

INTERVIEW OF RUTH G. VAN CLEVE

by Howard P. Willens

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- Willens: Ruth G. Van Cleve is an old colleague and friend who has served with distinction over many decades in the Department of the Interior with specific responsibilities for territorial affairs. She has agreed to be interviewed and understands the informal ground rules. Ruth, thank you very much for coming. I wonder if we might just summarize for background purposes your education and the circumstances under which you first became employed at Interior.
- Van Cleve: Surely. I have an AB from Mt. Holyoke 1946. I spent a year thereafter in Washington as an intern in the National Institute of Public Affairs, an old Rockefeller Foundation organization which was well known and well thought of at the time but no longer exists. Thereafter, I went to law school and have an LL.B. from Yale 1950. I was admitted soon thereafter to both the D.C. and the Minnesota Bars and commenced working for the Interior Department in December 1950 in a three-to-five-month temporary job as a staff person, GS5, on the Commission on the Application of Federal Laws to Guam, something created under the Guam Organic Act. The three to five months, as has been known to happen in the government, turned out to be 43 years, and I retired in December, this last December. From the Guam job, which was housed in and for all practical purposes a part of the Interior Department, I moved into what was then called the Division of Territories and Island Possessions. When the lawyers in the Interior Department were all amalgamated into the Solicitor's Office in 1954, I moved there, soon thereafter becoming the Assistant Solicitor for Territories, Acting Assistant Solicitor for many years since I was junior in rank, as well as age.
- Willens: You remained in that position then until you became Director of the Office of Territories in 1964?
- Van Cleve: Correct. A position I held until 1969, when the coming of the Nixon Administration transitioned me out, and I went off to the Federal Power Commission, where I had a pleasant and, so far as the territories are concerned, not very relevant experience, but it was professionally attractive. I became an Assistant General Counsel there. In 1977 I was invited to return to Interior by the then new Under Secretary in the Carter Administration, Jim Joseph. Jim Joseph rang up one day and invited me to come over to talk about possible candidates for the job. At the conclusion of our doing that, he said, "What about you, would you be interested? And I said I had wondered if he was going to ask the question. I'd have to make a phone call." And I did, to my husband, to say, "Would you mind if I did it again?" And of course I knew perfectly well that he would say, "Not at all," but there are some phone calls that have to be made, even if you know the answer. And I then became the equivalent to what I'd been in the Johnson Administration, though with a slightly different title. I was Director of the Office of Territorial Affairs, which had been slightly reorganized after it was in fact obliterated in the early Nixon years. And in 1981, I suggested to the transition people (I'll not go into the detail I enjoy on this subject because it isn't pertinent to our work) that a job really did need to be done, that the Executive Branch, the Congress, OMB in particular, had agreed that somebody ought to figure out how federal laws affected the territories and what needed fixing up. We had legislation that had already passed the Senate to create a Commission to do this. OMB had set aside some

\$5 million for that purpose. Predictably the Reagan Administration saw it as not essential to its program, and I said I could do the job and could do it for less than \$5 million. I think the transition people then felt that it was kind of a relief to have this elderly lady disposed of in a fairly graceful way. So I moved back to the Solicitor's Office, did the study that I've just described, along with a lot of other things, but essentially the study. And when my encyclopedia went to GPO in November 1993, I went to the retirement office and said, "I am ready finally." And I did retire as soon thereafter as we could all get organized.

Willens: Did you work on the legal project in 1981?

Van Cleve: That's correct.

Willens: And you remained . . .

Van Cleve: In the Solicitor's Office until 1993. What I did was survey each and every permanent law of the United States to see whether it applied to the territories and to make a judgment as to whether it should. And I documented these research results. It just takes a lot of time to look at 48 active titles of the U.S. Code.

Willens: It was a mission as I recall that the Department of Justice declined to undertake in the negotiations I had with them during the early 1970s because of the immensity of the task. So we had to find some formula or short-cut approach to deal with the problem in a way that we thought would be consistent with our client's desires.

Van Cleve: An admirable formula, incidentally. There weren't more than a handful of occasions in the entire body of federal law where that formula didn't seem to work very successfully. There were a few cases, but not many.

Willens: No, it was a contribution of one of my former partners who has left the firm and gone elsewhere. He was a very ingenious lawyer. Ruth, turning back to your work in the Solicitor's Office for the moment. I know you were there for a longer period, but I'd like to direct your attention to the Eisenhower Administration just briefly. How would you characterize (if you were in a position to know) U.S. policy toward the Trust Territory in those years?

Van Cleve: It was to perpetuate the status quo and make no waves, I would say. I was not then in the Territories Office, but I worked with it on a daily basis and knew the people. I think some of the program people attempted to justify the lack of initiatives, the lack of action, the lack of respectable funding, essentially on the ground that the culture of the Micronesians should not be disrupted. It was a variation of the anthropological zoo concept. And I think the motives of the people that I am referring to were perfectly good. They wouldn't have been the motives of you or me (well, I don't mean to ascribe to you particular points of view). They would not have been my preference had I been in a program or policy position, which I was not at the time. But I think they thought they were doing the right thing by perpetuating the status quo. These were happy natives, happy campers if you will, who knew little about life beyond their own islands and were contented with the life they had. So why disrupt it? But that of course was consistent with the attitude of the Eisenhower Administration in most connections. It was not a period of government activism. In fact, most people highly placed in the Executive Branch at that point were those who really preferred to have the government govern least. And so it was, and there were no pressures. There were no pressures upon the Eisenhower people in the Interior Department to develop programs of value to the Micronesians.

- Willens: You described the policy in your book as a holding operation or worse, which is more or less what you just elaborated upon.
- Van Cleve: I think that's an all-right phrase, yes.
- Willens: I'm looking at the book to see who was the Director of the Territorial Office at the time, and I see the name of Anthony T. Lausi who served from 1955 to early 1961.
- Van Cleve: That's correct.
- Willens: Did he or his staff ever have the occasion to discuss with you these underlying assumptions that governed U.S. policy at the time?
- Van Cleve: I remember talking with some of his subordinates. The Office was then a little bit bigger but not a lot bigger than it is now and has been in most of the years since. And I certainly talked on a very frequent basis with most of the people working for him. There was very clearly an attitude of let us not disrupt the lives of these contented people. I remember, not apropos of the Trust Territory but apropos of Samoa, a conversation that I found interesting in probably 1953-54 with the person who was then involved with Samoa. And he said that he thought perhaps the worst thing the U.S. government could do for Samoa would be to extend the Social Security Act, that Samoans understood how to take care of their own. They did it admirably, he said. And the introduction of this New Deal concept of the government paying people to exist in their later years would be ruinous to attitudes, to the Matai system to everything else. Well, it's obviously the wrong island, but it applies I think to the Trust Territory thinking as well.
- Willens: There was a Department of Interior document prepared in the early 1960s I think as part of the Kennedy Administration's reevaluation of policy that identified three basic assumptions that had governed policy toward Micronesia during the preceding decade. The assumptions were, first, it was assumed the Trust Territory should be economically self-sufficient, even though they recognized that it could not reasonably approach that status in the foreseeable future. Second, it was assumed that the primitive and economic structure of the islands was to be preserved, and the third assumption was that neither the United States nor the Micronesians would be making any decisions about future political status within the foreseeable future defined as 15-20 years. And you touched on the first, or at least the second of those three assumptions with respect to preserving the economic and social structure. Do you have any recollection as to what thought if any was given to the need to develop some future political status that would follow the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement?
- Van Cleve: I can't say much about that except to say that I certainly felt a curiosity on the subject. I went I think as early as the 1950s to Trusteeship Council meetings in the spring in New York and was mindful that sooner or later the U.S. had to do something. The Micronesians had to do something. I don't think that I ever found anybody really interested in turning to the issue at all in the 1950s. It was known to be a question that would in due course arise, but there was certainly no policy looking toward providing a particular answer.
- Willens: In your capacity as a lawyer in the Solicitor's Office with responsibilities for advising your clients, did you come into contact with High Commissioner Nucker?
- Van Cleve: Oh, yes. I knew Dell Nucker very well.
- Willens: Well, I've not come across his name or any real assessment of what he brought to the task. Can you give me your best recollection as to what kind of a High Commissioner he proved to be?

Van Cleve: Be glad to. He had been the Administrative Officer in the Office of Territories before he went to the Trust Territory. I forget how early he went, but 1954, 1955, maybe the appendix of my book would give a date on that. He was there in any case during the bulk of those years. Dell Nucker was well thought of so far as I know by just about everybody. He was a long-term civil servant. I thought of him as apolitical, and whether he was or wasn't, I guess he must have been nominally, no, not even nominally, he does not have to have been a Republican. He was well known to the Committees, because as the Administrative Officer he was the person who chiefly testified on the territories' budget. And accordingly, the Appropriations Committees knew him well, and the legislative Committees were acquainted with him, because he very often testified. He was articulate. He was straightforward. I think he was a very good person. I have a great deal that's good to be said about Dell Nucker. I think he was not what you would now call a sensitive person. I think he would not have been terribly bothered to see Micronesian children sitting under a tree rather than in a building and going to school with broken slates and no chalk. I don't think that would have bothered him very much. He was efficient. He knew what the numbers were. He was a nice fellow. He is dead, incidentally, as of maybe ten years ago, maybe more. But I had a high regard for him. I think he was probably the right kind of person as a High Commissioner in the 1950s given the attitudes of the Eisenhower Administration.

Willens: You make the point in your book that the level of funding during those years was more or less the level that was sought by the Executive Branch and that Congress did respond to those requests. You also make the point, however, that the level of funding was quite low and was principally concerned with paying some salaries and making sure the ships and the . . .

Van Cleve: Airplanes.

Willens: ... airplanes ran, which they did from time to time. I've heard it said that High Commissioner Nucker really was not at all troubled by the low level of funding and at one point tried to suggest to his successor or an incumbent in the Office of Territories that the budget could be reduced even further. What is your sense about the level of funding in those years, and was there ever an effort that you can recall to increase the level of funding in order to respond to some of the educational or health needs that several years later became of importance?

Van Cleve: I don't think that there were. I don't know. I was not close to the budget process. It is fairly usual that the lawyers are not. I suppose you can lay hands on the budget estimates for those early years. I remember Dell Nucker used to have them lined up in his office going back ten, twenty years. You could find out if we had sought anything more. I think we did not. My best recollection is that we were at a \$4 to \$5 million level most of the years of the 1950s, when we had in fact a slightly higher ceiling. We had a ceiling of about \$7, \$7.5 million as I remember. And strangely, I don't think we ever even tried to get up to that ceiling. It would not surprise me if Dell Nucker thought we could save money. That was the kind of thinking he engaged in. He may have been originally a budget man who rose to the Administrative Officer level, which was a fairly impressive job in the old Office of Territories. It was maybe the number three person. And he would save money. He was that kind of person. It isn't that he didn't care about the little Micronesian children not learning anything. It was that he kind of overlooked it. If somebody had said, Dell, isn't this awful, he might have said, yes, I wouldn't want my grandchildren learning as they sit under a tree. But it was not within his personality. I think he was not a formally educated

man. I don't want to sound like a snob on this point, but I think he was not, I think he was not trained. I think he kind of grew up in the bureaucracy.

Willens: One of the interesting perspectives one learns in talking to the Micronesians about this period of time is that they contrast the resources available when the Navy was administering the Marianas as distinct from when the Interior Department was. They make the point that the military had facilities and resources available to it by simply order of the Commander-in-Chief that Interior or any civilian agency would not have and to some extent the comparison reflects unfavorably on Interior only because of the differences between civilian and military rule. Do you have any recollection along those lines?

Van Cleve: Oh, well I do indeed remember it often being said that the Navy had an easier time than Interior. I think I remember that the Navy got straight-out appropriations for Trust Territory Administration not far off from what the Interior Department got. But the Navy had all of these ancillary sources of support that didn't cost it anything and that didn't show up in the budget. So of course they were way, way ahead of us, particularly in the Northern Marianas where a lot of activity was going on beyond that in other parts of the Trust Territory.

Willens: To what extent did the Interior Department know about the training facility that ultimately was used by the CIA and left a physical infrastructure there that was subsequently used by the Trust Territory government?

Van Cleve: We were delighted. It was better than the Interior Department could ever have hoped to achieve on its own, of course. Obviously I can't speak for others with certitude. I can assure that I didn't know anything about it, and I think that if close colleagues were acquainted with it, somehow there would have been some gossip in the corridor. I don't think we knew about it.

Willens: Well, when did they first become aware that there was such a facility?

Van Cleve: I think there were a couple of magazine articles in about 1961. I can't tell you what they were. They were in funny publications, not the sort that one customarily reads. But there were a couple of articles that in effect blew the cover. And that's when we first knew about it. That's when I first knew about it, and I believe that's when most people first knew about it. I had a security clearance in those days, so that I was not deprived of this information on that basis, and that would have been true of most of my colleagues. I can't tell you what Stewart Udall knew in 1961. He is somebody who is still active and alive and probably could answer that question. But it was a surprise to me and to most people that I know.

Willens: When did you first visit Micronesia?

Van Cleve: 1964.

Willens: Was that in the company of a Congressional . . . ?

Van Cleve: Not the first time. I certainly did go with Congressional committees from time to time, but my first trip was a kind of maiden voyage to let me look at this area, something my husband learned to refer to as my vice regal tours. And it's interesting that I had worked for 14 years for the Interior Department and had never been to the Pacific. I'd been to Hawaii in connection with statehood. Now new employees within six months are sent out on familiarization tours. We saved money in those days. It was partly the Eisenhower Administration attitude. It was partly just the general view.

Willens: One of the points you made in your book was that, however parsimonious the policy in the 1950s may appear to be now, there were not heard in Washington many complaints from the Micronesians themselves or indeed the U.N. visiting mission with respect to the fulfillment of U.S. responsibilities in that part of the world. Is that your recollection?

Van Cleve: Oh, absolutely, absolutely. This was before the colonialism committees of the U.N. came into being, the Committee of 17 that became the Committee of 24 that became the Decolonization Committee. I don't know what it's called now, but something like that. Which of course became quickly pretty anti-American, so we all sat up and took notice. Before that, we had had simply a Committee on Information, I think that's what it was called; it was part of the massive Secretariat at the U.N. And we would file annual reports, and it was like the black hole. Now and then somebody would go up to elaborate on them, and I think it was in that connection that I visited the U.N. in the first instance. But certainly there was no U.N. pressure. I must at the time have read the reports of the visiting missions. It wasn't until 1961 that there was anything critical said. And surely there were no members of Congress who were telling us that we should do something more. And the Micronesians weren't beating a drum. There were no pressures from any source at all, unless now and then somebody had a conscience, was stricken by a bit of conscience, and thought that the U.S. should do better. But they didn't talk about it.

Willens: You suggested, in part because you didn't make your first trip until 1964, that the relationship between Interior and the Trust Territory Administration was a formal one. Let me ask the question more objectively. How would you describe the relationship between the Office of Territories and the High Commissioner and his Administration?

Van Cleve: The High Commissioner was an extension of the Office of Territories. It was a very close congenial working relationship. Dell Nucker and Tony Lausi were good friends. They all played poker together with my boss, who was the Associate Solicitor, whenever Dell came to town.

Willens: Who was that at the time?

Van Cleve: My boss was A.M. Edwards, known as Moko Edwards, a splendid man who is dead. Splendid in so many ways, but that's a different story. These people all got along very well. Dell Nucker always did what Tony wanted him to do, but mostly Dell was the stronger of the two, and so he would simply persuade Tony that this was a good thing to do.

Willens: The reason I ask is that there is some suggestion in the documents from a later period (that you may have seen in the volume that I made available to you) that the ambiguous status of the Trust Territory in international law as being either a foreign country on the one hand or under the sovereignty of the United States on the other hand created some uncertainty within the Executive Branch as to how to deal with this unique responsibility. It suggests that some people in Interior tended to treat it as more or less of a sovereign country, leaving executive responsibilities to the High Commissioner. Do you have any reaction to that characterization?

