

INTERVIEW OF FRED RADEWAGEN

by Howard P. Willens

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- Willens: Fred Radewagen has been a knowledgeable observer of Trust Territory and Marianas affairs both from Capitol Hill and from the Department of the Interior. Fred, thank you for participating in this project. I appreciate it. Your first name is Fred?
- Radewagen: Fred.
- Willens: It is not Frederick?
- Radewagen: Fred Radewagen. That's it.
- Willens: You have no middle initial?
- Radewagen: Right.
- Willens: Fred, could you give me a little background about where you grew up and where you were educated?
- Radewagen: I grew up in the Chicago, Illinois area. I was educated as an undergraduate at Northwestern and have a Masters in Foreign Service from Georgetown.
- Willens: When did you complete your education?
- Radewagen: 1968.
- Willens: That's when you got your Masters Degree from Georgetown?
- Radewagen: Yes.
- Willens: What did you do at that point with respect to employment?
- Radewagen: During the last of my two years at Georgetown I had worked part time at the Republican National Committee, and when I received my degree I signed on board the Nixon campaign—moved from the National Committee to the Nixon campaign.
- Willens: What did you do during the campaign?
- Radewagen: I was Director of Administrative Services for the Washington Headquarters.
- Willens: After the campaign was successful, did you obtain a job in the new Administration?
- Radewagen: Yes. First of all, I went over and held the same job with the Inaugural Committee, and then after winding that down about the middle of February, for a two-month period while the Administration was shaken out, I stood by and wound up being asked to join a Task Force at the Interior Department going out to Micronesia to assess what should be done under the new Administration to initiate talks to resolve political status.
- Willens: Approximately when did you assume your responsibilities at Interior?
- Radewagen: Mid-May 1969. That was as a result of a trip that Secretary Hickel had made to Saipan (and I think other places but I know Saipan for sure). He came back and I believe had written a document to the White House suggesting that the situation needed to be resolved politically. The White House and the Interior Department put together a special task force of outside experts to go out to Micronesia and spend a considerable time during the summer, a full 12 weeks, in the Territory to travel from one end to the other to find out what the problems were and what the Administration needed to do to create

a climate in which there could be successful negotiation. Specifically, to take a look at the kinds of projects in capital improvements and other areas which the team could then recommend to the Interior Department for priority funding, since the funding had not been at the level of the ceiling of authorization for that time. I think the budget in 1969 was something like \$50 million a year as an authorization, but the appropriation was only \$42.5 million. So the team specifically went out there to find out how to spend the other \$7.5 million.

Willens: When you reported to the Interior Department in mid-May, in the course of your initial weeks there did you learn about what had caused the Hickel visit to Micronesia?

Radewagen: Not that I recall, other than a general desire on the part of the Administration to keep things moving. I don't know if there was a precipitating incident.

Willens: Do you know whether Secretary Hickel when he returned made any report to the President?

Radewagen: I believe so, and it may even be in this book. But if I've ever seen such a document, I doubt that I would have. That would have been above my pay rate at the time.

Willens: To whom did you report at Interior?

Radewagen: Initially the person who recruited me was an assistant to the Secretary by the name of Lewis Helm. He had been a Nixon campaign staffer as well at the same headquarters that I was at, and that's how that connection was made when they were looking for an officer to go along with the team who would stay on at Interior after the team members disbanded and went back to their regular jobs. So he brought me on. And in the ensuing 12 weeks that I was in Micronesia, there were changes underway in the Secretary's office, realignment of responsibilities. By the time I got back Helm had departed, and the Micronesia portfolio had shifted to Edgar Kaiser, so I came back reporting to Edgar.

Willens: Was Edgar Kaiser on duty when you came back and reported?

Radewagen: Probably so, but I can't prove that because he wasn't in the loop. He was not in the loop with which I was dealing. He was in the midst of a White House fellowship, and I think in the middle of his term when the Administration changed, the Nixon folks wanted to move him off to an agency because he wasn't politically of their stripe. So he wound up at Interior.

Willens: Was Ron Walker there at the time that you reported?

Radewagen: Ron Walker was there as an Assistant to the Secretary and I know had been on the trip to Saipan—in fact did the advance work for that trip.

Willens: Do you know Mr. Walker?

Radewagen: Very well.

Willens: Did you hear from him any reports of his experience in advancing that trip?

Radewagen: No. I think subsequently over the years we talked about it, because he always remembers the fact that he met the woman who later became my wife on that trip.

Willens: Did he continue to have responsibilities for Micronesia after the Hickel trip?

Radewagen: If he had any responsibilities in the immediate office to the Secretary, I would not be aware of what they were. My reporting relationship was through Edgar Kaiser, and I did not deal with others who might have had bits and pieces of it.

Willens: Was Harrison Loesch on duty by the time you reported in mid-May?

- Radewagen: Harrison Loesch was on duty.
- Willens: Did you work with him in connection with this project?
- Radewagen: Oh, yes. After Edgar Kaiser's departure during the reorganization, I was shifted under Harrison Loesch (in very short order as a matter of fact). I think while I initially reported to Edgar in September and October, it might have been as early as October (in fact it probably was, because October was when we began the first negotiations, I think October 11 of 1969), and by that time I think I had been shifted to Loesch.
- Willens: Do you recall approximately what 12 weeks you spent in Micronesia that summer?
- Radewagen: I know that the first day we landed was the 12th of June 1969, because that was the 25th anniversary of the invasion.
- Willens: And then you stayed there . . .
- Radewagen: For 12 weeks.
- Willens: So that takes us into . . .
- Radewagen: Right into September.
- Willens: Into early September.
- Radewagen: Yes. When the team I was working with dispersed (there were some that were on it from other agencies, Paul Cook had come from MIT, the leader of the team), the idea was always that I was going to stay behind and help facilitate negotiations and then take on some more permanent role thereafter.
- Willens: Were any of the other members of the task force also from Interior's Office of Territories?
- Radewagen: No. In fact the idea was to set up this team independently of that office. We had no reporting relationship to that office. Other than getting a couple of briefings on the way out, we had no relationship to that office. That was done purposely to bypass the bureaucracy and not taint us with the bureaucracy's view of Micronesia.
- Willens: Secretary Hickel when he visited the Trust Territory announced a rather ambitious action program that had been prepared by Interior before he went out. Did that action program serve as a checklist for your assignment, or did you have a more specific directive?
- Radewagen: I'd have to take a look at that action plan again to give you an answer to that. I mean I know what we did out there, but I don't recall whether it related to any action plan that Hickel put together. I'm certain it did, but I can't specifically recall.
- Willens: One of the featured items on the action program was to enlist the military forces through the Seabees to work on infrastructure projects.
- Radewagen: Oh, yes. We did that.
- Willens: Why don't you tell me in summary fashion what your task force did do, since this is the first time I've ever really interviewed anyone who had any experience with that aspect of the operation.
- Radewagen: Well the High Commissioner's development coordination committee I will have to assume came out of the Hickel initiative or action plan and his April trip. When he came back the action team was put together. Edgar Kaiser clearly was involved even that early in some fashion. It must have already come over from the White House, certainly came over from the White House right after Nixon came on in January. And I suspect that part of what Hickel had to do was pigeonhole him because he was clearly a Democrat, and this

