

INTERVIEW OF GERARD J. MANGONE

by Professor Bruce Kalk

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- Kalk: Professor Mangone, I appreciate so much your willingness to participate in our study. Your role in the Solomon Commission as essentially the political scientist for the Commission was very important in the political history of the Marianas.
- Mangone: Well, I joined the Commission on the recommendation of Harlan Cleveland, who at that time was the Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, and I was a Professor at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. Harlan Cleveland had been Dean there, and I was his executive assistant up there. Cleveland asked me to join this group as the political officer under Tony Solomon. I had never met Tony Solomon before, and I joined this group which you probably have the components of. Richard Cooper was there. I don't remember all the people present.
- Kalk: Cleo Shook, you may recall.
- Mangone: Shook, that's right, he was another person.
- Kalk: I think an engineer. And Pedro Sanchez.
- Mangone: Pedro Sanchez was there, that's right. Solomon was a self-made economist. He was a businessman. He had gone to Mexico, I think, after he finished a Harvard M.B.A. and made \$10,000,000 or so by selling out a food business that he had there. Then he was ready for public service, and he began doing some consultation, I guess, for AID, and then came back and for various political reasons was made head of this Commission.
- Kalk: Do you know who selected him?
- Mangone: I really don't. He had done, I think, some kind of economic development work in Columbia or in Iran, one or two countries as a consultant. So he was that kind of economist, if I may put it that way, as against Richard Cooper who was, let's say, a professional economist.
- Kalk: Academically trained, yes.
- Mangone: Yes. And those two had a lot in common and thought a great deal about the economic development of Micronesia. Surely you know that after the Japanese were interned after WWII they were all repatriated from Micronesia, the whole economy collapsed, and the United States government essentially had no interest and abandoned any interest it had except for maintaining a force there. And so it was with the new Administration of President Kennedy that there was this idea that maybe we should do something, there had been some articles, I believe, that were rather condemnatory of this island paradise that was going to rot.
- Kalk: I believe the United Nations was critical as well.
- Mangone: Right, yes. So, it was that period fifteen years after WWII in which a new Administration decided to take a new look at this territory.
- Kalk: Let me ask you, Prof. Mangone, if you recall a directive that came from the Kennedy Administration that is a National Security memo, NSAM 145, which really lays out this policy. Do you recall reference to that at the Solomon Commission?

Mangone: I think so, yes I think I do. I think that was probably our mandate. My task there, of course, in large measure, was trying to ascertain the will of the people from the political point of view, since both Solomon and Cooper were concerned about economic development and what kind of infrastructure there might be and where would employment come from and what technical developments could you get, you know, whether you introduced small artisan activities or helped the fishing industry or whatever it was. My concern obviously as a trained student of politics was to see first of all historically where we were, secondly, what the governing situation was, and then what the people were interested in in terms of representation or government and relations with the United States. So, to that end, I tried to speak to as many people as I could. Of course, sometimes this was done with Tony or with the others where we met chiefs, for example, but very often it was on a one-to-one basis. There were rather humorous parts to this going from grass hut to grass hut and knocking at the door and asking, "What do you feel about the government in your area?" Some of that is expressed in this paper. For example, at another time I brought together eight or ten women and just had an open forum with them about their feelings about Micronesia and the government and the United States.

Kalk: What were your impressions of the traditional elites, the chiefs?

Mangone: Well, they behaved very much like chiefs. They behaved as people who were concerned with their own fiefdoms, and that's essentially what turned out. Indeed, I see the President of Federated States I think is a person who was a chief at that time when I was there thirty years ago. His name is familiar, I read it in the Times, otherwise I wouldn't know about it. Yap is an island unto itself, and of course the Chamorros in Saipan are a different type of people. There was nothing, I guess, in either German or Japanese or American administration that would ever bind these people together into a political entity, not even as much as we have in Yugoslavia with at least a communist party doing it. Perhaps I was overly naive in my assumption that you could begin by having a unicameral legislature—that's in this paper too—elected with powers over local affairs. As I said, the ability to tax themselves but with obvious subsidies from the United States and a High Commissioner, perhaps following a little bit on the British system of the past in which you might edge them into becoming a territory of the United States.

Kalk: Following the India example.

Mangone: Yes. And you know from a territory it might go any way. I don't know whether statehood would be any possibility but was more likely to move toward independence and no reason why you couldn't have first a territory of the United States and then a self-determining territory and then a completely independent state, although that was certainly a far distant future as it is even now considering the limited resources. So that in brief was what I was engaged in. I have to recollect a little bit of what I said here [referring to manuscript]. "The territorial legislature would be able to override the veto of the High Commissioner, in which case the decision of the Secretary of the Interior would be final." And also "The territorial legislature should elect its speaker, both as presiding office and chairman." You know I was moving toward a constitutional basis, fundamentally, that's what I was doing.

Kalk: Did you have any interactions with the Trust Territory government?

Mangone: Yes, we met with the High Commissioner there and some of the people there.

Kalk: What were your impressions of them?

Mangone: Well, my impression was that it was simply a holding operation, that there was no plan for

development, no plan for change. This was essentially a bureaucratic arrangement waiting to be told what to do. I can't see that there was any central policy coming from the United States. I don't blame the High Commissioner who was there just holding the job.

Kalk: That was Goding?

Mangone: Yes, I think it was. And of course the bureaucracy that was there had all of the traits—I can speak freely of this, I think, thirty years later— of any colonial bureaucracy waiting for the sun to set for the first drink. You know, life was not easy there, there was not much excitement at all. It was quite an isolated place and, at that time, the amenities were very few and far between. Some good beaches, of course, but the population is sparse. You have got men out there who were at the end of their careers, and they certainly had no policy development to work toward. So what you had was what you would have in any old colonial bureaucracy far from the homeland and a good deal of drinking and tedium. Again, there was no attempt to malign the people, but that is an environment that leads to that condition.

Kalk: Some have commented that there were two different Micronesian elites, the old chiefs and the young Micronesians, who were educated.

Mangone: That certainly was true. I think there was among them a certain amount of tension, but on the other hand, in terms of policy, there was no real difference between them. First of all, the United States had to be regarded favorably in the sense that a lot of their welfare depended on it and there was nothing in our administration that was oppressive, nothing cruel, no forced labor.

Kalk: Unlike the Japanese.

Mangone: Unlike the Japanese. You know we are pretty much a benign people. Of course, I haven't mentioned the Eniwetok situation where you had the Pacific missile range testing and an island where again in a colonial sense, at sunset, all the Micronesians had to leave and go to the other island which was far poorer obviously in its composition. There you had an enclave of America complete with bowling alleys and Arthur Murray dancing, and bars, etc. I regard that all as part of a strategic colony, so to speak, that lends itself to primary concern with defense and no real concern at that time with the welfare of the people in particular. Maybe making good eventually on the nuclear destruction and the contamination of the island of Bikini.

Kalk: Many years later.

Mangone: Yes, many years later.

Kalk: A comment to follow up on the question of the young Micronesians. Did you sense any burgeoning sense of nationalism among younger Micronesians you met? Maybe that's too strong a word.