Van Cleve: I don't feel that that would have been true in my experience through 1968. I think we knew what this strange animal was. I don't think there was any ambiguity. We had a lot of old hands around in the 1960s, names that you will have run into: Marty Mangan, George Milner, Bob Mangan, his brother, who was the alter ego of John Carver, who was the Assistant Secretary. Now Carver and Robert Mangan were not old hands. George Milner was and Marty Mangan was for all practical purposes. These people knew exactly what was going on. We didn't have any trouble knowing how to deal with them, I would say. Now there was a little animosity between Will Goding, the earliest High Commissioner in

- the Kennedy Administration, and John Carver. But that's a different kettle of fish. That's simply a matter of personal relationships.
- Willens: Well, since we mention these names, why don't we just run down them one by one. I know you gave some biographical information about Carver and others in your book. Is Mr. Carver still alive?
- Van Cleve: Yes, he is. He's a retired law professor at the University of Denver.
- Willens: Have you been in touch with him?
- Van Cleve: Haven't seen him for maybe three years or so, nor are we in frequent touch. Robert Mangan, whom I mentioned was his Deputy, lives in Northern Virginia, and I have been going to call him simply for social purposes. Haven't seen him for some years, but so far as I know he is alive, well, kicking and quick-witted.
- Willens: He served in the later stage, did he not, as Deputy High Commissioner?
- Van Cleve: No, that's Marty, his brother.
- Willens: That's Marty.
- Van Cleve: Right. Robert Mangan and John Carver were kind of alter egos. Marty, a younger brother, had been in Interior quite a long time, in the Indian Bureau quite a long time, and came to Territories I guess at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration. When last I knew, he was living in Honolulu. That would be easy enough to find out from Bob Mangan. And Robert Mangan can be found, I think it's Vienna or some other near-in Northern Virginia suburb. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary and knew everything that was in John Carver's mind and, along with John Carver, found the most interesting part of the Assistant Secretary's jurisdiction to be the territories. Incidentally, I had a post card from Bob Mangan from Puerto Rico just a couple of months ago, so at least as of then he was certainly around and about. And I have, as I say, been going to call him.
- Willens: And he lives over in Virginia.
- Van Cleve: Northern Virginia, yes.
- Willens: I certainly would be interested in talking to him in the future, in case you do happen to touch base with him.
- Van Cleve: I will be doing that.
- Willens: You mentioned High Commissioner Goding, and I gather from some material that I read that he came from Alaska and had a long association with Senator Bartlett of Alaska. Do you have any recollection of the circumstances under which he was appointed to be High Commissioner?
- Van Cleve: Oh, Bob Bartlett pushed him, and Bob Bartlett had enough clout to get Will this rather prepossessing job. Will had been in the Alaska Division of the old Division of Territories and Island Possessions. He always was a Bartlett man, so he left during the Eisenhower years. In any event, he became High Commissioner at the very beginning of the Kennedy Administration, and as I said earlier, he and John Carver didn't quite hit it off. John Carver was, and I'm sure still is, a pretty irascible person. So's Bob Mangan. And I admired John Carver very much, as you can probably tell from what I wrote in this book, and he did a nice Forward to my book. I like him a lot and think he's very, very good. But he's not an easy person to get along with, and he believes that everything should have been done yesterday, and Will Goding is slow of speech, slow of action, and not a big government activist. Will had to be pushed into all of the major programs of redevelopment in the

early years of the Kennedy Administration. He really wanted to go much more slowly. He is I think still alive, he was when last I knew, but living in a difficult part of the world, like maybe Oklahoma. I think George Milner, with whom I am in frequent touch . . .

Willens: George I've met over the years. Is George . . .

Van Cleve: George is very much around and about.

Willens: Did he retire?

Van Cleve: He retired in 1981. He was tired of instructing new Administrations about the territories. And he and his wife we see with great frequency. We share Arena tickets, which means we see them seven times a year without any question, and usually more. They are in the summer usually at Chincoteague where they have a house, but they come back with some frequency. They live in Northern Virginia, Skyline Towers or one of those places near Skyline at Baileys Crossroads.

Willens: Where?

Van Cleve: It's Fairfax County. I think the address is Falls Church. Anyway, it's George R. Milner, and I really should know the number off the top of my head, but I don't.

Willens: I remember meeting George, and I think he would be apprehensive of an interview unless you tell him it's not a terrible experience, which is a judgment you'll have to reserve making.

Van Cleve: There were moments when I looked at your outline when I thought that maybe a joint interview would have some value. George and I worked very closely together for a long, long time. George is always cynical and down in the mouth, and probably we were a pretty good balance, because I tend to smile under most circumstances, and George almost never does. So he was constantly holding me back, and I was constantly pushing him forward. George is a consummate bureaucrat. He's wonderful in all kinds of ways, but he really is a kind of lugubrious guy. And you would get from him a much less upbeat account of everything than you're getting from me. But that's probably good, you know?

Willens: That's exactly the point in talking to a number of people . . .

Van Cleve: Of course it is.

Willens: You'd be interested in a description by Mr. Nevin who wrote a book on the Trust Territory, who described Goding as an early JFK supporter but not a New Frontiersman in style or outlook or approach. He was a bureaucrat, a stolid, rather cautious man of 49 who was not imaginative or creative or was very forceful. Nevin went on to say Carver and others began to find him frustrating. I gather that description would coincide with yours.

Van Cleve: Absolutely. And I remember Nevin. Nevin was a student of Robert Robbins at Fletcher. And I met Nevin once or twice and read his book, as a matter of fact.

Willens: Is Robbins still alive?

Van Cleve: Oh, Robbie Robbins was murdered in his own house by a man whom he had invited in for the night. Robbie Robbins was one of the sweetest men who ever lived, and we got to know him well. He spent a lot of time at our house. He and I served on the so-called panel of experts that Don McHenry assembled when he was doing his book on Micronesia, or when other people were doing Don McHenry's book on Micronesia.

Willens: I was invited to some of those meetings then, and went to a few of them.

- Van Cleve: Well, you would have met Robbie there, because he was a very, very conscientious fellow. He was teaching at Tufts at the time and such a nice man. Anyway, his wife had died, and he was essentially lonesome. And he once picked up a hitchhiker and brought him to his house and gave him dinner. And that was the end of that escapade, and a couple of months later the man came to his door, and Robbie invited him in, and the man said he was homeless and needed dinner. And Robbie gave him dinner and sent him to his guest room to go to bed, and while he was asleep, the man got up and bludgeoned him to death. Big news in Medford and Boston, as you can imagine, because Robbie was a distinguished political scientist. Anyway, we'll never finish if I carry on with these footnotes, will we?
- Willens: Let us turn then to 1961. At that time, a new head of the Office of Territories was designated, a Chamorro from Guam, Mr. Taitano, whom I had the pleasure of interviewing very briefly in Guam last fall. He recalls that his appointment was a quid pro quo in connection with Daniel . . .
- Van Cleve: Bill Daniel.
- Willens: . . . becoming Governor of Guam. Do you have any recollection of the circumstances under which Mr. Taitano became Director?
- Van Cleve: That's exactly what was understood by all hands at the time. And it was John Kennedy who announced from his R Street house the appointment of the Director of Territories, which was kind of interesting. Do you remember how in the early days after the election Kennedy came out every day at 4:00 or 5:00 p.m. and announced three or four appointments. And they were important ones. And one day, what did he do but announce that the Director of Territories was this person from Guam, Richard Taitano, whom some of us knew something about because Dick had been important in local politics. And we were all stunned, because it made no sense in terms of the level of appointments that he was announcing. Well that supported the notion that it was a quid pro quo. Bill Daniel was first going to be sent to the Virgin Islands, and it was Price Daniel who was the big player here. He was first going to be sent to the Virgin Islands, and so many people objected that they then decided to send him to Guam, and in order to make it a little more palatable, a Guamanian was named as head of the Office of Territories. Dick was well thought of by everybody. He was an absolutely honest, well-educated, decent human being. So Interior did not suffer in any serious way.
- Willens: Did your working relationship with him differ in any important respect from your relationship with his predecessor?
- Van Cleve: I think I felt closer to Dick because my own politics, which I had mostly, and I think quite successfully, disguised. My own politics were compatible with Dick's, and they were not with Tony Lausi's. But I was there to give answers to legal questions for both of them, and I did my best in each case.
- Willens: Interestingly, Harlan Cleveland remembered you but did not remember Mr. Taitano. Did Mr. Taitano get involved in the inter-agency meetings and discussions that took place during this time?
- Van Cleve: I don't think we did much about the Trust Territory political future in Dick's day.
- Willens: He has a recollection (one has the feeling that these recollections, as in each of our cases, were colored somewhat by the passage of years) that one of his early thoughts was to abolish the office that he was asked to head. That actually is reminiscent of some rhetoric that is currently being offered by the incumbent in that office. Do you have any recollection that

he came in as a Chamorro outsider with views with respect to the Interior Department's responsibilities to the territories that were unexpected or came as a surprise?

Van Cleve: I have no recollection. I mightn't have known. But I think if he had so revolutionary an idea, and if he had expressed it, I think it would have come to me. His principal helper was a person named John Kirwan. John did very little about the Pacific; he was so carried away with the Virgin Islands that he practically never thought about anything in the other ocean. He is still alive, and I am in touch with him; at least two or three times a year we correspond. John was Dick's Assistant Director, and I was pretty close to John Kirwan, whose father was Mike Kirwan, remember the famous Ohio Congressman who, among other things, was Chairman of our Appropriations Committee. John I credited in my book, as I recall, I haven't looked at it in many years, with being the smartest person I ever knew. And I would continue to say that. He's quirky. He's absolutely bonkers in a dozen different ways, but he's terribly smart. He has a magnificent mind. John and Dick were close, and John and I were close, and John would have told me if Dick had this in mind. I don't think he did, in other words, or I don't think he articulated it. He may have had it in mind.

Willens: Where is he living now? Is he in the area?

Van Cleve: John Kirwan is in Florida.

Willens: How would you in summary fashion characterize Taitano's performance in his role as Director of the Office during the three years he was there?

Van Cleve: I would have thought it was good. I gather that the Secretary and Assistant Secretary didn't find him very effective. They thought that Washington was just too big a place for this 4'-11" Chamorro. I was very much impressed with Dick. I used to go to hearings with him, as one's lawyer often does, and he knew his subject, and he was articulate about it. I thought he did very well. And to this day, I don't know whether I got that job as a result solely of pressures by the White House upon the Cabinet to elevate women. That certainly was very, very much the rationale for my getting it. Or whether it combined with the fact that they were disappointed in Dick. I do not know whether it was all the former or a combination of the former and disappointment with Dick.

Willens: He has some recollections on that point which we'll come to. From time to time in the interview, he refused to answer questions, saying that you'll have to ask somebody else. But he does remember the circumstances under which he was more or less asked to return to Guam, and he was replaced to you. And he does indicate that he had a very high regard for you, but did indicate there were some politics involved.

Van Cleve: Well, I was perfectly sure that somebody at the White House, maybe even the President, said to each of his Cabinet officers, find me a woman. There's no question about that. And it's perfectly clear that the Interior Department had very few to offer at that particular point. So I never doubted that I was chosen on the basis of sex. And I felt bad about replacing somebody who I admired. But, you know, I was not going to say no. The idea is to grab the opportunities when they come, and it had come. Dick was going to leave. It was pretty clear Dick would have left, even if I had declined the job. Or at least so it seemed to me. And I didn't decline.

Willens: Well, he recalls that he made a politically sensitive mistake by recommending what I gather must have been an Hispanic from Texas to be a judge in American Samoa and had identified an Hispanic who was not aligned with President Johnson's party. He felt he had seriously antagonized, and was led to believe he had seriously offended the political

powers in the White House and that was one reason he left. The other reason was that Daniel had left Guam apparently by 1964 and to some extent the circumstances had changed in a way that made it easier for him to return back to Guam.

Van Cleve: I have no recollection of the judgeship, and that may certainly have been involved. The Solicitor's Office oddly didn't always play a role in judges in the Trust Territory or Samoa. They were seen as political plums. And that was the responsibility of the Territories Office, not of the Solicitor's Office, at least at that point. So I don't know. And I would guess that probably Daniel had left Guam by then. Was it Ford Elvidge who succeeded him? I forget. It doesn't matter.

Willens: Let us turn then to the 1961 United Nations Report, which you made reference to earlier. It was one of the first indications that the ground rules were changing somewhat with respect to scrutiny of United States administration within the Trust Territory. What is your recollection of the extent to which, if any, that report generated some re-examination within the Administration of its policies toward Micronesia?

Van Cleve: Well, certainly there was a re-examination. I am not inclined to credit the U.N. Report for having precipitated it. Not inclined to. There was not a very high regard for the U.N. in the Interior.

Willens: Just to refresh your recollection, the 1961 United Nations Report criticized the division of authority within the Trust Territory. It criticized the location of the Trust Territory headquarters in Guam. It criticized the U.S. for not replacing American employees with Micronesians as rapidly as possible. It was complimentary of the administering authority's efforts to develop self-government and ended with some general conclusions about the future political status of the Trust Territory and Saipan in particular. It made reference to the fact that two political parties had been created on Saipan. This had taken place in the late 1950s. One thing I meant to ask you earlier is that in discussing Micronesia, in the 1950s and the early 1960s, one is inclined to think of it as a single entity. My question is when you first became aware of the diversity within the various areas out there and the extent to which in particular the people on Saipan seemed to have very different views about their future political status than the other districts.

Van Cleve: I can't answer with great specificity. Surely when the series of referenda commenced, of which there were several. You probably know this with precision, I can only remember that there were several, all asking for affiliation with the United States, which preceded any very major initiative on the part of the United States toward political status negotiations. I think through the 1950s and a portion of the 1960s Micronesia was an entity so far as we were concerned. I can remember a meeting—it should have been along around 1963 or 1964—with Bill Gleysteen, who was as admirable then as he is now, and Don McHenry, in my office (it has to have been after I moved into that office in 1964) in which we talked about the enormous importance of keeping the Trust Territory as one because of (and this was Bill Gleysteen's phrase) "the menace of the mini-state." And so there wasn't any question in the minds of any of us at that point that we would cause the Trust Territory to move as one into some new status. Sometime thereafter probably the referenda to which I referred caused us to realize that maybe we'd have trouble. I remember being astonished when it turned out that the Marshalls (this was much later, in the early 1970s I guess) wanted to go it alone. And then subsequently Palau. And then, "Oh, ye gods, what have we wrought?"

Willens: We'll have to come to that. Well then, let me ask you what you believe were the important factors that contributed to the re-examination of U.S. policy in 1961 and 1962 that did in fact take place.

Van Cleave: I think the conventional answer tends to be the polio epidemic in the Marshalls, but I don't think that stood alone. I think these were just different kinds of people. I think that the Udall/Carver/Kennedy attitude towards social programs caused these people to believe that the United States just had to do more and do it better, particularly in education and health.

Willens: There was a sense that Mr. Cleveland emphasized about the President's speech on colonialism and the fact that as a liberal Administration there was some sensitivity to the fact that the United States was well on its way to being the last administering authority of a trusteeship. So he was making two points: that there was growing pressure in the U.N. on the colonialism front through the Committee of 24 as it developed, and also that the United States under the new Administration had some sense that it had to respond more affirmatively to its responsibilities for these less advantaged people. Are those considerations that you think were important?

Van Cleave: The second I would absolutely emphasize. The former was doubtless in our minds, but I don't really think that the U.N. attitude was a very important one so far as Interior was concerned. In fact, I used to worry a little as a product of the thinking of World War II and the one worldism that followed. I used to worry quite a lot about what seemed to me to be an illiberal attitude toward the international forum, the international community, and the only thing we had going for us organizationally. And I don't want to make Interior sound as though it was rebuffing the U.N., but there were time when my colleagues, and I am now thinking I think of the early 1960s, would talk about how it really didn't matter what the U.N. said so long as the Interior Committees and the Congress were with us. That was of course the prevalent Interior idea, and realistically that was pretty much true. People talking about how U.N. criticism was a mere pinprick that would pass. So I would not give too much credence to the anti-colonialism attitudes of the early 1960s within the Interior building. We undoubtedly nodded affirmatively when people like Harlan Cleveland talked about the embarrassment of having the U.S. be the last remaining colonial power. But we had other attitudes too, and that was that the U.S. simply cannot preside over an area where people don't get educated and don't get immunized against polio, etc.