was a very highly partisan organization, and Edgar didn't hide his Democrat leanings and credentials. I'm guessing, this is totally a guess on my part, that Hickel and his partisans said well we've got to do something with him, he's a White House fellow, and they looked at this Micronesia issue, and at that point early on it was no sort of priority, and they kind of threw that to him as one of the things he could do. But somewhere along the line he very quickly earned the trust and respect of Hickel and became a key player.

Willens: Do you have any specific examples in mind as to how he became a key player?

Radewagen: No. I know he was responsible for bringing Paul Cook on board as the chairman of this committee, which is an indication that he had, if not the respect of the Secretary, at least he had that in his portfolio, and he was given the clearance to go ahead and put this team together. If at that point Micronesia was not a high priority, then the Secretary had no reason to not go along with that. This was a purely apolitical project being put together. No reason not to go with this, Paul Cook being an economist, and that's one of the things they were looking at there. But you have to remember, I was away in Micronesia for three months. So from the period of when we left on Washington on about the 6th or 9th of June, probably the 6th of June I think because we had several days of briefings in Honolulu CINCPAC and the usual suspects from that point until I got back right before Labor Day, I have no idea whatsoever of the machinations in Washington, none. That's a four-month blank in my slate. No Internet, no E-mail, no nobody, I didn't know the players. But all I know is by the time I got back all the deck chairs had been reshuffled. We had a whole new set of players.

Willens: That's when you began to report directly to Kaiser?

Radewagen: That's when I began to report directly to Kaiser for a very short period, and then on to Harrison Loesch. Even though there was a bureaucracy in place run by Mrs. Farrington, the Office of Territories, I did not have any responsibility there. I had my responsibility direct to Loesch, because again they wanted to have a fresh look at this thing and keep the negotiations or what they were doing, which was going to lead into the negotiations, outside the normal bureaucratic channels.

Willens: Was there a formal report submitted by the Cook committee after you concluded your investigatory work?

Radewagen: Certainly it had to be something. But what I recall is that the final report was primarily kind of a budget document that recommended to Interior how to best spend the \$7.5 million gap between the authorization and the appropriation in the year coming up, in order to best position the U.S. to reach its objective there of ending the Trust Territory.

Willens: Do you have a general recollection today as to what the principal priorities were for spending the additional funds?

Radewagen: Absolutely. The priorities were to do high visibility projects which would make Micronesians look more favorably upon the U.S. and toward affiliation with the U.S. in some fashion.

Willens: Any examples come to mind?

Radewagen: The post offices. We built post offices in each of the six districts. That was one of my own personal projects.

Willens: Were funds in fact obtained for that purpose?

Radewagen: Funds were obtained for that purpose. I believe it came out of the Interior budget. I remember going down with an official from the Post Office Department. We went down

to Houston where the contract had been let for these fancy prefab deals, which still are in Micronesia today, still serve as the Post Offices today, with the idea being that every District Center would have a Post Office with an American flag flying, and it would be a psychological way to tie the Micronesians to the U.S. I mean it wasn't very subtle and was not meant to be. I mean this was not a psychological operation per se dictated out of Fort Bragg or Okinawa. It was simply one of these high visibility things which we do all over the world with USAID, for example, to make people feel better about America. It was the same sort of thing in Micronesia.

Willens: Do any other examples come to mind?

Radewagen: The Seabees, the civic action teams. Part of our recommendation was that some of these projects that needed doing or completing around the whole Territory could be done with the Defense Department's help through civic action teams.

Willens: Were some of these recommendations implemented during the course of your travels out to Micronesia?

Radewagen: No.

Willens: Did it all wait for your return and formal action back in Washington?

Radewagen: My recollection is that it was not until we got back. But it was shortly thereafter. My guess is that the first civic action team probably went down fewer than nine months after we returned. I'd say probably by the summer of 1970 we already had people out there.

Willens: Do you recall whether these recommendations were received favorably on the Hill with respect to increased funding?

Radewagen: Oh, yes. We made a case. The Department made the case for additional funding, and as I recall we came up to about \$49 million out of the \$50 million in terms of supplemental, it might have been even emergency supplemental or whatever they were calling them in those days, to fill in that gap.

Willens: Just to back off a minute, Fred. How long did you stay with Interior?

Radewagen: Until April of 1975.

Willens: April of 1975. Then did you stay in the government?

Radewagen: No. I left government and did a short-term consultancy with the Department of Agriculture and then moved over to become the Associate National Political Director of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce?

Willens: Is that your current position?

Radewagen: No. I did that for four years and four years with the Republican Governors Association. Then in 1982 I opened up my own consulting firm back doing Pacific Island affairs and started a newsletter.

Willens: And that's what you're currently doing?

Radewagen: Yes. An enormously influential newsletter, I might add, which if you've never seen your way clear to . . .

Willens: I want to subscribe. I hereby subscribe. Send me a bill.

Radewagen: All right. Give me your card, and I'll put one in the mail.

Willens: Okay, let's go back and finish up with the summer of 1969. I assume that you traveled to all six districts?