Mangone: When you say nationalism, I don't think they were thinking in terms of a union of Micronesia. They were still thinking in terms of the Marshall Islands, the Caroline Islands, their own area.

Kalk: What about an acceptance of the rhetoric of decolonization coming from the U.N.?

Mangone: I'm sure that that was part of it, and yet on the other hand, the older and wiser people probably knew that they didn't have the wherewithal to survive without outside aid. I mean, sure, there was that rhetoric, but it was not manifest. I certainly didn't meet any firebrands. I think I could say that easily. But it is quite different when somebody has been to Honolulu and been to school there and then comes back. He has a somewhat obviously

different perspective on things. I think mostly in the sense of getting more aid, I think that is probably the strongest desire.

Kalk: To generalize a little bit beyond your own particular work on the Commission, Prof. Cooper commented to me that each evening you would all assemble and compare notes.

Mangone: Yes, that's true.

Kalk: He indicated, and I would be interested in your comments on this, that those turned out to be very productive meetings in terms of the evolution of your thinking.

Mangone: I think so, I think they were very very helpful. It was quite good because each of us would say what he had done that day and what he was thinking about. I concur in that 100%.

Kalk: Who was dominant in these discussions?

Mangone: Well, Solomon of course was the chairman, and I don't know whether anybody was dominant. I think Cooper was a stronger person, and he certainly, if I had to say in all honesty, he was closer to the chairman than I was, although I was regarded perhaps as more senior. I was senior in that sense, but because Solomon was more interested in economic development, and Cooper was filled with economic theory. He was young and had all of the idealism and enthusiasm and maybe naivete to a certain extent because economists learn more and more that the word isn't economics, it is political economy that counts. I would say that he had more the ear of Tony Solomon than I did, because again I think the Mission was very heavily on the economic development side. I think in retrospect the Mission was to be sure "what about the future of Micronesia," but that future was very much linked as it was and all through this period of the 1960s. Remember what period we are talking about. We are talking about a great naive period of economists. Remember takeoff, Walt Rostow's thesis that once you get these states rolling with the infrastructure, they were going to take off economically. Of course, it hasn't happened to 1990. And the real answer, as a man like Galbraith had to admit at the American Economic Association, which every political scientist should know, if you don't have security, if you don't have good government, you can have all the economic change you want, and you know where it goes. I have just come from Manila just two weeks ago. I have seen buildings crumbling off the track that Mrs. Marcos put up because she wanted to have the Miss Universe contest there. Meantime, around Manila there are hundreds of thousands of people who are living in tin shacks with no plumbing facilities, water facilities, etc. So, it was that period and I would say the Mission, because of Solomon and Cooper, was rather heavily oriented toward economic development as such.

Kalk: Would you go so far as to say that the Commission accepted much of the thinking of Walt Rostow?

Mangone: I think so, I think that was contemporary view, yes. It was in that period. In any study, you never try to use your own morals or your own experience to say how people treated other people 100 years ago. You have got to get into their framework of thinking, and the 1960s had a different framework than the 1990s, to be quite honest.

Kalk: How did the thinking of the group as a whole change over the course of the six weeks?

Mangone: You know again when you asked me if anybody was dominant there, I can't really think of much contribution that was made by others except Solomon and Cooper and myself. I am not quite sure. You see, there was somebody from the Navy there as well.

Kalk: Yes there was.

Mangone: You know, I kind of felt he was there just because the Navy had to be represented.

- Kalk: Commander Charles Chamberlain, Paul Daly from the Peace Corps, Donald Lindholm from the Bureau of the Budget.
- Mangone: They don't sound as familiar as I wish they did.
- Kalk: Howard Schnoor from the Bureau of the Budget.
- Mangone: But they were not with us at all, they were not on the Mission. I remember the Mission as being only about seven or eight people as I recall. Now others may have come in and out.
- Kalk: Perhaps they contributed to the final report.
- Mangone: Well, final report, yes. I think that is where it wound up.
- Kalk: So those who were active in the actual Mission itself were a more limited group.
- Mangone: A very limited group. You know I can't really recall that the others either had the intellectual status or the experience. It was sort of representative. You know the way interagency committees are. You're got to have someone there representing you.
- Kalk: Certainly.
- Mangone: So, I really think it was Solomon and Cooper and I who had real input.
- Kalk: Would you say there was any dissent among the members of the Commission?
- Mangone: Well, if there were any dissent, I guess it would be between me and the economists.
- Kalk: Based on discipline.
- Mangone: Based on discipline and based on their notion that all this was going to happen if they only did this, that and the other thing. I have had a great deal of experience in developing countries. I have been to nearly every country in the world in Asia and South America. I was just in Manila. I was in Singapore. I am running a program in Singapore, which is one of the most advanced states in the world, and going from Singapore to Manila is like going from the United States to Guatemala. So I am very familiar with these problems and the time that they take to implement and again coming from my perspective, and I am not try to denigrate economics, but the first thing you have to do is have a sound receptacle before you put any of the ingredients in. And I didn't see that we really had a sound receptacle at that moment to get the kind of cooperation and collaboration that you would need from the local people, and I guess that is why I was tending toward a more territorial legislature with sort of a paternalistic outlook on the part of the United States.
- Kalk: You felt that was more realistic?
- Mangone: I thought so, yes.
- Kalk: Very early on, the report is quite critical of the behavior of the U.S. government up to 1963.
- Mangone: Yes. Under a previous Republican administration, we should say.
- Kalk: I believe the quote is: "For a variety of reasons, in the almost 20 years of United States control, physical facilities have further deteriorated in many areas."
- Mangone: Absolutely.
- Kalk: "The economy has remained relatively dormant and in many ways retrogressed while progress toward social development has been slow."
- Mangone: Sure. I could have written the same lines, I mean that I absolutely concurred because it

was self-evident. You only had to travel around. As I said, there were no hotels, you always had to stay in AID facilities. You could see such streets as there were, such buildings as there were, such physical facilities that the Japanese had had there had all deteriorated. There were still remnants of WWII there so “dormant” is the exact word, anyone could see this on a visit, it wouldn’t take much.

Kalk: What was the reaction of the Department of the Interior, since they were responsible for the islands?

Mangone: I don’t know. I told you in talking to the High Commissioner, he simply was a bureaucrat carrying out whatever policy he had. It was more or less just occupy and administer on a day-by-day basis. Such funds as were coming in I’m not sure were going toward any progressive purpose except for the costs of the administration, which was largely the bureaucracy as such, and I don’t know of any capital projects that took place during that time. Maybe you do.

Kalk: One would think that since the report was somewhat critical of Interior, there might be record of their reaction to the report. We don’t have that in our possession. We have the reaction of the Defense Department and the State Department, which was generally sympathetic.

Mangone: Well, as I said, you have to realize what you were coming into. Remember the time, although I realize you may not remember the time, that was thirty years ago. But John F. Kennedy was coming in after Dwight D. Eisenhower. For all his steady and good government, here was a fresh breeze coming along. And it wasn’t only the Trust Territory. You will remember it was the period of the Peace Corps, and there was the period of sacrifice. We were going to move ahead, and we were going to defend democracy wherever it may be, so there was all that kind of contagion of a brave new world coming about—change. Something our present president has tried to emulate but not succeeded in doing, as far as my judgment is concerned. So that was the temper of the time and I think that probably, and this is speculation, Interior’s leaders had been changed and there was no need to make a reply on this sort of thing.