Willens: The first document in the volume that I provided you was a letter dated February 26, 1962 signed by Secretary Udall addressed to Mr. Cleveland at the State Department. It set forth certain assumptions and subjects to be discussed at a meeting to be held on March 1, 1962. What's interesting to me about this is that I really could find no earlier documents reflecting meetings or exchanges at the staff level that would undoubtedly have taken place before a communication of this kind was sent and a luncheon meeting at this level was set. It also is dated February 1962, and that means the new Administration had more or less been in place for over a year, although probably less than that given the time needed to fill slots. Do you have any recollection of staff work that might have taken place beginning early in the Administration in 1961 that might ultimately have led to this letter?

Van Cleave: I have none, and I wouldn't have known about them, because you see I was not part of the office. I have none at all. That's the kind of question that Dick Taitano would probably have known the answer to. I hope that you had a chance to put it to him. And also John Kirwan might know the answer to that. Incidentally, John Kirwan is so full of quirks, as I said earlier, that I don't know how he'd react to being interviewed on these subjects.

- Willens: There is one piece of paper, an Interior memorandum (that I don't think I made available to you) that suggested that there had been some inter-departmental efforts during 1961 that were not successful in bringing about some unified view as to what should be done with respect to the Trust Territory. My interest is in figuring out where the initiative came from. Did it come from the White House, which seems unlikely? Did it come from the Secretary level at State or Interior? Or did it come up from the Office of Territories or from Assistant Secretary Carver? Do you have any judgment on that or recollection?
- Van Cleve: Certainly no recollection. I can't tell you anything useful on that subject.
- Willens: What was the extent of Secretary Udall's personal interest in this part of the world? This is a relatively minor aspect of Interior's range of responsibilities. Is he someone who was personally concerned, or was he responding more or less to the initiatives from the Office of Territories and Mr. Carver?
- Van Cleve: I would say with all due respect to Stewart Udall, and I have a great deal, that he didn't care deeply about the Pacific, about our Pacific territories or the Trust Territory. He was the first of the environmentalists, and he was much more concerned about such things as the National Park Service, etc. John Carver was the real seat of thinking and activism on this subject.
- Willens: When did you personally become aware for the first time that U.S. policy was being formulated toward the objective of bringing Micronesia as an entity under the sovereignty of the United States?
- Van Cleve: With NSAM 145, if I've got the right numbers. And what was the date of that?
- Willens: April 18, 1962.
- Van Cleve: 1962. And I don't think I even knew about it until . . .
- Willens: Mr. Taitano did not recall the document, which I thought was somewhat surprising.
- Van Cleve: Yes. I think that's surprising, too. Maybe if he'd seen it, he would have. The thing that I found interesting, and I suppose I knew this at the time. When we get to the Solomon Report, I'll tell you what I found surprising in looking at these things again. I remember NSAM 145. I don't think I saw it until I became Director, which was well after it was issued.
- Willens: Do you have any personal knowledge of any discussion that preceded its issuance?
- Van Cleve: No. I have a clear recollection of talking with John Kirwan, who doubtless had 145 in mind, who was himself committed to every possible avenue toward bringing the Micronesians under U.S. sovereignty, who often talked in an extravagant way about how nothing but American movies and Coca Cola and McDonalds hamburgers should be served to anybody in Micronesia, because they must be as Americanized. They should be made American as quickly as possible because of the need to bring them into our orbit. I think that John—well, he exaggerated, as he often did—was clearly motivated by this policy pronouncement of the President. And I remember when I first saw it, I was just stunned by its crassness. It just seemed to me impossible that we could talk this way, even in a document that was not be public. In this day and age. And I was stunned again when I read it, you know. Did we really think we could push people around this way?
- Willens: Well, certainly it was straightforward to the point of bluntness.
- Van Cleve: Oh, gosh, yes.

Willens: But it also reflected what seems to have been a strongly held view at Defense and one that was deferred to by the other agencies that the strategic importance of Micronesia was at such a high level that it justified this declaration of U.S. policy.

Van Cleve: Right. Exactly so.

Willens: Repeatedly Interior and State would both from time to time question that but not officially. They would defer to that as within Defense's expertise. You may notice that under Tab 3 there was an information letter sent up to Chairman Aspinall with respect to the fact that there's a review under way within the Administration regarding the Trust Territory and that a request for additional funding was currently before the House of Representatives at the time. You spoke in your book of Chairman Aspinall's expertise in the area and interest. Could you elaborate for me what your assessment was of his views with respect to the Trust Territory and the role that he played with respect to U.S. policy toward the Trust Territory during this 1961-69 time frame.

Van Cleve: I don't suppose there was anybody more powerful in terms of deciding what we would do or more particularly what we wouldn't do. He was Henry Jackson's counterpart, but I guess he probably had more time than Henry Jackson did to devote to the subject. He was, again the word irascible comes to mind, so that one didn't want to cross him. He was a difficult, snarly person in opposition, not the standard affable politician. Affability is the last word you'd use to describe him. He was very well-informed. I don't know how long he'd been in the Congress, but a very long time, before he became Chairman. And he knew more about the Pacific Territories probably than most people in the Interior Department. This could happen then. He was not a Government activist. He was a conservative Democrat. You had to work hard to persuade him to spend more money. We obviously persuaded him time after time after time. He came from a little town in Colorado, something Junction, Grand Junction. He thought the U.N. was a bunch of nonsense. He was just plain mean when State Department people would come before him. I don't know whether Harlan Cleveland spoke to this point, but honestly, there was one day when Harlan Cleveland was testifying, I'm sure on something having to do with probably the future of the Trust Territory, and Wayne Aspinall was presiding, or if he didn't preside, he always sat to the left of the subcommittee chairman, Leo O'Brien. Leo O'Brien was everything that a politician ought to be—a round-faced Irishman as affable as the day is long, nice, charming, agreeable, wonderful man. But Aspinall would sit next to him to make sure that—and he did this with all of his subcommittee chairmen—to make sure that they all behaved correctly. And I think it was Aspinall who stopped Harlan Cleveland in the middle of his statement. Harlan Cleveland was going through things in his attaché case to prove a point, and he said, "You don't happen, I suppose, to have a copy of the United States Constitution with all these papers?" Well, Harlan Cleveland, to his credit, said, "I don't, because I assumed that that would be available through the Committee staff." I remember being tremendously impressed with that at the time. But it was terrible bad manners, you know, and Harlan Cleveland was doing his job as we all were, and of course he did it very, very well. I suppose Harlan Cleveland is now retired.

Willens: He is, from a whole series of careers.

Van Cleve: College president.

Willens: Recently as a Senior Professor Emeritus at the Hubert Humphrey School for Public Service.

Van Cleve: At Minnesota.

- Willens: I visited him in conjunction with visiting a daughter of mine who was working for the State Senate at the time, but is now working for the State Attorney General. He remembers this keenly, as does Mr. Gleysteen, who remembers, as you said he's a very gentle academic man, who found himself sort of overwhelmed by the way in which the members of Congress would confront him when he was there on a few occasions to testify on the subject with questions as to, "Well, what is that going to do for my constituents in the Bronx?"
- Van Cleve: Exactly.
- Willens: And he, as you or I would, would experience some difficulty in trying to relate the need for funding for the Trust Territory out in the Western Pacific with the needs of the constituents in the Bronx.
- Van Cleve: Did either Bill Gleysteen or Harlan Cleveland remember the response about how the staff would have a copy of the . . . ?
- Willens: No, no one remembers that response, but somewhere I've seen reference to the question. I've forgotten where, in one of the documents or maybe one of the interviews. Well, the general assumption, certainly as you can see from the State Department documents, was that the Interior Department necessarily had an obligation to be responsive to the Committee that provided its funding and oversight, and as you point out in your book, that's the way the system works. How did you develop a mode of operating and dealing with Congressman Aspinall, given his authority on the one hand and his personality on the other?
- Van Cleve: I didn't have too much trouble. In fact, I think I was understood by him to be "John Carver's girl," if I can put it that way. Goodness, one shouldn't at this moment, but you understand what I mean. John Carver, I'm sure, had encouraged Stewart Udall to appoint me to the job as Director, and he and I had a very good working relationship. John Carver in turn was very close to Wayne Aspinall. They hit it off perfectly on all subjects. And I think genuinely. I don't think John Carver was dissembling when he appeared to agree with the Chairman. I profited from this cordial relationship. So I didn't have too much trouble. I respected Wayne Aspinall for all that he knew. He really was a smart man. And in turn Wayne Aspinall, in hearing after hearing, used to throw me bouquets for my testimony, so I could hardly be as hard on him as I have implied I fundamentally was. I had some considerable respect for him as a man of great knowledge, and he just wasn't very polite. And this is of course very hard. Much easier to deal with incidentally than Phil Burton, who succeeded him in a way as being the terror of the Interior Committee, because Phil Burton was so often irrational and even worse in terms of bad manners. Much worse.
- Willens: Profane to boot.
- Van Cleve: Oh, yes, and usually drunk, which of course played a terribly important role. No, I got along all right with Wayne Aspinall. I was enormously deferential, and I realized after a couple of serious missteps that Wayne Aspinall needed to be treated as somebody who was in the know at the outset. I had this brilliant idea at one point, as we were dealing with ceiling legislation, as we did every year or two, of not picking a figure that we could sell to Wayne Aspinall and Company, but as to figuring out what we really needed. And with help from a lot of people came up with legislation that would have raised the ceiling gigantically. But it seemed to me there was something to be said for this, honesty being one of them. And had sent it up in the way that the political science textbooks say you do. You get it cleared by the Bureau of the Budget, and you send it up, and you don't talk

about it before it's cleared by the Bureau of the Budget, because that's the way the system is supposed to work, you see. And everybody approved—Defense, State, OMB—and we sent up the ceiling legislation with, I don't know whether it was Udall's or Carver's signature, it didn't matter. Because they were seen as the same person for Territorial purposes. And Wayne Aspinall just hit the roof, because it was a surprise. And we got no place with it. And probably got no place essentially because I had erred. I was playing this like a political science student, not like a sophisticated politician, which I wasn't then and never have been, but I keep trying. And that kind of lesson I learned.

Willens: Was that the example you referred to in your book where you requested a five-year period of funding, or are you thinking of another

Van Cleve: No, I think that I probably did refer to this, because I felt much chastened. I don't remember frankly if this was the thing. But it was a five-year funding bill, and we were going to transform the Trust Territory into something really wonderful. This was all the money we needed to build all the schools we needed and all the hospitals we needed and to fix up the roads. And it was in excess of \$300 million, as I remember it. Well, since we were then talking about \$35 million, you know, pretty hard to get the Committee to make such a leap. Anyway, my own experience with Wayne Aspinall is on both sides, that is to say, I think he treated people abominably, though not as bad as Phil Burton has, did in later years. I think he was smart. He was a former school teacher, so he had some instincts about the importance of treating young children well in the educational process.

Willens: I've seen reference recently to the name of an assistant, John Taylor. Is that a name that means anything to you?

Van Cleve: It does. He is dead, long, long since, back in the 1960s.

Willens: Is he someone who had significant responsibilities?

Van Cleve: Yes. He was the principal staff man, the Jeff Farrow, except that he wasn't a politician, which Jeff surely is. But he was the architect of much of what was done in the 1960s. He was himself in fact a Ph.D. political scientist from Clark University. Goodness, the things one sometimes remembers.

Willens: Let me ask you about a few of these names that you've mentioned, just to get your capsule recollections. With respect to Mr. Cleveland, what was your assessment of his performance and personality?

Van Cleve: Oh, I thought he was simply marvelous, absolutely superb. I wished that he was on our side of all these things. But he was certainly a gentleman. I had read *The Reporter* magazine. Remember the reporter Max Ascoli? And Harlan Cleveland wrote extensively there. And that was my first acquaintance with Harlan Cleveland, as a writer in Max Ascoli's old magazine. So I had wonderful associations with him in terms of ideas, and I knew him to be essentially an academic, and I just plain like academics. And he seemed to me gentle, a gentle man, and just wonderful.

Willens: How about Mr. Gleysteen?

Van Cleve: Oh, great, oh, yes. I liked Bill a lot. The Park Avenue accent always stunned me, but he may have come by it naturally, and of course, what a career he had, becoming Ambassador to South Korea. I liked Bill a lot. He was probably more snobbish than most of his State Department colleagues, but he was too smart to let you think that. So that I didn't have any problem with him in terms of his thinking. When you name some other names, I'll tell you who thought we were dumbkopfs. No, I think Bill was just fine.

- Willens: How about Mr. Sisco?
- Van Cleve: Oh, yes. Well, Joe Sisco of course was our nemesis. Joe was just awful. Incidentally, he's around, well, you said you were going to see him. Joe called me three or four years ago for some information, and I had to go to some work to get it, and I got it, and gave it to him. And we had the most cordial of exchanges, so I guess times have passed. But I remember saying some years back that there were about three people in the world that I really didn't like, that I just thought were awful. Mostly I can be very optimistic about most everybody. Joe Sisco was one of those three. I thought he was awful. And it was partly because of something adverted to in here. He had, I thought, accused me of leaking some documents to the Hill. And I marched myself right up to him and I said, "I did not do that. I wouldn't do that. I am an honorable bureaucrat. And for you to tell me that I did something and I'm lying about it is an attack on my integrity." And he did not respond in a nice way at all. It was a conversation in a corridor in the Interior Department. I remember it very clearly. And he just snarled at me and said, in effect, "You lie." And in fact I later learned that he was talking really about John Carver, with whom he had an even worse relationship than with me. But that kind of ended my feeling warmly toward Joe Sisco. But as I say, I am now back on the wagon of thinking maybe he's okay. I was even the Mt. Holyoke delegate to his inauguration as President of American University, something that didn't work very well, did it? He was got rid of fairly promptly. Anyway, I thought Joe Sisco was a fraud.
- Willens: Well, we'll come to that I guess as we proceed through this chronology. I gather he worked under Cleveland for a while, then succeeded Cleveland . . .
- Van Cleve: I think that's right.
- Willens: . . . in the position as head of the . . .
- Van Cleve: IO [International Organizations Bureau].
- Willens: ...IO at State. And then other people were active, Elizabeth Brown and Don McHenry. What is your recollection of those two individuals?
- Van Cleve: Well, Elizabeth Brown I did not think very well of. She was one who made all of us at Interior feel inferior. There is an ability in the State Department to do that. I say this as the mother of a Foreign Service officer, incidentally, a newish one. But anyway, Elizabeth Brown was pretty disdainful and didn't, I thought, try very hard to be cooperative. Don was so junior in those days, you know, that I didn't think much of him. Wet behind the ears, not very experienced, not as smooth of course as Bill Gleysteen. They were great friends. I, incidentally, have later known Don very well. We served together for many years as trustees of Mt. Holyoke. His former wife teaches in the English Department, and he said he accepted the invitation because his son was at Amherst, which didn't seem sequitur, but she was frantic. She didn't want him in Southampton all that much, and I know her pretty well. She's marvelous. Don's okay. I don't think he really is a world beater.
- Willens: Do any other names come to mind? Mr. Cleveland or Gleysteen mentioned Mr. Buffam, who was I think a career foreign service officer, but unless you tell me otherwise, I think we've identified all players at the State Department during the years that you were at Interior in the 1960s.
- Van Cleve: You've named them all. I don't think there are any others.
- Willens: We'll come to the name Katzenbach later on, and there are a few interesting exchanges reflected in the documents. Did he come to take a particular interest in this area when he became Deputy Secretary?