- Radewagen: Six districts, 35 islands. I've probably been to more islands in Micronesia than most Micronesians.
- Willens: During the course of that assignment, did you have the occasion to meet the political leaders of the various districts?
- Radewagen: Yes.
- Willens: And did you from time to time have discussions about future political status with leaders in those various districts?
- Radewagen: Not per se. That was not our mandate.
- Willens: I understand that. Well let's focus for the moment on the Marianas. Do you have any recollections of the individuals that you met that year?
- Radewagen: Yes. Very clearly I do, because one of the things that the person who brought me on board in April, and one of the things I brought to the exercise he thought, was having a good judge of political leaders. (I was the administrative officer on the trip, number seven on a team of seven, the young fellow who was making sure that the tickets were there and the hotels were there, and everybody else had a specialty—economics, land, and so forth.) I was asked because of my political background, in addition to my foreign affairs background (fresh out of school), to keep a special eye out for the leaders who I thought that the U.S. would be well advised to deal with and could deal with in negotiating political status or anything in the future who were favorably disposed to the U.S. and who were people who were anti-U.S. Then I came back and I kind of put together an informal report.
- Willens: Turning to the Northern Marianas, what do you recall about the leaders that you met in 1969?
- Radewagen: In what sense?
- Willens: Well let me ask a more general question then. Were you aware before you went out there of the recommendations of the Micronesian Future Status Commission that included the objective of free association or in the alternative independence?
- Radewagen: No.
- Willens: That report came out while you were there in July of 1969?
- Radewagen: Right.
- Willens: But in fact its conclusions had been thoroughly reported in advance. Were you aware of that report?
- Radewagen: No. I was not aware of that at the time. I recall distinctly that when I came back in September the U.S. side was still on a course, thought they were embarking on a course, and were going to bring this full Trust Territory in as a territory of the United States. And if there were such a recommendation from probably the Congress of Micronesia or the Committee at the time, I think that was probably taken fairly lightly in Washington because I think they truly believed they could overcome that with persuasiveness when the first negotiations were held in October. It was only then (I recall distinctly) that the Micronesians held their ground and said we want free association, well independence. We don't want to become a territory of the United States. And I think that was the point of departure, that first round of negotiations, where the U.S. side came to the conclusion that we were going to have to table other options besides just some sort of territorial status with the U.S.

- Willens: The two members from the Marianas who were part of that first delegation were Benjamin Manglona from Rota and . . .
- Radewagen: Olympio Borja.
- Willens: . . . and Palacios?
- Radewagen: Oh, no, that's right. Palacios, that's right.
- Willens: They had somewhat different views with respect to the Marianas, but they were both well-respected.
- Radewagen: Right.
- Willens: When you visited the Marianas for the first time, did you become aware personally that the Marianas did have a long history of seeking affiliation with the United States?
- Radewagen: Yes. And as a matter of fact, that fateful referendum in which Guam rejected, I think it was May of 1969 that Guam rejected . . .
- Willens: Well it happened later.
- Radewagen: There were two referendums. There was the Guam referendum and the Saipan referendum.
- Willens: That's right.
- Radewagen: Was not one in May and one in November?
- Willens: No, I think not. But they were both in November within a week apart.
- Radewagen: All right.
- Willens: But you were aware then I gather . . .
- Radewagen: I was aware of a lead up to it.
- Willens: Did you come away having visited 35 islands with any sense as to any factors that either argued for keeping all six districts together or factors that struck you as leading in the contrary direction?
- Radewagen: Nothing led me in the contrary direction, because we did not engage in political conversations. We had one mission, and there was no political aspect to the mission, other than my informal role to see what leaders I could identify whom the U.S. could deal with and whom they were going to have trouble with. And this was mostly to be done by observation, not by sitting around having pow wows over drinks. My own sense of things, and I think it was shared by all those in the loop at the time, was that one of the compelling reasons to keep the Trust Territory as a single entity was that there was no economic viability to splitting them apart into separate territories, states, freely associated states or whatever. That they just didn't have the political mass necessary to go out on their own. I mean not that they were going out on their own anyway, because nobody dreamed of independence or sovereignty, and that held up I'd say right up until the end of the Soviet Union.
- Willens: Okay. Let's turn to the first round of negotiations which you made reference to earlier. Did you attend any of the sessions?
- Radewagen: Yes. All.
- Willens: The U.S. delegation was very limited with its formal instructions.
- Radewagen: Yes.

- Willens: It seemed to include Mrs. Farrington, Loesch . . .
- Radewagen: And I've got a great picture of the first session which you could have for your book.
- Willens: Well, we're looking for new pictures that haven't been published.
- Radewagen: This is a picture with Harrison Loesch and Buddy and Milner at the table and the ubiquitous Herman Marcuse who predates me.
- Willens: He predates us all.
- Radewagen: Let's see. And then there's a guy whose name now has long sense escaped me who was the State Department guy.
- Willens: Arthur Day?
- Radewagen: No.
- Willens: Peale?
- Radewagen: What was the name? Peale's first name?
- Willens: I think Samuel.
- Radewagen: No. Not Sam Peale. No.
- Willens: The names on the formal delegation list are limited to Harrison Loesch, Elizabeth Farrington, George Milner (all of Interior) and then Arthur Day of State.
- Radewagen: Well, we were not listed as the formal delegates as part of the negotiating team, you know, but we were all there in the room. You know how these things are. There are people at the table and there are people around back.
- Willens: I've been in both locations.
- Radewagen: But there were more than just the three at the table. And I don't even remember Arthur Day, frankly.
- Willens: Actually I think you're right. I think he may have been replaced even before the discussions began by someone else from State. The Micronesians came with a series of 11 topics they wanted to discuss. Is it your recollection today that they came to the first session with the objection of working out some kind of freely associated relationship with the United States, or do you think their views were a little less precise than that?
- Radewagen: I think they were a little less precise than that, and I've looked for years to find it, because I remember having tucked it away, and I wanted to give it to Lazarus sometime years ago, the 11 principles or whatever they were called.
- Willens: There were Four Principles, but you didn't hear about those until 1970.
- Radewagen: Yes. These were the 11 whatever they were. 11 Points, all right?
- Willens: 11 Points, right.
- Radewagen: They were handwritten on a yellow legal pad . . .
- Willens: Is that right?
- Radewagen: . . . which I was handed to go get Xeroxed so that everybody could have copies. So Lazarus and the boys sat around and they wrote them down. It wasn't a matter of some fancy pants attorney from a high-priced firm having these talking points already to go. These were hammered out. And I can't remember if it was the opening gambit. My recollection is that

it was not an opening gambit but rather after a day or so of talks, that they retired to an anteroom and talked it through and came up with the 11 Points.

Willens: Did you have the impression that if the United States had been able to agree to all 11 Points that the Micronesians there would have agreed to some kind of permanent affiliation with the United States?

Radewagen: I think if at that point the United States had had the flexibility, the deal could have been consummated. But we're so musclebound, the U.S. is so musclebound, that we ultimately came to a far weaker position in what ultimately transpired.

Willens: Why was the U.S. so musclebound?

Radewagen: Well, because you have competing agencies. It goes back to your original point of 1961-62. You have turf battles all the time. I mean I sat in on innumerable drafting committees on the U.S. side.

Willens: Is this before?

Radewagen: My memory's fuzzy on that one. My hunch is that my drafting committee days came after that first round of negotiations as the U.S. tried to come up with a response to these 11 Points. I forget when the second round of negotiations were what? March of the following year?

Willens: May of 1970.

