC Under Secretaries Committee had been deliberating about this before you arrived on duty.

Loesch: That's right.

Willens: They seemed to have formulated a view along two separate lines. One, they thought that a special assistant ought to be designated by the White House to deal with this Micronesian problem. And two, they wanted to prepare some kind of a policy paper that set forth what the options were so that the President or his National Security Advisor could decide what to do. Do you recall hearing of the recommendation that a special assistant be appointed by the White House to deal with the Micronesian problem as early as the spring of 1969?

Loesch: No. I don't recall that at all.

Willens: Do you remember seeing any papers or being briefed as to what the purposes were of Secretary Hickel's trip?

Loesch: No. As a matter of fact, it wasn't until after he got back from this trip that I had any real function, as far as I remember.

Willens: Well, that's interesting. And certainly that's supported by the documents, because I don't see your name on any of the documents until in fact the summer of 1969. What interests me then is who was helping to shape Secretary Hickel's views about this new U.S. plan to announce publicly that the United States desires some kind of a permanent relationship with Micronesia. Did he formulate this view himself or who were his advisors, if you recall?

Loesch: I don't recall. I believe he did ask the Office of Territories for a briefing paper. But, to my recollection, Secretary Hickel didn't trust the Office of Territories at all. He, of course, had been Governor of Alaska and there was a big to-do about the native claims up there. I don't know, I really can't get into his mind on that, but certainly I didn't advise him before his trip. And I never really zeroed in on my responsibilities in connection with the Office of Territories until after he returned. In fact, as I recall, he called me up to his office and said: "Hey, Loesch, you got a job to do here."

Willens: Let me ask a few questions about Secretary Hickel. Did he personally take an interest in this set of problems associated with Micronesia or did he largely delegate it to you and your assistants to formulate and implement policy?

Loesch: He largely delegated it. I don't think Secretary Hickel was much interested in Micronesia. I know he was sent by the President on his trip. I don't know—I have nothing to back that

- up—but I'm pretty sure he wouldn't have done it if he hadn't been told to by the White House.
- Willens: No, that seems clearly supported by the documents, though there were times, as you can see from the documents, when the other agencies within their own deliberations asked whether you were in fact speaking for Secretary Hickel. Did you have a practice of briefing him from time to time and making sure that within general parameters what you wanted to do was consistent with his objectives?
- Loesch: Yes, yes.
- Willens: You never thought that you were sort of out there in left field without secretarial support?
- Loesch: Oh, no. No, he supported me very thoroughly all the way. In fact, I believe that on my behalf he opposed (informally because I didn't see anything in the documents about it) the appointment of any special advisors because he thought I was doing a good job.
- Willens: I was going to ask you about that because, certainly, he was very strongly on the record before you came in opposition to the appointment of a special assistant under White House auspices. It will not surprise you to know that had been the consistent Interior Department view for the preceding eight years. The State Department kept pushing for some White House assistance and Interior with the support on the Hill resisted it. Just going back to the Hill for a minute, was Congressman Aspinall someone that you had any acquaintance with before you went to the Interior Department?
- Loesch: I've known him since he first got to Congress.
- Willens: Is that right? How did that come about?
- Loesch: Well, his first term, his campaign was coordinated by Dan Hughes, who was a local Montrose lawyer and afterwards a District judge, and had been my boss when I was first out of law school.
- Willens: Your first boss in a law firm?
- Loesch: Yes. When I got out of school in '39, I came straight back to Montrose and went to work for a local firm, which was not too happy an experience. I just about had enough when the war came along. I got out of that job by going in the service.
- Willens: An honorable way to leave.
- Loesch: Yes. And Dan Hughes and Wayne Aspinall were very close friends.
- Willens: Don't you think that Congressman Aspinall might have had something to do with your appointment?
- Loesch: No. I'm sure he was kind of surprised.
- Willens: You mentioned that Congressman Aspinall was surprised, you recall, when he learned that you became the assistant secretary. Do you have any recollection of a first meeting with him in your new capacity?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: When was it?
- Loesch: Well, it was before I was confirmed. When I first went back there to be interviewed, I went on the Hill and one of Senator Allott's staff took me around and introduced me to other

senators and so forth. But on my own I went to see Wayne Aspinall and told him what was up. That's how I know he was surprised.

Willens: Did he tell you of his very strongly-held views with respect to this Micronesian status issue?

Loesch: Not then, he certainly did afterwards.

Willens: On more than one occasion, I expect.

Loesch: Oh, yes. The Chairman was funny. Of course, I had a great deal to do with him on account of BLM and other stuff besides the Office of Territories and Micronesia. I would sometimes call him and ask him for an interview, a meeting, and he would say: "Well, Harrison, yes, I can do it Tuesday morning at 9:37," and woe if you weren't there at 9:37. He never gave you a 10:30 or 9:30, always was an off-minute deal. But right after Secretary Hickel's trip to Micronesia, Wayne called me up and asked me to come over. I did, of course, and he at that time told me what he wanted done out there, and of course he felt very strongly that State was "too loose" and Defense was "too tight" on Micronesia.

Willens: I think I know what he meant when he described State as being "too loose," but I'm not sure I understand what he meant by saying Defense was "too tight."

Loesch: Well, I may be missing his thoughts some, but I think he felt that, while it was absolutely necessary that we keep our presence in Micronesia, maybe Defense was a little too demanding or perhaps not sufficiently aware of the monetary needs of Micronesia. But again I'm making my own interpretation.

Willens: Certainly the documents suggested Congressman Aspinall in the previous Administration had several points that he reiterated. First, he said the Executive Branch had never been able to get its act together. That State, Defense and Interior had never gotten their act together and, when they got their act together, he'd be prepared to respond to it.

Loesch: Yes, that's what he says in this document.

Willens: You've seen that in some of the documents that relate to your tenure as well.

Loesch: Yes.

Willens: You think he really believed that or was he using that as an excuse for not really exercising much initiative in bringing about change, because in fact he liked the status quo?

Loesch: I hadn't thought about it that way before, but I think you're right. He probably was using it as an excuse. Of course, with the Nixon Administration he was on the other side of the fence politically, so I don't think he was crazy about helping the White House. He did like the status quo in Micronesia. That was apparent all through my time.

Willens: There certainly were other members on the Committee who were very irate on the subject, as some of the documents reflect, claiming that United States should just basically annex Micronesia and let the United Nations concerns be totally dismissed. My sense is that Congressman Aspinall did not share that view.

Loesch: No, I don't think he did. I know that he felt that it was so far away that as far as having a similar status to Puerto Rico, for instance, it wouldn't work. I don't think he went that far.

Willens: In the last years of the Johnson Administration, Congressman Aspinall was a central figure in preventing a proposal for a presidential commission to be created by legislation to deal

with this problem. Some of the documents and some of my interviews confirm that he said he wanted to leave the new administration with a free hand. Did the subject of a presidential commission ever come up in your discussions with him?

Loesch: No. I don't recall ever discussing that with him.

Willens: Also in hearings on the subject of a proposed presidential commission he often said that his Committee had the necessary expertise and there was no need for a presidential commission. Does that strike your recollection of something you heard?

Loesch: Well, Wayne was proud of his Committee and he did feel that among the members there was plenty of expertise to deal with this problem. But, you see, by the time I came on the scene, at least to my knowledge, the idea of a presidential commission was pretty well dead.

Willens: I think that's right.

Loesch: And so it wasn't an issue. I never remember Wayne saying a word to me about it.

Willens: What is your overall assessment of Congressman Aspinall's ability? And particularly his set of attitudes with respect to Micronesia?

Loesch: Well, I'm a biased witness on that. I admired Aspinall very much and he was a terrifically hard worker. Anything he got interested in or took up, he went whole hog on research. I know that he felt that Congressman Saylor was too—how shall I say? Saylor was more one of those who wanted to just annex Micronesia and let the U.N. fuss, and Wayne didn't want that at all.

Willens: Your complimentary comments, I think, have been shared by lots of people who may have disagreed with some of his policies, but respected the man as a Congressman who worked hard and had integrity. I get the sense from the documents that he was of the view that matters with respect to Micronesia ought to proceed in the same gradual step-by-step process that was being done with respect to Guam and the Virgin Islands. And there was no need for the Executive Branch or Congress to do anything on a more expedited or different basis.

Loesch: Yes, I think you're right.

Willens: Is that a fair judgment? I don't want to put words in your mouth.

Loesch: Yes. That's a fair judgment, yes, it is.

Willens: Let's go back then to the Hickel trip. First, let me ask you how did Secretary Hickel think that it went when he went out there to Micronesia and made what was viewed as the first public pronouncement of U.S. intentions with respect to Micronesia? There's some suggestion in the documents written by the Interior Department that the response out there was favorable, and that the trip was successful.

Loesch: He thought so.

Willens: Did he think so?

Loesch: Yes. He thought so.

Willens: Did he think people were appreciative of his coming forth with that kind of a statement?

Loesch: He thought his reception was very good and that the trip was successful. He was always in every way an optimist and he felt that as a result of his trip there would be little problem in a fairly quick resolution of the issues. Of course, for instance, Tom Whittington, who knew a lot more than I did about Micronesia, was quite contemptuous of that view. He

said that many of the Micronesians do not like confrontation, they're likely to be polite, and possibly give the impression that they agreed when they don't agree. He thought that Hickel was way too optimistic both about the future of Micronesia vis-à-vis the U.S., and about his own performance on the trip.

Willens: Did Edgar Kaiser go along with Hickel on that trip? Was he on board yet, do you remember?

Loesch: Yes, he was on board and, now that you mention Edgar Kaiser, there was one who did brief Hickel about Micronesia. Yes, I'd forgotten all about Edgar Kaiser.

Willens: His name figures during the 1969 period and then he disappears.

Loesch: Yes, well he was a White House fellow.

Willens: Is that how he came over to the Department?

Loesch: He was assigned to the Department as a White House fellow. Of course Edgar was a rough young man. He afterwards owned the Denver football team, you know, the Denver Broncos.

Willens: Let me ask you this, what kind of influence do you think Edgar Kaiser had on Secretary Hickel's views or the Department's policies.

Loesch: I think he had quite a bit of influence on Hickel's attitude, yes.

Willens: Did Mr. Kaiser bring to it any particular bias or point of view?

Loesch: Not that I know of. I didn't have a whole lot to do with him. He wasn't there very long. I can't remember when he left the Department, but it was certainly during the year 1969.

Willens: I think that's right, because the last reference I see to him involves the organic act and his role in delivering that to the Micronesians later in 1969. Some of the documents purporting to reflect Micronesian views state that the Micronesian leadership felt that Secretary's Hickel pronouncement was a unilateral action by the United States and to some extent they were offended by that. Was that a point of view that was ever expressed to you personally?

Loesch: Yes.

Willens: Do you recall by whom and under what circumstances?

Loesch: On my first trip to Micronesia . . .

Willens: When would that have been?

Loesch: I can't quite remember.

Willens: I know you went out in early 1970 with the so-called political status act. . .

Loesch: I had two New Years Eves on that trip. . .

Willens: Was that your first trip, though? There may have been an earlier trip, but I don't have a note of it here.

Loesch: I think that was my first trip.

Willens: That was then after the first round of negotiations.

Loesch: Yes.

Willens: Well, let's come to it in due course. But you do remember having some Micronesian views expressed to you about Secretary Hickel's trip.

- Loesch: Yes, I do. The first one was from Amata Kabua. I'm not sure. On the way I stopped first at the Marshalls. I met with Kabua and others, Ekpap Silk for one. I got the impression right there that Kabua hadn't liked the result, or hadn't liked the attitude that apparently was expressed by Hickel on his trip. Later, I don't remember when, but later I got the same sort of feeling from Lazarus Salii.
- Willens: At the same time that Secretary Hickel announced this generalized statement of American or U.S. objectives, he also announced that the Department of the Interior was prepared to undertake an action program for Micronesia. I've shared with you a few documents that relate to the action program for Micronesia under tabs 8 and 9 of the volume that I provided you. Sometimes in the emphasis on status, I forget that there were also a wide range of practical, political, economic developmental problems going on the Trust Territory and that these were of major concern to the Interior Department as well as the Micronesians.
- Loesch: I was in negotiations with Defense. Defense pursued this action deal. Defense assigned people in construction teams. . .
- Willens: Those are the civic action teams, or Seabee, efforts. Did you have any role in putting together this action program and the identification of specific areas in which the Trust Territory government and Interior should move forward?
- Loesch: No, I didn't have anything to do with that until after it was announced.
- Willens: Do you know where it came from?
- Loesch: No. I have no idea.
- Willens: Did you have any opportunity in your first several months on duty to form any views about what the developmental and other needs of Micronesia were? Did you come to form any views about what the priorities were out there?
- Loesch: Oh, yes. Oh yes.
- Willens: What was your sense as to what ought to be done?
- Loesch: Well, my sense, I was thoroughly in favor of the action program. At the same time, I was a main witness before the CAB when Continental and Pan Am were hassling about air service. And I also dealt with Defense, I can't remember who. I dealt with some assistant secretary over there about construction teams for airports.
- Willens: Did you generally want to get the Defense Department actively involved on construction projects?
- Loesch: Yes, I sure did, because we didn't have the capability in Interior, and Defense did.
- Willens: Was Defense generally cooperative in that effort?
- Loesch: Yes, they were.
- Willens: Were those Defense civil assignments well-received in the Trust Territory so far as you knew?
- Loesch: Yes, as far as I know, they were. There was one little local hassle, I can't remember whether that was in Palau or Truk.
- Willens: What was the hassle about, do you remember?
- Loesch: Oh, I think it was a drunk Seabee or something. It was a local thing. It wasn't a rape, I'm pretty sure of that. A guy wrecked a bar, I believe.