- Van Cleve: Well, I think he was required to because of that Under Secretary's Committee. He is of course so wonderfully clever that he could be difficult and effective in his opposition in a way that some of the other State Department people were just difficult and irritating. And that meant that I was kind of put out by him, because he was so good.
- Willens: That certainly is a fair commentary. He was a professor at law school at Yale when I was there. I guess he came in after you.
- Van Cleve: He was a graduate student when I was at Yale.
- Willens: We still have the unanswered question as to why it occurred in the 1961-62 time frame that the Executive Branch re-examined all the pre-existing assumptions with respect to the Trust Territory and revised each and every one of them, both with respect to the desires of the people to become part of the modern world, the need to face the political status issue sooner than the 15 or 20 years that had been assumed, and the fact that they couldn't remain sort of isolated in the anthropological zoo. And I'm still sort of groping for some sense of what prompted this radical re-examination with respect to what had to be a relatively minor piece of the foreign policy problems confronting the new Administration.
- Van Cleve: I'm going to take refuge in the Solicitor's Office once again, because the fact is, it's a marvelous question, and I am simply stunned by the fact that I haven't got a ready answer to it. It's a question that could well be put to any of the Interior people that I've mentioned, George Milner, Bob Mangan, John Kirwan, John Carver. I don't know how far afield you want to go geographically. John Carver would be interesting to you.
- Willens: I have thought of pursuing Mr. Carver. I wanted to talk to you first. I have an address which may be several years old, in Littleton, Colorado. I'm not so sure that's any longer . . .
- Van Cleve: I've got that one, and I'm not sure it is either, but I once was told by him or his wife that the University of Denver Law School could always find him. And Bob Mangan would surely know, because I'm confident that they're in frequent touch. He used to come to town fairly often. But he is getting a bit long in the tooth now, too, so I just don't know. Maybe it's the wish being father to the deed, but I like to think it is, at least in some measure, that Interior people who came in with Kennedy cared about things and wanted to correct problems that their predecessors in the Eisenhower years had overlooked.
- Willens: Since I entered the government in 1961, I share that. Turning then to the NSAM 145, which you said you did not really see until you became Director in 1964. Even though you had not seen it, did you become aware of the fact that there was this newly articulated Executive Branch policy that called for a plebiscite within a relatively few number of years?
- Van Cleve: This is the kind of question on which I should be accurate, and the fact is, I cannot be sure. I'm half of the view that indeed the conversations that I described about teaching all the young Micronesian children English and feeding them nothing but McDonalds hamburgers, that these were precipitated by that piece of paper and that particularly my friend John Kirwan, he is the one with whom I would have talked about this, may well have revealed its existence. I just can't be sure. I'm sorry.
- Willens: There was an aspect of the document that asked the relevant [Cabinet] Secretaries to establish a Task Force at the Assistant Secretary level to implement the policy by developing appropriate programs and presumably seeking Congressional approval of those programs.

- Do you have any recollection of participating in any Task Force that was formed in 1962 or thereabouts?
- Van Cleve: I'm quite sure I did not participate in any such thing.
- Willens: Do you know who from Interior was involved?
- Van Cleve: It would have been John Carver, I'm almost certain.
- Willens: Mr. Cleveland remembers some concern at the State Department about any such Task Force because of the assumption that it would be chaired by someone from the Interior Department. There was this recurrent apprehension at State that you've seen reflected in the documents that the thrust of the new policy was basically going to encounter opposition from the Interior Department with perhaps the holdovers more than some of the new appointees. Do you have any recollection as to how the new policy was in fact accepted by Interior's personnel?
- Van Cleve: That surprises me. I can imagine that Cleveland would have had real difficulty with it because of the uncertainty that it couldn't pass muster at the U.N. I would have thought they'd be much troubled by NSAM 145, which I see essentially as a Defense Department document. I don't remember ever hearing anything in Interior by way of criticism of it. It was of course a fait accompli by the time I saw it. But I don't think it ever got much circulation. I don't think it ever became a genuine policy.
- Willens: Well, there was a very considerable effort to preserve its confidentiality, and I'm not too sure that the full text was ever in the public domain . . .
- Van Cleve: Oh, I'm quite sure it was not.
- Willens: . . . until we obtained this under FOIA. I'm not sure of that, but I don't remember seeing its full text.
- Van Cleve: I know it jumps ahead, but I can remember in the later 1960s, 1967, 1968, when we were trying so hard to get the political status issue to move, and of course had this terrible conflict with State, so that we couldn't. Going to the Trust Territory and sitting down with political leaders at the time who would say, "Just tell us that you want us. If you just tell us that you want us." This happened more than once in the years 1967, 1968, and it was me and maybe the High Commissioner, I think just the two of us probably with four or five of the significant heads of political thinking in the Trust Territory. "If you only tell us that you want us, the United States never has. If you tell us that you want us, we will do the necessary." And I remember thinking, we can't. We can't, because this statement, you see, is classified. And besides that, I don't know really whether the State Department would approve, and I can't say something that is—and of course we did desperately. At that point, I was sure that if George Milner and I could walk up to the Hill with an organic act for the Trust Territory, it would have been passed in three months, and the Micronesians would have endorsed it the way the Puerto Ricans did in 1952. It was so frustrating. But we did not have our ducks in a row in the Executive Branch, and this statement, which if I could have quoted, would have solved the problem. And it was the most frustrating thing in the world.
- Willens: Very interesting. The question I've asked several people relates to the feasibility of the U.S. policy set forth in NSAM 145. The assumption was that if you implemented the appropriate educational and related programs, you could both educate the Micronesians sufficiently to make an informed decision by 1967 or 1968, and that the outcome of a U.N.-supervised plebiscite would be overwhelming in support of a permanent affiliation with the United States. And, as you've just suggested, the Hill would have been of course

receptive to something that looked like an organic act, and Aspinall himself would have responded very affirmatively I assume to NSAM 145.

Van Cleve: And so would Henry Jackson. Yes. That is my best guess. Now the next step is, would it have held through the 1970s and 1980s . . .

Willens: That's the question I was going to put to you given the divisiveness that subsequently unfolded, and I've heard some different views. Some people have thought that it might have held together. I tend to come out the other way. But what's your judgment in light of the 25 years since that time?

Van Cleve: Well, it's so iffy, I don't think I have an informed judgment. I'm pretty sure that if we had acted, if we could have got the State Department to withdraw all of its fussiness about what would happen in the U.N., we would have just rammed it through in some manner. I remember Joe Sisco saying the way you get this through the Security Council is to wait until some day when the Soviets are late getting there. So there's a way to do it. So if we could simply have got the State Department to withdraw its objections, we and Defense could, I believe, have persuaded the Hill in very short order to have done the thing that John Kennedy contemplated. And there was every reason to think at the time that the Micronesians would have endorsed it very heavily. But that's a series of ifs. Whether it would have held together, how can we possibly know? I like to think that it wouldn't have, on the ground that I could have contributed toward eliminating such a great big problem if I'd done these things that we're talking about in the 1960s. I don't know. It's wonderful to contemplate, isn't it?

Willens: That's a postscript at most.

Van Cleve: You bet.

Willens: Unfortunately, we obtained very few documents about the work of the Task Force that was set up to implement NSAM 145. It turns out that Mr. Taitano was the Executive Secretary of the Task Force, and there was a meeting held, the first meeting, on May 1, 1962. There is some indication that another five or so meetings were held during the remainder of that year with virtually no documentation with respect to the minutes, reports or accomplishments of that Task Force. But meanwhile, in 1962 there were some Executive Branch actions that were taking place. There was, for example, an Executive Order transferring authority for I guess Saipan and Tinian to Interior and away from Navy. Do you have any recollection of the circumstances that led to that particular change in administration?

Van Cleve: Sure. It was the blowing of the CIA cover. At least that's what we always understood, what I always understood.

Willens: This might not have happened if the CIA cover had not been blown.

Van Cleve: That's correct. My understanding is that the CIA facility in Saipan was serving what was seen in the pertinent circles as a useful purpose. CIA and Defense and maybe State, I don't know who was involved, but CIA essentially. And it was apparently quite well preserved. There are Saipanese who I have understood can tell you about all the funny goings-on before 1962 when planes would land in the dead of night and obviously Asians and not Chamorros would get off in great numbers and be taken to where they were staying and so on and so forth. But it was apparently an important ingredient to Defense policy at the time, and it no longer worked once everybody knew it existed, once it was known that we were training, I guess it was Taiwanese, to take over the mainland or something of that sort.

- Willens: Ruth, you were talking about the steps that were taken in 1962 to open up and change the administrative responsibility for some of the Northern Marianas Islands. There was the Executive Order that transferred authority to the Interior, then there was a directive in August of 1962 more or less granting free entry into the area, I guess alleviating some of the security clearances that had to be obtained before anyone could go to Saipan or Tinian. Do you have any recollection with respect to whether Defense went along with those particular changes?
- Van Cleve: Oh, I think so. I think so. I never quite understood how Interior could get the whole Trust Territory in 1951 as it did when there was a special interest in Saipan. It was maybe in 1952 that the Executive Order was issued taking Saipan away from Interior. And I remember our people were just furious because we didn't know anything about it and for an Executive Order to be issued, without any knowledge on the part of the administering agency, was almost without precedent, and certainly bad government.
- Willens: Do you think that was the administrative step that was viewed as necessary to be taken in view of the CIA's plan?
- Van Cleve: Well probably. I don't think I know enough to say. I do know that the person who was the Director of Territories at the time was as angry as any person I have ever seen in history when somebody in the old Office of Territories read in the Federal Register that President Truman had issued—I think it was Truman—this Executive Order removing a piece of Interior's jurisdiction and restoring it to the Navy. You must remember that this was a period in history when Interior and Navy were at each other throats all the time. The Navy really wanted to hang on to everything, and Harry Truman was adamant in the notion of civilian control, the importance of civilian administration. So first we got Guam, which was a terrible problem to the Navy. Subsequently, Samoa about which it cared rather little, and then all of the Trust Territory in 1951. Admiral Radford was the person who apparently engineered the restoration of Saipan to the Navy. Probably that was because the U.S. then anticipated a CIA facility there, but I don't know that. But that seems pretty likely. And we of course got a revision of that order so that the Navy got everything except for Rota, as I recall, which is close enough to Guam so that it could be administered by Interior. And I think that there had been a lot of people who had bristled as a result of that Navy action back in 1952. A lot of people in Interior thought that this was unseemly. And as soon as the CIA story became public and it became quite clear that CIA couldn't continue, I don't know whether we took an initiative or whether the CIA simply said, here are all these buildings, do you want them. And Interior was just overjoyed, because pretty obviously we had had a funding problem throughout and here we had right in the Trust Territory, wrong location, being at one end instead of in Truk, but nevertheless it was still in the Trust Territory, a point that had been made by the 1961 visiting mission, as you pointed out. And so we got the buildings, and I don't know again who took the initiative. I don't remember any big struggle over that 1962 order. And it was just lovely to have the whole Trust Territory back. We all felt pretty good about that.
- Willens: One of the steps taken in 1962 in response to the new U.S. policy was to secure a substantial increase in funding for the Trust Territory, and legislation was enacted changing the \$7.5 million ceiling to \$15 million for the fiscal year 1963 and \$17.5 million for subsequent fiscal years. Did you have any role in this legislation or the discussion that went into deciding what additional funding to seek and how to expend it?
- Van Cleve: I don't remember any role at that particular increase. I was certainly involved in subsequent increases, but I don't think that one, because that was when I was still in the Solicitor's

Office. I probably drafted the legislation and may have written some of the statements, but I don't remember any policy position.

Willens: The presidential directive more or less identified education as one of the principal concerns. You made reference earlier to some of the educational deficiencies that existed in the area. What was the process if you know by which the needs of the Trust Territory were identified in some organized way and proposals made to Congress for dealing with those needs?

Van Cleave: I don't know is the answer. I would speculate that Will Goding as High Commissioner had his district administrators produce figures on numbers of school children, numbers of deficient buildings, numbers of buildings already there, how many they would need to meet these requirements and so on and so forth. That would be the likely way. I don't remember any private contractors. I think this was all done in-house, and as a consequence of that, those numbers, it would be easy enough to figure out the millions of dollars. But as I said earlier in a slightly different context, there was never a very careful effort to have the ceiling figure match the needs. The effort was to figure out a ceiling figure that Wayne Aspinall could live with and then to proceed with a justification and that was always easy. But I suspect the justification came internally from the Trust Territory government.

Willens: You think that, with respect to the level of funding that was sought in 1962, there would have been some effort made to inform Aspinall in advance of what he thought and how the money would be used?

Van Cleave: Oh, yes. I couldn't prove it, and I don't think anybody could have proved it then, but almost certainly John Carver would have talked to Wayne Aspinall, and said what we are thinking about and got a nod.

Willens: But do you think, and this might be just guess work, is it more likely than not that Aspinall knew about the newly defined U.S. policy with respect to the Trust Territory?

Van Cleave: At a guess, probably, but I certainly don't know.

Willens: About a year after the NSAM 145 was issued, President Kennedy issued another National Security Action Memorandum No. 229 asking for a report on the progress made by the Task Force with respect to implementing the new U.S. policy, and that's Tab 6 in your file. There's some confusion here.

Van Cleave: Tab 6. Yes, I got 8 in the wrong place, but 6 is 6 and that's fine.

Willens: I guess there is a draft, I don't have a Task Force report. I do have a letter under one of the other tabs, I guess it's 8 or 9. A letter from Harlan Cleveland to John Carver under Tab 8, a letter of some seven pages described as a State Department initial contribution to the status report that the President asked for. And this provides some historical material. It talks about the fact that the Trust Territory is now open to American journalists and there is going to be increasing publicity and then it addresses some of the subject matters. Had you ever seen this letter or anything like it before?

Van Cleave: Quite sure I had not.

Willens: It's unclear whether the State Department's input was adopted by John Carver, since I don't have a copy of the report. It seems for the most part not to reflect any disagreements of substance as between the agencies, so I expect that the content of this letter for the most part found its way into the report. There also was at the time pending HR 3198 before Congressman Aspinall, and we do have under Tab 9 a letter to Congressman Aspinall from Assistant Secretary Carver supporting the bill which was addressed to a wide variety

of problems that existed out in the Trust Territory. Did your Solicitor's Office played any role in drafting the bill and providing the justification at the time it set forth in the Carver letter?

Van Cleve: Yes, I think I probably wrote this letter, it sounded like I might have. I am quite sure I drafted the legislation, and I remember testifying on it.

Willens: You remember testifying on this particular bill?

Van Cleve: I do, yes.

Willens: I am not sure whether I know if the bill was passed essentially in the form in which it was proposed.

Van Cleve: No, all the tariff material and the entry material, the Immigration and Nationality Act material, was eliminated. The tariff provisions which would have extended what was known as Note 3A, it's got a slightly different title now, but it's close to it. I've got the new lingo in my encyclopedia. Well, in any event, the tariff provisions would have extended 3A to the Trust Territory. This was partly motivated by the theory behind [NSAM] 145, but it also made sense quite apart from that. The theory was that things such as Micronesian handicrafts, and we saw that as the most important single item, would then come in duty free, because of course all the raw materials and all of the labor were performed in the Trust Territory, and they would meet the [Section] 301 tests. Without them, handicrafts were often 100 percent, 200 percent dutiable, and I can remember talking to people about how kili bags which could sell awfully well on Wilshire Boulevard, Rodeo Boulevard had not yet entered the language, couldn't sell for \$200 but they probably could sell for \$50 as a for instance, and so this was a fine idea. And it would have passed except on the very day that we had our hearing, there had been a story, I would say on the front page of the *Post*, or close to it, about Russian watch parts being imported into the Virgin Islands and converted into [Section] 301 watches. And Peter Dominic from Colorado came storming into the hearing and said he would have to oppose our Trust Territory tariff provision on the ground that Virgin Islands watches had a Soviet input. It was very discouraging, but that's of course how decisions get made. Equally, the admission of Micronesians on the same basis in effect as nationals, I have also recollection of that. It was Neiman Craley who was in the Congress at the time who said you could take the entire population of Micronesia and set it down in any number of American cities and nobody would know the difference. But there are always the xenophobes, particularly on the Interior Committee, and the idea of these aliens with dark skins bouncing around the U.S. without restraint was offensive to them. So if I thought about it I could probably tell you more about other things that got changed. We did get the technical assistance provision, and I guess this was probably another one where we were seeking an increase in the ceiling, I don't remember that, and we probably got that. But the tariff and entry provisions we did not get, and we were so discouraged that I don't think we ever tried that again.

Willens: Was it your experience during these years that the House of Representatives and in particular Chairman Aspinall's committee was the principal legislative barrier that had to be overcome?