Radewagen: By May of 1970. So we had all that time between October and May that particularly I sat in innumerable meetings. I mean half these documents, the ones from Kissinger to the President or the Department or the Inter-Agency Group to Kissinger, I had a hand in. And we'd painstakingly go over line by line with State fighting here, Interior fighting there, Defense fighting the other place, each of them making sure that they're crossing t's and dotting i's to make sure that everybody's parochial interest was protected. And that's why we're musclebound. I mean we have to do everything through this process. There's not a clear agency in charge. Interior had responsibility for administration, but Defense had responsibility for the defense of the whole area. So Defense in effect has always had a veto power, and certainly in those days, always had a veto power over everything. Because all they had to do was say to the rest of us, this will weaken the security of the United States. And who's going to dispute them? I remember once in that period there was something called the PACE Experiments, Pacific Area Cratering Experiments, to be conducted on some atoll in the Marshall Islands that they had chosen, and they were going to go ahead. They announced it in the Inter-Agency Group, here is what we're going to do, this is vital to our national security interests. Everybody said well this is Defense's bailiwick, so how are you going to tell them you don't need these things. Well by that time there was the Micronesian Legal Services operating in Micronesia, and they said well we don't have to worry about the U.S. defense, and they sued. And eventually the Pentagon backed off, and it turned out these were not vital to the security of the United States, because in the face of a legal threat, they found an alternative method. It was a very useful lesson for a young operative to learn in this game in terms of dealing with the Pentagon.

Willens: Let me just ask you about two issues that seemed to loom large at the first round of negotiation. One involved the Micronesian desire to write their own constitution. And the United States side had agreed before the negotiation not to provide for a Micronesian constitutional convention—not to agree to it. They specifically rejected that proposal, which had come from (among others) Congressman Lloyd Meeds. Do you have any

recollection today as to why the United States was so reluctant then to agree to a constitutional convention?

Radewagen: Policy decisions were made going into the October negotiations as a result of deliberations that went on in my absence.

Willens: I'm sure.

Radewagen: I cannot shed any light on it.

Willens: So even as the discussions went forward between the two negotiating teams, you do not recall any discussion within the U.S. side as to whether they ought to agree?

Radewagen: No, because I don't think that the flexibility was there. I think that the NSAM or whatever they had in that day that set Loesch's course didn't permit for that flexibility. I think that they had to withdraw to a later date. And that was part of the problem with the process. These concrete guidelines were handed down from the Inter-Agency Group from the earliest days, and they didn't permit the flexibility of the negotiators on the scene to make the seat-of-the-pants decision to move forward, because these were so carefully crafted with every agency's interest in mind that you had no room for deviation. Loesch didn't have any room that I recall that he could negotiate on his own.

Willens: The second issue that would seem to be even more important related to land and specifically the eminent domain power of the United States. It appears from the documents and my work to date that Secretary Hickel told Loesch to try to strike a compromise with the Micronesians, namely that he (Hickel) would endorse the Micronesian desire to restrict U.S. power over land if in return the Micronesians would agree to a permanent affiliation with the United States and that Loesch presented that compromise to the Micronesians. Do you have any recollection of that?

Radewagen: I do.

Willens: Do you recall whether the Micronesians in fact agreed that if Hickel could get State and Defense to buy off on this compromise that they would agree to a permanent affiliation with the United States?

Radewagen: I don't recall.

Willens: The documents are conflicting on the point, with some documents suggesting the Micronesians did agree and yet other evidence suggesting that is unlikely. Because some of them that I've talked to had to recollection that the compromise was even being canvassed around. So you have no recollection of that?

Radewagen: I have a recollection of that deal being offered. I have a recollection of that deal being discussed. I cannot specifically recall Harrison saying in a negotiation session, "Here is what I'm going to offer you." I think that's what happened, but I know it certainly was discussed and he had the authority to do it, and I suspect he did do it, and I suspect it caught Lazarus and the rest of them flatfooted. And as a matter of fact, it may well have been, although I cannot recall for sure, it may well have been the issue that precipitated their withdrawal into a room to come up with the 11 Points. It may very well have been that issue.

Willens: Well from what I understand from Mr. Loesch and others, the Micronesians found the formal sessions not as productive as the private sessions with Mr. Loesch.

Radewagen: That's true.

- Willens: And that the other agencies seemed to have permitted the informal settings because they felt that Loesch was reporting to them accurately to them as to what went on.
- Radewagen: And it didn't make any difference because he was so hamstrung with this negotiation that he couldn't deviate enough to give away any particular agency's interest.
- Willens: Can you give me a little personal flavor of Harrison Loesch and how he handled the negotiations?
- Radewagen: A swashbuckler. Very informal. Hail fellow well met, you know. Sit there, heavy smoker, you know, get the thing over with and let's all go out and drink. Conducted with good humor, much more so than Lazarus on his side, who was just a bundle of nerves. I mean he would sometimes go out to the men's room to throw up.
- Willens: What did you perceive to be Salii's relationship with the other members of his delegation?
- Radewagen: I perceived him to have been somewhat distant.
- Willens: Who were the other strong members of that delegation who you recall, either from the first session or from other dealings?
- Radewagen: Bailey Olter comes to mind immediately.
- Willens: How so?
- Radewagen: Well, I just recall him having things to say as well. I think Frank Palacios comes to mind defending Marianas interests. The Marshallese were quiet. That was Ekpap [Silk] and Amata [Kabua].
- Willens: How about the people from Truk: Andon Amaraich and Tosiwo Nakayama?
- Radewagen: Andon and Nakayama were sphinxes. They were probably the biggest puzzles to the U.S. side. They could not quite figure out these two fellows who sat there like sphinxes.
- Willens: Was that true not only at the first round but at subsequent sessions?
- Radewagen: Subsequent rounds. I think I had one additional round. The May round was also an Interior round.
- Willens: Okay.
- Radewagen: In Washington. And after that I was out of it. Where was round 3?
- Willens: Round 3 was Hana. Round 4 was Palau.
- Radewagen: By Round 3 I was gone from the negotiating milieu, because Haydn Williams came in and we didn't get on.
- Willens: You may have noticed from the documents that there was apparently a meeting that Secretary Hickel participated in with Dr. Kissinger in late December, and it's one of the few meetings as to which I have a written record.
- Radewagen: Is that the one where he said, "Who gives a damn?"
- Willens: Secretary Hickel said he had three meetings with Kissinger, all of which were equally unsuccessful from Secretary Hickel's point of view.
- Radewagen: Yes.
- Willens: Did you ever hear anything contemporaneously about Dr. Kissinger's role in these negotiations?