- Willens: That happens. There's some concern expressed in one of these Interior Department documents that, although the Department of Defense had been very cooperative, they state "This cooperation of DOD carries with it the danger of being misread by the U.S. press and the Micronesians as an indication that DOD will build extensive base complexes in the Territory in the near future." Was that a concern that you recall being discussed?
- Loesch: Yes, I recall it being discussed. Of course, Defense was ambiguous about its needs. What's the big island of Palau?
- Willens: Babelthuap.
- Loesch: The commandant of the Marine Corps that was an ex-Coloradoan, what the dickens was his name. I had been acquainted with him, just very casually. He wanted to pretty well take over Babelthuap just in case. Just in case they needed it sometime in the future. But Defense always said that it had no present plans to build any bases at all.
- Willens: In Palau or throughout Micronesia?
- Loesch: Throughout Micronesia. Other than what they already had, or course, in the Marshalls and so on. On my first trip out there, I stopped overnight in Hawaii and was put up at the Admiral's guest house off of . . .
- Willens: Barber's Point?
- Loesch: Yes. And the Navy gave me a pretty thorough three-hour briefing on Micronesia and what it had in mind up there. Of course, Defense and the services were very strong that they needed to keep control just in case of future needs. You realize that all of this was in the context of the Vietnam War. Nobody knew at that time how it was going to turn out in Vietnam, but I think there was some feeling that, if we got kicked out of Vietnam, we'd need some bases somewhere else.
- Willens: The documents indicate that the Department of Defense in early 1969 reaffirmed the importance of Micronesia to the national security.
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: As things unfolded, however, it became clear that their interests were multi-faceted. They wanted to deny the area to foreign powers, one. And two, they had some interests in some bases. Three, they wanted to have contingencies protected against in the event of reversion of Okinawa or loss of bases in the Philippines.
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: Did you personally deal with military people at Defense or civilian representatives in Defense or both? Do you have any recollection of how you interacted with the Defense Department?
- Loesch: I'm trying to think. It was civilians except, like I said, the Admiral gave me a briefing in Hawaii.
- Willens: I'm just trying to tie down whether you took a trip out there in 1969 before the first round of negotiations.
- Loesch: You know I just can't remember. I remember some telephone conversations concerning the action program but whom with, I don't know.
- Willens: The name Colonel Kuhn comes up in the documents, K-U-H-N.
- Loesch: Commander Kuhn.

- Willens: Was it Commander?
- Loesch: Yes, it was Commander.
- Willens: He was Navy. Let me ask a more general question.
- Loesch: Now, that, let me stop you there for a second. After Commander Kuhn was assigned to the committee . . .
- Willens: The interagency committee?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: Correct, that's where I see his name.
- Loesch: Then I dealt with him exclusively. With Defense, you know.
- Willens: And what was your assessment of him personally?
- Loesch: Oh, I liked him, he was a good friend. I thought he was a very competent fellow. He was young for a commander.
- Willens: Where do you think he is today?
- Loesch: I have no idea.
- Willens: Did you feel that Defense was exercising any leadership with respect to dealing with the Micronesian status program issues or was it simply standing back, saying these are our needs, and leaving it to Interior and State to figure out how to achieve those needs?
- Loesch: That's the way I assess it, yes. Defense, except for being leaned on in the action program, doesn't really take any leadership at all.
- Willens: Do you remember any discussions in the early years of your tenure about the possibility of constructing a major military base in the Northern Marianas, specifically on the Island of Tinian? Were you ever apprised that the Defense Department was considering such a facility?
- Loesch: Yes, I was apprised that it was. But it never got focused.
- Willens: The documents do reflect, as we'll come to it, that some members of Congress, from time to time, would lean on the Defense Department to be more specific about their needs and avoid some of these vague references to contingencies that they made. Were you present when that was done?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: Just to stay with the action program for a few more questions, several topics are set forth in the Interior Department's action program that had been on the agenda for many years and, indeed, stayed on the agenda for several additional years. For example, there's a reference to engaging more Micronesians in high government positions. Was this an objective that you shared?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: What is your assessment, looking back on it, on whether in fact Interior and the High Commissioner moved as rapidly as they could to achieve that objective?
- Loesch: To go back a little, when I got to Yap, there were six district administrators. I don't remember what they called them.
- Willens: That's what they called them.

- Loesch: District administrators, five of which were Americans, and one, this Frank Ada, was newly appointed as district administrator in the Marianas. I always felt that the district administrators really dragged their feet in advising the High Commissioner about putting Micronesians in office. I also felt that Mr. Johnston did not assert his power, you might say.
- Willens: His clout.
- Loesch: Yes, his clout, in doing that. And I have always felt that there were talented Micronesians who could have been promoted quicker.
- Willens: Was that a point of view that you expressed to the High Commissioner from time to time?
- Loesch: Yes, yes. And it was a point of view that Hickel expressed, too.
- Willens: Even more significantly. But did the High Commissioner have any explanation for the pace at which he was proceeding in this area?
- Loesch: I don't remember what he said.
- Willens: Were you persuaded by him?
- Loesch: No. I'm trying to think. The Palauans were a headache. I mean, they were split in their own society and they were loud and liked to fight, you know. I think that Johnston didn't want a Palauan in high office because he knew that, if you put one in, the other side was going to have a fit, you know, and so forth.
- Willens: But the Palauans did end up playing a leading role in the Congress of Micronesia.
- Loesch: They did, you bet. And I have always thought that Lazarus Salii was about an able a guy as I ran into out there. Good.
- Willens: What was your general assessment of the Trust Territory Administration? It's easy, in hindsight, as many commentators have done, to dismiss the bureaucracy out there as full of rejects or expatriates who didn't have any real commitment. And there are those who are close to it who identified some very capable people. Do you have any sense of how that governmental institution worked during your tenure?
- Loesch: Well, to tell you the truth, I always felt it was incompetent. I didn't respect Johnston as an administrator.
- Willens: Was Neiman Craley out there at that time, the ex-Congressman from Pennsylvania?
- Loesch: Yes, yes, who shows up in here as a friend of Morton's. Craley, I never did understand what he did out there or why he was there. But he was there when I was there.
- Willens: All right, I won't belabor the point then. Another subject that had long been controverted in the Trust Territory was the question of pay equalization. This was a subject of considerable importance to the Micronesians, many of whom I have interviewed who worked for the Trust Territory.
- Loesch: Where are you there?
- Willens: I'm under tab 8 on page 4 where it refers to the dual wage scale and suggests that everyone has concluded it's objectionable and it's inconsistent with American concepts of equality and justice.
- Loesch: Yes.

- Willens: Do you have any recollection as to whether any meaningful steps were taken to achieve pay equalization during your tenure?
- Loesch: Yes, I remember testifying before the Appropriations Committee. What was that lady's name that was chairman of subcommittee on . . . Hansen. Julia Hansen from Washington. And, of course, every year during my entire involvement, we would go to that Committee and really fuss about the appropriations for Micronesia, because they wanted it much higher than it was and in fact we did get it up quite substantially.
- Willens: Did you specifically make a point of trying to get more money in order to achieve pay equalization?
- Loesch: Yes, yes.
- Willens: Was Congress supportive of that objective?
- Loesch: Yes, yes. And I think that there was quite a bit of money in the first appropriation that I was concerned with that was more or less for that purpose. I would think that the committee records would show that—the appropriations subcommittee that Ms. Hansen chaired.
- Willens: I had great difficulty in getting records of legislative action. I certainly have legislation that was enacted and reports. Many of the hearings were never transcribed or, if transcribed, the records have not been retained in any orderly way. In fact, one of the people I'm trying to interview is Jim Bierne, who you will remember from your days. He made a speech recently about the lack of institutional memory on the Hill about dealing with the territories. I was in the audience and I wrote him a letter saying this is your chance to deal with institutional memory, please be interviewed. And I've had trouble getting him down to the table. But the other few topics that I wanted just to mention briefly were, one, the effort to improve health and education services out in Micronesia. As you undoubtedly learned or came to learn, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations had made a major push in the education area in terms of more money, more schools, more teachers, and there were many debates about how successful that expedited effort had been. What was your sense in 1969 and 1970 about health and education facilities in the Trust Territory and what the federal government ought to be doing in those areas?
- Loesch: Well, I felt that we were way behind on that and we pushed pretty hard for the establishment of clinics, not only in the district headquarters but outside.
- Willens: Health clinics?
- Loesch: Health clinics, yes.
- Willens: How did you intend to staff them, with Micronesians who were trained or with U.S.-imported technical people?
- Loesch: We hoped that we would get help from the Peace Corps in the health area, but we really wanted the Micronesians to do it. Dr. Palacios. . .
- Willens: Francisco Palacios, a client and colleague of mine for many years. And a wonderful man.
- Loesch: Yes, yes. A good friend of mine, too. Is he still around?
- Willens: No, he died several years ago. You dealt with him because, as I recall, he was a member of the negotiating delegation from Micronesia. Did you have the occasion to speak to him about health service needs?
- Loesch: Yes, yes, I did.

- Willens: What were his views?
- Loesch: Well, he thought we certainly could do more than we'd done. He believed that there were enough health-educated Micronesians, not doctors but people who could certainly give initial care and that sort of thing to staff clinics. We did establish some. I don't have an idea now where and when and how many, but I know we did establish clinics.
- Willens: And was it your impression that they were both needed and served their purposes?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: Would you generally have left the implementation of the action program to the personnel in the Office of Territories or did you personally feel that you, aided by Tom Whittington and others, had some responsibility for supervising this program?
- Loesch: Yes, yes I felt we should lead. Aside from George Milner, there wasn't anybody in the office of Territories who would know anything about anything.
- Willens: Did he leave sometime in 1969? I forget.
- Loesch: No, he was there in 1970.
- Willens: Was he?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: Okay. He did have a good deal of accumulated experience. But in contrast with Secretary Hickel, I think George would agree that he's better described as a pessimist rather than an optimist. And Ruth van Cleve makes the point that they were a good team, because she was always foolish and enthusiastic and George would restrain her. The last subject that I wanted to just mention is the economic development issue. As you probably learned, there had been numerous studies done during the 1960's with respect to the economic potential of Micronesia. These reports for the most part were not optimistic because of the lack of natural resources and educated personnel. What was your sense as to the economic potential of Micronesia as a whole or some of the individual districts?
- Loesch: Well, I was pretty pessimistic about it. There was in gear a project for a tuna factory, I think in Palau.
- Willens: Did that materialize?
- Loesch: Yes, not then, but sometime in the later 1970s. I think it was Bumble Bee that built out there. One of our big. . .
- Willens: Van Camp, right. Was it Van Camp? I get it confused with the one in American Samoa.
- Loesch: I don't know. There is a tuna processing factory in Palau now. I believe.
- Willens: And that was one form of economic development that you thought made sense?
- Loesch: Yes, it did. But actually, I could see little reason for optimism on the establishment of substantial manufacturing or other business enterprises. In the first place, there weren't enough people. Second place, it was spread out so all over hell that you couldn't visualize how any substantial project would work.
- Willens: There is a good deal of debate throughout the 1960s as to whether fishing and agriculture could ever be developed—in some respects at least up until the point where they were during the Japanese colonial period. Did you have any sense that the Micronesians that you dealt with really had any interest in developing fishing and agricultural industry?

- Loesch: No. On Ponape they grew peppers and I went to see the operation. To a farm boy it was pitiful (laughter). It was good pepper.
- Willens: It's widely distributed still.
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: Why do you think it was that the fishing and agricultural alternatives were never taken by the Micronesians very seriously? There's a question of lack of resources, lack of personnel, lack of motivation or what?
- Loesch: It was largely lack of motivation, as far as the agricultural end of things went. Fishing, I don't know too much about. On Ponape, for instance, in the pepper business they had a heck of time getting the people to work. You know, like any agricultural project there is work to be done.
- Willens: One of the tasks after Secretary Hickel came back was to prepare an organic act. I have supplied you with some documents suggesting that an organic act was prepared within the Interior Department and then provided to Congressman Aspinall as a drafting service. Did you personally play any role in drafting the organic act or reviewing it before it was sent up to Congressman Aspinall?
- Loesch: Yes, I reviewed it. I didn't have any part in drafting it, as I recall.
- Willens: Would that have been drafted by this Mr. Bracken who's identified as legislative counsel in the letter under tab 7?
- Loesch: Yes. By the way, I just got a note from Bracken, who is a good friend of mine, who was under-secretary in this last administration.
- Willens: Oh really, under President Bush?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: I didn't know that.
- Loesch: He's out of Indiana.
- Willens: Well, the drafting of the organic act was a matter of some controversy within the Executive Branch for several reasons. First, Secretary Hickel had promised the Micronesians that they would be consulted before any legislation was sent to the Hill.
- Loesch: Right.
- Willens: Do you recall any discussion with Secretary Hickel as to whether supplying this draft to Congressman Aspinall was consistent with his undertaking to consult with the Micronesian?
- Loesch: I don't remember any conversation with Secretary Hickel about that?
- Willens: Were you aware of the commitment?
- Loesch: Oh yes, I was aware of the commitment. Of course, it depends on how you look at it. I am sure that Interior didn't think that this draft was going anywhere in the first place. It was done at Aspinall's request and I notice in here Bracken nearly denied responsibility for it.
- Willens: I certainly would like to know what Congressman Aspinall's reaction was when he got this cover letter.
- Loesch: I don't know.

- Willens: You are right. Mr. Bracken's letter does try to protect the Secretary's position as to the need for consultation. Do you have any idea as to whether Congressman Aspinall in fact wanted to try to introduce legislation on this subject as early as September 1969?
- Loesch: No, I'm sure he didn't.
- Willens: Really. There is some suggestion in the documents that this was supplied because he was anxious to introduce it sometime in the fall of 1969, either before or after a trip he was contemplating making out to Micronesia. Do you recall any discussion with him on that subject?
- Loesch: I'm trying to think. I got the notion fairly early on that he didn't intend to introduce legislation at that time.
- Willens: Do you think he was prepared to accede to the Secretary's commitment to talk to the Micronesians before any legislation would be seriously put before Congress?
- Loesch: Yes, I think so.
- Willens: There wouldn't have been any reason for him to be opposed to that, would there?
- Loesch: No, I think he thought that was a good way to go about that.
- Willens: So why did he make this request then in your judgment for a draft Organize Act in the summer of 1969?
- Loesch: He was planning to go to Micronesia. I don't remember when he went, it must have been in the fall.
- Willens: He was planning to go in the fall and I think he did.
- Loesch: Well, I know he went out there.
- Willens: So you think he wanted to have some idea of what the definition of the status would be before he went out?
- Loesch: Yes, I think he probably wanted to see what the Interior's attitude was. And he didn't get much satisfaction. Aspinall, you know, was quite a hero in Micronesia. We named a high school after him, just like we did down in U.S. Virgin Islands. He was well thought of.
- Willens: I interviewed recently a colleague who was an assistant to Delegate Won Pat from Guam for many years and he spoke of how Won Pat's strategy was to make certain there was something in Guam named after every significant member of Congress. I don't think it should be taken necessarily as high commendation.
- Loesch: No. Well, I think that is right. I remember on one of my trips—I don't know, I don't think it was the first one—but I was in Ulithi and they had a new high school in Ulithi.
- Willens: Where is that island?
- Loesch: It's off of Yap in the Yap district. They had a young well-educated Yapese principal at the high school and he thought Aspinall was the greatest. That was very affecting—that trip. I don't remember how far it is from Yap but it's quite a ways. I remember the Navy did the transportation for me. And the kids at the high school on Ulithi put on an entertainment for me, very effective, grass skirts, no tops, beautiful dancing and I was pleased, I tell you.
- Willens: What had taken you there, what was the occasion?
- Loesch: Well, I was just going around the districts and wanting to see all the islands that were inhabited.