Kalk: We have some record—and it is slender and you may help us on this—that the Secretary of the Interior, Stuart Udall, may have been largely responsible for the National Security Memo No. 145. Do you know anything of that?

Mangone: I thought that was true; I think that what you are saying is true.

Kalk: Do you know any of the background to that?

Mangone: No, I don’t, it rings a bell as though that might have been true. I don’t know whether Harlan Cleveland could help you on that.

Kalk: We did speak with him. I did not, my colleague did.

Mangone: He didn’t have anything on that?

Kalk: No, not to my knowledge.

Mangone: He got involved largely because it was a trust territory and therefore as Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, he called on me, somebody he knew on the political side. As these deeds go, of course.

Kalk: Prof. Cooper suggested that the reason the report was ultimately classified in his opinion may have been because the Department of the Interior felt that it was overly critical and therefore it would hurt them for the report to be released to the public.

- Mangone: Of course, again, you must remember the time, November 1963, the assassination. I don't know whether that ceremony ever took place on the big ship that was supposed to be given to the president, whether he ever got it or not, I don't know. It was a beautiful thing that they had done. There is also the possibility that, with the assassination of the president, this thing was just buried.
- Kalk: What would be the motivation?
- Mangone: Not to do anything. Take a new look at it. That very often happens. You get a change in a president, you get a change in underlings, etc.; you may be right in your speculation that it was too critical.
- Kalk: Oh, it was Prof. Cooper's speculation.
- Mangone: What is the next thing that happens after that, can you enlighten me? What is the next string you pick up after nothing comes out of this?
- Kalk: For a period of about four years, there are deliberations between the Department of the Interior bureaucracy, that at the State Department, and that at the Defense Department and essentially an impasse as to where to go next. That is what our documents seems to indicate. You may have personal knowledge for that period.
- Mangone: No I'm sorry to say it was sort of a blackout. As I say, I was even requested to send back this [his draft of the political section of the Solomon Report] and any papers that I had and so forth.
- Kalk: You mean to Solomon.
- Mangone: No, it was somebody else that wrote to me asking for it, not to Solomon. I sent this to Solomon, he got this. So that is in the file somewhere, maybe. But they wanted all the other papers that I had. Let's see what I've got here. I am trying to think what this is. "The United States is committed under the terms of . . . 2-26-63." Does that seem like anything to you?
- Kalk: This perhaps was the political section of the final report, of your draft?
- Mangone: I'm not sure. Here is another study I did on U.N. trust territories, independence with and without plebiscite. I think I was asked. This is September 1963.
- Kalk: Was that for the Solomon Commission as well?
- Mangone: I'm not sure. Maybe I was asked to do that because I suppose maybe I was looking into this change, and I looked into what had happened in the other trust territories as to how they'd conducted elections, independence with and without plebiscites.
- Kalk: Let me ask you about that. Was there a precedent for independence without a plebiscite for a U.N. trust territory?
- Mangone: It did vary a little bit.
- Kalk: My assumption from reading the introduction to the Solomon Commission was that a plebiscite was a matter of course for trusteeships.
- Mangone: It starts out, "Specific islands, New Guinea and Nauru, Australia and New Zealand, the United States are the only remaining trust territories of the eleven territories originally placed under the system. Since 1957, eight of the territories concerned have achieved independence or reached statehood by becoming part of other countries. Cameroon under French, Cameroon under British, Togoland under French, Togoland under British, Rwanda-Burundi under Belgium, Tanganyika," etc. "Independence for trust territory

without a plebiscite: Republic of Cameroon. French Cameroon was part of the former German protectorate. Cameroon had been divided into land area, progress had been quickened when the French ran elections for national legislature to approve a new governing statute to take more responsibility.” That was really what I think I had in mind too.

Kalk: So, in other words, there was a precedent.

Mangone: Cameroon was to become independent in 1960, requested the Trusteeship Agreement be terminated. Debate on this request centered on whether the U.N. should supervise elections to the new legislative assembly before independence was granted as demanded by several Cameroon political leaders. The General Assembly decided that to recommend unsupervised elections would be to interfere with domestic matters, Trusteeship Agreement was terminated on 1 January, 1960 and the Republic became the second trust area, the first received trustee status, the first by achieving independence.”

Kalk: I want to make certain that we get this in the record. There is in that case of Cameroon ...

Mangone: It is right here.

Kalk: . . . no plebiscite.

Mangone: Yes, in place of that and Togo also.

Kalk: Then why did American policymakers think that a plebiscite was essential for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands?

Mangone: I can't answer that. That's what I did. I did this study you know to see the different ways. They may have felt that they would have a better way. Remember this, of course, was a strategic trusteeship, wasn't it?

Kalk: Yes. Prof. Mangone, most of the documents I have seen, and I have seen only some of them for the 1964-68 period, seem to indicate that the bureaucrats at Interior, State and Defense assumed a plebiscite was essential.

Mangone: That could be. I did this in September and this is after the Mission itself.

Kalk: Yes.

Mangone: So I did this study. Now here is Somalia.

Kalk: Perhaps they were unaware of your work?

Mangone: It is possible. “By 1959, only foreign policy and defense remained under the control of Italy and in late 1959, Italy recommended to the U.N. that the date for independence be moved up to July 1960. This was approved by the General Assembly. The principal matters of discussion concerned the border dispute and the General Assembly recommended that it be settled before the date set. Legislative counsel elected in February. The British Somaliland requested independence, British Somaliland received its independence,” etc. So these were apparently without plebiscites.

Kalk: It is fascinating.

Mangone: There is a referendum in Rwanda-Burundi and it has got questions—”Do you wish to retain the institution of Quami? Do you wish Kegali the fifth to continue?” That is a referendum. Here are U.N. plebiscites in trust territories and there is British Togoland. I guess I did my work all right. And the preparations for the plebiscite, in the British Cameroons. It looks like the British held plebiscites and the French did not. There is a second plebiscite; that one did not work the first time. “Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the Independent Republic of the Cameroons? Do you wish to

achieve independence by joining the Independent Federation of Nigeria?" That was the choice they were given. There was a plebiscite in Western Samoa. There was a study of all of these. It shows how it was done.

Kalk: Was this an addition then to the Solomon Commission Report? This project was separate?

Mangone: It must have been because this is early. Oh, I am sure it was, because I wrote this other when I was out. [Refers to writing his portion of Solomon Commission while out in the Pacific] Here is the summary in the cases reviewed: "It seems as if the administering authority eventually decided the most suitable future status for the trust territories, and then used the U.N. plebiscite to win international recognition and acceptance for that decision. The exception is, of course, the southern Cameroons which Britain had hoped to save for Nigeria. In general, the Trusteeship Council has approved the administering authority's action. There is evidence that the Trusteeship Council lacks the confidence the U.N. members have in the General Assembly, especially the fourth committee, etc. So the fourth committee and the General Assembly preferred that decisions regarding the timing of the plebiscite, voter eligibility, choices be presented and their exact wording are ultimately determined by these bodies." I guess what my thrust here is, if I were reading this, that I might say I was leaning toward having a plebiscite.