Van Cleve: Oh, yes. There was not much of practice then of—what did they call it—legislative referrals to other committees. Now the tariff provisions would have to go to Ways and Means and the entry provisions would have to go to Judiciary, and you would never get anything done. In those days, Wayne Aspinall did it all, so we could produce these sort of omnibus bills, as we did in many other connections, occasionally with an exchange of letters with the chairman of other relevant committees, but often not. We'd just deal with

the whole thing. No, it was Wayne Aspinall, and the Senate usually cared a little less, had a little less time, and was willing to go along with what the House did.

Willens: There was a reference in one of these reports at about this time that legislative approval was sought to enable federal agencies to offer their (I guess) technical assistance to the Trust Territory. Was that what you were referring to?

Van Cleve: Yes.

Willens: Was there some uncertainty whether federal agencies could make their resources available to the Trust Territory?

Van Cleve: And we did get that through, I am quite sure. I think that's in Title 48 today, as a matter of fact.

Willens: About this time also there was a suggestion for the first time advanced by the Department of State that some single individual within the Executive Branch, perhaps a White House Assistant, ought to be identified to coordinate the Executive Branch's interest in the Trust Territory.

Van Cleve: I saw that in here, and I don't know that I remember that. I didn't know about it at the time.

Willens: It came up subsequently, and we will come to that in due course. But I gather from what you say that as early as 1963 you were not aware of any proposal coming from the State Department to that effect?

Van Cleve: If I was, I've wholly forgotten it. But of course it would have been consistent with what we later understood to be the State Department view that all these things should be confined to the White House, keeping the Congress out of it. Well, it would have seemed to me I guess perfectly obvious, and it seems to me ultimately that we were simply reacting to the chunks of the Constitution that applied to our work. The State Department deals with foreign policy and foreign relations, a thoroughgoing Presidential prerogative, and we were accustomed to being responsive to the Territories Committees, the Interior Committees owing to Article IV of the Constitution. So that was fundamental to our diverging points of view.

Willens: There was a Department of State memorandum that I don't think is in the book dated April 11, 1963 that reported to Cleveland, I forget who the author was, that Aspinall was upset with the State Department, that he was "angry at what he believes to be the critical and unpatriotic attitude in the Department of State towards the exercising of the American Trusteeship in the Pacific Island", and the memo suggested that the Department of State might want to have some meetings with him before the hearings that I think took place on this piece of legislation later that month. Did you have any recollection of any specific incident that might have precipitated Aspinall's strongly held views with respect to the State Department?

Van Cleve: I am struggling here. "Unpatriotic" is what made me chortle, because I think he did consider that he was more wrapped in the flag than anybody at the State Department and that any suggestion that he and his committee were not capable of doing everything that needed to be done he took as a personal affront. But you asked for something specific, and I don't know.

Willens: Well, several people have commented, and this doesn't come as a surprise to either of us, that Chairman Aspinall did not take the concerns expressed by the State Department regarding the United Nations as seriously as the State Department did.

- Van Cleve: Oh, absolutely, and that was key of course to our whole problem which we are going to talk about further. But no, no, absolutely, and when I talked a bit ago about somebody who said they were like pinpricks—criticism at the U.N. was the equivalent of pinpricks—I meant only to be reflecting the widely held view by just about everybody on the House Interior Committee, but particularly by Aspinall, that it absolutely did not matter to him, to the people of Grand Junction, and probably to the people of Micronesia, what the U.N. thought. He would take care of the people of Micronesia in his own way and don't pay any attention to these foolish people in New York or those in the State Department who were reflecting their attitude. No, no, there is no question but what that's true, in my view also. You know, I should keep throwing in "in my view, in my judgment," because I am sounding too dogmatic about things that one can forget after thirty years.
- Willens: One result of the deliberations of the Task Force and the President's request for a report was yet another National Security Action Memorandum, this one is number 243, and it's under Tab 10 in the book. This is the one that announces the appointment of Mr. Anthony M. Solomon to be the head of a mission to gather information and put out recommendations with respect to the Trust Territory. What is your recollection as to the background for the decision to create a survey mission composed principally of outsiders?
- Van Cleve: Again, I don't think I got any knowledge. I don't think I knew at the time, and I certainly don't know now.
- Willens: Do you know where the idea came from?
- Van Cleve: No.
- Willens: When did you first hear about it?
- Van Cleve: After it had happened. And I don't remember the date of the Solomon Commission Report, but it was pretty close to the time that I moved into the Territories Office.
- Willens: It would be late 1963?
- Van Cleve: Okay, and I moved in March of 1964, March or April of 1964. I had not seen it until I moved into the Territories Office.
- Willens: You had not seen the report.
- Van Cleve: Had not seen it, and I did see it when I moved in. I understood that it was an important thing that I look at. But I remember going to a meeting in John Carver's office soon after I became Director and being quite embarrassed about the fact that I hadn't seen it, so obviously hadn't read it, and there was some conversation about it. So that's pretty clear in my mind, so I am pretty sure I had not had anything to do with it. I knew somebody on it, Howard Schnor, who is no longer alive from what was then the Bureau of the Budget. I am reminded now and I remember talking to Howard about it thereafter. I had known him in connection with statehood transition problems for both Hawaii and Alaska.
- Willens: You might be interested in Cleveland's recollection that it was what he characterizes as a preemptive strike in anticipation of the 1964 visiting mission from the U.N. There was some sense that the Executive Branch might want to get the facts, improve its programs and generally be prepared for that further review that was anticipated to be at least as critical, if not more critical, than the predecessor visiting mission in 1961. Several people have claimed paternity for the idea. I guess that reflects the view it was a successful report. I gather you don't know where the idea came from—Taitano, Cleveland, the NSC staff at the White House, or so forth.

Van Cleve: I have no idea. What I started to say an hour or so ago and then said scrub it for now is that I was surprised when I looked at the list of members of the Solomon Commission that there was nobody who had a real State Department attitude, and much of what I was reminded was in Volume 1 of the Solomon Report was certainly not acceptable to the State Department. They must have found this an anathema. Did Cleveland suggest that?

Willens: No, actually he thought it was a very fine product. He did emphasize the recommendations made with respect to economic development and political education. But there was of course subsequently a great debate about its confidentiality, and it became a cause celeb many years later when portions of it were released by the Young Micronesian publication, if I have my title correct. Richard Taitano recalls that he accompanied the mission.

Van Cleve: Yes, it says so here, doesn't it?

Willens: But I don't think he is listed as a member.

Van Cleve: No, he's not. Well, excuse me, I don't mean to sound didactic. I think he was not, but there was some statement at the conclusion of this portion of the report that you gave me which as I guess is the summary about how much it had profited from the assistance of Mr. Taitano.

Willens: He has sort of an ironic recollection that his principal mission was to make a physical count of the typewriters that were needed throughout the districts and at the TTPI headquarters, and that's his contribution to the report. I don't know to what extent that represents his view about how he was regarded by the Solomon Commission members. It does have a series of recommendations with respect to the proposed plebiscite and some criticism of the TTPI Administration. I gather in the course of preparing for this interview you have at least skimmed it.

Van Cleve: Oh, I have looked at everything here, yes.

Willens: Well, can you recall now, this may be difficult, what your reactions were to the principal recommendations of the Solomon Commission Report when you finally did get a chance to review it in early 1964?

Van Cleve: I can remember essentially, if I thought about this a longer, and I guess maybe I should look at it after we adjourn today, and we should start in on this subject when next we meet. I presume that you think that we ought to carry on for another session. And if that is so, let me look at this again. What I remember essentially is Will Goding as being very upset at the aspersions cast upon his colleagues in the Trust Territory government. There is a summary of who said what to whom at a meeting in which he attempts to defend the personnel of the Trust Territory government. The assessment of Goding that you offered earlier, (perhaps from Mr. Nevin was it; do I have that name correct?) I agree with for the most part. He was not terribly effective, not very quick witted, heart in the right place without question, but not very full of oomph, shall we say. And it sounded like the Will Goding that I knew, who had said you're not nice to my people. We've got a lot of good ones. And they did have some good ones, without any question, but they also had a lot of lemons. Places like the Trust Territory attract lemons, so it always seems to be true, and I remember that part of it. I don't know that I can remember a lot else, except my feeling as I read this the other day that the State Department must have been quite offended by the political status discussions all of which are consistent with and carrying on NSAM 145.

Willens: We are basically at the conclusion of Taitano's period and we are moving into the point at which you assumed those responsibilities in early 1964. As you take a look at it, you're right I think in the sense that there was a very straightforward program set forth by the

Solomon group as to how to bring about a favorable plebiscite at an early date. To the extent that it was contemplating a status that was less than the State Department thought would meet U.N. approval, then it certainly was a direction in which State Department officials might have had a problem. I think that is a recurring thing that did come up. Cleveland knew Solomon and had confidence in him and recalls that the creation of such a committee was at least in part his idea, so what he did when he saw the response, I don't remember. Could you summarize your assessment of Secretary Udall's role in territorial issues during the years that you served with him.

Van Cleve: Yes, indeed. I was as I said reflecting on the fact that I had not given Stewart Udall sufficient credit on this subject when you and I spoke a couple of days ago. So long as John Carver was the Assistant Secretary for Public Land Management, and thus having jurisdiction over territories, Stewart Udall was not called upon with any frequency to take action on the subject. However, even then and certainly after John Carver departed that position, consistently Stewart Udall was wonderfully responsive whenever I as the Director of the Territories Office felt that we needed him as our most powerful spokesman on any particular subject, whether it was signing a letter or a memorandum of whether it was going to the Hill and testifying. He was really first rate. He was absolutely cooperative, and he took the time necessary to become a very good witness, and I didn't want to leave any impression that he was short of A-1 on this subject. He was really very good indeed.

Willens: As we come to some of the documents that were generated by the Interior Department during 1966, 1967 and 1968, we see on occasion some very strongly expressed views usually over Carver's signature, with respect to an appropriate policy toward the Trust Territory. To what extent were the views expressed by the Department of Interior in those years views that were known to and shared by Secretary Udall?

Van Cleve: Oh, I think they shared entirely, I don't think there was any deviation from the party line you are referring to, at any level. I believe as I have been through these documents that most of those signed by John Carver and subsequently Stewart Udall are ones I wrote. They were reviewed with some care by all of my superiors and if for what its worth concurred in by my subordinates by which I mean George Milner and Barney Manglona and others who were involved. We all believed quite strongly in the position that we were taking, that is, we could not achieve any status that was not acceptable to the Congress, because if we tried to and in fact succeeded at the Micronesian and U.N. end, it simply wouldn't work in Washington, and then it wouldn't work at all.

Willens: As you know from your experience, there are issues on which subordinate officers sometimes have different views than their superiors and to some extent the views of the superiors of course always prevail, but I gather from what you say that there really was a unanimity of view both within the Territories Office and at the various levels of review within the Department as to the key issues.

Van Cleve: So far as I know there was absolutely no dissent in any quarter. It seemed to us nonsense to contemplate any route other than the one we were proposing. That sounds awfully rigid, but we were at all points impressed with the power of the Congress. The authority under the Constitution and the actual clout of the Congress in controlling this area, in controlling what position post-Trusteeship Micronesia would have, and you could not work in the Interior Department without being impressed with the power of Wayne Aspinall and his colleagues. Accordingly, we will have one mind. I really do believe that to be true.

- Willens: It's leaping ahead to a few decades but would it be fair to say based on your subsequent tours of duty in this area that the role of Congressional Committees, which was much more well defined and powerful in the 1960s, would prove to be the same twenty years later in the 1980s or the early 1990s?
- Van Cleve: I can't really speak to the 1980s, because my work didn't bring me close enough to the Committees. There now seems to be so much warfare on the Hill—the House versus the Senate and the House staff versus the Senate staff—not the same kind of respect that they seemed to have in the 1960s. So I don't know about the 1980s. I would say in the 1970s it was less effective, because in my judgment Phil Burton was simply very much less effective than Wayne Aspinall had been, not less powerful, but infinitely more difficult. They were both difficult, but one was rational and the other was not, in my view.
- Willens: Let us go then to where we were in our prior meeting when we were discussing Solomon Commission Report. You told me at that time that you were not personally involved in reviewing the report at one of the meetings that's referred to in the collection of documents, but that you did have the opportunity to read the report after you became Director in early 1964. One of the essential recommendations of the Solomon Commission was to plan for an early plebiscite in 1967 and 1968 and they outlined a program directed to achieving that. If I am repeating myself, I apologize, but was it your sense when you assumed the position of Director that a plebiscite as early as 1967 or 1968 was a feasible objective?
- Van Cleve: I don't think so. I found the Solomon Report and my relationship with it to be a bit of a blur. Upon re-reading it, it still is a blur, and I think it's probably because by the spring of 1964, when I went into that job, already the Solomon recommendations had become somewhat moribund. Very soon thereafter the Report kind of disintegrated, it did not really become a matter of federal policy. I have been trying to think of any meetings, any gatherings that I attended where the Solomon Report was the focus, and I can think of only one, and it's an interesting one. I assume that it was the spring of 1964—can't say that, but it seems likely—when Stewart Udall presided over a luncheon in the Secretary's dining room of the key Congressional people and at least some bureaucrats. I was there, I don't remember whether the State Department was there, and it didn't matter, because the point was essentially to sound out the Congress, the Congressional leaders, and find out their disposition towards this early plebiscite. The luncheon—it's not clear to me, many details, most details of the luncheon are not clear to me—but I do remember, and I was very new to the game, I had read the Solomon Report and in answer to your initial question thought it's just not possible for the U.S. government to move as fast as the Solomon people had contemplated. It was after all at that point, only three or four years hence, and the things that needed to be done before a credible plebiscite would be held would take many, many years. I mean schools had to be built, teachers had to be hired, people had to be educated in some at least rudimentary way before they would know what was involved. So, my own feeling was that it is just not possible to compress into these few years all the things that need to be done. And it was surprising to me that so many people on the Solomon Commission didn't recognize what all of us who were associated with the U.S. government know. It's just terribly hard to get the U.S. government to do anything, and it takes years of real, real pressure on the part of a lot of people to get it to move, so how you could do this great big thing in the course of a few years seems to me impossible. Returning to the luncheon. Someone, maybe John Carver, I don't know, summarized the Solomon recommendations, and as I recall the members of Congress and I remember Rogers Morton at that meeting and I remember Leo O'Brien. I suppose

Aspinall was there, probably Henry Jackson was there. We saw him as an especial ally. He was easier to deal with than Wayne Aspinall. All of them just threw up their hands in terms of the timing and just couldn't believe that we could with any sense of reason contemplate acting so quickly. That's about the only thing that I remember from the Solomon recommendations. The Solomon Commission did not become, therefore, anything like the guide to us that was contemplated in the Anthony Solomon papers.

Willens: There is a suggestion in at least one of the documents that the assassination of President Kennedy had impact on the viability and significance of the Solomon Report.

Van Cleve: Oh, of course, it has to have done that, particularly when one sees that curious memorandum from the President signed by John Kennedy asking for reports from all the key departments by I think it says November 31, does it not? I seemed to remember noticing that at the time way back that is in the 1960s, and thinking how funny that the President would sign something with a obviously impossible date on it. But that's not quite the point. You feel such poignancy when you read that particular document. No, there's no question that the Solomon effort was thwarted by that terrible event.

Willens: Did you think that the Congressional reaction that you recall being expressed at the meeting represented their basic reluctance if not opposition to any plebiscite, or was it a sense that a plebiscite with the favorable outcome that everyone wanted could not be prepared for and administered within this time frame?

Van Cleve: I think it's the latter point. I don't know when we first begin talking about a plebiscite as the *sine qua non* for resolving Trust Territory status, but we probably had by that time. I don't remember ever hearing members of Congress doubt the importance of our having a credible vote. I think they just thought that this was too soon. I don't know this, shouldn't speculate, but having started to, I'll finish the thought, which is that in order to get close to achieving the 1967, 1968 date we would have to get enormous quantities of money and spend it effectively very, very quickly, and we had proved that we were not very good at spending a lot of money in a hurry.

Willens: By early 1964 there already had been some experience with the expenditure of increased funds in the Trust Territory, and the majority view in the literature at least is that although well intentioned, much of the money was not well spent.