- Willens: Was this one of your first trips? Was it your first trip probably?
- Loesch: I'm not sure. They kind of melded together and I can't separate them. But I really think this was my first trip. That trip was the only one on which I went to every district.
- Willens: I see.
- Loesch: I spent three weeks out there on that trip, I'm pretty sure. I mentioned a while ago I had two New Year's Eves on that trip. I went across the date line.
- Willens: The Organic Act in draft form was also the subject of much discussion within the inter-agency group that you chaired. Do you recall any debate after your arrival at the Interior Department as to who would chair the inter-agency group? Whether it should be someone from Interior or someone from State?
- Loesch: No. The only thing I know about it is that Secretary Hickel was very stern that by God, it was Interior's business and Interior was going to chair it. But I didn't know that I was going to be the chair until it happened.
- Willens: I see. How did it happen? He basically told you that you were going to chair the committee?
- Loesch: Yes, he just told me I was chairing the committee.
- Willens: How do you think the committee generally worked? Was it a useful forum for the agencies to present their differing views and try to arrive at some consensus?
- Loesch: Yes, I think it was, I think it was.
- Willens: Did you generally think that the Department of State personnel who participated contributed in a meaningful way?
- Loesch: Well, yes. It always appeared to me that the members of the committee from State didn't have the authority to match what they were doing. I mean they always had to go back and consult higher ups. In consequence, it seems to me that (looking back) State kind of dragged its feet as far as making the committee a really workable committee, because they had to keep going back and then come back with some kind of revision or something.
- Willens: Who do you remember as being the principal participants from state? I mentioned Assistant Secretary De Palma. Was he someone you recall dealing with?
- Loesch: Yes, yes.
- Willens: He certainly had authority within the department that was roughly comparable to yours, isn't that correct?
- Loesch: Yes, that's right.
- Willens: He recalls that he subsequently delegated much of this to other people in his office.
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: The name Peale comes up regularly. Was he someone that you recall dealing with?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: He was fairly junior at the time, as I remember.
- Loesch: Sam Peale.
- Willens: That's correct.
- Loesch: Yes.

- Willens: Do you attach particular views to them?
- Loesch: I only saw DePalma at one meeting . . .
- Willens: Really?
- Loesch: . . . of the committee and Peale, as you suggest, was quite junior. And he's the one that usually had to go back and get further instructions all the time.
- Willens: Well, by the time you became actively engaged (in say the summer of 1969) on the organic act and in preparing for the first round of negotiations, the State Department people that I have interviewed say that they more or less were bystanders because some of their views had been rejected early on in terms of what kind of political relationship ought to be offered to the Micronesians. Do you have any sense that that was the case?
- Loesch: Yes, I do. State was more liberal, wanted to go further in the proffer than was satisfactory either to me or to Defense.
- Willens: There is one very specific issue on that point that came up during the summer of 1969 that related to whether the organic act's provisions with respect to the governorship should provide for an appointed governor with an elective governor sometime in the future, or should provide immediately for an elected governor perhaps with some kind of federal overseer. Do you recall that debate?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: And the State Department personnel took the view that unless you had an elected governor right off you were so far away from self-government, as the U.N. would consider it, that it was a futile effort.
- Loesch: Right.
- Willens: What were your views on that subject at that time?
- Loesch: Well, I was kind of ambiguous on that. But I thought too that we should, I didn't care a bit about what the U.N. was going to think about it. Neither did Aspinall. And State did. State wanted us to be on all fours with the U.N. at all times and neither Defense nor Interior felt that that was important. But, I believed that, if we are going to do anything, we should have an elected governor. As far as supervision was concerned, I really didn't have any view on it that I recall now. I don't think it is reflected in anything that I read.
- Willens: I think that's right. There seemed to be even some debate within the State Department as to whether the politics of this situation, given Congressman Aspinall's views, meant that State should seek some kind of compromise here and not argue strenuously for having an elected governor right off. But, did you basically agree that an elected governor was sort of an essential element of meaningful self-government?
- Loesch: Yes, I did.
- Willens: Did you have any view at the time that the Micronesians were ready for this measure of self-government or not ready for this measure of self-government?
- Loesch: Well, in the first place, there wasn't any unified view from all the six districts on this. The Marshallese were still pretty heavy duty on their chiefs, you know. To all intents and purposes Amata Kabau just ran the Marshalls; whatever he said went. And I felt that as far as the election went it was pretty foreign to the Marshalese, they just went with the chiefs. If there had been an election, why Amata would have undoubtedly been unanimously elected as governor of that district. As to governor of the whole shebang, of course, I

learned early that Micronesia was a sort of bastard thing because there wasn't any real, what do you call it? Each of the sixth districts was different and they had never before been—well I can't say that—but the districts were all different in their views of what should happen.

Willens: What kind of views did you associate with the Marianas in the summer of 1969?

Loesch: Well, I always thought that the Marianas wanted to have a close contact with the U.S. In fact, the documents disclosed that they wanted to get mixed up with Guam and just have one deal. And this went on as long as I was involved. They wanted to have as close a contact as possible with the idea of eventually becoming a State.

Willens: Did you think they were more prepared culturally and politically for self-government than the other districts?

Loesch: Yes, I did. You've told me how different Saipan is now from what it was. But the Saipanese were pretty sophisticated at that time. Of course, there was a lot of back and forth between Guam and the other Marianas, so I felt that we would never have any trouble if we gave the Marianas to them. If we had a plebiscite, for instance, there I knew it would be perfectly satisfactory to the Defense, State and Interior.

Willens: Where would you put Palau in this continuum regarding their readiness for self-government and their views about subjects like an elected governor?

Loesch: Palau was more radical, if that's the right word. Palau did not go along with anything except for virtual independence at that time.

Willens: Did you think there was a strong movement for independence in Palau at that time?

Loesch: Yes, I think there was. I wouldn't say it was a majority, but it was a strong movement there alright. I think that's reflected in these documents by Salii's attitude too. He wasn't wanting independence for Palau, as I recall, but he wanted a heavy self-government operation.

Willens: On that subject, it was during the summer of 1969 that the Future Status Commission issued its final report in Micronesia. That was the report that espoused their relationship of free association with the United States with all the measures of sovereignty and self-government that that involved. And, in the alternative, independence, if the United States was not willing to negotiate an acceptable free association relationship.

Loesch: Yes.

Willens: Do you recall a reading of the report shortly after it came out?

Loesch: Yes.

Willens: What was your general impression of the report and its recommendations?

Loesch: Well, I can't remember what my attitude was when I first read it. I knew it went further than would be satisfactory to some factions in this administration. But I thought it was a reasonable document. When did that come out?

Willens: That came out in about July of 1969. Then the Congress of Micronesia at its session in August, as I recall, endorsed it. So that before the Micronesian delegation came to the United States for the first round of negotiations in October of 1969, the United States had been informed through this report of what ostensibly the objectives of the Micronesians were. The documents reflect some uncertainty within the Executive Branch as to exactly what free association meant, and also whether the Micronesians in fact were advancing it seriously, or were advancing it as an bargaining ploy of some kind. Do you recall having

any judgment at the time as to whether it was a legitimate and/or serious objective as distinguished from a bargaining ploy?

Loesch: I know we discussed whether it was a bargaining point or was real. But I don't remember what my attitude was about that.

Willens: Well, one thing became clear as the Inter-Agency Committee that you chaired prepared for the negotiations. You (under tab 14) submitted a draft of the so-called Micronesia Political Status Act, which represented the preliminary agreements among the agencies and your cover letter says that there is a provision for a Micronesian Constitutional Convention in the alternative version. In this document and in others you appeared to have been a proponent of trying to advance as early as possible to the Micronesians some form of legislation authorizing them to have their own constitutional convention.

Loesch: Yes, yes.

Willens: What prompted you in that direction?

Loesch: Well, of course, the Under-Secretaries Committee was under some pressure to get something done. We felt that there were certain things in the Micronesian draft that we just couldn't go with, I mean you know, but we thought (the committee that I chaired thought) that we ought to do our best to get something done quick, very quick. And perhaps the constitutional convention would be the best way to do that. But, the Under-Secretaries Committee didn't think so, as I recall.

Willens: No, you are correct. You are recommending by your letter of August 25, 1969 that a version of the Legislation, including a proposal for a constitutional convention, might be a fallback position. It seems to me that you were aware from the Micronesian Report and from other information available to you that a constitutional convention was a high priority to the Micronesians and that the U.S. might be more responsive if they were to have some proposal on the subject. I don't want to read too much into this, but it's a theme that we'll see continues to be espoused by you for the next six to nine months with you frequently being out-voted until early 1970, when your views carried the day. There also is a suggestion that Congressman Meeds had some particular interest in having a constitutional convention proposal put before the Micronesians. I've never understood exactly how Congressman Meeds got involved and wonder whether you can help me sort of clarify that.

Loesch: I really can't. He had a personal interest in Micronesia. Where he got it I don't know, and who his advisors were I don't know. He was much more liberal in his attitude than Aspinall was.

Willens: You don't really have any detailed recollection as to how it was that he became so interested in the subject area?

Loesch: No, I don't.

Willens: Shortly before the first round of negotiations in the fall of 1969, there was an article in the Christian Science Monitor which I provided you under Tab 15. It refers to President Nixon going through Guam in the course of a trip to the Far East and being presented with a resolution from the Congress of Micronesia. Do you have any recollection of this event and what significance, if any, it had? The reporter suggested this resolution had been drafted with the assistance of a consultant to the Congress of Micronesia and that it was more or less of a declaration to the United States that the Micronesians were not going to be dictated to, but they were ready to open up serious negotiations with both the

- Executive Branch and with the United States Congress on the subject of future status. Do you have any recollection?
- Loesch: Well, we were notified right after Nixon's visit there and I believe that is when Kissinger got really interested in this thing. I don't know about this article to the Christian Science Monitor. I don't really think that the reporter got some of it right.
- Willens: It is only an indication that the Micronesians had sort of responded to their Commission report, that they had endorsed it in the Congress of Micronesia, and they now were sending a delegation to meet with you in October of 1969. I provided you with several documents about the first round of negotiations in which you were the chief or head of the U.S. negotiating team. The documents reflect that a wide range of subjects were discussed, but that ultimately the issue on which the most time was spent was land and specifically the U.S. readiness to limit its right of eminent domain in any future relationship with Micronesia. Is that your recollection?
- Loesch: Yes, it certainly is. You know, the Marshallese didn't care about individual ownership of land and the concept of eminent domain was quite foreign to them, although they were more involved on account of the defense installations in the Marshall Islands than any other district, except possibly the Marianas as well. But the issue of eminent domain was central to Micronesian attitude.
- Willens: There is an overview of the negotiations under Tab 22 that was prepared several years later and it lists the members of the Micronesian group on page 3. If I could ask your indulgence in just sort of running down these Micronesian representatives briefly and giving me your best recollection of their ability and participation in the negotiations that you engaged in with them. You generally have expressed your respect and admiration for Lazarus Salii; would you describe him as an active leader of his delegation.
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: Do you think he generally had the support of the majority of his delegation.
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: Did you think that he had a political position back in Palau that he was trying to protect or advance in some respect? How would you describe his political position in Micronesia?
- Loesch: Well, I know he was highly respected by the Congress of Micronesia. I don't really know what he had to protect in Palau. As a matter of fact, I don't ever remember talking about what the political situation in Palau was.
- Willens: You remember him as someone whose word you could rely on?
- Loesch: Yes, I do.
- Willens: Do you consider him politically sophisticated in your judgment?
- Loesch: Yes, more than some of the other members.
- Willens: Well, let's talk about some of the other members, what is your recollection of Senator Nakayama of Truk?
- Loesch: He was perhaps as well-educated as any of the members. Tall, good looking guy. I can't recall. He followed Lazarus, I mean he was always on Salii's side, I am sure.
- Willens: In some of the subsequent sessions, based on the documents, it looks as there was a substantial independence movement in Truk. I do not recall at the moment whether Senator Nakayama was an advocate of independence subsequently?

- Loesch: Yes, he was, he was.
- Willens: Did he express any of those views in the early meetings with you or did that come later?
- Loesch: It came later. Didn't express those in the first set of negotiations either.
- Willens: What is your recollection of Senator Bailey Olter of Ponape?
- Loesch: I liked Bailey. He became quite a good friend of mine. He was personally ambitious both politically and economically.
- Willens: Was that for himself or for his Ponapeans?
- Loesch: I think it was for himself. Except he wanted Ponape to have a full say in this. All of them did, I mean the six districts all wanted to be heard and have their views followed.
- Willens: Where there any specific views regarding status that you associate with the Ponape representatives on this delegation?
- Loesch: Yes. They wanted to influence the U.S.; they didn't want independence for Ponape I am sure. Their terms of free association varied some from the notions of free association from the other districts.
- Willens: Can you recall any specifics?
- Loesch: No. I am trying to think.
- Willens: Well, certainly the documents do reflect some uncertainty on the American side as to what free association meant. And you are suggesting now that there were differing views expressed even among the Micronesians as to what they meant by the term.
- Loesch: Yes, that's right.
- Willens: What is your recollection of Senator Amaraich of Truk?
- Loesch: I really don't have any.
- Willens: What is your recollection of representative John Mangefel of Yap?
- Loesch: Yes, I remember John. He was, how shall I say, he was less sophisticated than most of the others—which was kind of endemic among the Yapese.
- Willens: Was he the only representative from Yap?
- Loesch: Yes, he is the only one from Yap. I don't how that happened.
- Willens: That's interesting, I had assumed there was equal representation there. Well, I skipped over the first thing we both mentioned earlier—Senator Francisco Palacios of the Marinas. What do you remember about Senator Palacios in terms of his personality and his views on status?
- Loesch: Well, I remember his personality better than I do his views on status. But he went along with the notion of a close contact with the U.S.; he didn't go for independence at all, I don't think. And his free association idea was more conservative than some of the others. I tell you a funny story about him. When I was there he took me . . .
- Willens: "There" meaning out in the Marianas or . . .
- Loesch: Yes, in the Marianas. He took me out on a boat with two fishermen and we were going to look for shellfish. I forget which direction it was from Saipan, evidently towards the Guam side somewhere. I was snorkeling and the two fishermen that were in to boat with us were out and about snorkeling and pretty soon they kept going back to one place and I went

over to look. There was a big shell fish, star shaped, and I picked it up and brought it back in the boat. And everybody got in the boat, we were going, after we were gone just a little ways in the boat I said: "Well I don't know why I want to keep this, and I picked the thing up and started to throw it and bang, one of them grabbed my wrist, and it turned out it was a very rare thing they had steered me to and they didn't want me to throw it back, believe me. That guy got my arm with a hand of steel, believe me.

Willens: It wasn't Palacios who grabbed you though.

Loesch: No, it was one of the other guys that he had going out with us. But he informed me that that was a insult to these guys who had steered me to this spot and it was because I was a wheel that they had done all that. They sure didn't want me throw it back.