Kalk: That is was advisable?

Mangone: Yes.

Kalk: But not necessary according to the Trusteeship Agreement?

Mangone: No, well, you know, I guess I can't remember. Among other things I was the executive director of the President's Commission on the U.N. under Richard Nixon, so I worked under Kennedy and also under Nixon. Henry Cabot Lodge was my supervisor at that time, and I'm trying to remember what the U.N. charter might say on this. Probably ascertaining the will of the people is as far as it goes. Now ascertaining the will of the people is not always by plebiscite. There are a lot of different ways that that could be done.

Kalk: In your expert opinion, would you say that it was advisable in the case of Micronesia that the U.S. government hold a plebiscite?

Mangone: I guess I personally was leaning toward that as the desirable way to do it. But then again you have the question of what is the plebiscite for? It is not necessarily for independence.

Kalk: In other words, other options would be presented?

Mangone: Yes, you see the other way of going at this—you are assuming that it is for independence. I think the one that I actually preferred, was that you begin by setting up this legislature under a High Commissioner and moving toward a territory and perhaps holding the plebiscite at some time when it was independence that you wanted. You see, you can't just leave the trust territory. Even here the British gave options as to whether they wanted to join one thing or another or whom they wanted to rule them. That was another kind of option. What option would you have in a plebiscite there, especially since I was thinking of an all-territorial unit? Certainly didn't want to give them an option of either staying as a trust territory or becoming independent. It wouldn't make any sense given the economic wherewithal. So I think that was my thrust. Actually I was doing this, I guess for somebody to review this business.

Kalk: Do you recall who authorized the study?

Mangone: No. Cleveland might have asked me to do it. Solomon might have asked. I just don't

remember. But it is after the Mission. There is no question about that by this date.

Kalk: September 1963.

Mangone: Yes. Actually, this is two months before Kennedy was assassinated.

Kalk: That's fascinating in light of the fact that policymakers after 1963 apparently to my knowledge did not consider that a plebiscite was optional.

Mangone: Well, I'm not sure what they were aiming for, you see. That's the other thing. Even if they didn't consider that a plebiscite was optional and they considered that a plebiscite was necessary, my question would be plebiscite for what?

Kalk: In fact it became much of their disagreement, but one of their points of controversy was when the plebiscite should be held to be most advantageous to the U.S. government's interests. Now here I have a question for you. Back to NSAM 145. That suggests very strongly that it is in the best interest of the U.S. government for the Trust Territory to become permanently aligned with the U.S. Do you recall instructions to that effect upon joining the Solomon Commission?

Mangone: No, I had no instructions to that effect, but I think it became so obvious to us that we really didn't need any prompting on that score.

Kalk: Not even from Solomon?

Mangone: No, because as you looked at the history of these islands, stretched out in three million square miles with 95,000 people at the time, and the several different languages, what could be your objective? At least from my point of view it was to start them toward a role of responsibility. Remember that they were really nothing more than wards of the United States at that point, and unless, in my judgment, you give people some responsibility, they're not going to grow into any kind of self-government. And that was my thrust here, that let's try to start with a legislative body, an elected legislative body.

Kalk: Let me follow up to that, Prof. Mangone. One of the glaring political problems of the early 1960s in Micronesia was the lack of Micronesians in positions of equality in the Trust Territory government, particularly equality of pay. Do you recall this issue at the time and what your thoughts were?

Mangone: Well, they were completely different, again. It was a colonial arrangement, after all. It was no different than the Belgian Congo and Nigeria or anything else, and when the expatriates of Britain or Belgium came out to those countries, they were paid a much higher scale than the local people, and that was the endemic situation there, yes.

Kalk: What was your thought about that?

Mangone: Well, this becomes a kind of a general argument. Pay scales are whatever the market will bear, and you can't always have people getting the same money for the same work because their environment is completely different. The expatriate feels that this is a burden for him to be out there and sacrifice and risk and away from his home and all of that and the people around him, his equal training that his own clan are getting a higher salary, he really expects that. I don't find that to be as often brought out as to be undemocratic. I think it's unrealistic, otherwise. I think what you need to do is bring up the standards of the country in which you are there and bring up their standards so that their pay scales eventually go higher.

Kalk: What are some of the issues involved in the formation of a legislature in Micronesia? The Council of Micronesia was organized the year before the Solomon Commission.

- Mangone: Right. Well, the Council of Micronesia, though, had no powers of any kind. And it didn't have any control over anything. As far as I could see, it was simply a talking body.
- Kalk: Did you meet with some of the members?
- Mangone: Yes, oh, yes. And there was just a lot of vacuous discussion. It was the beginning of something but, again, I come back to my point of giving them some responsibility; giving some money to play with. May I put it that way? When a legislature has some money to play with, it then takes its work seriously.
- Kalk: Could you have foreseen it as being a precursor to the kind of all-territory legislature that you describe in your report?
- Mangone: Well, I think there we'd have to get down into the electorate, and I don't know whether we got into that detail as such, as to who was doing the elections and whether women were going to participate in this, and so forth. I don't recall now exactly how the Congress was selected. I think it was quite a small elite of leaders and chiefs and so forth, and I really wouldn't have called it a very representative body at the time. But that's just an impression that I had. I thought of it more as kind of a way, and it just had started, I believe, I think it was the year before so it really had no experience and I shouldn't, I'm not meaning to condemn it, at least it was a beginning.
- Kalk: Certainly.
- Mangone: But I saw the way to move on that, and often you do have to start that way, like committees of correspondence in our own government once upon a time. But then I think it has to have some power to do something. And they had no powers of any kind.
- Kalk: What about the district legislatures that had been formed and the municipal councils?
- Mangone: They were just beginning there, I think, as well. And that was sort of the idea that they would begin to move toward somewhere, and I was really trying to move ahead on that. Yes, I think these were proper steps to take as initial steps. Because, after all, these people had never had any representation anywhere at all.
- Kalk: How far toward self-government do you think those steps were? Bona fide self-government?
- Mangone: Oh, they were just infant steps, practically none. And I think they were pretty largely self-elected people. I don't remember, I really don't remember what kind of elections there were for those groups. I'm not even sure whether they were even nominated or not, that's a possibility, too.
- Kalk: Well, were there any Micronesian leaders that you met that you felt stood out for their leadership skills, for their personalities, their constituencies?
- Mangone: Yes, there were, there were. Some of them in the Saipan group were quite articulate and more politically advanced, no question. My impression was that they were, but I don't want to say more Western, but they were certainly farther along in self-development, and of course they did become self-governing sooner than the others did.
- Kalk: You mean the Northern Marianas?
- Mangone: Northern Marianas, yes. Yes, I said Saipan, the Northern Marianas. I don't know why. I suppose the people themselves and their own experiences as such. I think they were much

more alert and aggressive people than the people in the islands.