Van Cleve: That's correct.

Willens: Do you have any personal recollection or judgment with respect to that?

Van Cleve: I certainly know that that was the conventional wisdom at the time, and I don't know that I could contribute anything further except to say that our standard defense was, that it is just terribly hard to contract for construction or equipment, all the things one needs, when the islands number at least 100 and when they are scattered over a wide area and when bidders don't even know where the islands are. It's just a very, very hard row to hoe. Of course, at the same time you know, we had these wonderful things happening in Samoa under Rex Lee, and the Congressional Committees would go to Samoa, as did we, and the contrast between what was happening in Samoa and the Trust Territory was gigantic. Eugenie Anderson was very much impressed with this contrast. But the Trust Territory represented something like 20 Samoa's, less accessible than the American Samoa was, at least many parts of it were less accessible. Accordingly, it wasn't really fair to do that.

Willens: There seemed to be a consensus that the principal investment in the Trust Territory should be directed toward educational facilities and personnel.

- Van Cleve: That was our first priority but a very near second was medical services. But those were the two.
- Willens: High Commissioner Goding, about whom we spoke a few days ago, was quoted in one book saying that the Solomon Commission Report basically had little or no effect. Others said that essentially the Solomon Report yielded nothing more than they had been told before they went out but that its value was having a non-governmental and reasonably well-connected group presenting the views that were set forth in the report. I gather from what you said earlier today that you don't think it really had any lasting effect in terms of shaping U.S. government policy.
- Van Cleve: That's right. And I think I would agree with both of the earlier statements that you made, that is the one ascribed to Will Goding and the one to others. Incidentally, of course, the Solomon people weren't non-governmental entirely, you know.
- Willens: The Solomon Commission Report identified as a major obstacle to the overall development of the Trust Territory "the creaky functioning of the quasi-colonial bureaucracy in the Trust Territory government." It is easy with the benefit of hindsight to fault the expatriates who were out in the Trust Territory at the time. Can you give me any judgment as to your experience with the personnel both in terms of their strengths and their weaknesses?
- Van Cleve: Some were marvelous and some were just ineffective, probably like most any other organization. But maybe the ineffective ones represented a larger proportion than would have been usual. I really did know some first-rate people. One of the difficulties was that people tended to stay too long. As one who had virtually the same job for 43 years in the government, you see, I am a marvelous one to say that, but we had, for example, several district administrators who were products of the Naval post-graduate school at Monterrey, the one that instructed people on the administration of island governments. They were good people. To start out with, they had been trained well, they had been sent by the Navy, and we inherited them from the Navy. And unquestionably they were really very good at the outset, but they grew tired over time, and it is a little hard to sit on a Pacific island with very little input from the outside and retain your sense of urgency about really anything, you know. And of course alcohol was cheap, so alcoholism was a constant problem. I don't have any statistics in mind, but I am sure the alcoholism rate was somewhat higher than it was in any mainland communities, and the absence of interchange with colleagues has to have had some kind of debilitating effect on the intellectual prowess of these people if you will. But what do you do with them? They didn't have any kind of rotational scheme. We tried to develop one at some point, but it is really pretty hard to do. These were not people who had jobs to come home to. You can't fire them. A lot of them had children, some of them in Micronesian elementary schools, some in boarding schools in Hawaii which was the standard approach, some in college on the mainland. You don't fire people for being fatigued. You don't fire them for being imperfectly effective. It is a very difficult problem, but I think the conventional wisdom again was that this is not a crackerjack organization, and it is absolutely right. I used to think we ought to go to London and learn what the British Colonial Service did. I guess it was Rudyard Kipling who helped caused me to enter the civil service and that terrible poem I won't recite but it is in your mind as it is in mine, and I remember learning at an early age that the brightest people from Oxbridge entered the Colonial Service and did their stints often in India but not solely India. How did the British manage to keep people if they did with the right kind of spark. We did not figure out a way to do it. We tried to work a rotational scheme of some sort, but it never really got off the ground. But we did have some awfully good people, there is no question about that.

- Willens: One of the last questions I will ask about the Solomon Commission Report was its observation based on its interviews in the Trust Territory that the High Commissioner and his staff seemed not to have been aware of National Security Action Memorandum #145 and the reframed U.S. policy toward the area of the world for which they had administrative responsibilities. I found that somewhat difficult to believe or understand.
- Van Cleve: I do remember reading that and something flitted through my mind by way of an explanation, and I don't know that I can grab it again. I think it has to do with the fact that in the first place [NSAM] 145 was classified, so it was not treated like a Presidential press release. The further problem is that I am not absolutely sure that [NSAM] 145 ever became a genuinely understood federal policy, equally so with the Solomon Report. The two are really very consistent, of course, and I never felt I could talk about [NSAM] 145 as being the U.S. government stance. I said a couple of days ago about this terrible frustration that I felt when Micronesians said let us know if you want us and to quote that would have been very easy because that was one President's statement of where we were going. At the same time, it was not consistent with what we were hearing from the State Department about the supreme importance of our stance in the international community which I thought nonsense then and I think nonsense now.
- Willens: The TTPI staff and heads of departments knew that there was new increased federal funding. They knew there was talk of putting the Peace Corps out there which didn't eventually happen until 1966. They were responsible, I gather, for supervising the construction of the educational facilities and improving the health facilities.
- Van Cleve: Some motive.
- Willens: I guess the question goes to whether there was communication—this may not be a question you can answer—between the Interior Department and the TTPI Administration at a high level that managed to communicate the message that this is a new Administration with a new program.
- Van Cleve: I don't know that I can talk about our communication with Will Goding on the subject. It may be that the Carver/Mangan/Milner group can do that. I had lots of conversations with Bill Norwood, who was absolutely read into where we were in this terribly difficult warfare with the State Department.
- Willens: How would you evaluate Norwood's performance as High Commissioner?
- Van Cleve: Pretty good. He was such an agreeable person that it is almost impossible for anybody to say anything about Bill Norwood that isn't complimentary. And that is the chief thing that comes through. I still am in correspondence with his widow. Bill Norwood died, what, 15 years ago, maybe more. But she was as nice as he, and we just keep exchanging little notes from time to time. I don't think that he was—he was not a Rex Lee. If we had had another dozen Rex Lees, what a job we could have done, but he didn't have the instincts of a Rex Lee. Did you know Rex Lee at all? You know something of his performance in Samoa, I am sure. Rex Lee was an old government hand who knew what the government could do if you knew which buttons to push and which telephone lines to use. And the consequence was that he had military units crawling over Samoa, building television aerials and fixing up the roads and all of this for nothing because he had this close relationship to Wayne Aspinall and he had merely to mention that and people just leaped to help him. Bill Norwood had not had that kind of experience. He had experience in government in the state of Hawaii and he was in fact a newspaper man by training and long experience. I guess I can't say that he was a crackerjack, I can't say that he turned the place around. He

was honest, he was honorable, he was pretty energetic, but not the paragon that we needed and would have wanted. But he was close to Daniel Inouye, that was how he got the job.

Willens: Can you tell me the circumstances under which your predecessor, Mr. Taitano, became the Deputy High Commissioner of the Trust Territory?

Van Cleve: Well, didn't he move there upon leaving the directorship at Interior?

Willens: Yes, he recalls that he was asked sort of to warm the bench or occupy that on an interim basis, pending someone being appointed. I forget, but I gather Benitez . . .

Van Cleve: No, Jamie Benitez preceded him.

Willens: . . . preceded him and left, and Taitano took that position on the assumption that Interior would agree on some permanent replacement. I don't think it was ever contemplated, at least he doesn't recall it was contemplated, that he would stay there. But he did indeed stay for some 30 months and left, as he recalls, somewhat precipitously, and antagonized people back at Interior for so doing.

Van Cleve: Well, he was being encouraged to leave. In fact, I was sent once as a messenger to ask Dick to move back to Guam, and Dick resisted. It is the sort of mission that anybody hates and I hated it particularly, having felt that I had already gotten in Dick's way in a serious way once. I don't remember that it was foreseen as temporary. Jamie Benitez was a colorful Puerto Rican who made some wonderful speeches persuading people about the need to put up more dollars for the Trust Territory, but he was much of the time quite drunk and not helpful. When he left, we certainly needed somebody else, and I thought that Dick was given the Trust Territory job firstly to ease his departure from Interior—it simply looked better—and secondly, because it was thought that he would be genuinely useful, and I think he was genuinely useful. At some point it was concluded that it would be better if Dick were not Deputy High Commissioner. I can't remember who was behind this but it has to have been either Carver or Udall and I was asked on a trip to the Trust Territory to sound Dick out—would he be willing to move from the Trust Territory to Guam. I guess maybe we were prepared to offer him perhaps the post of Secretary of Guam. I forget. In a very gingerly way, I had a conversation with Dick and the gist was “No” he liked what he was doing and I dropped it there and so reported and that did not precipitate his departure. But, no, I think Dick was well thought of in his Trust Territory post. He was succeeded by Marty Mangan, who was the brother (we went through this the other day)—of Bob, the younger brother of Bob.

Willens: One of the issues throughout this period—that is the 1960s—was the extent to which Micronesians had increasingly assumed executive level positions in the administration of the TTPI. Was it advantageous in terms of supporting that effort to have a Chamorro, be it from Guam, in the position of Deputy High Commissioner?

Van Cleve: Probably. I don't remember that as being of overwhelming significance, but I am sure it must have been viewed as better than having a WASP.

Willens: In early 1964, the U.N. visiting mission visited Washington for briefing sessions in advance of its review of U.S. performance in the Trust Territory. I think we discussed very briefly the 1961 U.N. visiting mission. Did you recall participating in any of the briefing sessions with the visiting mission? This would have been shortly before you became Director, so you might not have been involved.

Van Cleve: Then it is the 1967 one I am thinking of. Angie Brooks was the leader of a U.N. visiting mission in which I was much involved. That was probably, however, 1967. If this preceded

- my coming to the Territories Office in 1964, then I would not have been involved in any clear way.
- Willens: The State Department documents that I have, and I forget whether they were included in the volume that I provided you, reflect a very clear decision in advance of the visit not to inform the visiting mission with respect to NSAM 145 or, more importantly, the basic federal policy to take steps to bring about integration or affiliation of the entire Trust Territory with the United States. I gather from my conversations with others and ours a few days ago that this is not surprising given the classified nature of the information.
- Van Cleve: But also given the fact that these documents lead to an arrangement which the State Department found anathema.
- Willens: Well, you mentioned that a few days ago. I am not so sure the State Department people read [NSAM] 145 as necessarily requiring a relationship that amounted to something identical to Guam and the Virgin Islands. As the documents indicate, they kept striving for something that smacked of free association (whatever that meant in that day and age) that they thought would meet the U.N. requirements.
- Van Cleve: Your construction is a reasonable one. There is nothing in the papers that you gave me to suggest that the State Department opposed either [NSAM] 145 or the Solomon recommendations. It is so clear to me that they were leading in a direction that the State Department ultimately found unacceptable. In any event, I would not be at all surprised if State didn't want the U.N. visiting mission to know anything about this federal policy.
- Willens: If I were a critic inclined to take an adversarial view, which I am not, one would suggest that the U.S. government mislead the U.N. visiting mission by suggesting there was no U.S. policy as to the timetable for putting the issue of future political status to the people of Micronesia and no U.S. policy as to the outcome that the U.S. favored. Is misleading an inappropriate or too strong a word?
- Van Cleve: Well, I think maybe the premise may be incorrect. I don't think the U.S. policy was quite that unambiguous, quite that solid. I think we were in disorder. I really think we were.
- Willens: One of the subjects that came up both in the briefing visits and the 1964 U.N. report related to the consideration within the Executive Branch of issuing an order creating a Congress of Micronesia. Indeed, during the briefing session, members of the visiting mission asked questions about it and were briefed about it and expressed some views, of course tending to reflect their view that the Micronesians ought to be given more power over budget and so forth. There was some extensive consideration given within the Executive Branch to the Secretarial Order that created the Congress of Micronesia. Do you have any recollection of your involvement in that particular matter?
- Van Cleve: Yes, I think, I thought of that as a clear step forward under the Van Cleve administration if I can use a highfalutin term that I never used then. It was a big thing, I thought, that we were doing and I was anxious to do it. It's the sort of subject I like. George Milner and I together, I think, crafted drafts of the Secretarial Order. And I think this was the first time I spent a lot of time with the UNP people at State—Gleysteen, Brown, McHenry. I remember being irritated at their rather carping approach to small points in the Order. It seemed to me that they should give us more credit for doing this bold thing. I don't know how bold it was, but it was big. And as I say I remember some irritation. We sat for a lot of time round conference tables working on the very words of the Order in cooperation with the State Department people, and as I say my feeling was at least from time to time minor irritation. George kept taking the position that they were just so surprised that

we are doing anything as enlightened as this, that they really can't believe it, and they are not going to give an inch. But they were not, it seemed to me, sympathetic to some of the realities that we thought were upon us. For example, I think this is right though I would have to look at papers to remember for sure, the Order provided that twice-vetoed Micronesian laws would come to the Secretary of the Interior for action, for approval of the High Commissioner's vetoes or otherwise, and we had constructed it to encourage speedy Secretarial action but not to presume on a particular result if he didn't act. The State Department people wanted the Secretary to have 30 days, and in the absence of action in that 30 days, the Congress of Micronesia position would prevail. Well, that's the sort of thing that we found hard, because we knew how long it took to get papers to the Secretary and to get him briefed and so on and so forth. That sort of thing we would talk about for hours, and it was that kind of pickiness that made me kind of mad. But in any event, we were very excited about it, and those who were in Saipan on the occasion of the first meeting of the Congress of Micronesia. John Carver was there and came back virtually with tears in their eyes. They said it's like Philadelphia in 1776, you know, it's the birth of a nation. They were I remember very, very pleased.

Willens: That is interesting and I'll come back to that with reference to a few documents. By the time the U.N. visiting mission submitted its report in or about May of 1964, you were then Director of the Office. Without focusing necessarily on that particular report, can you give me your judgment as to the role that the U.N. visiting mission played in these three-year interval trips and reports that ultimately were considered by the Trusteeship Council and had to be responded to by the U.S. government? In your book you spoke in a complimentary fashion with respect to those reports in terms of their objectivity and so forth.

Van Cleve: Yes, they seemed to us quite well done. I didn't think we use them very much as guidance for what ought to be done because we could never cite a U.N. report in the hearing of a member of the House Interior Committee without being laughed out of the room. These documents were worse than useless so far as our Hill people were concerned. But I do think that they were workmanlike, professional documents. My recollection is the 1964 report contained a little bit of praise here and there; it was much less harsh than the 1961 document. And of course we always preferred to be praised rather than condemned. So on balance, I used to read them and learn something from them. There is no question that I felt that was true of them.

Willens: The U.N. reports always devoted substantial time to political status questions as well as organizational problems and health and educational needs and so forth. In the 1964 report, the U.N. mission evaluated Micronesian sentiment on political status issues and concluded that the Micronesians were somewhat confused about the options that were available to them. In my interview with him, Harlan Cleveland said he does not find that surprising at all given the status of education and political sophistication in Micronesia.

Van Cleve: And given the fact that we hadn't talked about this subject to our administrators and certainly not to the Micronesians themselves. We had not undertaken to outline what the choices are for all the reasons with which you are familiar.

Willens: One of the interesting issues is the extent to which policy makers in Washington including you had any reasonably accurate sense of what Micronesian sentiment was on political status issues. What were the sources of information on which you and others would rely for the evaluations of Micronesian readiness and preferences that are reflected in the documents?