Willens: Well, those are the kind of misunderstandings that we all have experienced. What do you remember about his personality and his educational training?

Loesch: Well, I remember that he was extremely interested in the health aspect of the action program, and was very articulate about it too. I liked him, and we had a good relationship.

Willens: In my experience with him later on, he was one of the leaders in the Marianas who was most reluctant to assume a separate Marianas future as distinct from staying with the remainder of Micronesia.

Loesch: Yes.

Willens: Did you have any sense during your discussions with him that he was trying to find some way to compromise the different interests of the districts so that all of Micronesia could stay together?

Loesch: Yes, I did. He believed that, despite the differences in society and all, Micronesia as a whole would be a viable entity, and based that on his experience in the Congress of Micronesia. He thought that there was generally a good relationship amongst the six districts.

Willens: That's interesting. Do you recall his views ever changing on that during the time that you dealt with him?

Loesch: No.

Willens: The other representative from the Marinas was Benjamin T. Manglona, who was recently the Lieutenant Governor of the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas island and got defeated in his effort for reelection last year. What is your present recollection of Mr. Manglona?

Loesch: I don't really have any. I wasn't that close to him.

Willens: Did you find that some of these Micronesians representatives were much more comfortable in their use of the English language than others?

Loesch: Yes.

Willens: And did you find the people who you got to know best were the most like whom you could talk readily in English.

Loesch: I think so. Salii and Olter were of course fluent in English and you could discuss anything with them. Some of the others, for instance Ekpap Silk of the Marshalls, was quite hesitant in English.

- Willens: He remained active in status matters for several years, but it's very hard to get any feeling for him from the documents, since he always sat for the most part quietly while Lazarus Salii expressed the views of the delegation.
- Loesch: That's true.
- Willens: Do you have any other recollection of Mr. Silk in terms of his personality or his views?
- Loesch: No, I don't. He was a handsome fellow and he had a body like you couldn't believe. He was suppose to be one of the best swimmers in the Marianas, and I could believe it, looking at it. I liked him but, as you say, he was a very quiet chap and didn't say much. And one thing, he always deferred to Amata Kabua as dictating his attitude. I am surprised he was still, he was still active after that.
- Willens: He was the only representative from the Marshalls I see from this listing. The last person we haven't mentioned is representative Ueki of Palau, who is someone that I have never heard anything about.
- Loesch: And I haven't either.
- Willens: So he was not an active participant as you recalled.
- Loesch: No. Lazarus Salii called the shots for Palau.
- Willens: Well, going back to the substance of the first round of negotiations, I noticed that the delegation under your leadership elected not to present to the Micronesians the draft legislation that you had so laboriously put together and discussed. Why was that?
- Loesch: Well, in the first place, going back we didn't want the Micronesians to believe that we were unilaterally setting the agenda. They knew of our supplying Aspinall with a draft, of course, but I remember myself pointing out in one of our sessions the fact that we were more or less forced to do that, and that it was not the position necessarily of the Interior Department.
- Willens: They had had been provided with copy of the organic act by Mr. Kaiser, as I understand from the documents.
- Loesch: I think that's right.
- Willens: Did they ever express to you their views that the organic act was a non-starter so to speak?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: Was that before the negotiations began or during the course of the negotiations, or both?
- Loesch: I think it was both. As a matter of fact, before we negotiated we had entertained the Micronesian delegation and had a lot of informal conversations with them. I remember that I told at least some of the members of the delegation that the organic act was not the position of the Interior Department.
- Willens: And so was that one of reasons why you thought it would not be useful tactically to present that draft bill to them at the beginning of the negotiations?
- Loesch: Right.
- Willens: As it happened, your strategy was to present sections of it as particular topics came up—like the judiciary or whatever.
- Loesch: That's probably right.

- Willens: The overall summaries under Tab 22 (and at pages 1 and 2) there is a very brief overview. Other documents provide sort of a day-by-day review of the negotiations, but it does look that the land issue came up early in the negotiations and more or less became the dominant issue.
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: What prompted the land issue coming up in that way? Was it a Micronesian response to a U.S. position, or was it a initiative that came from the Micronesians?
- Loesch: I think it was an initiative that came from the Micronesians and it was caused by the Defense Department that had sent some kind of delegation to Palau to look over Babelthuap with a view to installing something there. As it happened, and I mentioned that the commandant of the Marine Corps, General Walt, came out of Fort Collins. I think that, while the Defense Department denied that they were intending to install something big out there in Palau, the fact that it sent a delegation to look over the land, and probably the Micronesians knew about General Walt's idea. General Walt just wanted to take over the island totally. Whether or not he wanted to build anything soon or not, he just wanted to have it under his wing. I knew that the Micronesians knew about the delegation from Defense that had gone out to survey and look over and decide how much they needed in Babelthuap for some in-the-future installation. I think that's what really triggered them on making land acquisition a central feature.
- Willens: Is it your recollection that the Defense visit to Palau for that purpose happened before the first round of negotiation?
- Loesch: Oh, yes.
- Willens: Definitely it happened sometime before October of 1969 and it was a cause of some concern to the Micronesians.
- Loesch: Yes, it was.
- Willens: Many other issues apparently came up during the first round, such things as control over foreign affairs and the need for a Micronesian constitutional convention. Were any of these issues discussed in detail to your recollection or did it ultimately come back to the land issue?
- Loesch: Well, we did discuss the other aspects of the US's irreducible proposal.
- Willens: What kind of proposal?
- Loesch: I said irreducible—for needs that we had outlined. We discussed them, but the land issue was central, pretty central. Was your firm involved with the Micronesians at that time?
- Willens: No, we didn't get involved until the Marianas opened up separate negotiations. I don't believe there was any U.S.-based lawyer assisting the Micronesians at that time. They had some consultants. Do you recall Dr. Gladwin or Professor Freeman? Do these names mean anything to you?
- Loesch: Yes, Professor Freeman does.
- Willens: Did they play a visible role during the first round of negotiations?
- Loesch: No, not a visible role.
- Willens: During the course of the negotiations it developed that the Micronesians found it more productive to meet with you personally in informal meetings rather than during the formal sessions. How did that come about?

Loesch: Well, I don't really know. I have always been a friendly, outspoken sort of guy and I had a good personal relationship with all of them as far as I know, although some were better than others. And I was always willing to listen to them, which I think sometimes they felt that in the formal meetings we weren't necessarily really listening to them. That's the only way I can explain it.

Willens: Well, as you can see from the documents, the fact that you were meeting informally with the Micronesians meant that the other agencies had to be constantly kept informed as to what you were saying and whether it represented their views or not. Do you recall any criticism from State or Defense as to the use of these informal meetings? Or did they find it also to be a constructive way to conduct a discussion?

Loesch: I don't recall any personal criticism for doing that. I think that both State and Defense felt that they got more information about the underlying Micronesian attitudes from these informal meetings than from they did from some of the formal negotiations.

Willens: Did anyone from the Defense Department sit in with you on the formal meetings?

Loesch: No. I don't think so.

Willens: I noticed from the official report that it only identifies four people as comprising the U.S. delegations, you, Ms. Farrington, George Milner, and Arthur Day of the State Department. Is that your recollection?

Loesch: Yes, except that Mrs. Farrington really wasn't a factor. Commander Kuhn didn't come on until after the first round and I don't know why Defense wasn't involved in that. I really don't.

Willens: Because subsequently there were some memoranda prepared at the State Department (and I think at Defense too) to develop a position about this compromise (so-called) that you had discussed with the Micronesians. As I understand the proposed compromise, it proposed that the Interior Department would support the Micronesians with respect to limitations on eminent domain if the Micronesians in turn would accept the kind of permanent association with the United States that had been roughly discussed in the negotiations. Is that a fair summary of the compromise.

Loesch: That's a fair summary.

Willens: Can you give me a little background as to how that developed and what role you and Secretary Hickel played in trying to urge this kind of compromise within the Executive Branch?

Loesch: Well, I don't know what activities Secretary Hickel had with the talking back and forth with the other Secretaries. I just don't know. I wasn't in on any such conversations.

Willens: Well, but did Secretary Hickel support you in terms of making this compromise? I note on page 1 there is a paragraph beginning on October the 16th it refers that you announced to the U.S. team on October 16, 1969 that you had been directed by Secretary Hickel to make a proposal to the Micronesians without consulting with or informing other team members. Is that an accurate statement of what you told the other U.S. representatives?

Loesch: I think so, yes. I remember I was kind of shocked by my direction from the Secretary and the rest of that paragraph is accurate all right.

Willens: It does suggest that the idea for the compromise emanated from Secretary Hickel, is that correct?

Loesch: I think that's correct. Yes.

- Willens: That suggests to me that you must have been informing him rather regularly as to the substance of the negotiations. Is that correct?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: Did you suggest that there was possible room for compromise here along the lines that I've summarized and that he then endorsed it and directed you to try to implement it?
- Loesch: Yes, I think that's accurate. Every day during the course of the negotiations, at the end of the day, I would traipse up to Secretary Hickel's office and he and I would have one-on-one discussions about what was going on. He was kept fully informed, believe me, because he was interested.
- Willens: This was after all the response that he had asked for when he visited Micronesia several months earlier.
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: We'll come back to the compromise proposal, because it subsequently was much discussed within the interagency working group and at the Under Secretaries Committee level. But stepping back from that specific issue for the moment, what was your overall assessment of the first round of negotiations?
- Loesch: Well, I thought it had been worthwhile. And I was optimistic that we could reach eventual agreement. Of course, I had no notion at that time it would be a twenty-year project. But I felt that I had established a good rapport with the delegation and that certainly there was room for further negotiations in good faith with the probability of eventual agreement. And it was during the negotiations we had a lot, as you've mentioned, of informal stuff that weren't in the sessions. It was at that time that I found the idea that I ought to go out as quickly as possible to Micronesia. There was a certain amount of tension in the Interior Department at that time. Secretary Hickel and Under Secretary Train were at odds. Hickel didn't like Train; he had nothing to say about who his under secretary was going to be and he bypassed Train as much as he could. Of course, the way Interior had been run for a long time and the way Hickel ran it was that Train was not a line officer, he was a staff man. This had been going on during Carver's time; he just loved being assistant secretary and he thoroughly disliked being under secretary.
- Willens: It's absolutely right.
- Loesch: And so Hickel kept playing on the sidelines as much as he could and couldn't help it if he [Train] was on the Under Secretaries Committee. That was a given from the White House—that the under secretaries would be on that committee. As a line officer, I also tried to backstop Train as much I could. In the first place, he was a devoted environmentalist in those days; I'm from the West and I wasn't. So, I never had a very good relationship with Train, although (I must say) I respected him.
- Willens: How did that relationship between Hickel and Train affect the working of the Under Secretaries Committee?
- Loesch: I don't know. I really don't know.
- Willens: It would seem to me that it would make the work of the interagency group in which you participated of greater importance.
- Loesch: Well, I think it did. I think it did—looking back. At the time, that never occurred to me, but looking back, I'm sure it did.

- Willens: Well, I've heard from some of the people I've interviewed that they felt that the U.S. was not well-organized for this round of negotiations and that the three agencies really hadn't got their acts together.
- Loesch: I think that's true.
- Willens: How so?
- Loesch: I know I was not happy with the make-up of the U.S. delegation.
- Willens: Who selected the delegation?
- Loesch: It wasn't me.
- Willens: I gather that.
- Loesch: I don't really know. I suspect it was Hickel.
- Willens: Would you have wanted a larger and more diverse group or what?
- Loesch: Yes. Well, what I would have liked, if I had known then what I know now, I would have liked to have Commander Kuhn and at least Sam Peale. Sam Peale, by the way, was a good friend (maybe I've said this before) of Tom Whittington.
- Willens: No, I didn't know that.
- Loesch: They were friends and about the same age.
- Willens: I'm trying to locate Mr. Peale but I've been unsuccessful.
- Loesch: Tom might know.
- Willens: There had been so many meetings and discussions about an organic act and draft legislation that it seems to me that the three Executive Branch agencies seemed to have united behind a legislative proposal. But as it turned out, they didn't really present that legislative proposal. If there was a weakness in the U.S. position, it may have been that they were unprepared for what the Micronesians were going to present across the table. But I'm not sure that's the case. Were you surprised by the Micronesian positions that were advanced during the first round?
- Loesch: I was a little surprised with one or two aspects of it, I think.
- Willens: Do you feel they came in as advocates for a free association relationship that was inconsistent with the draft organic act? Or did you think that they came in ready to seriously consider a territorial relationship of a more traditional nature?
- Loesch: I think that your first hypothesis is a true one. I don't think they really wanted at that time a close territorial position with the U.S. or by themselves. And I think we were not fully prepared as a delegation. In the first place, if I'd had my druthers I wouldn't have had Mrs. Farrington on it at all. She took very little part anyway.
- Willens: It seems to me that the documents are hard to understand, but the Micronesians came in having had a Commission report and endorsement of that by the Congress of Micronesia. Yet as you suggest, various members of the Micronesian delegation had different views about free association. And one gets the sense that they might have been fairly reluctant or tentative about advancing those views across the table to a formal U.S. negotiating team.
- Loesch: Yes, I think that's true.
- Willens: Based on my experience, they're sometimes reluctant to advance positions that they think are confrontational or far beyond what the other side wants to hear. But this is all with the

great 20/20 benefit of hindsight. The other point about the negotiation I wanted to raise with you was the need for a constitutional convention bill. You had been urging this, but the U.S. delegation during the first round did not advance any proposal that would give the Micronesians the right to have their own constitutional convention. It looks from the documents as though the Micronesians were emphasizing their desire for a constitutional convention. Is that your recollection?

Loesch: I think so, yes.

Willens: So did you come away feeling that if the United States had been ready to advance a constitutional convention proposal during the first round, there might have been more receptivity and community of interest between the two delegations.

Loesch: Yes, yes I felt that at the time. And looking back only reinforces that opinion.

Willens: After the negotiations then, the interagency working group sort of got together again and one end result was to reject the so-called compromise proposal. Both State and Defense weighed in opposed to the concession that you and Secretary Hickel were urging be made on the land issue.

Loesch: Yes.

Willens: Did you personally have any discussions with your counterparts at State and Defense before those agencies weighed in at the Secretarial level in opposition to that proposal?

Loesch: No.

Willens: Do you feel the proposal got serious and careful consideration at the other agencies?

Loesch: Well, I am not prepared to say on that. I doubt it, but I have no basis for saying that, really.

Willens: One of the issues it highlights is that the Defense Department basically was of the view that it could not identify in advance its specific needs for the Trust Territory with the certainty that it was ready to be bound by in subsequent years. I haven't said that very well, but the sense was that they always wanted to preserve the ultimate right, whether it be called eminent domain or presidential authority, to take land in Micronesia in the future if required.