- Radewagen: No. Nothing comes to mind. I dealt with a number of the documents that went up to Kissinger in those days, and I suspect subsequently in the drafting groups I participated in, the NSC fellow was always there as well. John Holdridge, I think you wrote in here, was one you had not been able to get.
- Willens: I don't have a telephone number for him.
- Radewagen: He's here.
- Willens: I know he lives in Bethesda, but he's unlisted.
- Radewagen: Call the Asia Society. Call Judy Sloan at the Asia Society. I bet she knows.
- Willens: The Asia Society here?
- Radewagen: The Washington office, yes.
- Willens: What's her name?
- Radewagen: Judy Sloan. She's the Director of the Washington program.
- Willens: Is he doing some work for them?
- Radewagen: Well his interest has always been Asia, and I know he's been on their board in the past and done programs for them. She might not give you a phone number, but she would pass the message to him that you wanted to talk to him. I'm a pretty good friend of John Holdridge.
- Willens: I was thinking. I know Jim Wilson has his telephone number.
- Radewagen: Yes.
- Willens: And I thought I'd call Jim, because he mentioned Holdridge to me also, and I see his name on some of these NSC documents, and I'd like to interview him.
- Radewagen: And Levin. Levin would be . . .
- Willens: Levin I don't know.
- Radewagen: What's his first name? I want to say Art Levin, but I know it's not Art Levin.
- Willens: After the first round, it looks as though the Inter-Agency Group was considering how to react to the negotiations and whether the United States ought to change its position. After the meeting that Kissinger had with Secretary Rogers and Secretary Hickel, the Inter Agency Group really was told stick to the program. And as a result, Loesch had to go out to Micronesia around New Year's Day of 1970 to report to the Micronesians. Did you attend the Inter-Agency Group meetings from that point on?
- Radewagen: Yes, at the working level.
- Willens: At the working level, yes. What was your impression of the way in which that group worked?
- Radewagen: Well there were parameters. The parameters included no fragmentation. That was one key thing. And no sovereignty for Micronesia. So if no sovereignty, there was no free association I don't think, the way they interpret free association. And there were other guidelines as well which don't come to mind. If you refresh my memory they would. But within those parameters of course everybody still looks at their own bureaucratic turf.
- Willens: There came a time in early 1970 when Salii basically wrote back to Harrison Loesch saying that unless the United States is willing to let us draft our own constitution, there is

- no point to having further conversations. Do you recall that issue becoming an important one in early 1970?
- Radewagen: Not specifically, but I don't specifically not recall it either. I mean in that whole period, that was always an issue, but I don't recall the resolution.
- Willens: What is your recollection about the second round of negotiations in May when the Micronesians announced for the first time their Four Principles?
- Radewagen: I have fewer recollections of that than I do of the October 1969 round. I recall the Four Principles, but I think by the time that period in 1970 came around, by that time Whittington was on board, and I think we were sharing responsibility. He was doing more the substantive work as I was kind of phasing out of that and getting more involved in trying to reorganize the Office of Territories. It became a second priority to try to get some sort of new structure, because in the meantime under Phil Burton's prodding Congress had passed elected governor bills. So Interior with the Office of Territories' permission was shifting, and with Whittington on board, Whittington took over more of that than I did, because he had had two years out in Micronesia as well. Besides being a lawyer, he had had two years out there and he had a rapport with a number of the key leaders. So I kind of faded into the background, and I think by the time we got to the Four Principles I was doing less of the drafting. I still had my hand in it, but I was doing less of that work than I had been before.
- Willens: Who got you involved in the reorganization effort?
- Radewagen: Let's see, Hickel didn't go out until the November election. I think he was ousted by Nixon right after the November election.
- Willens: It's a little hard to tie that down, but I think you're probably right. I mean his controversial letter goes back to I think May of 1970 or thereabouts. And some of the evidence I've seen suggests that everyone anticipated that he would be leaving.
- Radewagen: Oh, yes. He was proven to be a maverick. The White House was really annoyed at him.
- Willens: Well, why did it take so long before he departed?
- Radewagen: Very simply. Because he had an environmental constituency in the early days, and with the 1970 elections coming up, the White House just didn't want to bring that issue to the floor, which would cut against Republicans. To go after the key environmentalist. And we all knew that once the election was over and the die was cast and what the next Congress was going to look like, he was gone. He knew it too.
- Willens: Did he or anyone in the Department to your knowledge know who was going to replace him?
- Radewagen: No, I don't think so. As I recall the Morton appointment was a surprise to everyone, because it had traditionally gone to a Westerner, and nobody anticipated an Eastern Shore farmer.
- Willens: Was it your recollection that the desire to reorganize the Interior's Office of Territories predated Morton's taking office?
- Radewagen: You know, I'm not sure now that I think about it. I know that once Whittington came on, Whittington took the lead in the drafting, much to my liking because I'm a political operative and not a drafting group kind of guy. I just hated those sessions and was just delighted when Tom came on board. Now what I was doing then, I know I was traveling out to Micronesia.

- Willens: Did you remain then involved in the implementation of some of the action projects?
- Radewagen: Yes, that may have been what I was doing, following up on the projects. I remember one trip I took out there where after a long deliberation they finally opened up Micronesia to foreign investment. That was one of my babies. And we got Morton to do a video tape, and we literally hand-carried the videotape out to Saipan and set up the Congress of Micronesia chamber where we had this dramatic departure in U.S. policy. It was a very dramatic departure.
- Willens: Now my recollection is that that may have happened as late as 1974.
- Radewagen: That could be. No, it wouldn't have been that late.
- Willens: Whom do you remember from Defense?
- Radewagen: Defense had two people involved in negotiating. They always had somebody from the J5 staff, as well as somebody from the Assistant Secretary (ISA) staff.
- Willens: Was Kuhn on the ISA staff?
- Radewagen: Right. He was ISA.
- Willens: Was Stockton also, or was he from the J5?
- Radewagen: I think he was J5.
- Willens: Was there much interest in foreign investment out in Micronesia based on your experience?
- Radewagen: No, but this was something that stuck in the craw of people, particularly in the Marianas I think. Here you wanted to bring these people in close to the United States and yet you have this policy of denying foreign investment, which could give them a needed boost, particularly since we couldn't get any interest whatsoever in American companies to go out there. I remember (and my mind is fuzzy again as to the actual time frame) that there was one mission put together led by a Professor out of the Naval War College up in Newport whose name I could confirm to you if you came across it. It just doesn't hit with me right now. But he brought a team in, and I can't remember now even who put that team together. But it was a team of business folks that he took out there. The Navy paid for it.
- Willens: What happened?
- Radewagen: Well, he took them out there to try to interest them in investment in Micronesia, and they took a look at the place and said you know we can maximize our dollars elsewhere. But we had high hopes for that team, as I recall.
- Willens: I have in the volume that I gave you a press release dated May 26, 1971 summarizing the reorganization of the Office of Territories.
- Radewagen: Yes. I was very involved in that. I probably even had a hand in writing that release.
- Willens: There's been some suggestion tactfully put that this was attributed in part to the Secretary's disappointment with the way in which the Office of Territories was functioning under Mrs. Farrington.
- Radewagen: No doubt about it. She was a flat-out political appointment under the patronage of Hiram Fong that the White House felt they had to make in 1969. And poor Betty, I mean you know, her time had passed, and she was out of it from day one.