Kalk: The other islands?

Mangone: Yes, the other islands.

Kalk: What about some of the other glaring social problems that have been described frequently? For example, there was a polio epidemic on the Marshall Islands in 1962, health care was one of a multitude of issues that was mentioned frequently as a problem.

Mangone: Once again, you're dealing with a very sparse population. We did a census on these things to try to find out who they were and what their ages were and things like that. And you couldn't get them to move from a small island into a larger island. Are you going to have a doctor in all of these places or a school in all of these places? It's not an easy task. I don't want to criticize people from the past. And, clearly, until you build an infrastructure where you have good communications, that people can get to a center, their own traits naturally—after all, originally the peoples came to these islands because they wanted to be away from everybody. I'm trying to be fair, here, you know. And you often have heard them referred to as paradise. In a way, I guess they had a certain paradisiacal quality because people didn't work very hard. Nature is beneficent, the weather is there, you've got coconuts and you can do almost everything with coconuts. And so, bringing in Western-style ideas is not easy. And therefore, when you apply Western criteria to health and education (the social problems you're mentioning), they may not be quite as appropriate as they first seem. We've seen this in all colonial life, but I would say that the Trust Territory area was one of the most difficult of all in the world because of the dispersion of the people and the ethnic differences. Now, the remedy for that—and it could be true elsewhere—is at least to set up centers that would be accessible and provide the infrastructure for that. And we didn't do that.

Kalk: Not even the administrative centers in the six districts?

Mangone: I don't think so. I mean, I can tell you it's almost impossible to get around there. Do you know the island of Babelthuap, by any chance?

Kalk: I've heard of it, yes.

Mangone: Well, I was trying to meet people. I was trying to go everywhere to meet people, so I heard there was some Roman Catholic priest that lived up at the end of this island, which is virtually an uninhabited island, magnificent island, but no roads on it whatsoever. It must be ten miles long or something like that. So I got into a little boat with a motor and a young boy who couldn't speak any English, and here I am going through the lagoons and the shallows, and there's nothing on the shore whatsoever, and you get up there finally and you find this priest, you know, who's living pretty much like a hermit and there may be a few people there. And then when you try to talk, what about the future of Micronesia, there's not much relevance, you know, as far as he's concerned. I think if the Japanese were still there he might not even know the difference. So, this is a very difficult task and it's easy to criticize when you're home and in the West and comfortable, but when you're out there, it's another matter. And I know about this kind of criticism. And basically, of course, we were using the South Pacific Missile Testing Range. That was our major activity out there—a good deal of activity around there. But the conditions on that island across the way were very poor, and certainly we might have done more there.

Kalk: You bring up the question of the strategic value of the islands.

Mangone: Yes.

- Kalk: One comment that comes to mind from the final report, from the introduction, was a reference to the purpose of providing money for appropriations for education and health and so forth as a “strategic rental.” Meaning that, hopefully, if the islands could become further economically developed, the United States government wouldn’t have to expend as much in appropriations in the future. And therefore the cost to the U.S. taxpayer of keeping these strategically important islands would be reduced. Was that the way that the Commission conceived of it?
- Mangone: I don’t think that kind of thinking was in it at all. I think, if anything, the costs of those islands in terms of what you were using them for was very cheap. That is, very little had been put into it and the rent, so to speak, was very slight. And I think the thrust of it essentially was it came out of criticisms, and there were plenty of criticisms. I think articles were written. We had a journalist out there. He wrote for one of the newspapers.
- Kalk: Do you recall the man’s name?
- Mangone: Yes, I should, but I don’t remember. He’s still quite a writer. He travels around. Our Pacific Paradise. What journal was it at the time? The journals have changed, too. He spent a few days with us and then went back and wrote about it. And there was this criticism that we had neglected our Pacific paradise, something like that. So there was, once a journalist gets hold of this, pictures and figures as to how little was being spent on it and how it was being used. I read all that kind of thing as well. But I don’t recall anything of what you say about reducing the cost to the taxpayer because, from my point of view, the rent as a strategic territory, was cheap.
- Kalk: This is interesting.
- Mangone: I had the budget somewhere here. Appropriation for the Trust Territory in 1962 was \$6 million.
- Kalk: I think that shortly afterwards, the Kennedy Administration raised the ceiling and it went up quite a bit.
- Mangone: “Until 1962, the attitude of the United States (I’ve got it all in here) toward Micronesia, despite any rhetoric to the contrary, was that of a custodian—protecting, preserving, and maintaining, but not developing the territory, as the following appropriations clearly indicate.” Now the interesting thing is, the appropriation in 1952, which is the beginning of the Eisenhower Administration, was \$4 million. And at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration, 1962, ten years later, it was \$6 million. So even on an inflationary basis, it was just negligible.
- Kalk: Interesting. Then, in light of what you wrote, I begin to wonder if perhaps some of the thinking of some others may have been added into the introduction that was produced in the final report. I’m just reading on page eight.
- Mangone: Oh I think a lot of this was concocted back in Washington.
- Kalk: By whom?
- Mangone: Well, the Bureau of the Budget, I think, is one of the people in that.
- Kalk: Here, a quote from it says “Granted that the subsidy can be justified as a strategic rental, it will amount to more than \$300 annually per Micronesian through 1968 and any reduction thereafter will require long-range programming.” Finally, “This hoped-for reduction in the level of subsidization and the implementation of the political strategy in capital investment programs require a modern and more efficient concept of overseas territorial administration than is evident in the prevailing approach.” In other words, it

seems that whoever added this in the final report, was adding something contrary to what you had written. You were part of the Commission, one of the three people really that contributed the most to it, and this [report] seems to be very different from what you recall.

Mangone: I just had a feeling that my report was virtually disregarded.

Kalk: And you think . . .

Mangone: At least I have Tony's letter on that, you know, which is the original letter that was sent to me on this. This is dated 10 August 1963. You see, so I had already sent my report in, and that's why this trustee thing [refers to his September 1963 report on U.N. plebiscites] follows afterwards [refers to letter from Anthony Solomon to Gerard Mangone]. He said it came and "they are very gratified the entire manuscript even in first draft shows incisive sensitivity," whatever that means. "As the other material keeps coming in I am restructuring somewhat your material becoming increasingly pleased even at this stage with the overall look of the report." But you have never seen that final report though, have you?

Kalk: Only the introduction. Have you ever seen the final report?

Mangone: No, I never saw anything, its a complete blackout thereafter.

Kalk: Do you know of any . . .

Mangone: And ideally one should even have gotten a letter of appreciation. It was the President's Commission, I never got a letter of appreciation. You know, that's normal.

Kalk: Let me turn to the Marianas for a moment. You commented on the level of political sophistication among Marianans. Was there a bona fide movement at that time to separate from the other islands and retain a closer relationship?

Mangone: I think they were stronger in their feeling. They didn't feel any real kinship. I think they felt that they were ahead of the others and that they were a separate group.

Kalk: More so than on the other islands?