Loesch: That's right.

Willens: And that's reflected as being the underlying reason why they were unprepared at this point in time to accept a compromise proposal.

Loesch: Yes, I think that's accurate. The Defense Department, in spite of urging by the Congress or by the Committee and by everybody, Defense was unprepared to do anything except say: "By god, we just want the whole ball of wax. We want the right to take what we need when we need it, but we don't know what we need or when we need it."

Willens: It does make it difficult for the negotiating representatives under those circumstances.

Loesch: Sure.

Willens: The other issue that came up in the inter-agency group (and this is before your trip to Micronesia) was what kind of proposal should be made to the Micronesians in light of 1) the rejection of the land compromise; and 2) the views they had expressed during the first round of negotiations. Out of those discussions came a proposal from the inter-agency group that you chaired for a constitutional convention bill and a political status bill that set forth two alternatives for the governor's position. Do you recall discussions within the

inter-agency group? I'm looking under now at the moment tab 25, which is prepared by Mr. Peale of the State Department and it refers to an inter-agency working group meeting of November 20 making certain decisions. Do you see that decisions were made in the inter-agency group that you should go forward to Micronesia and present some alternative proposal; and the proposal in mind was the constitutional convention draft?

Loesch: Right.

Willens: Did you have any difficulties within the inter-agency group in persuading State and Defense that under the circumstances the U.S. had to make some kind of an affirmative and new proposal to the Micronesians in order to get any progress in the negotiations?

Loesch: Yes. I felt we had to see if there were any alternatives that would be acceptable.

Willens: Did State or Defense disagree with that?

Loesch: I don't think so. I don't recall that there was any argument about it.

Willens: And then on the elected governor issue, the inter-agency group seemed to accept the proposal that was offered by the Defense Department, which was to include both provisions in the draft legislation. Did you think that was a good idea.

Loesch: Yes, I did.

Willens: What was your thinking at the time?

Loesch: Well, I felt that, if Defense wasn't willing to compromise on the land issue, we'd just have to approach it in a different manner. The constitutional convention offered that kind of opportunity. Now did that answer your question?

Willens: No. My question went to the so-called Political Status bill which the inter-agency group was seemed to be ready to present to the Micronesians. You all concluded that the dispute about whether there should be an elected governor or not should be avoided by presenting both alternative versions in the Political Status bill to the Micronesians to see which they reacted to most favorably or most critically. So it seemed to be a tactic that made some sense. Do you recall any difference of view about that?

Loesch: No, I don't think so.

Willens: These recommendations were discussed at a cabinet-level meeting that was held on or about December 23 (no, December 16 I think) of 1969. I recognize that you were not present at that meeting. The only record I have of it (other than interviews) is the redacted memorandum under tab 28 dated December 16, 1969 prepared by Mr. Peale for the State Department files. He debriefed Assistant Secretary De Palma and this is the result, with the rather conspicuous redaction on the first page that I have to live with. Secretary Hickel did attend this meeting, however. When he came back, did he brief you as to what happened?

Loesch: Yes.

Willens: What did he tell you about Dr. Kissinger's role in the meeting?

Loesch: Wait a minute, you're talking about which meeting?

Willens: There was an inter-agency Secretarial meeting where Secretary Hickel met with the Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, and Assistant Secretary Nutter of Defense. They had before them the recommendations of your inter-agency working group; and the recommendations were the two we've discussed—about a proposing a constitutional convention bill and so forth.

- Loesch: But what you asked me was if Hickel told me about this meeting.
- Willens: Afterwards, yes. You don't remember?
- Loesch: I don't remember at all.
- Willens: Do you remember learning from any source whatsoever that the Secretaries and Kissinger had rejected the recommendations of your group?
- Loesch: Yes. We were just flat told that.
- Willens: Were you given any explanation as to why that had happened?
- Loesch: Not that I recall. I think De Palma told us about the meeting. Yes, I'm sure he did. He told us about the meeting and what had happened.
- Willens: Under the very next tab, there's a De Palma memorandum dated December 19 that refers to a meeting of your inter-agency working group on December 17, which was the day after the Cabinet-level meeting. He reported (and he told me) that Dr. Kissinger just basically took a very strong view—that the United States should not back off from its organic act approach so quickly as the inter-agency working group was recommending. What was your reaction to De Palma's report about the Cabinet-level meeting?
- Loesch: Well, I was pissed off to use the vernacular. I felt that Kissinger really didn't understand as well as Hickel the way of doing business with native peoples. And I remember being somewhat irritated during this meeting.
- Willens: It looks as though Hickel did argue strongly in favor of the Interior proposal and the recommendations that came out of your group.
- Loesch: Right.
- Willens: But he was overruled to some extent by Dr. Kissinger; and also Secretary of State Rogers apparently failed to support the inter-agency group even though he had been fully briefed in advance and seemed to be supportive of it.
- Loesch: Right.
- Willens: I don't have any information as to what position Assistant Secretary Nutter took at that meeting, but since he was outranked on several different counts I expect he couldn't have carried the day in any event.
- Loesch: No.
- Willens: But you were then essentially told (as I understand the documents) to go out to Micronesia anyway, tell them that the land compromise had been rejected, and present to them this Political Status act and not present the constitutional convention proposal that you had wanted to present and that the inter-agency group approved.
- Loesch: Yes, well that was on account of Kissinger. He just flat told us not to do that, didn't he?
- Willens: Had you had any either prior or subsequent dealing with Kissinger with respect to Micronesia status issues?
- Loesch: Yes. I didn't see it in these documents. But I was present at a meeting of Secretaries Hickel and Rogers and Kissinger. No, wait a minute—not Hickel—two other secretaries were Rogers and Laird.
- Willens: You may have been standing in for Secretary Hickel at a meeting with Dr. Kissinger?
- Loesch: I may have been.

- Willens: Do you recall approximately when and what the subject matter was?
- Loesch: Well, it was about this time. I'm talking December of 1969.
- Willens: You're talking before your trip to Micronesia?
- Loesch: Oh, no.
- Willens: That probably happened later?
- Loesch: After my trip to Micronesia.
- Willens: Ok, well maybe we'll come to it because that's important; I would like to hear about that.
- Loesch: I thought I looked at all these documents, I may have missed it.
- Willens: No, I don't have any such document. That's one of the reasons your being available is so important to me. Well, the documents then and your own recollection clearly confirm what your instructions were and you went ahead out to Micronesia. There's a summary of your report to the inter-agency group under tab 31 and actually then there's another report under tab 33. They're very similar. But you apparently told the inter-agency group that you had presented the Political Status Act to members of the delegation, but you had not really received any reaction to it during your visit. Is that correct?
- Loesch: That's right.
- Willens: As you recall the visit, you visited each of the districts.
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: And did you try to meet with the members of the delegation who were from that district in each of their districts, or did you meet with the delegation as a group later on in Saipan?
- Loesch: It was the delegation as a group in Saipan.
- Willens: Did you go through the individual districts before you went to Saipan?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: And did you have any discussions on status in the other districts or were those principally get-acquainted social visits?
- Loesch: They were basically get-acquainted—to let me understand better than I had before of what the general ambience (you might say) was like in all the districts. While I ran into one or two of the delegation in the district, I remember meeting John in Yap.
- Willens: Would you have given him a copy of the Political Status act when you met him in Yap or did you
- Loesch: I don't think so. Whittington and I worked together the whole trip.
- Willens: Is he the only one that traveled with you?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: I'm surprised I didn't find any memorandum for the record written by him about the trip. There may not have been such a memorandum and Interior on the whole was more forthcoming than most of the agencies in providing documents.
- Loesch: I don't think there was any memo on that trip. I talked to Tom on the phone the other day; I should have asked him about that.

- Willens: When you got to Saipan, it looks as though you delivered the proposal and you informed the members of the Micronesian delegation that the land proposal that you had supported had been rejected. The memo indicates on the top of page 2 that they took this information very calmly. What was your real sense at the time of the sentiment of the Micronesians that you met with in Saipan when you told them that the compromise proposal really had not carried the day?
- Loesch: Well, as I recall, they took it very matter of fact. I don't know whether it's accurate to say that they had always expected this result. I think some of the optimists on the delegation thought it might go.
- Willens: Some of the optimists among the Micronesians?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: Who would you identify as among the more optimistic?
- Loesch: Bailey Olter.
- Willens: Would that have included Salii?
- Loesch: I think so, and I'm sure it included Palacios. I'm sure it did.
- Willens: The State Department report or memo (so to speak) of your report indicates further that you were told by the Micronesians that they definitely wanted to have some form of constitutional convention. Is that an accurate report?
- Loesch: That is.
- Willens: Do you recall any specifics about the Micronesians urging this upon you when you were in Saipan?
- Loesch: Well, yes, in one of the informal meetings. Surely there are minutes of the negotiation meeting?
- Willens: Not that I've been able to see.
- Loesch: Well, I recall them just telling me that they were going to have a constitutional convention.
- Willens: And you better agree to it.
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: I don't understand the reference to the "last" meeting contained in this memo and in others. It looks as though you reported to your colleagues back in the United States that the Micronesians told you in Saipan that the next negotiating session would be the last such session unless there were certain agreements expressed by the United States to the demands of the Micronesians.
- Loesch: That's what they told me.
- Willens: What were they insisting that the United States do at the next round of negotiations?
- Loesch: Make some kind of accommodation on the land question and on the self-government.
- Willens: With respect to self-government, does that mean specifically the constitutional convention bill or were they talking more broadly about. . .
- Loesch: They were talking more broadly about an elected governor and other matters, as well as the constitutional convention.

- Willens: The State Department report of your report to the inter-agency working group also emphasizes your report that the Micronesians were increasingly interested in status and that this was a very important time to move forward. You also are reported as saying that one should not overestimate the power of the chiefs in any test of public opinion, making specific reference to Palau. Was it your sense at the time that, if the United States responded to these desires by the Micronesians, you might be able to have gotten agreement that would have kept Micronesia together in some kind of acceptable relationship with the United States?
- Loesch: Ask me that again please.
- Willens: Well, do you think at the time and this will come up I guess in the course of the second round of negotiations, but the question is asking you to (with the benefit of hindsight) give me your judgment about whether the Micronesians were ready in all six districts to agree to a permanent relationship with the United States, if the United States had been willing to compromise on the land issue and give them some of the important elements of self-government.
- Loesch: Yes. That was my impression at the time and really still is.
- Willens: Your report then prompted more discussion within the Executive Branch because your recommendations certainly suggested a course of action that went farther than had been agreed to by Dr. Kissinger at the December 1969 meeting. Initially as the State Department reported, your colleagues from other agencies were very apprehensive about any constitutional convention and they expressed some doubt about whether the inter-agency group could go ahead and adopt a new policy based on your recommendations in view of what their principals had agreed to just a few months earlier. Do you recall discussing that kind of political problem with your colleagues?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: And were you urging that they support your views and go back to their principals and get them to change their mind?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: What kind of reaction did you get from the two agencies?
- Loesch: Very frightened.
- Willens: Do you remember any specifics about the State Department or Defense Department views after you made your report?
- Loesch: Well, I remember State Department saying: "No way they're going to go back to their principals." I really don't remember what Defense said.
- Willens: There seems to have been growing support though within the inter-agency group for some kind of a constitutional convention proposal. But they still were anxious to hear specific views from the Micronesians as to the Political Status Act that you had left with them. And so many of these memos suggest that the Executive Branch should defer making any judgment about its next step in the negotiations until the Micronesians had responded. Did you have any doubt as to what kind of response you were going to get from the Micronesians to the draft legislation that you left with them? Did you think they would embrace it?
- Loesch: No, I didn't think they would embrace it without amendment. But I was still fairly confident that we could reach agreement if the U.S. had sufficient flexibility.

- Willens: Chairman Salii did finally submit comments by letter dated February 2, 1970 (under tab 35 in the book) and it provides a fairly detailed legislative proposal that is (as he indicated in his letter) substantially different from what the U.S. had proposed. The differences between the two approaches and the statements made by Salii about the need for some action by the United States seems to have prompted some change of sentiment within the inter-agency group. Is that your recollection—that they were surprised by this Micronesian submission and decided that some change in U.S. position was warranted?
- Loesch: You know, I don't have any recollection of what the reaction was. Somewhere about this time, I was in a meeting with a few Secretaries and Kissinger, in some office in the State Department, in which I tried to change their minds about our position and back the inter-agency group's position.
- Willens: Was it specifically directed toward presenting a constitutional conventional bill?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: Because Salii did come in with a letter dated February 27, 1970 saying "at this time I simply wish to informally let you know that unless the United States is willing to let the Micronesians draft and adopt their own constitution I do not see much chance for successful negotiations between your group and ours." That kind of letter did prompt some concern, which is reflected in briefing papers prepared for the Under Secretaries Committee. So do you think it's possible that sometime then in March or April before the next round of negotiations, you had the meeting with Dr. Kissinger and the two Cabinet officers?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: What was Dr. Kissinger's reaction on this occasion?
- Loesch: Well, he told me in no uncertain terms that he saw no reason to go back and change their minds. I told him that I didn't think he understood the essence of the native peoples concerns and it seemed to me that the United States needed to be more flexible than he and the Secretaries were allowing. (There must be a memo on that meeting somewhere.) Anyway, it didn't last very long, because those two statements were about it. Secretary Rogers sat back; he didn't take much part in it. Secretary Laird simply reiterated that the Defense Department didn't want to back up on its land requirements. So I was out-ranked and out-voted.
- Willens: With the benefit of hindsight, it's hard to see why Secretary Laird (particularly since he's a fairly flexible fellow) didn't see that there were many ways to achieve the national security objectives of the United States out in Micronesia.
- Loesch: I didn't mean to say that he was inflexible about how that was to be achieved. He wasn't inflexible in that way. He just said that Defense has minimums.
- Willens: Did Dr. Kissinger evidence any familiarity with the history of the negotiations and the differences among the districts?
- Loesch: No.
- Willens: And where one might ultimately want to end up?
- Loesch: I don't think he had focused enough on the thing to really know what he was talking out, to tell you the truth.
- Willens: Well, what's interesting about the process is that the National Security Council was extensively reorganized under his initiative in early 1969 to use such devices as the Under

Secretaries Committee to deal with policies like Micronesia. Here you have an instance where the machinery developed a proposal and approach that he then interceded with and rejected the proposal.

Loesch: Yes, right.

Willens: The Under Secretaries Committee received a detailed briefing paper (which is under tab 39 of the book). There is no signature associated with this nor really a date, although I think it was sometime in April 1970. I have the strong suspicion this may have been drafted by you or under your auspices. Do you recognize this document sufficiently to know who might have drafted it?

Loesch: Yes. I think Whittington and I drafted it.