- Willens: It seems as though as a result of that people below her in the Office of Territories did not really play any substantive role in the 1969 to 1971 period.
- Radewagen: Absolutely not.
- Willens: That it was principally done by Loesch and people assigned to Loesch or to Hickel's office.
- Radewagen: Yes. Loesch, Edgar Kaiser. Following Kaiser, Mike Levitt is another one you ought to talk to. Michael Levitt.
- Willens: Really?
- Radewagen: Yes.
- Willens: I've never seen that name.
- Radewagen: The fellow at Interior (who was a career guy who was assigned to Levitt) by the name of Phillip DeLongchamps, who works, who may have just retired, or may have gotten caught up for the reorganization last year. But Phil was a career Interior guy who was brought up to Hickel's office to work under Mike Levitt, and Levitt had succeeded Edgar. Levitt was a left-wing environmentalist, bomb-throwing type. As a matter of fact it was part of Hickel's problems with the White House. Levitt and I became good friends, because I was his interface with Harrison Loesch, and I lost track of him for 25 years. Then I read somewhere in a national journal or something that he had come to town (and I forget to do what), and we had lunch together. I don't think I could come up with his phone number. I'm going to put it on my Rolodex, and if you remind me I'll see if I can find it. But he's worth talking to. He succeeded Edgar Kaiser for probably the rest of the Hickel period. Then when Hickel went out right after the election, we had a period of drift there. Is that when Fred Russell was Acting Secretary?
- Willens: Yes.
- Radewagen: All right. Russell was a very important person in all this.
- Willens: How so?
- Radewagen: Russell had a personal relationship with Nixon, a personal friend of Nixon's. And he was Acting Secretary but an activist. I recall one time in particular we had a drafting session. Well we're sitting there drafting and Russell himself comes in, takes off his coat, sits down there and drafts with us.
- Willens: No, I haven't heard this story.
- Radewagen: Oh, ask Tom. When you talk to Tom next, he'll give you the chapter and verse on it. But Russell sat down there and started drafting. He looked at a set of papers, and Tom and I just kind of sat back, and what are you going to do you know? A member of the cabinet, Acting Secretary. But the minions from State and Defense who were all careerists, had never dealt with this sort of thing before. I mean I'm young but I've also dealt with the political level before, I mean I came from a political world. But I was in awe as well.
- Willens: I have seen in a document that Russell went to an Under Secretaries Committee meeting at one point while he was Acting Secretary and made a proposal that was disapproved by everyone at Interior but because of his stature it had to end up in the working documents.
- Radewagen: Right, called the Russell Option. And we sat there and drafted the Russell Option as a result of that working group meeting. I think Tom again took a lead on this thing. I don't

even remember what the Russell Option was now, but it was rather bizarre, and he even took it on up to his level. But I mean the Russell Option itself is of little consequence, except there was kind of a furor around for a short period of time. But it was his personal relationship with Nixon and the infighting that he brought to the attention of Nixon that I'm convinced led Nixon to say this has got to stop and the only way to stop it is to bring in an independent negotiator.

Willens: Well that's very interesting. Because I have no information as to what precipitated Kissinger's memo to Nixon that recommended the appointment of a Special Assistant.

Radewagen: Kissinger could not control Fred Russell, who was a personal friend from California days of Nixon, and was involved in the 1960 campaign, probably going back to 1948. He was one of the palace guards, and the Interior position was kind of his crumb. There was no way to anticipate that he would wind up as a Cabinet officer even on an acting basis. But he took a shine to this Micronesian issue and he grabbed it. I think Kissinger just didn't like the idea that there was somebody who could just walk into the Oval Office anytime and, who knows, bring his Russell Option to Nixon's attention. Whether he did it I don't know. But I'm convinced from folks that I recall talking to, and nobody told me this per se, but it's just my political instincts putting two and two together, that Loesch would be stepping down from the negotiations and an independent negotiator would be brought on. It was not too long after Russell's Option was the flavor of the month.

Willens: Did you hear of the likely appointment of a Special Assistant before Williams was appointed? Were you aware that this was percolating in the White House before the President announced in March of 1971 that Williams was going to serve that function?

Radewagen: I can't be sure. My instinct is no. My instinct is that it just came down on us one day.

Willens: Do you have any recollection as to what the reaction was at the Interior Department?

Radewagen: Well the reaction in the Interior Department, I mean we say Interior Department, but there were only a handful of us that were involved. And that was Harrison [Loesch] and Whittington and me and Lewis. That's another one you don't have on there that you need to add, and Harrison's deputy, very much a confidant of Harrison, Orme from Phoenix. He'd give you some perspectives. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary. This was Harrison's baby, but Orme got it involved and he's worth calling about those years. I mean we were disappointed. I was assigned immediately to be kind of the head of the welcoming team for Haydn Williams. I was sort of seconded to him to get him situated. I mean we took care of the logistics of his office spaces, his desk and his telephone.

Willens: I don't have a copy of any Executive Order or any Secretarial Order establishing the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations. It is not among the 80,000 pages that were produced to us.

Radewagen: How interesting.

Willens: Do you have any recollection as to when that was done and at whose initiative it was done?

Radewagen: It came out of the White House.

Willens: It may not have happened until later that summer after in fact the President had approved Williams' negotiating instructions.