Mangone: Well, the other islands were not as aggressive about it as I think the people of the Marianas were. They really regarded themselves as closer to the Americans than the others did, too. That is because of the ethnic composition and of course the seat of administration in Saipan and anything coming in that was new or interesting would probably come through Saipan. There would be more political consciousness there because that was the headquarters of the administration. Saipan was the only place that looked a little bit like a village. I say a village, I mean not a city.

Kalk: Could you elaborate any, perhaps, about the separatist tendency in the Marianas, any evidence as early as 1963 that the Marianas would go a separate way?

Mangone: I think they wanted closer affiliation with the United States. I may be wrong on this, but almost everywhere I went there was no hostility toward the United States. The Marianas and elsewhere, certainly it was a very positive feeling toward the United States and a desire to be affiliated with the United States. There was not a desire to throw off the administration of the United States. It wanted a larger share of revenues and maybe more self-government and things of that kind. They were much more articulate in what they were interested in; it was harder to get information from people in Yap and Ponape and Truk. All these places are coming back to mind.

- Kalk: Yes. The Marshalls.
- Mangone: Because we covered nearly all of this area. It is amazing how many places we went to at the time. There is the name of the High Commissioner, Goding, that's right?
- Kalk: Yes, M. H. Goding.
- Mangone: I remember now, he impressed me simply as a bureaucrat, no imagination or distinction or anything. Doing his job. It is just like a colonial office with no policy thrust from the homeland. Well, you eat out every day, you go to your office which is air-conditioned and you get through the papers and make sure you answer what has to be answered from home, and you see a few people for little problems, and then you go back to your air-conditioned cottage at 5:00 o'clock and have a drink.
- Kalk: You said there was very little anti-American sentiment in 1963.
- Mangone: Yes, in 1963.
- Kalk: The final report, in the introduction, comments that if a plebiscite were held in 1963, perhaps 2 to 5% would opt for independence, no more.
- Mangone: That would be true. I think I may have sort of covered that somewhere.
- Kalk: Do you think that was your judgment?
- Mangone: That would be my judgment, yes. There was no movement to be completely independent.
- Kalk: A great deal changed, one would think, between 1963 and 1969. What do you think may have taken place on the islands that prompted the rise of the movement towards independence from the United States?
- Mangone: I can't tell you how strong that movement was. You feel there was a strong movement by 1968 or 1969?
- Kalk: Well, let me rephrase it. What I mean to say is that the Congress of Micronesia in 1968 initiated its Commission on Future Political Status and entered into negotiations with United States government ultimately seeking a relationship that was as independent as possible from the U.S. government. That's a big step from 1963, it would seem.
- Mangone: I think there was more political sophistication by that time. I am sure that that probably occurred. Naturally it's like any experiment, from the mere fact that you experimenting on someone they begin to have a reaction, just as you are asking me questions and I begin to get maybe more reactions than I should, the mere fact that you are interrogating me means that I am not going to be dumb or blind, I want to focus on it more sharply than I would have last week. I suspect that probably as a result of the visit of the Commission and the knowledge that there was reconsideration of policy, that in a complementary way some of the people in Saipan and so forth began thinking, "How can we get the most out of this ourselves?" So I am sure that that's probably true.
- Kalk: What about the Peace Corps? That's another matter that comes up in the introduction. Page 17 of the introduction, the report states that the Peace Corps should be "a spectacular success."
- Mangone: Yes. That came out of Solomon and Cooper. Talk to them about that, I am pretty sure. Here you were, you were a Commission under the Kennedy Administration. By the way, the first draft of the Peace Corps was written outside my office by a graduate student from the Maxwell School, and it was picked up by a Congressman from the West and then

finally John F. Kennedy was looking for something. Every politician wants to run with a good idea, and he picked up this idea. So you must remember the zeal: the election is in 1960, he comes into office in 1961, and here we are out with Solomon and Cooper, and this would be a way to fit in with the Peace Corps. So yes that's how it came about.

Kalk: Did you agree with their sentiment?

Mangone: I wouldn't agree with that particularly, of course. But you know I didn't think that the infrastructure would be there. I was in Nigeria when the first Peace Corps group came in. Among other things I am the author of book called the "The Overseas Americans".

Kalk: With Harlan Cleveland.

Mangone: With Harlan Cleveland. It's all about training overseas, so I know a lot about preparing people for overseas work. In fact our book was used pretty widely in the Peace Corps. This again is what I have told you a little earlier. There was this enthusiasm in the early 1960s for economic take off and people even thought of the Peace Corps as aiding that process. The fact of the matter is the Peace Corps did more for the American youngsters than it did for the people over there. The kind of things they did most was teaching English. They were not engineers. They were not physicians. We didn't bring that kind of person into the Peace Corps. They were good young people who got a wonderful experience and still do. Less now, because it closed down. So I wouldn't have agreed with that, but I didn't see any objection to putting volunteers in. That's how it got in. And as I said you have to think of the times, why somebody would do that.

Kalk: Do you have any recollection of the later history of the Peace Corps' activities in Micronesia?

Mangone: I don't have any, no. I don't know, when did they first send one over there?

Kalk: Shortly after the report.

Mangone: Did they?

Kalk: Yes, and there was a very large contingent.

Mangone: Do you know whether it was a success or not?

Kalk: Some critics charged that the Peace Corps volunteers "riled up" pro-nationalist feelings among the Micronesians. As a consequence, some policymakers in Washington were very critical of the Peace Corps in Micronesia.

Mangone: I don't know anything about that, but I think people can do a lot of harm when they are in situations as diverse as this and such a poor infrastructure and—[it was] just not the place. I think Nigeria was much better. You had a settled economy there. You had a place for them to go. Even then we had a fiasco when a little girl wrote back that men were urinating in the streets and put it on a postcard and then one of the political activists picked it up and used it as anti-American propaganda. It was a harmless card; in fact, she may have been tricked into doing that as far as we know. But I just didn't think this [Micronesia] would be the place, and it was probably one of the most backward places in the world that you would bring the Peace Corps to. If you want to make a success of something, you just want it to show off, that we can take it and we can live in hardship and all of that, that really isn't the object of overseas activities.

Kalk: On page 31 of the introduction, there is another matter that comes up and I have mentioned this a couple of times. This is NSAM 145. The comment in the report was that many officials in the Trust Territory government were unaware of the existence of this