Willens: It then does march through the alternatives and recommendations again and advances a proposal for providing a statement of principles as to a future political relationship rather than a specific legislative proposal, and to submit a detailed constitutional convention legislative proposal. That seems to be the recommendations that came out of this inter-agency group. One question on the use of the term "commonwealth," you had asked for some advice from Brewster Chapman as to the use of the term "commonwealth" and he supplied you with a memorandum that I've submitted in the book.

Loesch: I didn't care really what the legal definition of "commonwealth" was.

Willens: Was it your idea to reframe the Political Status Act as a "commonwealth" proposal for presentation to the Micronesians or did that idea come from elsewhere?

Loesch: I think it was mine.

Willens: And what did you hope to accomplish in that respect?

Loesch: Well, the Micronesian delegation had floated the notion of a commonwealth and I don't think they cared any more about the legal definition of it than I did. And it just occurred to me that if we've produced something under the term commonwealth it might get a better reception in Micronesia. That's about it.

Willens: There is a document here (I forget which one it is) that suggests that the use of the term commonwealth was more a matter of cosmetics than substance.

Loesch: That's true.

Willens: And I must say the only place in these documents where I found some tendency to question you, was when in the course of the negotiations you attempted to defend the commonwealth proposal as being vastly different from an organic act that had been previously submitted.

Loesch: Probably.

Willens: And it seemed to me you might, given your background and knowledge, have been doing that with the best of intentions but recognizing there was some problem there.

Loesch: Yes, I think so. As far as I was concerned, it was a cosmetic sort of thing and, of course, I felt that we ought to go along with an organic act under new restrictions whether the organic act came as a result of a constitutional convention or our initiative or their initiative. Really, looking back and even then, I was sure that the term commonwealth didn't really mean anything.

Willens: That is a subject on which I spent a fair amount of time in later years, trying to give it some substantive content that made a difference.

- Loesch: You were more successful.
- Willens: There certainly is a debate on that subject. The proposal from the inter-agency group in terms of strategy seems to have been endorsed by the Under Secretaries Committee. There are memos in here that set forth the strategy, for example, under Tab 41 there's sort of a summary of the position that will be taken during the negotiations. Here we begin to see in the documents some consideration given to what the position of the United States should be if the Micronesians refuse to negotiate seriously in response to the U.S. proposal. On page 2, for example, it says that in the event our proposals are received unfavorably by the Micronesians "the U.S. delegation should make clear the ultimate limits of the U.S. position" and so forth. Was it your view that the Executive Branch had reached a firm position at the time that, if the Micronesians wouldn't work within this framework that was being set forth, they should be told essentially that there was no room for further bargaining?
- Loesch:: Yes.
- Willens: I don't want to put it too strongly or overstate the proposition.
- Loesch:: But I think that's the way we were.
- Willens: And it seems to reflect a considered U.S. view that its objectives in terms of national security and so forth could not be met within a free association context. That seems never to have been seriously considered up to this stage during the negotiations through Round 2, either because of U.S. uncertainty about what it meant or because of lack of certainty as to the need to support it or whatever. What's your judgment?
- Loesch:: I think that the U.S. didn't really follow through on what could be made out of free association. The terms of free association were never really defined. I'm trying to think. Somewhere along about this time, we did have within the Inter-Agency C'ommittee a discussion about what were the prospects of defining free association so that it could meet with U.S. ultimate requirements. Is that reflected anywhere?
- Willens: Well, there are some papers generated within the State Department in particular (that are not in this book) that reflect that kind of consideration, because people at the State Department (and I'm sure you also) were aware that the Cook Island relationship was an example of a free association relationship. And so I'm not at all surprised to hear that there were such discussions (except exactly when they took place I don't know). Let's go to the second round of negotiations then, because the Micronesians attempted to give substance to their objectives of free association by articulating for the first time the so-called Four Principles. Under Tab 43 there's the official summary of the negotiations, and on page 1 there's a recital of the Four Principles which were announced early on in the negotiations which lasted, as I understand it, for only a week.
- Loesch:: Yes.
- Willens: What is your general recollection of the second round and, in particular, the U.S. response to the Micronesian statement of Four Principles?
- Loesch:: Well, the atmosphere was entirely different from the earlier round. The discussions were more heated than they had been before.
- Willens: And to what do you attribute that?
- Loesch:: Well, I really attribute it to intransigence by us on the land position and free association. I think we just hadn't explored sufficiently what we could do with free association.

- Willens: The Micronesians came in with criticisms of the U.S. legislative proposal as inconsistent with its Four Principles with respect to sovereignty and so forth and so on. To some extent do you feel they came in very critical of a U.S. proposal that they thought had not responded to their earlier statements?
- Loesch:: I think so.
- Willens: Where did the statement of Four Principles come from? I mean, do you remember the circumstances under which it was articulated by Lazarus Salii at one of the early sessions?
- Loesch:: Yes. It was articulated by Salii and somebody else.
- Willens: Did those statements come as a surprise to you or the members of your delegation?
- Loesch:: I don't remember.
- Willens: Who was on your delegation for this round?
- Loesch:: Oh, boy.
- Willens: I don't see a list, actually, here.
- Loesch:: It was a bigger delegation than it had been.
- Willens: Was it?
- Loesch:: Yes, and. . . .
- Willens: Had you had some input as to who would be there.
- Loesch:: Yes, I did.
- Willens: And do you think Commander Kuhn might have been there at the second one.
- Loesch:: Yes, I know he was, yes.
- Willens: Was Tom Whittington there with you?
- Loesch:: Yes, he was there with me.
- Willens: And Peale or someone . . .
- Loesch:: Peale and somebody else was there from State.
- Willens: From State? Was anyone from Justice involved?
- Loesch:: I don't think so. Not in the Saipan negotiations.
- Willens: Even this two-page summary tends to confirm your recollection that there was a sharp exchange of views.
- Loesch:: Yes, there was.
- Willens: On page 2 of this official report, there's a statement beginning near the top of the page about the major points made by the U.S. delegation. You clearly had to deal, perhaps for the first time, with what became the very controversial issue of unilateral termination.
- Loesch:: Yes.
- Willens: What was your view as to whether unilateral termination could be agreed to consistent with any concept of the United States exercising sovereignty? More of a legal question than either of us might be prepared to opine about today. It's an interesting issue as to whether unilateral termination is consistent with the concept of sovereignty, but there seemed to be some suggestion here that the view you took on behalf of the United States at the time was that unilateral termination was simply unacceptable . . .

- Loesch:: Yes.
- Willens: . . . because it appeared, at least at first blush, to be inconsistent with the national security objectives of the United States.
- Loesch:: I was just checking. The third line of that paragraph 5 has the word “officers” in it, it means “offers.”
- Willens: Offers, yes, I saw it. (Lawyers are always given to finding typos.) Do you have any further recollection about any internal discussions within your delegation about unilateral termination at this time?
- Loesch:: No, I don’t have any.
- Willens: And then at the very end of the negotiations, the Micronesians raised, at least according to this report, whether the United States was prepared to negotiate with respect to the terms under which Micronesia would achieve independence. Do you recall the subject of independence coming up during this round?
- Loesch:: Yes, I do.
- Willens: What do you recall?
- Loesch:: I recall discussions in which Micronesians raised independence and we said: “Hey, you people aren’t viable as a totally independent outfit. Where are you going to get the money to do anything?” And I remember Salii saying: “Well, heck, we’ll just ask Japan.”
- Willens: Well, they said that subsequently on many occasions. Did they raise the question that they would make the United States pay for the right to use Micronesian land for military purposes?
- Loesch:: Oh, yes, they raised that. We said: “Hell, we’ll be fair.”
- Willens: But you basically were not authorized really to have any discussion on the alternative of independence, isn’t that correct?
- Loesch:: That’s right.
- Willens: Did this round of negotiations end more rapidly than you had assumed because of the differences that were exposed early in the session between the two positions?
- Loesch:: I think so. When I went, I didn’t have any really firm notion of how long it was going to take, but I do know that it wound up quicker than we thought it would.
- Willens: It was at this session where the Micronesians took their very critical view of the so-called “Commonwealth Proposal.”
- Loesch:: Yes.
- Willens: Then, of course, subsequently after the session ended, the Marianas representatives gave speeches back in Saipan and in the Congress of Micronesia saying that, in their opinion, the “Commonwealth Proposal” was, if not immediately acceptable, at least it was an attractive place to begin. Do you recall during the negotiations themselves any different views expressed by the Marianas representatives?
- Loesch:: No.
- Willens: Were Palacios and Manglona the two Marianas representatives again?
- Loesch:: I don’t remember them taking any different positions.

- Willens: I don't see in the brief summary any indication that the issue of eminent domain and land had the prominence that it had during the first round. Is that correct.
- Loesch:: No. That's right.
- Willens: Was that simply because these overriding issues raised by the Four Principles took precedence?
- Loesch:: Yes, I believe that's true. The Micronesians felt that if we couldn't get over the Four Principles there wasn't any use talking about anything else. I think they still held pretty heavy views about land acquisition.
- Willens: Some of the subsequent reactions within the United States raised the question as to the extent to which the Micronesian delegation really was speaking on behalf of the Micronesian people. Did you personally have any sense that the delegation headed by Salii was not fully representative or did you have the sense that they probably were as representative a group as you were likely to negotiate with?
- Loesch:: Yes, I felt that. I didn't feel that there was any wide divergent view from the people.
- Willens: Did you think that ultimately the decisions on the Micronesian side would be made by people like Lazarus Salii and his colleagues on the delegation and in the Congress of Micronesia?
- Loesch:: Yes, I did.
- Willens: But there's some sense (occasionally in the documents) that reports came in from Micronesia that the Micronesian people themselves are ill-informed, but that when it comes down to it they'll probably follow their leaders.
- Loesch:: I think that's absolutely true.
- Willens: Did you regard the position of the Micronesians in the second round as being strongly and firmly stated?
- Loesch:: Yes, I did.
- Willens: What did you anticipate was going to be the reaction back in the United States Congress when you or others had the pleasurable duty of reporting to the Congress?
- Loesch:: Well, I don't know. I felt that the Chairman, Mr. Aspinall, would say, well, we weren't skilled enough to [negotiate with the Micronesians].
- Willens: Under Tab 48 of the book, there is a State Department memorandum that reports on apparently what was the second of the two briefing sessions of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Subcommittee on Territories that you participated in. There apparently was a first briefing session (for which I seem not to have any memorandum) at which Congressman Aspinall had not been present. Do you have any recollection of the first of the two briefing sessions that might have been refreshed by this document?
- Loesch: A little memory. I remember that Congressman Meeds was at that original session, I can't remember who else.
- Willens: Well, Congressman Carey was, because there is under another tab (Tab 45) a letter from you to Congressman Carey dated June 25, 1970 reporting that the briefing session took place before the Subcommittee on June 4 and a question was raised by another Congressman as to the constitutionality of the land tenure provision. You by way of responding to that inquiry enclosed a legal opinion.
- Loesch: He was that wild Congressman from Arizona.

- Willens: Did you recall any particular controversy at the first of the two briefing sessions?
- Loesch: No.
- Willens: Did you generally take representatives from the State and Defense along with you or did you handle these briefing sessions yourself? The inter-agency group seems to have been represented at the second of the two sessions, so that might have been the case at the first as well.
- Loesch: Yes, I think so.
- Willens: Just by the way, was the constitutionality issue on the land tenure subject something of particular importance to you or to Members of Congress?
- Loesch: Yes, it was of importance to some of the Members of the Committee.
- Willens: Were they generally willing to try to give the Micronesians some substantial control over disposition of their property if it were constitutional?
- Loesch: Yes, I think so.
- Willens: Did you share that view?
- Loesch: I did.
- Willens: Did you think that it was an important issue on which you (on behalf of the U.S) had to provide some comfort if you could to the Micronesians?
- Loesch: Yes, I certainly felt we ought to go as far as we could.
- Willens: Under Tab 48 we have the more detailed report of the second briefing session, and here on page 1 you will see that Congressman Aspinall once again expressed his view that the Executive Branch was not in agreement and was asking the Committee to do its job for them. You responded according to this report tactfully. You tried to emphasize that the Executive Branch had tried to agree on a proposal. What was the general tenor of Congressman Aspinall's views—I mean either as expressed during this briefing session or in any private meetings you had with him? What did he think you had done right or wrong and where did he think you ought to go from here.
- Loesch: Well, he didn't in terms criticize the operation of the interagency group. I can't remember what he thought we ought to do next.
- Willens: It seems to me that you were probably in a position that you couldn't really say what the Executive Branch was thinking of doing next, because you were simply reporting on what had happened and there hadn't been any sort of reconsideration of the matter yet within the Executive Branch.
- Loesch: No, I don't remember.
- Willens: It looks as though he did express some reluctance to anything that sounded like a commonwealth.
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: Then Congressman Carey reportedly suggested that perhaps the Committee itself might participate in the negotiations. There had been an exchange of letters between you and Lazarus Salii about whether Members of Congress or their staff should be invited to participate in the negotiation. What was your position on that issue?
- Loesch: My position was that we shouldn't do it. In the first place, I was still hopeful that in the end the Administration would take a more liberal position than it had up until then. And

I wasn't at all sure that Congressman Aspinall's position would be in favor of that. He was a very conservative guy. I really thought it was an Administration thing until we reach some final agreement and then get the Congress involved to implement the agreement. So I guess that was my attitude.

Willens: On page 3 of this report about the Congressional hearing, there is an interesting exchange that apparently took place between you and Congresswoman Mink. I don't know whether you had the chance to review this, but it looks as though she was pressing for some more specific Defense Department views as to what exactly they needed in the area and I see that Commander Kuhn is referred to here. What is your best recollection of Congresswoman Mink and what attitude she was taking toward these negotiations?

Loesch: She was taking an adverse attitude toward our position. Do you remember her? She was a very liberal gal from Hawaii and always, on any circumstances, (I testified before that Committee during my time as secretary) and never once did Mrs. Mink take a stand in favor of whatever the Administration wanted to do. She was always against everything. She was a Democrat, of course, and a very liberal Democrat. And she was, I don't know what her question was here and this doesn't say. It must have been what our least requirements were.

Willens: And whether they could be met through treaty relationships rather than insisting on some kind of permanent affiliation. But there came a time, I forget, there was a time both earlier and later, where every so often it would be suggested that Micronesia should be annexed to the State of Hawaii. That, I think, predated your time but I wonder how Mrs. Mink would have responded to that. But you think that to some extent her views here were motivated by her liberal position . . .

Loesch: Yes.

Willens: And perhaps real skepticism about Defense Department assertion of needs in Micronesia.

Loesch: I think so.

Willens: Congressman Meeds apparently went out of his way to compliment the Executive Branch on its proposal. He was the one who asked DOD if it could define its needs with somewhat more specificity and Commander Kuhn did that. You said earlier that Congressman Meeds, whose affiliation I forget

Loesch: I think he was a Democrat.