- Van Cleve: Well, sources of information were what we learned while travelling and talking to people and what we were told by our folks—the High Commissioner, the District Administrators and others. We obviously didn't have any scientific poll taking, but people were beginning to write little bits on this subject, that man at St. Xaviers, Hezel? Father Hezel?
- Willens: Father Hezel. Exactly.
- Van Cleve: Yes, there was the beginning, as I say, of some literature on the subject which we pretty well absorbed, memorized, and we did a lot of talking about it. And there was a warmth with respect to the U.S. that one felt was almost palpable throughout the Trust Territory in this period. Maybe it was just good manners, but one felt very well received. I don't know that there was a lot of bursting into "God Bless America" as there always was in Guam. I used to feel embarrassed at my own level of patriotism in Guam, because everybody beat me so totally in displaying it.
- Willens: There was one member of the Marianas Political Status Commission in the early 1970s who would burst into song from time to time. He was a representative from Tinian, and it would present Ambassador Williams and his staff with the same sense, I am sure, of wondering whether they were being sufficiently patriotic.
- Van Cleve: Oh, yes, exactly.
- Willens: One other issue that was featured in the U.N. reports for 1961, 1964 and 1967 related to the so-called fragmentation issue and the repeated expressions in the Northern Marianas for some form of reunification with Guam or permanent affiliation with the United States. The U.N. visiting missions uniformly rejected these as either not authentic, or not attainable, and admonished the U.S. to take all available steps to quiet this kind of disagreeable view. What is your recollection of the fragmentation issue as you became acquainted with your responsibilities as Director?
- Van Cleve: I don't think that there was ever any deviation, in any area with which I was familiar, from the position that fragmentation was deplorable and that we should treat the Trust Territory as a single entity.
- Willens: It was quite clear that the State Department as a legal proposition took the view that that fragmentation was not an available position for the U.S. to take. Ironically they departed from it in every significant respect in subsequent decades, although not due to my advocacy which was rejected. But was there some sense that there were other considerations beyond legal ones that were at play here. I get some sense from the State Department people that they were troubled by the prospect of multiple small nations.
- Van Cleve: Yes. Well, I think that would be a non-legal consideration. I quoted Bill Gleysteen the other day as having contributed the phrase that remains in my mind about "the menace of the mini-state." We were at that point seeing fragmentation in Africa and South East Asia. The Seychelles were one of the examples that were thrown up to us. No, I don't think of any considerations beyond that, so far as Interior was concerned. I think, if we thought about it, we were so clear that the Trust Territory was going to become a part of our permanent jurisdiction as the administrator or overseer of offshore areas, we could have made whatever internal arrangements within Micronesia that made sense. And whether that was in our minds or not, I don't know. But certainly in terms of moving Micronesia out of the jurisdiction of the Trusteeship Council of the U.N., we thought of just one entity and one series of actions affecting it.
- Willens: That's an interesting point that I haven't really focused on before. The thought was that you could accommodate district differences within the confines of some overall

relationship with the United States. Did you find yourself during the period from 1964 through early 1969 becoming more aware of the different cultural, linguistic and tribal patterns among the districts?

Van Cleve: I think we were mindful of them throughout and certainly the Northern Marianas particularly made this clear. I don't think any of the other districts took actions that indicated their preference for separatism. I simply don't know. Maybe your researchers would let you know. But the people of the Northern Marianas in the 1960s and into the 1970s made very clear their own preference to go it alone. When were the first referenda in the Northern Marianas? I want to say 1964, 1965.

Willens: There were some in that time frame. There were many resolutions passed by the District Legislature. The key referendum that sort of put the reunification effort with Guam off the agenda came in 1969, and the Guamanians rejected it.

Van Cleve: Yes, I remember that.

Willens: But there were some earlier expressions from the Marianas that overwhelmingly supported some kind of reunification.

Van Cleve: And that seemed to say secondarily that we don't want to be associated with the rest of the Trust Territory. In any event, there was a time when we became quite aware of the fact that the Northern Marianas wanted to go it alone.

Willens: Tab 15 in the volume that I gave you is a letter addressed to John Carver signed by Harlan Cleveland of State, and it includes some specific suggestions with respect to the draft Secretarial Order. Some of these are relatively minor as you suggested earlier. Some go to more fundamental issues, such as Congress of Micronesia involvement in the budgetary process and the veto issue. Did you recall seeing this letter at the time?

Van Cleve: I must have. This was exactly in my bailiwick and I must have seen it. I don't recall specifically, but it would have been almost certain.

Willens: One thing that interests me about the letter is that it seems to have been sent only a few weeks before the Secretarial Order was in fact issued. It obviously reflects a lot of inter-staff discussions between the two agencies, and I wonder whether some of the views here were not accepted by Interior because they were received too late or because basically Interior disagreed with the suggestions made?

Van Cleve: I think probably the latter. It's very hard to be sure at this point, but we did have, as I suggested earlier, meetings with the UNP people. My guess is that the Cleveland letter to John Carver simply cataloged the points about which State cared and which they had not succeeded in persuading us about in these earlier meetings.

Willens: And it may be as much making a record then of State Department views as it was an effort to persuade Interior?

Van Cleve: Or elevating the dialog to the Secretarial level, from the bureau level, which is where it had been with Elizabeth Brown and me. Yes, that's as much as I can say sensibly.

Willens: You recalled Carver's reaction when the Congress of Micronesia concept began to be embodied in a real institution. There is a rather substantial literature about the Congress of Micronesia. Professor Meller, for example, thinks it was one of the historic contributions towards creation of a Micronesian nation and sense of Micronesian unity. Others have suggested that over the years it was a vehicle that to some extent depressed local governmental entities and . . .

- Van Cleve: Local governmental which?
- Willens: Entities.
- Van Cleve: Okay.
- Willens: . . . as the Congress of Micronesia assumed more responsibility, the municipal councils and the district legislatures had less funds and authority to deal and the Congress of Micronesia became a forum in which the differences among the districts were ventilated. That's not necessarily bad. My question to you is how you would evaluate the contributions of the Congress of Micronesia during the 1965 to 1969 time frame?
- Van Cleve: Insufficient to achieve what we wanted, which was a relatively cohesive governmental unit in Micronesia, and obviously this wasn't enough to get there or we would not have experienced the fragmentation that subsequently occurred. Seems to me it was a step absolutely in the right direction. There was very little that was tying the units of the Trust Territory together. We had the Pacific Islands Central School in Ponape, wasn't it?
- Willens: Ponape or Truk, I forget.
- Van Cleve: Well, I think it moved, but I last saw it I think in Ponape. But this pulled some of the young people together. In due course, we had the vocational school in Palau which pulled some more together, but the Congress of Micronesia and its predecessor, the, what did we call it, the Advisory . . .
- Willens: Advisory Council.
- Van Cleve: . . . Council, that's right. This was the only place where Micronesian leaders met and talked together, and it seemed to me that it just has to have had some value. I don't think any Saipanese ever went to PICS. I suppose the children of the Northern Marianas went to Guam to high school or maybe stayed in Saipan.
- Willens: Some did. Some of the people I interviewed did go to PICS.
- Van Cleve: Oh, did they?
- Willens: And who became subsequently important leaders in the Northern Marianas. They recall with affection the relationships with other Micronesians that they developed in those years, which I assume was one of the purposes of the institution.
- Van Cleve: I used to hear that from various folks who once had been students at PICS. They did feel sentimental about that whole relationship. In any event, that was a tiny number and they were students. The Congress was obviously a pulling together of real leaders, and I think it was terribly important and I'm awfully glad we did it.
- Willens: Turning to 1965, there were beginning in 1965 and for the next two or three years a series of meetings and exchanges of correspondence among the three principal agencies trying to formulate a common policy for proceeding to implement NSAM 145. Under Tab 16 of the book I have provided you with a copy of a document you sent to the Under Secretary.
- Van Cleve: Oh, I can remember that.
- Willens: You were reacting to a DOD paper. We haven't talked very much about the Defense Department and its views here. Did this paper sort of refresh your recollection regarding your views of DOD's involvement?
- Van Cleve: Well, we felt that it was the Defense Department's interests that were the premise on which we were all operating here. I think chiefly we were much troubled by the fact that

they seemed very unsophisticated about some of the niceties in our business and that's what this thing says. They couldn't sort out a commonwealth from a possession from an unincorporated territory and nobody knew what an incorporated territory was. One of my sins throughout this period—whenever I fulminated on how nonsensical it was to talk about incorporating these areas—I talked simply in terms of the inchoate state problem. I never focused as we have done in the years since on how swift the areas would be to reject the notion of incorporation because of the fiscal consequences, the tax and tariff consequences. That's never mentioned in here, so I was not as sophisticated or as smart as I ought to have been. I certainly knew, because that was the whole premise of course of the Insular Cases, but I never pointed that out. In any case, this is a reflection of the fact that we thought that the Defense people were just being dumbkops.

Willens: There are, in these materials and in the other documents that I have reviewed, occasional expressions of Defense Department views. There is a viewpoint that the Defense Department would have been quite contented if the Trusteeship arrangement stayed in place in perpetuity. That certainly seems to have been the view of some of the military personnel. The civilian leadership seems to have been more sensitive to the need to address the U.N. responsibilities and look towards some new status that would still enable the United States to achieve its strategic and military objectives.

Van Cleve: I think that's right.

Willens: Do you have any sense of whether Defense simply sat by and watched Interior and State debate this during the 1965-1968 period, or were they active participants in the shaping of your views or of State Department's views?

Van Cleve: I don't think they were active at all in shaping the views of either of the other two departments. Certainly it was the clear Defense position that we have to hang onto this real estate forever that was motivating both of us, but more Interior than State. And I think that whenever the chips were down Defense lined up with our position pretty much to the exclusion of State's because I think they understood our problem of the political reality on the Hill. So I think we saw this pretty much as Interior with Defense mostly on our side, though I think they never would have talked that way, with State alone being concerned with what happened in the Trusteeship Council or the Security Council. I was reminded that there was a really remarkable Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton, who was the recipient of quite a few letters in here. He was killed in a plane crash as I recall. Am I right about that?

Willens: Yes.

Van Cleve: And he was very well thought of by everybody, and one has the feeling that he seemed to understand the nuances here in a way that the military people mostly didn't. They really didn't care so long as we kept it. A short answer.

Willens: In early 1965, President Johnson terminated the Task Force on the Trust Territory that had been in place for several years. After you became Director, did you participate in any Task Force meetings that you can recall?

Van Cleve: I'm quite sure I didn't. I'm quite sure I did not. I don't even remember that there was one as a matter of fact. This was a consequence of NSAM 145, was it not?

Willens: That's correct and there was a recommendation in the Solomon Commission Report that the Task Force sort of stay in place as to provide counsel to the Secretary of the Interior. There's some indication in the documents that the Interior Department, while valuing

the views of the other agencies, doubted that they had to be institutionalized in a Task Force.

Van Cleve: This is a kind of standard John Carver reaction, and it doesn't surprise me at all. There's something in these papers that suggests that I guess State was chiding us for abandoning the Task Force and there's a Carver statement that we didn't abandon it, it was terminated when it made the report that was required of it and then there's a note saying what report. None of this means anything to me at all.

Willens: I've been unable to answer those questions as well, and it's also impossible to do more than guess as to whose handwriting it is.

Van Cleve: I can't read many of those notes. Incidentally I should mention, though I'm sure that you've got so many sources of information that one more is of no possible interest, that I gave all of my papers (the term sounds a little high falauting)—the blue flimsies, the carbon copies of things that I either signed or drafted—to the Georgetown Law School. And there would be some files, one sided, just what I held in my file cabinet and often used. They exist at the law school library at Georgetown, and they might flesh out (a phrase I hate) some of this stuff in this period. A fellow named Brewster Chapman who you may have known who died many years ago had files from his briefer exposure and his widow, Patti, you would know her. Patti persuaded the Georgetown Law School to take them, I think with a tax benefit to her because it could be done in those days. I'm pretty sure she virtually said that. And I was cleaning out the attic and mostly dumping things on the ground that one's papers have no real benefit for anybody else when I came upon these fairly orderly files, and so I called Georgetown and said you have Brewster Chapman's and mine are much better. They agreed to take them and Harry and I drove down in February I think and delivered four or five boxes of files mostly from the 1960s.

Willens: February of this year?

Van Cleve: February of this year. They had been in our attic, and I was cleaning the attic.

Willens: Are they under any restrictions with respect to access?

Van Cleve: Not that I know of.

Willens: Because Chapman's were but we ultimately obtained the necessary clearance, and one of my colleagues reviewed them. We have some copies now in our overall repository. Very few of them were pertinent.

Van Cleve: He was not knee deep in this.

Willens: His legal opinions were more often wrong than right. In 1965 the Department of State began the process of developing a position paper with respect to the future political status of the Trust Territory, and they were also expressing their views before Congress. There was an occasion where Harlan Cleveland went before Congress and emphasized the pressures from the Committee of 24 in the United Nations and the extent to which there needed to be some effort to remove the Trust Territory and the other three territories or insular areas from U.N. supervision. One of the State Department views that was expressed early on was that the Trust Territory's future status should be treated as a piece of the entire problem and that one ought to move the Trust Territory, as well as Guam, the Virgin Islands, and American Samoa into some status with more attributes of self-government so as to remove all of those territories from U.N. supervision. Do you recall that State Department view, and what was your reaction to it?

- Van Cleve: Isn't it funny? Do you have papers in here that relate to that, because I think I do not. Nothing that you've said is surprising, but my problem is that I have no particular recollection of that.
- Willens: Well, for example, and this ranges a little bit more broadly, but at Tab 17 and subsequently for the next three or four tabs there are some internal documents, and let me just direct your attention to Tab 17, which is a memorandum from Mr. Lindley of State . . .
- Van Cleve: Yes.
- Willens: . . . to Mr. Rostow and on page 1, for example, it makes a reference to a speech by Senator Fong suggesting that the state of Hawaii might be expanded . . .
- Van Cleve: Oh, yes, I remember that.
- Willens: . . . to absorb the TTPI.
- Van Cleve: I remember that Fong initiative, yes. And I did look at these, but I don't believe I saw them at the time, that is to say these two internal State Department things. I would almost certainly have seen 19, which is a letter to John Carver from Joe Sisco.
- Willens: Yes, the attachment is not with it, but some of these State Department documents did suggest that all of the territories should be dealt with together. We'll come to some Interior documents suggesting that that's not a necessary result here and there already were recommendations in place for improving and increasing self-government in Guam and the Virgin Islands with respect to electing a governor. Did you have a sense then that Congressman Aspinall would be resistant to moving the Trust Territory and the other three territories into the same kind of political status?
- Van Cleve: I don't think I have any recollection or any knowledge or even a very sound bit of speculation on this subject.
- Willens: Okay. There is a suggestion in some of these documents that the way to move forward would be to appoint a White House assistant who might coordinate the agencies, specifically State, Interior and to a lesser extent Defense, in formulating U.S. policy. What is your recollection as to the Interior Department's reaction to that proposal?
- Van Cleve: Highly adverse, because we saw it as a technique for causing the State Department to prevail in all of its positions. So long as these issues were within the Executive Branch, the State Department would "win" because it is the senior department and always wins in Executive Department arguments. That becomes clear later on when the Bureau of Budget went along with State rather than us on our commission proposal. Incidentally there's a piece of that subject that is not in here that should exist someplace. But State, as I say, always wins so long as it's an Executive Branch matter. It was only when the Congress became involved, which we thought important because it would have to be once the area became part of the U.S., that the Interior Department had any clout at all. A special assistant to the President would be a reflection of the State Department attitude. That was our view. There's also, I looked at my book and I've got a footnote in there that I'd forgotten about completely, to the effect that we understood that Joe Sisco was maneuvering to get all of the Trust Territory transferred to the State Department. I don't know this and I think I reported it as a rumor. There were certainly people who thought that, and John Carver is one who would have.
- Willens: I was going to ask you about whether there was any specific recollection as to a document or an event in which Sisco or any other State Department representative recommended

that these responsibilities of the Trust Territory be moved to State from Interior.

Van Cleve: None of which I'm aware.

Willens: I have run across no documents in response to our FOIA requests that approach any such explicit proposal of a transfer of authority. There certainly are many documents, some of which you've now seen, reflecting State's views that Interior wasn't responding as State hoped it would and that there was therefore need for White House involvement.