- memo. Do you recall anything of that nature from the Mission?
- Mangone: Sounds as though I heard it, but I really can't verify it. There was some rumor of that kind, I guess.
- Kalk: They are perhaps three dozen references to this memo or two dozen references to this memo in just the introduction alone, implying that the NSAM 145 was very important for the Solomon Commission. Was it mentioned that much?
- Mangone: No, not that I recall. I only have what I have showed you here, this kind of thing.
- Kalk: You don't remember Solomon discussing it?
- Mangone: I don't, I really don't. [referring to the Solomon Report] "Individuals from U.S. government agencies having responsibility." Yes I told you had to have that "other experts in development" that goes first "and international problems." Richard Taitano that's right, Taitano was there.
- Kalk: He was the Director of Territories.
- Mangone: Yes, didn't know much about anything.
- Kalk: Do you recall very much about him?
- Mangone: I shouldn't put all that on tape.
- Kalk: You will get a release form with the option to exclude portions of this later if you would like to. But do you recall much about him?
- Mangone: Did you tape him?
- Kalk: He is on our list.
- Mangone: He is on your list. That ought to be interesting. Pedro Sanchez, I remember him. Oh yes, Commissioner of Education, the Virgin Islands. I am reminding myself now.
- Kalk: And he was on the Mission?
- Mangone: Yes, he was put in there because he here he was an educator in the Virgin Islands and they felt that there would be some relationship. Chamberlain, he was representing the Navy.
- Kalk: Commander Chamberlain.
- Mangone: Yes. And there was a Peace Corps representative, Cleo Shook. Yes, I remember him, he was very able.
- Kalk: He was an engineer?
- Mangone: Yes, yes okay. I am not sure that these, the budget person and Shloss person stayed with us the whole time.
- Kalk: You mean Donald Lindholm.
- Mangone: Lindholm.
- Kalk: And who was the other?
- Mangone: Schnoor? Bureau of the Budget.
- Kalk: Okay.
- Mangone: I think he had a big role to play, but I don't think he was with us. But that's another matter.

- Kalk: Do you think that the two gentlemen from the Bureau of the Budget were with you on the Mission at all?
- Mangone: I think they were there at some time. I am not sure. The others I remember very vividly, Cleo Shook and Chamberlain. I can even see them. I can see them very well. And Taitano I can see and Sanchez—he was a very nice person indeed, in fact they all were, Taitano was a very fine person, too.
- Kalk: Paul Daly?
- Mangone: Paul?
- Kalk: From the Peace Corps. Perhaps you don't remember him.
- Mangone: I don't remember him. You see, I am not sure all the people went along on this. This is a White House Release.
- Kalk: And that is dated May 23, 1963 in your papers.
- Mangone: Yes, I am not sure. What date did we leave? Do you know?
- Kalk: I know that the instructions authorizing the Commission were dated May 9, 1963.
- Mangone: I am trying to think when I wrote this report and then it would be a month before that. I don't have a date on this.
- Kalk: Am I to understand correctly, Prof. Mangone, you don't think that the two gentlemen from the Bureau of the Budget were with you for the entire six weeks?
- Mangone: No, I don't think so. There was some rough going there, going from one of these territories to another. I remember Taitano very well, Chamberlain very well, Cleo Shook I remember very well, and Pedro Sanchez I remember well, and of course Cooper I remember. That is what I was saying. I thought we were about six or seven throughout.
- Kalk: Yes. Let's discuss, if we may, implementing the Solomon Report. To your knowledge, did the U.S. government implement the recommendations of the report?
- Mangone: I had no other word from them at all. There was just a blackout completely, and I was waiting to see what would come out of this. I never had a sense that there was any report issued as such.
- Kalk: And you don't know who is responsible for the final report not having a position of prominence.
- Mangone: My only impression was that it got buried somewhere in the Bureau of the Budget. That was an impression I had, or the Office of Budget and Management, whatever it was, OMB?
- Kalk: It was Bureau of the Budget at the time. Did you have any reason to think that based on the conversations you had?
- Mangone: No, I don't know why I had that impression. Some of this is certainly just past hallucinations. Did Cooper have any idea? Help me on this.
- Kalk: His comment was that he believed that the Department of the Interior might have, because he was asked for his papers right away as well, and he never saw the final report either. His impression was that the Department of Interior, because the report is somewhat critical, may have insisted that the report be declared secret. Which in fact it was. And as a consequence, and he never saw the final report either. He thought that that would explain

much of why the report did not figure prominently thereafter, or more prominently thereafter.

Mangone: There is no doubt that there was—in fact I was really quite surprised—you see what I wrote here. [reading from his draft of his portion of the Solomon Report] “This is a first draft for the use of the U.S. Survey Mission of the Trust Territory of the Pacific only. In its present form it contains omissions, some approximations, and unedited material. It should not be quoted or circulated to anyone outside the members of the Survey Mission without further consultation with the author.” So this was the first draft that I was doing there and I was going to start with putting in a better style and all that. That’s the last I saw.

Kalk: That’s the last that you saw of it?

Mangone: The last I saw. This is the acknowledgement letter from Anthony Solomon, so I must have sent them this early in August.

Kalk: Of 1963. Did you have any conversations after the Mission was concluded as a follow-up to it, perhaps with other members of the Commission, perhaps with others in policy making positions?

Mangone: We never had anything more. We are all busy. I was back at my work. I had done my job and I was just waiting for the other shoe to drop, you know, in a way like Tony saying well, here is the first draft of the report. That’s what I expected, with my materials sort of amalgamated and then my comments, that’s what’s normally done. I have done other government reports, and I know. But there was just nothing but silence after that.

Kalk: There were many criticisms among Micronesians after the report was issued to the effect that it was a document that reflected an overwhelming desire on the part of the U.S. government to retain the islands a territory, in some fashion. In particular reaction in the issue of the Young Micronesian that appeared in 1971 was very critical of the report.

Mangone: That is, the report that came out.

Kalk: The report that came out. Do you have reason to believe that the report that come out might have been significantly different from the report that the Commission prepared?

Mangone: I think it must be. I mean I don’t recognize anything in it. You say there was an introduction and a conclusion to it?

Kalk: The introduction . . .

Mangone: You have a copy?

Kalk: I have a copy. This is a copy of the summary and introduction; it is approximately 32 pages long.

Mangone: [Examines introduction to the Solomon Report] Okay, that’s all background, okay. NSAM 143.

Kalk: 143 or 145?

Mangone: 145, excuse me. [refers to introduction to Solomon Report] “Set forth U.S. policy moving into a permanent relation within our political framework.” Well, in a sense that’s what I was trying to doing to do. Well, you see it says here, observers from the NSC and Bureau of the Budget. Is this the task force, is that what they are talking about when they say task force?

- Kalk: The task force, I think they are talking about an inter-agency task force, it was an Undersecretary's Committee, sub-cabinet level.
- Mangone: But this is 1962. To keep with that goal, the memorandum called for accelerated development; the memorandum also established a task force.
- Kalk: That was the Undersecretary's Committee, in 1962.
- Mangone: Okay. Then it came to the Mission of nine men, is that the one you are talking about?
- Kalk: That would be the Solomon Commission.
- Mangone: We may have had nine, from time to time. [reading again] "To secure the objective of winning the plebiscite and making the United States . . ." Well, that follows my report, doesn't it, to some extent. ". . . sufficient flexibility of Government structure to accommodate whatever measure of local self-government."
- Kalk: Actually, by the way, [if you would] stop one moment there, Prof. Mangone, to say that both my colleague and I are very impressed with many of the comments made by the Solomon Commission, at least as we understand them. My bringing up the question of criticisms is not in any way a reflection on our own thinking.
- Mangone: No, I understand that. Well, we are really trying to understand history here, and I think we can be after thirty years quite frank about all this because it's in a way kind of an academic exercise. We are not trying to indict anybody.
- Kalk: No indeed.
- Mangone: "Little desire fo—" I don't remember if I ever said anything like that. "The Commission recommends that a plebiscite be held," now where they got that I don't know.
- Kalk: You don't recall?
- Mangone: I didn't recommend that a plebiscite be held in 1967 or 1968.
- Kalk: Did the question of the date of a plebiscite come up at all?
- Mangone: It says here "Our timetable calls for creation of a true territory-wide legislature having its members serve out any initial three-year term before the plebiscite during which members of the different districts could develop more . . ." I don't know whether I have ever said that. They do go for the all-territory [legislature] though. So, then they are in their "Capital investment to make it easier to permit Japanese," well, that's another matter, that's okay. It is very heavy on the plebiscite, isn't it?
- Kalk: Very much. It is also quite heavy on NSAM 145.
- Mangone: "Questions offered should be combined: are you in favor of becoming an independent nation; are you in favor of permanent affiliation [with the U.S.]." I am just trying to recall. We did talk about some of these things.
- Kalk: How would you assess the introduction?
- Mangone: Let's see here. [Refers again to introduction to Solomon Report] "Assuming that the territorial legislature begins to function in 1968 and assuming further that the United States offers Micronesia a choice by plebiscite of self-government as a territory." I guess I did say that.
- Kalk: So those are your words.
- Mangone: Yes. "There must be provision for a Micronesian chief."