Willens: But, he was on the whole, you said, somewhat more sympathetic to the U.N. concerns that the State Department was trying to accommodate.

Loesch: Right. Incidentally, I notice Congressman Kyle. His son is now from Senator from Arizona.

Willens: You apparently said that you were sure that the Micronesians understood the nature of the proposal. That is probably true, isn't it.

Loesch: Sure.

Willens: At the end of this report, there is a very brief reference to Congressman Saylor who, on this occasion and others, apparently engaged in some tirade against the Department of State.

Loesch: He was a loud-mouth.

- Willens: So, just to step back from that particular session, I guess so far as Congressman Aspinall was concerned and other Members of his Committee, they did not disagree with what you had done up to this point. It sounds as though most of them probably weren't too unhappy with the resolution of the matter.
- Loesch: I think that is true.
- Willens: I mean maybe only Mrs. Mink and maybe Congressman Meeds felt that there had to be more of an effort to reach agreement. But it is hard to keep track of what the Congressional sentiment was over the years.
- Loesch: I don't think the Committee was dissatisfied with what had happened so far.
- Willens: As a result of the second round, of course, the inter-agency working group once again under your leadership regrouped and tried to reassess what to do. One gets the sense at about this time and one of the hypotheses is that to some extent the Micronesians seized the initiative sometime here in 1969 or 1970, not due to any great skill of theirs, but from that point on the United States was more or less in a reacting position. Not to be critical, but simply that is the way the dynamics of it seems to have worked out.
- Loesch: Yes. I think that's right.
- Willens: During this period, of course, there was the annual report to the U.N. Trusteeship Council. We haven't mentioned any aspect of that. In 1970, there had been a visiting mission which issued a lengthy report and representatives of the United States had to appear to respond to those comments. One interesting point I noticed was that the U.S. delegation and the Micronesian delegation had agreed not to provide any detailed report to the visiting mission or the U.N. as to what had happened at the first two rounds of the negotiations. I found that most unusual that both parties had agreed that it was in their mutual interest. Do you have any recollection as to how that came about?
- Loesch: A little. The State Department, of course, was always looking at the U.N.. I think it believed that we should have made more progress by the time the U.N. mission was looking. And the Micronesians at that point did not really want the U.N. to get involved in future political status.
- Willens: Did they think that would not be helpful for them?
- Loesch: Yes, well, I don't know about that. They understood that the U.N. in general was against colonization and for independence and so on, so I think—I don't know, but I really believe that probably the Micronesian attitude was that they wanted to finish their business with the U.S. before the U.N. got into it.
- Willens: It certainly is consistent with the record that I have seen. There were times both before 1970 and afterwards where the Micronesians tried to use the leverage of the U.N. within the Trusteeship Council to bring pressure to bear on the U.S., but apparently Lazarus Salii and his colleagues made a judgment that this was not a time at which to do that.
- Loesch: I think that is right.
- Willens: So as it happened then, the Trusteeship Council and the visiting mission simply said that negotiations had gone on, but they were unable to say anything specifically about the positions of the parties. Under Tab 49, we have a memorandum for the President (one of relatively few such memoranda that were produced) more or less informing the President, I suppose more specifically the Under Secretaries Committee, since this may be a draft, I am not sure whether this is a draft memoranda to the President or whether it actually went forward. But it basically indicates that the inter-agency group and the Under Secretaries

Committee will be preparing an options paper with respect to Micronesia. In the last page of the memo on page 3, it states that Secretary Hickel plans to make a visit to the islands shortly after the November 1970 election and it would be desirable to have a re-examination of the issue before then. Do you recall playing any role in getting the Under Secretaries Committee to reassess the situation in light of what had happened during the last round?

Loesch: No, I don't.

Willens: As a result, there was an options paper prepared (under Tab 51). I forget whether this one at the end of page 16 has a handwritten signature that may or may not be yours.

Loesch: I think it is mine.

Willens: This was a version that was supplied to us in several different copies with a diminishing number of redactions. But nonetheless, do you recall working with your colleagues in the inter-agency group in preparing this options paper?

Loesch: I do. That is my real signature.

Willens: Is it?

Loesch: I had a stamp, but this isn't it.

Willens: Well, this is a very sort of comprehensive, but brief, summary of where the negotiations had been and identified several options for consideration by the Under Secretaries Committee. These options and some refinements of them were subsequently reviewed later in the year and then early in 1971, and we'll come to that. One interesting point is that again among the options there is no discussion of free association.

Loesch: No.

Willens: Was that a deliberate decision within the inter-agency group that you wanted to proceed without that?

Loesch: Yes.

Willens: Did you personally think it was time to at least list free association as one of the options, even if it was far down the list.

Loesch: I did.

Willens: But you were out-voted on that issue.

Loesch: Yes, I was.

Willens: Was that because of the reasons we have discussed before—that people simply didn't think we understood what it was or were unprepared to go that far?

Loesch: I think probably a little of both, but also it was a reflection I think of Chairman Aspinall's attitude. He didn't want anything to do with free association.

Willens: That is certainly true. To some extent then, if you took a position that at least it ought to be considered, you were demonstrating some measure of independence in terms of Congressman Aspinall's views?

Loesch: True.

Willens: And you were prepared to do that?

Loesch: Yes.

- Willens: You thought you could deal with the Congressman and, if he disagreed with what you were doing, you would explain what you had done.
- Loesch: Sure.
- Willens: Some of your predecessors basically felt terribly constrained, and felt that they could not introduce any idea within the Executive Branch that they were not assured would be acceptable to Congressman Aspinall.
- Loesch: Oh, we didn't have any of that.
- Willens: You did not?
- Loesch: No. I frequently disagreed policy-wise with the Chairman. We were good friends. He knew I respected him and I believe he respected me, but that didn't mean we agreed and I didn't really care whether we agreed or not on Administration decisions or policies. Of course, the preceding Administrations were Democratic, which probably made Aspinall's opinions and activities more important, you know, being the same party. Democrats were still, of course, in control in the House, as it has been about the same for 40 years.
- Willens: Perhaps until today. Well, John Carver made the point that in your job you had so many responsibilities other than the Trust Territory on which the Congressman in his capacity as chairman of the relevant committee exercised great authority, that you really had to pick your issues very carefully as to those on which you might disagree with him.
- Loesch: I think that is right.
- Willens: But, in any event, this memorandum represents an assessment of Micronesian sentiment that is quite important. On the middle of page 4, for example, there is a suggestion that although true sentiment on the status issue throughout the territory is difficult to gauge. It identifies two facts—the first is that numerous members of the Congress of Micronesia are increasingly taking a hard-line stance in favor of the Four Principles or perhaps independence; and the second point that you make here is that there is a growing sentiment in the Marianas for becoming part of the U.S.. One of the options in this paper is a district-by-district-option
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: And it seems to be the first time that I have seen in the records where the Executive Branch is considering seriously an approach that would enable the Marianas to separate itself out. How did that particular option come to be included in this memorandum, if you can remember.
- Loesch: I can remember a little something about it. We were well aware of the Marianas attitude. I recall discussing just informally with members of the delegation whether there was a way in which we could separate the Marianas under the Trust agreement and, of course, there wasn't any way.
- Willens: You discussed it with whom—other agency officials or with the Micronesians?
- Loesch: No, not with the Micronesians—with our inter-agency group members.
- Willens: That's right. And there were some legal memoranda that were developed on this issue suggesting that it would not be permitted to terminate the trusteeship with respect to one and not all the districts. As you know, that proved not to be a legal position to which the U.S. adhered over the years. But you also were presumably aware that the Marianas representatives and leadership were speaking out in favor of the Commonwealth Proposal that the others had rejected.

Loesch: Yes.

Willens: So I assume that, given the DOD interest in the Marianas, this was something that you wanted to have the Under Secretaries Committee consider. Some of the documents that are not in this book suggest that the Department of Defense may have exercised some influence in supporting this kind of approach. As they were asked to be more specific, the focus became increasingly directed toward the Marianas. Some of the internal DOD documents suggest that the principal objectives could be achieved if the Marianas were brought under the sovereignty of the United States. Do you recall any discussions with DOD personnel along those lines?

Loesch: No.

Willens: One of the options was a commonwealth proposal that would be modified to permit some form of unilateral termination. I guess that assumes that the Inter-Agency Committee believed that you could have a territorial relationship with an area like Guam or Micronesia, even if the territory itself had the option at some point in the future to reach a contrary decision.

Loesch: Yes, yes.

Willens: Was that subject ever analyzed in any legal memoranda?

Loesch: I don't think so.

Willens: I didn't see any such document. But that was the assumption and you believed that it was one on which the U.S. could proceed.

Loesch: Yes.

Willens: This options paper also suggests that the independence option should not be presented, but it's the fourth option and there's some suggestion here that (I guess the much longer list of arguments against it than there are arguments for it) indicates (I guess also for the first time) that you and your colleagues believe that independence could at least be put on the bargaining table for discussion purposes with the Micronesians, even if it was thought there was more of a bargaining chip to be advanced by the United States.

Loesch: Yes, I think that's accurate. There was a range, of course, of opinion—ranging from Kissinger's attitude to Mink's attitude about future relationship. I never really understood why Kissinger was so adamant. Of course, he might deny it, but I never thought he liked me. I know that he felt that Interior was incompetent to handle the kind of negotiations we were in. Of course, that is shown by what happened towards the end. I got canned as far as having any respectable influence on what was going on. I was not happy when [that happened], and of course this denouement was sort of like the original notion of a special assistant to the President or whatever it was. And Hickel who was on the way out when all this happened, and I don't remember if Morton was in or just coming in.

Willens: When did Hickel leave, I forget?

Loesch: He left in May of 1971, I'm pretty sure.

Willens: May of 1971. Yes, that's right about when these things were happening.

Loesch: I was naturally protecting my turf. I was unhappy the way it was going. And I didn't think that Haydn Williams knew anymore about Micronesia than my staff did. And the staff of the inter-agency group. But of course I never made any fuss about anything. It wasn't my prerogative. I was just out of the loop all of a sudden and in a way that was a relief.

- Willens: It does appear that you obviously were asked to help with the transition and there were some visits in which you participated. But it certainly became clear that despite the references in the terms of reference to the prominence of the Department of the Interior that Ambassador Williams and the newly-established office pretty much took the task and ran the show essentially from that point forward.
- Loesch: Sure.
- Willens: And it generated some disputes and problems down the line. When the Under Secretaries Committee met on December 3, 1970 and under tab 52 there's a statement, a three-page statement, which is attributed to you. Do you recall making this statement at the Under Secretaries Committee?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: Was it unusual for you to attend those meetings?
- Loesch: It didn't happen often. It happened more than once but not often.
- Willens: But you were asked on behalf of the interagency group to explain the recommendations that were being put before the Undersecretaries Committee?
- Loesch: Right.
- Willens: And you decided to write a statement out rather than purport to do it extemporaneously?
- Loesch: That's right. If I remember correctly, and I think I do, I furnished this memo to them at the meeting.
- Willens: I see.
- Loesch: But then expanded on it some ad lib.
- Willens: This was the meeting at which Acting Secretary of the Interior Russell made a proposal that seemed to (excuse the expression) come off the wall.
- Loesch: It sure did. Russell was an odd ball.
- Willens: He had replaced Train presumably because of the relationship with Secretary Hickel that you referred to earlier.
- Loesch: Right.
- Willens: Did Under Secretary Russell take any particular interest in your work in the Trust Territory.
- Loesch: Not that I know of.
- Willens: So where did this proposal come from (if you know) that essentially the Trust Territory stay in place but that increased self-government be provided?
- Loesch: Russell was a peculiar person, very conservative, and didn't believe that anybody in the Interior Department was competent in anything. He was a loose cannon, believe me.
- Willens: Where did he come from?
- Loesch: I don't know.
- Willens: Had Hickel selected him?
- Loesch: Oh, no. He came from the White House. He'd been involved in some kind of political activity for Nixon. I don't remember where he came from.

- Willens: Did you know he was going to make this proposal before the meeting?
- Loesch: No, I didn't.
- Willens: Did you after?
- Loesch: It was a great shock to me, I am telling you.
- Willens: All of us who have served in the government had had this happen to us from time to time. Did you after the meeting tried to persuade him that his alternative lacked merit?
- Loesch: I did and I didn't get to the first base; he just shot me down.
- Willens: It appears that from that point forward as the Under Secretaries Committee considered these options looking toward a recommendation to the President that Russell's option supported by Interior was featured in the memorandum to the President (through Kissinger's office) but was opposed by the two other departments.
- Loesch: Right, and the support by Interior was against my will.
- Willens: Did the other members of the Inter-Agency Committee know that you personally did not support it?
- Loesch: They sure did.
- Willens: And they shared your views?
- Loesch: Oh, yes. That came as the biggest surprise in the whole process.
- Willens: So this was ultimately presented to the President in March of 1971, after the Under Secretaries Committee considered it, and basically now there are (I forgot whether there are five or six options), but the essential approach recommended was to go with a commonwealth proposal but try to make concessions that were designed to meet the Micronesian concerns. At the time this was put before the President, were you optimistic that this provided a set of negotiating instructions that might carry the day with the Micronesians?
- Loesch: I was optimistic, yes.
- Willens: Why was that?
- Loesch: I was less optimistic about eventual agreement than I had been earlier, but at the same time I still hoped that, if we were flexible enough, we could make something good out of it. What tab is it?
- Willens: Well the best tab to look at is under 58—which actually is the March 31, 1971 memorandum for the President and basically, without editorializing too much, and turning to page 6, the negotiating approach that was recommended to the President and adopted by the President seems to include some of the views that you frankly had been urging for more than a year.
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: In the sense that step B with a modified commonwealth was going to advance concessions on eminent domain. We haven't discussed federal supremacy, but the eminent domain concession here was that something you thought was responsive to what had been the long-held Micronesian view on the subject?
- Loesch: Yes.
- Willens: Then Step C on the next page—the modified commonwealth with the additional

concession with unilateral termination—this represented the first indication that the U.S. might be able to agree to unilateral termination with some caveats.

Loesch: Yes.

Willens: And that I guess could be seen as a very important proposal. What the chairman did in between this memo and finally submitting it to the President, he changed some things here—he made the district-by-district analysis the last one. But then there seems to be a free association alternative on page 9 of this memorandum; here it suggest that the United States for the first time might be willing to abandon the goal of U.S. sovereignty, but that they would try to negotiate a free association compact terminable only by mutual consent.

Loesch: Yes.

Willens: Does that make sense to you, or did it make sense to you at the time—that you could agree to a free association relationship and yet condition it on a mutual consent requirement in order to terminate it?

Loesch: I didn't think that that would sell with the Micronesians. I felt that this was a sort of stop-gap proposition to see if we couldn't get back to a negotiating standpoint with the Micronesians.