Radewagen: Yes, I think that might be the case. I think the lawyers got into it and recognized that somebody had to find some authority for them to do this. They had to find a way to pay them. I think the White House had made that snap judgment. Nixon himself made that

- snap judgment. I don't know if he made the appointment itself or if Kissinger did. I don't know how all that came about—why Haydn Williams. I haven't a clue. But I think (as I recall) that there was no legal authority, no controlling legal authority if you will, for the Williams appointment and something had to be dreamed up.
- Willens: Well, there were problems of funding and staffing, and it seemed to me that it was generally assumed that there should be some independent group.
- Radewagen: But that all evolved. There was no plan. I mean nobody sat there and designed an office of Micronesian Status Negotiations.
- Willens: That's what I'm asking: what do you know about how that came about?
- Radewagen: It just evolved. I mean he had to have people that he was working with that turned out to be the working group that we dealt with all the time. I can't recall now exactly, but somehow that evolved into an office, because every agency had to come up somehow with some sort of funding. Interior had to find space and somehow keep this growing staff in its budget. It was easy enough to give Haydn a single office. Then when it started to develop, they had to backtrack to figure the legal authority for all this. And I wasn't involved in those actual administrative arrangements.
- Willens: It looks from the materials as though the first thing that Williams did was to get familiar with what the Under Secretaries Committee had done and then begin to draft his proposed negotiating instructions.
- Radewagen: Right.
- Willens: Did you play any role at all in assisting him in preparing his negotiating instructions that had to openly go to the President for approval?
- Radewagen: I may have at the very outset, but my recollection is that after getting his administrative arrangements taken care of, he looked to me to give him background information. I'd sit with him hours at end telling him what had gone on, much as I'm telling you, in the two years preceding his appointment. But once he got up to speed, I was no longer involved in it, and I think he didn't want anybody from the Interior Department on his staff per se because he wanted to preserve his independence, and I was too tied to the one agency. So by the time he was fully on board, I was not doing anything more on negotiations.
- Willens: With the benefit of hindsight, what's your assessment of using an office like OMSN to staff him?
- Radewagen: Well, I don't know how it could be done any differently, because to do it any differently would require going up to Congress and getting authority to create a new office. And that's very difficult, because you have to go through the authorization process, appropriation process, negotiation, and they wanted something quickly. They wanted to get these negotiations back on track. They'd stalled, and they'd determined that Harrison was not the guy to get it done. He could not be in the first among equals and couldn't overcome the bureaucratic resistance of other departments.
- Willens: One of the points made by other departments, particularly State, was that the Interior Department was too deferential to Congressman Aspinall.
- Radewagen: Oh, sure.
- Willens: What's your assessment of that charge?

- Radewagen: No question about it. I've sat in private meetings with two or three people with Rog Morton who would say as much as, "I'm not really Secretary of Interior," when he meant that Aspinall was Secretary of Interior.
- Willens: Was that as much true with the Republican Administration as it had been during the previous Democratic Administration?
- Radewagen: I can't speak for the previous Democratic Administration. Interior was not a front-line agency that the White House was going to spend political capital on. That's an easy one. So you get a succession of Interior Secretaries in there, and you let Wayne [Aspinall] have his way.
- Willens: What's your recollection of the process by which Burton came to the forefront and literally replaced Aspinall as sort of the key figure?
- Radewagen: Burton was elected in 1964, so by 1970 he had three terms under his belt. I think it was after the 1970 election that Hugh Carey, who had been the Chairman of the Subcommittee, moved over to Ways and Means, as I recall, leaving open a vacancy. The inner machinations of how it works within the Democratic caucus are beyond me. But after three terms I think Phil Burton had to use that as a platform, as a Subcommittee Chairmanship, and how that all came about I don't know. But once he became a Subcommittee Chairman, then he wielded that power.
- Willens: A recent biography of Phil Burton, which I think was written by a California reporter named Jacobs, suggested that Burton's subsequent effort to reform the House (so to speak) was tried out in the Interior Committee and that he used some Republican as well as Democratic support. He set out to limit the authority of Chairman Aspinall.
- Radewagen: Oh, you know, that's internal Democratic machinations that I would not be privy to, but I would say that Phil Burton's style was such that no matter what Committee he was on he was going to do that to whatever Chairman. He also held a seat on Education and Labor, which was really more of a power base than this Interior thing, and I think he probably did that to the Chairman of the day over there as well. I do remember that I was still in a position as kind of Haydn's informal administrative officer or assistant before he got himself up to gear when he first came on board, and one of the earliest things he did was pay a courtesy call on Phil Burton, and I sat in on that.
- Willens: What happened?
- Radewagen: Well, I mean Burton told him how it was going to be. And Haydn is a very stiff, formal guy, and he'd sit there and he'd humph and he'd hurrah and so forth, and "Mr. Chairman," and Phil would say, "Ah, it's Phil. Haydn, it's Phil. Call me Phil." And of course Haydn was also based in San Francisco.
- Willens: Did you get the sense that they had known each other from San Francisco?
- Radewagen: No. I believe this was the first time the two of them had ever met.
- Willens: Really?
- Radewagen: That's my recollection. It was really a very formal meeting from Haydn's part but not on Burton's part. Jim Berg, who I hired . . .
- Willens: Did you?
- Radewagen: Yes, I was the one who hired Berg.
- Willens: He was and is terrific. He wasn't there, was he?

- Radewagen: No. I hired him later.
- Willens: Yes, it was 1973 or thereabouts.
- Radewagen: Yes, because that came as a result of meeting him in Truk. See we both went to Northwestern together, different eras, but when he finished his Peace Corps tour and came back to the States, I hired him for Interior. He later went to the Micronesian negotiations. By that time Whittington had gone. I'd been over there to the Deputy's spot in the Office of Territories, and when Williams came he went off to do Alaska stuff. I needed somebody to sit here because I sure didn't want to go back and sit in on drafting. In walks Jim Berg, and I said, "You're my Micronesian guy." I sent him out. You know he was bearded and to the left and all this stuff.
- Willens: What do you recall of that first meeting between Haydn and Phil Burton and specifically what were Burton's objectives?
- Radewagen: Control. I mean Burton basically said, "You're going to get along fine, Haydn. (I think he called him Haydn.) I'm going to tell you how it's going to be." And as I recall, it was late afternoon and he'd already had a couple vodkas under his belt.
- Willens: You don't have any recollection that Burton had particular objectives in mind as to how it all ought to end up?
- Radewagen: No, I don't recall that. Now going back to what I was going to tell you about Berg. Berg made a very astute point once that Burton was unlike most people who look at minorities or other ethnic groups and love the individuals but hate the group. Burton loved the group but hated the individuals. He loved Micronesians, but he didn't like specific Micronesians, where the rest of us you know might like individual people but hate them as a group, see. He's just the opposite. And that's the way Phil Burton was. He looked at things in the abstract. He was a classic down-the-line liberal helping our little brown brothers. It was a little brown brother syndrome as far as I was concerned. I don't recall any specifics coming out of that meeting. It was purely a courtesy call. I don't recall him talking about his objectives as much as he was talking about letting Haydn Williams know that whatever Haydn Williams did was going to have to come back through his Committee, and "Don't you forget it, Haydn." I do recall Haydn coming away from that quite rattled and unsettled by the confrontation. We rode back to Interior Department together. He was thoroughly unnerved, because he had never run into anything like Phil Burton. He'd never dealt with politicians that way. I mean even though he'd always been in the national security arena he was used to dealing with a different kind of a person than a Phil Burton kind of politician.
- Willens: Based on your observation over the years, how do you think Haydn Williams performed in his responsibilities?
- Radewagen: Well he overcame the bureaucracy to get his things done. But by the time he was well into his job I didn't have a good view of what he was doing. I think he thought at the outset he would be able to resolve this problem a lot faster, but it turned out to be a lot more intractable than I think he thought it was going to be. And I think in the final analysis he suffered the same as Loesch and everybody else in the way the process works in that there are competing agency interests and, even though he was the President's Personal Representative, unlike Fred Russell he couldn't stroll into the White House and resolve problems.
- Willens: Were you aware of the decision of the United States to agree to separate negotiations for the Marianas before it happened?