- Kalk: I am trying to gauge how much you feel the introduction assesses the work of the Commission itself.
- Mangone: Well, there is some in there, there is no question about that, yes. I had forgotten about this.
- Kalk: Do you feel there is material here that in the introduction, that . . .
- Mangone: It's much heavier around the plebiscite and the relationship with the United States. Mine I think was heavier in building the political infrastructure, so there was a shade of difference on that.
- Kalk: As a matter of emphasis.
- Mangone: Yes. "The United States must consider the first Micronesian territorial legislature as an intermediate step toward a closer affiliation with the United States by plebiscite. Leaders in the first territorial legislature would be the spokesmen of the Micronesians for future arrangements and they should be in one body rather than two. They should represent people rather than districts." That's my document.
- Kalk: That is your document.
- Mangone: "For that reason representation in the territorial legislation should be allocated by electoral precincts within the District, not by voting at large." I guess they did more than I thought. I sort of abandoned interest in it. I have to be honest with you. In 1963, within two years, I had left Syracuse, I became Dean of the Arts and Science College at Temple University, and I became Provost at Temple University. I was establishing other programs in other parts of the world. It is fascinating. I am delighted, of course, that you are resurrecting all these things and some day I'd like to read the whole report.
- Kalk: Well, I look forward to that.
- Mangone: I forgot to ask you, I thought I had, what you are doing this for? I mean, is this commissioned or . . .?
- Kalk: No, we hope to generate a book out of this project and this has been ongoing.
- Mangone: Well, I certainly will look forward to reading it as you will know more about it than almost anyone over the historical period. It is very difficult to see these things, even a person like me who has been involved deeply, from a month or two or three. And not to get the whole story and really I am afraid that we were sort of left out of the second part of this. It always left me with the feeling of incompleteness, I must admit that. I felt that we had done a good job, a fair job, under very difficult circumstances. I did feel that—never a letter of appreciation and never a follow-up draft copy. I mean when this comes out, I certainly would like to have seen it.
- Kalk: The introduction?
- Mangone: The whole business. And comment on it and say, "Well, I didn't mean that" or "This is what I think would be better." That never happened.
- Kalk: I did want to ask you about another follow-up matter if I may, Prof. Mangone, which is how you would characterize as you understand it Lyndon Johnson's later policies towards the Trust Territory, if you have any knowledge of that.
- Mangone: I really have no comment on that. I didn't have any comment on that. Because as I told you before, I sort of felt cut off on this and I never had any further communications with either Solomon or Cooper about this. I don't know whether they may have kept in touch

a little more because Cooper was in the government and Solomon was in the government and they may have been more pleased by the fact that funds were diverted there [to Micronesia]. So there was a sense from the economist's point of view that something was being done.

Kalk: What about the impact of the report on the agendas of any policymakers? Do you have any knowledge of that?

Mangone: No, I really don't.

Kalk: I did ask you about the criticism that was raised, and I think we got off the subject.

Mangone: About the Peace Corps?

Kalk: Well, particularly this was the criticism that appeared in the *Young Micronesian*, in 1971, making the claim that the Solomon Commission report was trying to keep an overly strong American presence in Micronesia. Do you remember any . . .

Mangone: I think that would be a natural reaction after it had come out. I mean if I were a Micronesian, I would like to get as much assistance and aid as I possibly could but not sacrifice my integrity in any way or feel that I was subservient to the United States. I think that's a perfectly normal reaction. We were not calling for the independence of Micronesia and we were calling for a territory of the United States with many, many benefits as we saw it, and which I think most Micronesians see it today. They have, in my judgment, just like Puerto Rico, the best of both worlds. As I understand, for example, now textiles are being manufactured over there and stamped made in the United States.

Kalk: That is correct. I read that article in the *New York Times* as well. One other matter and then I should perhaps tidy things up, because we have been chatting for quite a while and I don't want to detain you. You developed a great interest in marine resources. I took a gander at your many publications, a list of them anyway, and it was very extensive, particularly on the strategic minerals underwater. Given the emergence of manganese nodules as an issue, starting in the late 1950s and early 1960s in the Marianas, did that play any role in your interest in the project or in the Commission's study?

Mangone: No. I started on the marine resource side later, in 1970. I went to Washington, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Hubert Humphrey invited me there to head up a marine studies program. I brought thirteen scholars from all over the world there. I had always been a Professor of International Law, and of course the Law of the Sea is a part of that. Then when I got down there, of course, I spent two years studying marine problems and that's how I came here. The University of Delaware created this College of Marine Studies, and they wanted somebody to give leadership on the political, economic and legal side. And so I was invited up here and set up this whole program, that's how it got started. I have five faculty members here now. We just give the masters degree and the doctoral degree as such. But coming back to the exclusive economic zone sea bed minerals, it is a great importance to these island states because all of a sudden they have a claim to jurisdiction over 200 miles of resources. So you have a tiny island, and perhaps there is tuna or shrimp or something of that kind, and now what used to be a common good requires a rent, because it's now been put under their jurisdiction as a result of customary law and the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982. So for the Federated States [of Micronesia] and for the Northern Marianas, this would be a very important economic benefit to have control of.

Kalk: But, am I to understand that in the early 1960s this was a non-issue?

Mangone: No, it wasn't really. As a matter of fact, 1959 was the first general information we had about the wealth of the oceans. A study was done on the economic value of manganese nodules, and the first popular book was 1965. So it really was not an issue at that time. The only other thing would have been on oil resources, and I don't know of any oil resources [there].

Kalk: Professor Mangone, I want to tell you how much I appreciate your willingness to participate.

Mangone: Well, I enjoyed it. I hope it will be helpful, a few words anyway that might be relevant to it, and what I am going to do is give you this document that nobody else, I don't know, would have. That's this document. I would like to get a copy of it back. Take it with you. I have been holding this for thirty years or more.

Kalk: Thank you. That will be very helpful.