Willens: In the sense that at least it had the U.S. being ready to discuss some form of free association, is that your point?

Loesch: That's my point. Yes. Now it was right about this time that I was out of it.

Willens: Not quite yet, but coming. Well, at about this time or a month before in February 1971, the Marianas District Legislature had not only passed a resolution threatening to secede if they weren't allow to pursue their independent status objective, but coincidentally the Congress of Micronesian buildings were burned down—in an act of arson. Were these events that brought home to the Executive Branch the seriousness of the Marianas purposes?

Loesch: Yes, they were. And I think that's what triggered, although he had undoubtedly been thinking about it for a long time, I think that's what triggered Kissinger's activity also. I remember, when I first heard about what was going to happen, I wondered who the possible appointment might go to. I had frankly never heard of Haydn Williams at the time. But what I heard about him sounded good.

Willens: Well, let's turn to the memorandum of December 24, 1970 that Dr. Kissinger wrote to the President (under Tab 55). I have no documents that indicate or illuminate what prompted Kissinger to make this recommendation at this time. I have no documents from any of the agencies that indicate that they were pushing for this at this time and what prompted him to make the recommendation. The people at the State Department tell me that they heard about Haydn Williams appointment before, I mean they heard that someone was going to be appointed before it was actually publicly announced. Did you hear before the Haydn Williams appointment was announced that there was going to be a special assistant?

Loesch: Yes, well I heard that.

Willens: You did, how did you hear it? From the Secretary or from other Department personnel?

Loesch: I think it came second-hand to me through [someone] who heard it through the Justice Department. If I remember right, that's the first I heard of it.

Willens: And did you hear that there was going to be a special assistant or did you hear that Haydn Williams was going to be appointed?

Loesch: I just heard that there was going to be a special assistant.

Willens: You have expressed some views about that, but putting aside personalities and the way in which it may have been handled, do you feel today that the idea of appointing someone in this capacity was a good idea or not?

Loesch: I thought it was a good idea. Considering the fact that there was quite a body of opinion, not only Kissinger's but others, that the Interior Department wasn't necessarily competent to do this kind of negotiations. I think we might of gotten quite ahead if we had this kind of organization from the very beginning. I thought I did a good job within my limitations, but I never considered myself an expert negotiator, I'll tell you.

Willens: What interests me about this is that really there was nothing in the first two rounds of negotiations, in which you participated as chief negotiator, to suggest that the problems inhered in the Department of Interior, in the sense that all the positions being urged on behalf of the United States had been the result of extensive inter-agency deliberation.

Loesch: Yes.

Willens: So I don't really, I mean I am not sure that this was motivated because of a conviction that the Department of Interior by definition was incompetent, which I think would be unfair. The sense was that there were multiple agencies involved and there probably had to be some way to get them together in some authoritative sense and perhaps get White House support. The need for White House support was what had been urged long ago by the State Department, and I would tend to share your view that perhaps that if it had been done earlier than later, it might have been more effective. There is some correspondence indicating that you did play a role in drafting the terms of reference for Williams. I found a letter that you wrote to the NSC staff enclosing the terms of reference. I believe the date is May 25, 1971 and I do have the terms of reference here. My only question to you is whether you remember any real dispute among the agencies with respect to the terms of reference under which Ambassador Williams was supposed to function. The terms of reference basically set out who is to coordinate his work, what his duties are, and then in the last part of it has relationship to the executive departments and it says the negotiations will be conducted under the "aegis of the Secretary of the Interior." It says that the Secretary of the Interior will provide appropriate administrative budgetary and other support. The clear indication is that Interior was supposed to continue to occupy some kind of a primary position among the agencies with respect to negotiations. Did you recall discussing the terms of reference in draft form before it was produced?

Loesch: No, I don't remember at all.

Willens: Do you remember seeing the terms of reference before?

Loesch: No. I don't remember it at all.

Willens: Do you remember hearing of any issues discussed or differences among the agencies as to what his terms of reference should be?

Loesch: No. I have no recollection.

Willens: There is some indication that you went with Ambassador Williams to a meeting with Lazarus Saliu sometime in April of 1971. The only reference I have to it is a memorandum of a meeting subsequently held by Ambassador Williams without you on June 10 and 11, 1971, at which he makes reference to the earlier meeting. The key element at that

- earlier meeting seems to have been some agreement reached with Salii that there would be informal talks before the next round of negotiations, rather than a commitment to formal presentations.
- Loesch: Salii was in Washington and there were others there too, Bailey Olter was there. And they were appearing as witnesses in the budget hearings before Mrs. . . .
- Willens: Hansen?
- Loesch: . . . Hansen. And I do remember having a meeting with Salii and Haydn Williams.
- Willens: Were you being asked to sort of provide the transition function here as to introduce Ambassador Williams to Salii.
- Loesch: Salii hadn't met Williams.
- Willens: How'd they get along?
- Loesch: All right I think. I know that some of the Micronesians were irritated that I was no longer in the loop. I was a pretty good friend, but I think they saw the advantages of having direct White House support for the U.S. side. I think as far as I know Williams got along well in his early meetings with the Micronesians. I don't know who else he met with besides Salii. I do remember Bailey Olter being there at the same time and I think John Mangefel from Yap was there at that point.
- Willens: What do you recall as being any further dealings that you had on the subject? Let me just tell you that I found a press release dated May 26, 1971, announcing that Secretary Morton announced the upgrading of the functions heretofore assigned to the Department's Office of Territories by saying these functions will be managed by a new deputy assistant secretary for territories operating under the supervision of the assistant secretary, Mr. Loesch. What prompted that creation of a new slot?
- Loesch: Well, I'll tell you. I had one deputy. As I've said before, I had four agencies in the Department which included half the personnel in the Department and two-thirds of the budget in the department, because the Bureau of Indian Affairs (which was a terrible agency) was so big. When Morton came in, he said "Hey, that's got to be upgraded."
- Willens: What has to be upgraded?
- Loesch: The ability of the assistant secretary to handle things. But how he did that was to appoint two more assistant secretaries, one for Indians and one for—let me see what did they take away from me?
- Willens: So two new assistant secretary slots were created and they were given functions that you previously had been responsible for?
- Loesch: Yes. Right.
- Willens: So that theoretically reduced your span of control.
- Loesch: It did, it did.
- Willens: How was that related to the creation of this new deputy assistant secretary slot?
- Loesch: I don't know.
- Willens: Did you support this step to create a deputy?
- Loesch: Oh, sure. I wound up with less to do by far because the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation were gone. So from then on I had the Office of Territories and the Bureau of Land Management. And I wound up, having done I thought quite well

with one deputy, I wound up with three deputies. Morton gave me two more deputies, took half my responsibilities away and created two more assistant secretaries. Three assistant secretaries now did what I did; and it's just what's happened to government in the last 20 years. My God, there wasn't any need for it, I don't think.

Willens: I have the same reactions to what they did at the Department of Justice after I was there. Was this the slot that was ultimately filled by Stanley Carpenter? Does that name, he was a Foreign Service officer who came over on detail

Loesch: Yes.

Willens: . . . to the Interior Department for several years?

Loesch: Yes.

Willens: Did you select him or have any role in his selection?

Loesch: Yes, I had a role. But State Department proposed him, I'm pretty sure. Yes, I remember it. And I checked him out and said, "Yes, you bet."

Willens: After you performed your role to assist Haydn Williams in getting familiar with his responsibilities, did you have anything to do with the formation of the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations?

Loesch: Not a thing.

Willens: Did you have any views as to whether establishing that kind of a staff office within Interior was a useful thing?

Loesch: Yes, I believed if you were going to have a special assistant to the President (or whatever you call him) that he ought to have a proper staff. If you're going to have a single-purpose mission, the staff ought to be keyed to that mission; and I think that's what happened.

Willens: One of the last documents I have with your name on it is a letter addressed to Congressman Burton in his capacity as chairman of the relevant subcommittee enclosing a memorandum analyzing whether the Marianas could be severed from the rest of the Trust Territory. It includes (I think) a brief memo from the State Department taking the usual position that this could not be done. Did you have any dealings with Congressman Burton after he succeeded to Aspinall's position as chairman?

Loesch: No.

Willens: Had you formed an opinion as to Congressman Burton before he assumed that position?

Loesch: Yes.

Willens: What was your view?

Loesch: My position was that Burton was a radical who had been a thorn in Chairman Aspinall's side and that the competence of the chairman had been cut in half, at least.

Willens: Do you recall having any other dealings with the Micronesian negotiations between about June or thereabouts of 1971 and the time you left the Department of the Interior?

Loesch: No, I don't I had anything to do with it in June.

Willens: Am I correct in understanding that you went up to work as Minority Counsel for the Senate Interior Committee?

Loesch: Yes.

- Willens: Between the years 1973 and 1976?
- Loesch: I got fired.
- Willens: Well, you mentioned that earlier. You want to tell me about that just for . .
- Loesch: You may remember that right at that time there was this big radical Indian insurrection that trashed the Indian Bureau often and . . .
- Willens: This was in late 1972?
- Loesch: Yes, just before the election. I took a very strong stand, which the White House didn't want me to, to kick him out. But the White House wouldn't let me. We'd had this kind of thing happen all across the country. This was the eleventh time that this outfit had taken over government offices. The first time was in Denver; it took me 48 hours to get him out, because the Commissioner of Indian Affairs was weak. After that, they took over offices in Minneapolis and all over the place and the most they were during working hours was 45 minutes, because I'd learned my lesson and I knew what to do when they came to Washington. I had 125 riot police in the basement of the Interior Department just across from the Indian Bureau. But Garment called up and wouldn't let me kick them out. So by that night, they were soundly forged up there and it would have hurt some people. We could have gotten them out without hurting a soul in the early morning.
- Willens: But the White House was concerned that it would turn into some kind of dangerous situation?
- Loesch: Yes. And they also said they needed votes, Nixon needed votes, 15,000 votes in the whole Indian communities. Anyway, I got plum crossed-wise with the White House on it, was interviewed on the tube by reporters, and there were headlines and this, that and the other. So I knew I was gone. I came to work on Monday, the Monday after December 8 (which was a Friday) found my secretary weeping and she handed me this letter.
- Willens: Saying you had resigned.
- Loesch: Yes. And then on Wednesday, that was Monday, on Wednesday the Secretary and I, the two senators from Arizona, the assistant secretary for water and power and our solicitor were due in Phoenix for a big hoedown with the Indians over Indian water. You know where that's still an issue from time to time. Are we off the air?
- Willens: No, we're on the record.
- Loesch: Anyway, I went to the Secretary's office and I said: "Hey, I'm not going to Phoenix, I'm off the payroll." Morton said: "Oh H., don't take that attitude." I said: "I'm not going to do it. I've flat been canned as of last Friday and there's no point my going for nothing." Well, they couldn't do without me, I knew that. Finally Morton said: "Hey, I'll get this fixed so that you'll go with the other assistant secretaries," which had all been promised even before the Indians come in. But I insisted that I wasn't going and finally he said: "I'll tell you I'll do, H." He said: "I can get this fixed, but I can't necessarily get it done by Wednesday. I'm pretty sure I can get it done by the end of this week, by Friday but not before." So he said: "I'll give you this note, handwritten, that says what I'm going to do and, if I do, you tear it up and nobody knows anything about it till we're all long gone from here. But if I don't, you can use it how you like." So I said: "Okay, I'll do that," and I went with him to Phoenix. And when I got back the following Friday, I had this second letter. So I tore up the note. Since Morton is dead and gone and I'm long out of the government, I not now shy about repeating that story.

- Willens: That's a good story. It does have echoes of what Secretary Hickel writes about the conditions under which he left the Nixon Administration.
- Loesch: I was in the office in a meeting at OMB with Casper Weinberger in charge when Hickel was called out of the meeting by John Whitaker who came in from the White House and said that the President wants to see Mr. Hickel. So Mr. Hickel left and got fired.
- Willens: A very personal element to it. Just briefly about the work on the Interior Committee. Did you play any role in advising the Members of the Committee when the Marianas Covenant came before it for review in 1975 and 1976? Just to refresh your recollection, the document that I participated in negotiating was ultimately signed by the parties on February 15, 1975. Up to that point Haydn Williams was very solicitously briefing Members of Congress, particularly on the House side but he'd make efforts to see Senator Jackson (as I did). I think we were uniformly unsuccessful in getting to see Senator Jackson; we'd often end up seeing Jim Beirne if we were lucky. But from time to time, I'm sure he tried to brief Republican Members of the Committee and I think I did too. But I frankly can't remember who were ranking members of the Senate Interior Committee minority at the time you were there.
- Loesch: First of course was Senator Allott; he was the ranking member. Then there was Senator Fannin from Arizona. Senator Fannin is the one who hired me as minority counsel. I went off the Interior payroll on Saturday and on the Senate payroll on the following Monday.
- Willens: Do you have recollection of considering Micronesia or Marianas status issues when you were on the hill?
- Loesch: I talked to Jim Beirne every once in a while, but I don't have any recollection of seeing Haydn Williams up there.
- Willens: Well, the Marianas Covenant swept through the House very quickly in a vote orchestrated by Congressman Burton. But on the Senate side it became a matter of some serious controversy. The Covenant was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee as well as being considered by the Interior Committee. There was opposition to the Marianas Covenant both from liberals (like Senator Kennedy and Senator Hart) and from conservatives, who questioned the military need for this and bringing any Micronesians under the U.S. flag. Do you have any recollection of this?
- Loesch: Yes, I recollect that Senator—oh what the heck was the Senator's name? Hatfield. I guess he's still a senator, isn't he?
- Willens: No, I don't think so.
- Loesch: Senator Hatfield was against the Marianas Covenant, but I don't think he wanted it to come up for a vote. I think he was instrumental in asking Senator Fannin, the ranking Republican member, to get it referred to other Committees. I'm sure that, if that's true, Senator Fannin discussed it with "Scoop" Jackson.
- Willens: Did you have the feeling that this was a partisan issue as between Republicans and Democrats. There's not much in the record to suggest that. I mean, it had been consistently a matter of U.S. policy through Administrations of both parties.
- Loesch: No, I didn't feel it was an issue between the parties.
- Willens: And so you think that ultimately if Senator Jackson really supported it that the ranking minority senators would go along.
- Loesch: Yes. I do. Did it pass?

Willens: Yes. It passed, it got about a two-thirds vote. There was substantial opposition by some from the Foreign Relations Committee who thought that the fragmentation issue and U.N. concerns were predominant, and that you shouldn't vote on a separate relationship until the relationship for the rest of Micronesia had been negotiated. And we had fought hard against that position, not anticipating that the negotiations with Micronesia would take as long as they did. All right, that brings our interview to a conclusion. Thank you very much for your time.

Loesch: You're entirely welcome. I enjoyed it.