- Radewagen: When was that decision made?
- Willens: It was made public in April 1972 at the Palau round of Micronesian negotiations but there had been a good deal of planning for it during late 1971 and early 1972.
- Radewagen: I'd have to be aware of it, but the time frame doesn't stick out at me.
- Willens: Did you have any reaction at the time as to whether this was an appropriate step to take or otherwise?
- Radewagen: Not that I recall.
- Willens: Do you recall any reaction from Micronesians that you came in contact with regarding the separate Marianas negotiations?
- Radewagen: No. Most of these things as I watched from 1969 on through to 1986, it was an evolution. I don't recall much in the way of anything being a dramatic breakthrough one way or another. It seems to be (as I recall) all these decisions were a natural progressing and an inching back of the U.S. step by step by step. If what finally came out in 1979 had been laid on the table by the U.S. in 1969, it would have been a dramatic departure. But it was little inch by inch giving up, it's like getting older. You know, until you look at your high school photo 40 years ago, you don't believe you look any different. You're looking at the same guy in the mirror every day. It's the same.
- Willens: What is your assessment today in 1998 of the way it ended up with four distinct entities out there in the Western Pacific?
- Radewagen: In what sense? I mean on so many levels I could comment.
- Willens: Well, do you think that the United States interests would have been better served if it had insisted that they all stay together?
- Radewagen: In retrospect, no. You look at the Federated States of Micronesia and it's a musclebound animal. I mean there are almost a microcosm of the United States, and there's so many competing constituencies, the kind of constitution the FSM had to put together just to stitch a nation together, for which there is no guarantee of survivability, you know. I mean when that thing was put together there was still a Yugoslavia, which there no longer is. So when you deal with all these separate cultures, there's no sense of Micronesian unity or identity the way we thought back in those early years. We wanted to try to build a singleness, and I think there was a naivete on our part that it could ever be done. I think the fragmentation was probably inevitable. Nobody saw it back then. Only in hindsight can we say that was inevitable. And it's not just because the Marianas wanted to be more like our cousin, to be close to the United States. No, I think there was more to it than that. There are the ethnic rivalries. And I don't need to tell you, having dealt as long with the Marianas as you have, there is a the cleavage between the Carolinian community and the predominant Chamorro community. So when you spread out over thousands of miles of cultures, I mean in culture, there may be some vague similarities between Chamorro culture and Sadawal or Eniwetok people in terms of communal living and what not, but it's almost negligible. There's some fundamental things we didn't understand back in those days. To give you a good example, I don't think we understand land to this day the way Micronesians understand land. Whether they be Chamorros or Marshallese, they all understand intuitively land in a fundamentally different sense than we do. One of the people that we had on our team in 1969 (his name was Brogo Toward I think) he came from the Bureau of Land Management, and his mission for that 12 weeks was to look at how we do land reform. Land reform! You get out to Yap, and you take a parcel of land, and you know one family knows that they have the right to cross the land, the other has

the right to the coconut tree, and the third one has the right to pick the coconuts. Nobody really owns the land. How are you going to have land reform? How are you going to put boundaries when this is all done intuitively? Land in the Micronesian sense the lion eye view of it here is land is to the Micronesians and makes Micronesians Micronesians, or I should say Saipanese and Sadawalese and Palauans and so forth, what the United States Constitution binds you to me, that piece of paper called our Constitution, which makes us Americans, not this land. But what makes somebody a Saipanese is that land, or a Palauan is that land. That's their fundamental identity. We don't understand that as a people. I'm convinced of it. Unless you understand something like that, you're going to have your hands tied behind your back at the front end. As I look back at those 1969 negotiations, if I had the understanding that I have today with 30 years hindsight, to go back, I would have undertaken negotiations entirely differently.

Willens: Do you have any judgment about the current situation in the Northern Marianas? What is your assessment of the difficulties that the Northern Marianas now has with respect to control over immigration?

Radewagen: It's the same thing. It's a fundamental of both sides talking over each other. If you take a look at Clinton's order of May 30 to Froilan Tenorio of last year, talking about American values. Who has the right to talk about American values? They don't understand American values out there. American values don't mean anything to them out there. I mean we're looking at the different basis—the land and the soil being their Constitution, law and order being ours. They are U.S. citizens, but they are not Americans. They are not Americans. We're talking "us" and they talk about "they." You know, Americans. When they talk about Americans they're talking about us, the Saipanese. And they're carrying the same color passport you and I are.

Willens: Well that's been commented on, and some people say well you have to realize that it was only 1986 . . .

Radewagen: Guamanians have been at it since 1898. They're not Americans.

Willens: That suggests that on the whole you think the idea of having offshore territories is fundamentally a bad idea.

Radewagen: If we have to put it in the narrow framework of the Constitution and our value system of which the Constitution is inextricably tied, it is. It's an irreconcilable difference if we're in that Constitutional straightjacket. There's no question about it. Our cultural fundamentals go back to Christ and King John. I mean it's so interwoven in everything we do that you can't extract one from the other into this fabric we've woven, and our mindsets and attitudes, which come from an entirely different basis than island cultures do. So Interior and Saipan are talking past each other, not to each other. You've got to worry about the shape of the table, and you've got to worry about the frameworks in which you're dealing before you can tackle the issues. And they're not doing that. And I blame the U.S.

Willens: You think they can work it out?

Radewagen: Not unless they can sit down and talk in the terms and come to a mutual understanding of fundamental terms and framework in which to have honest negotiations.

Willens: Is there anything else that you'd like to say on the record about the Northern Marianas or the process by which Micronesia has developed over the last 30 years?

Radewagen: No.

Willens: Well I want to thank you very much for being so helpful.