Van Cleve: Well, a lot of these things I don't suppose were ever recorded. I'm interested to see the number of things that were a memoranda of conversations between Don McHenry and me, for example; there's one such later on in this book. And State sometimes does a pretty good job of recording telephone conversations but, during this period when the State Department was trying so hard to cause things to happen in the Trust Territory, it was always behind the scenes. They went to the Peace Corps without murmuring to us that they were going to do so. The fact is, we were not resistant to the Peace Corps. We weren't all that keen on 800 or 900 PCVs but the idea of the Peace Corps appealed to us very much. We had tried it and failed in the early 1960s for legal reasons, but the Peace Corps changed its mind. The State Department went secretly to the Peace Corps. It went secretly to a half a dozen agencies in town to say what you ought to be doing in the Trust Territory is [this], and never told us. It was that kind of thing, of course, that made us really quite irritated. These other agencies would ring up and say what's this thing known as the Trust Territory, where it is and what's going on? So that obviously did not help our relationship in the slightest, but this is all by way of saying that so far as I know none of these things were written down. I have a vision, don't know if it was true, of Don McHenry personally going over to the Agriculture Department and talking with them and Agriculture which had day-to-day relationships with us called us thereafter to ask questions. I know that Eugenie Anderson as a person went over to the Peace Corps and talked to them about a Peace Corps program. And there were other incidents that George Milner might remember. But this is to say that, if Joe Sisco really was trying to empire build, he probably didn't write anything down, he probably talked to people around the National Security Council most likely and never documented it. It would not be likely. And I don't even know that it's true. It seems to me John Carver was my source. John Carver and Joe Sisco had just a terrible relationship. It was just awful. Bob Mangan was so close to John Carver that he would have know. Bob Mangan may have been my source. Anyway, they are better sources than I because they picked up higher level gossip.

Willens: There is under Tab 21 a memorandum from Mr. Sisco to the Secretary of State reporting that Mr. Bundy in the White House agreed with the idea of appointing a senior official and reflecting on Sisco's view that Max Taylor would be a good man for the job. Is it your recollection now that you never knew that a recommendation for a special assistant went as far as this document indicates.

Van Cleve: Certainly I did not. I did not.

Willens: Under Tab 22, there's a very important letter dated October 8, 1965 from Mr. Carver to Mr. Sisco responding to the study that State had made available to Interior. The study as I recall was fairly long, but this letter reflects Interior's reaction and sets forth rather clearly some of the issues that separated the two departments.

Van Cleve: I'm pretty sure I wrote this. It sounds like something I would have written.

Willens: Let me ask you your views about some of the issues as to which the two agencies appear

to disagree. There is in the letter some reference to whether there was in fact at the time of this letter a desire among the Micronesians for more self-government. The assumption in the State Department's view is that there was, but the assumption in the letter is that there was no recently expressed desire for more self-government by the Micronesians. Was it your view at the time that the Micronesians were not in fact providing the kind of impetus for change that the State Department imputed to them?

Van Cleve: Well, it must have been. I'm pretty sure I wrote this, and I would not have written it if I didn't think it.

Willens: And is it your view that they really were not anxious for any change of status but were more or less content (may be too strong a word) or prepared to live within the Trusteeship framework for the foreseeable future?

Van Cleve: Well, I'm looking for exactly what I said. It would be page 2, I guess, someplace, wouldn't it?

Willens: At the bottom of the carryover paragraph on page 2, the sentence is "So far as Samoa and the Trust Territory are concerned, we are genuinely unaware that the people of those areas have any current unfulfilled self-government aspirations. They are of course in political transition but at a pace which is quite agreeable to them."

Van Cleve: I'm sure I thought it. I'm sure I wrote this letter. It just sounds like the way I wrote. And I truly would not have said this if we didn't think it was true.

Willens: At the bottom of that same page and continuing over to page 3, you identify certain important considerations that have to be taken into mind in evaluating the timing for a plebiscite. And you were suggesting here in a way that is reminiscent of issues that have come up since, that you really can't have a plebiscite without some clear identification of the options that are to be made available and have some degree of Congressional assent to implementing the desire that's reflected by the people. That was your view?

Van Cleve: Yes. And of course the Commission proposal subsequently is an outgrowth of that attitude.

Willens: There was in the State Department paper and some of your own papers consideration of something called free association. The content of what was free association was a matter of some discussion. Did you have the sense at the time that a free association relationship, which in the State Department's view would provide much more self-government than either Guam or the Virgin Islands had, would be unacceptable to Congressman Aspinall?

Van Cleve: I don't know the answer to that question. I don't necessarily think so, because I don't think we had a clear enough understanding of what free association would mean to know whether it was a good or a bad idea in the view of the Committees.

Willens: At the bottom of page three in the last paragraph, you advise the State Department that "we in this department would be unable and unwilling at this time to offer the Trust Territory the free association option which would result in a political status more elevated than that which Guam and the Virgin Islands now occupy."

Van Cleve: Yes, we seemed to have been quite preoccupied with not elevating the Trust Territory above the status of Guam and the Virgin Islands. That comes through in all of these statements. It's articulated with such clarity and such frequency that it has to have been paramount in our minds. I don't now remember feeling that strongly about it, but I must have.

- Willens: It was an issue that is characterized in some of the documents as leap-frogging and the Trust Territories should not be leap-frogged or made more advanced than Guam and the Virgin Islands and American Samoa. It was expressed on many occasions. It seems to have been based in part on a sense that the people in the Trust Territory were not as well-prepared for self-government as the citizens of Guam and the Virgin Islands.
- Van Cleve: I see that in these documents, and isn't that playing God. My goodness. It really is 19th century colonialism, isn't it? I don't remember being that semi-benighted, but we certainly did talk that way.
- Willens: There are several letters over Carver's signature that do express fairly strong views as to the lack of readiness in Micronesia and, putting aside whether it's colonial or not, the question is was the viewpoint a sincerely held view?
- Van Cleve: Has to have been.
- Willens: What information was it based on with respect to the readiness of the Micronesians for self-government?
- Van Cleve: Oh, I think recent history would be the answer. In the Virgin Islands we had had from 1936 forward a fairly coherent territorial government with political parties and political leaders. In Guam we had had something increasingly so from 1950. Samoa was, of course, always kind of a footnote. The Samoans are truly contented with their lives or have been. I can't speak of today, but they were never restive. And the Micronesians were in substantive measure illiterate, incapable of communicating with one another in any single language so long as the English language program was not very far advanced and it wasn't at this stage. Oh, there's no question that by whatever test one wants to apply of what's important to an effective democratic process, the Trust Territory was way behind the others.
- Willens: The last few paragraphs of the letter refer to the State Department's recommendation that an official in the White House be designated in order to "avoid the fate" of the Trust Territory Task Force.
- Van Cleve: Oh, that's right.
- Willens: Was it your recollection that there had been a report of the Task Force at the time you wrote this? It certainly must have been the case.
- Van Cleve: Or the paragraph could have been added by somebody in John Carver's office. If I had a recollection, it's left me now.
- Willens: Following these exchanges, there were some meetings that were held in early 1966 in an effort to reduce the gap between the two departments. But before I leave this, Mr. Cleveland suggests with the benefit of hindsight that the State Department's view of packaging all of the territories together was probably never, in his words, a viable starter. I mean, he's suggesting in retrospect that State may have overstated the needs under the circumstances of lumping the Trust Territory with the other three territories. I gather from what you have said that you agree with that now, and that you thought back in the 1960s that lumping them together was not feasible, necessary or suitable to the different situations that prevailed.
- Van Cleve: Exactly. And I think I would have said then and I certainly say now that each territory is unique and to try to treat them in the same fashion is to do injury to at least some.
- Willens: One of the important elements of the State Department's efforts in this time frame was that all aspects of the program should be handled "in absolute secrecy". They seemed to anticipate that there was a favorable Congress, I suppose a more Democratic Congress as

a result of the 1964 election, but they definitely seem to think that implementation of U.S. policy toward the Trust Territory should be handled expeditiously and in secrecy. Is that simply a reflection of the fact that National Security Action Memorandum 145 was classified and that U.S. policy here was or would be viewed as controversial with the United Nations if it became public?

Van Cleve: I can't tell you. We certainly did regard it all as highly classified, which is why all of our minions in the Trust Territory weren't talking to the Micronesians about what the U.S. was trying to do. No question but what we were circumspect about this. You know the State Department just had a way of classifying an awful lot of stuff. We used to be very irritated because it was simply hard to deal with. We were not equipped in the way they were with safes and people with multitudinous security clearances and so on. So State kind of began from the premise that it ought to be classified, that anything ought to be classified. Beyond that, I really cannot say clearly. It seems to me that State had a hard problem in New York if NSAM 145 were well known.

Willens: The Defense Department apparently weighed in to support the State Department's study and recommendations. There's a letter which I guess I did not include in the volume that I've provided you from McNaughton in October 1965 asserting that continued U.S. control of these territories is essential to U.S. national security interest and expressing a desire to participate in the program advanced by the State Department, which did emphasize moving toward a free association relationship that theoretically at least would meet their view of U.N.-imposed obligations. You said earlier Defense more often than not tended to support Interior in these inter-departmental disputes. This seems to cut the other way. Is this surprising to you particularly?

Van Cleve: I have no recollection of being surprised. I would not have meant to imply that Defense was always with us. I think I had some feeling that McNaughton was a more sophisticated player than some of the subsequent Defense people, and he may have understood the niceties of the State position better than some who followed him. Not sure. Can't contribute usefully there.

Willens: There was an occasion in early 1966 where Ambassador Anderson did testify on the Hill with respect to a visit to the Trust Territory that she and several members of the House Committee had made in November and December of 1965.

Van Cleve: I was on that trip, too.

Willens: Well, it was a little unclear to me from the materials what prompted the trip, what its purpose was and what was accomplished. Can you give me your judgment?

Van Cleve: Well, I think the trip was one of the standard Congressional trips between sessions. It was then quite usual in odd-numbered years for the House Interior Committee to send groups out. And Wayne Aspinall was very clear that this was important for their education. He was not on that one. I could find a lot of pictures from that trip that would show some of the people who were, and as I recall we invited Mrs. Anderson to come, and as I also recall, her husband came along and was part of a larger party. I don't think there were any other Interior people except for Trust Territory government people. I think Will Goding was with us quite a lot of the time. And it was simply an educational mission.

Willens: Would you visit each of the six districts as part of such a trip?

Van Cleve: I believe we did.

Willens: Now would she have some particular responsibilities in preparing a report because of her role with the U.S. delegation to the U.N.?

- Van Cleve: No, I think she just wrote a report just because that's a good thing to do after you take an official trip. I don't think there was any special requirement upon her.
- Willens: And did you on behalf of Interior have any particular objective in making this trip other than simply to be there with members of Congress?
- Van Cleve: It was just thought a good idea to hear what members of Congress and others, in this case Mrs. Anderson, were saying and help them understand what was going on.
- Willens: She did produce an interesting report. Some of the points made were that she thought an early and favorable termination of the Trusteeship Agreement was very desirable because of growing pressure in the U.N. She confirmed there was widespread friendliness toward the U.S. out there and she reflected the Solomon Commission Report's judgment that if a vote were taken the most likely result would be continued affiliation with the U.S. She was critical of some of the programs out there, and she ended up testifying before I guess ...
- Van Cleve: Leo O'Brien.
- Willens: . . . O'Brien's committee. I forget whether the materials indicate that Aspinall was there. I think he was.
- Van Cleve: He would have been there. As I mentioned, he invariably came to sub-committee meetings. All of them, but particularly Territory's.
- Willens: She apparently summarized her report before the committee, and she used American Samoa as a model for economic development, presumably due in part to the contributions that Rex Lee had made to which you previously referred. Aspinall questioned her as to whether the kind of economic development she felt was possible in the Trust Territory could be pressed forward along with political developments leading to more autonomy. Do you have any recollection as to your appearance before the committee and your testimony?
- Van Cleve: Well, I am reminded by one of the documents in here. She spoke for upwards for a couple of hours, and I'm sure I'd been asked to be there on the ground that the Committee would pay that deference to the Interior Department. At the conclusion of her testimony, which went on quite a long time, I was asked in the remaining few minutes to respond. Elizabeth Brown has done a memorandum, and she said that in a rapid-fire 10 minutes I said all these things about how we knew everything Mrs. Anderson had said and we were doing our best as fast as possible to fix it up. And I remember Leo O'Brien's comments to the effect that we were about to shout fire and we now see that the fire department's already coming down the road or words of like effect. I do remember his saying that, and I do remember being rather pleased with what I managed to compress in a few minutes.
- Willens: Did you have any advance notice as to what the substance of the testimony would be?
- Van Cleve: I don't think so. I suppose I may have seen her report eventually, but I don't believe I had seen it before that. I'd of course talked to her quite a lot. I found her a difficult person. I thought that the fact that we both were Minnesotans would make a difference, and I remember inviting her to dinner. Half the world has had dinner in this house. And I invited her to come out and thought that I had some feeling that if she and I could talk without a lot of other people around maybe we could come to terms with this subject and that was my objective. Well, she spurned my invitation in no uncertain terms in a way that I thought was fairly impolite. I had said something about how I'd be glad to drive her out and bring her back to town because I knew that we were sort of off the beaten path. And she instantly informed me that she had a State Department car but in any event she

couldn't come. Then on another occasion I invited her to my office, again hoping to sit down with her on a one-to-one basis without anybody else in the room and say, look here, what can we agree to? And she came to my office, could hardly avoid that, and we sat for just a few minutes and it was perfectly clear she wasn't about to say anything. I don't know whether she felt constrained by whatever instructions she had. She may have. But I remember being just severely disappointed because I really thought that two Minnesota women—we're known for our rationality, you know, or we think we are—could pull off something here and it just didn't work at all. I gave up that approach with the second unsatisfactory approach. Anyway, the answer to your question is that I'm pretty sure I did not know. The summary of my comments that Elizabeth Brown offers suggests that I didn't know what she was going to say because I think I said we know all these things already and we could even add to the horror stories if you wanted us to, but we are trying to get at it. Something like that.

Willens: Was it your judgment at the time that Ambassador Anderson was an important player in the formulation of U.S. policy with respect to Trust Territory?

Van Cleve: Pretty much so. Joe Sisco would have been more important, but she was close him and close to Elizabeth Brown.

Willens: Under Tab 25, there's a memo dated January 25, 1966 from Miss Brown to Mr. Sisco reporting on an opening statement by Congressman Aspinall at that time. Congressman Aspinall referred to "a movement within the U.S. Administration which is thinking about taking the territories away from us." Do you have any recollection as to what might have prompted this kind of statement?

Van Cleve: My guess is that it is the Sisco scheme to move the Trust Territory from Interior to State which would have resulted in the loss of jurisdiction to the Aspinall Committee. I'm pretty sure I never saw this piece of paper. It certainly came to me as a surprise. My guess is that he and John Carver, who were very, very close, had shared this information that Aspinall is said to have characterized as not just gossip.

Willens: Well, it does actually provide some credible support for the proposition that there was being floated within the Executive Branch some proposal that would have removed this subject matter from the jurisdiction of the Committee. It's unclear to me whether, when I first read this, Chairman Aspinall meant that the territories were being taken away from the U.S. I mean, whether he had some sense that the State Department was urging a status for the Trust Territory that would remove it from U.S. sovereignty.

Van Cleve: I did not read it that way. I read it as saying that the Executive Branch, which had the authority to do so without any Congressional input, would change the jurisdictional arrangement for the Trust Territory, not for the territories, and that his Committee would thus lose its power. You must be aware, I guess I've said it in other ways, that Wayne Aspinall thought that his committee really had done and was doing a very, very good job for these areas. He was nothing if not confident and satisfied about the innate wisdom of himself and his Committee.

Willens: Shortly before the hearings, there was a meeting between Sisco and Carver that took place on January 19, 1966, and there were some briefing papers prepared for Mr. Sisco in that connection. There was also a paper that George Milner seemed to have prepared about territorial political development. And then under Tab 27, we have a report from Mr. Sisco to the Secretary and Under Secretary of State regarding the meeting. And you will note Mr. Sisco's efforts to summarize Interior's position beginning at page 1 and it's done, I suppose it's fair to say, as an advocate would, but it summarizes the view in these

five points. Have you had a chance to take a look at those points, and do you agree with his description of Interior's position?

Van Cleve: I did read this and I'm looking quickly now, I think it seems pretty fair.

Willens: And certainly you'll notice that point number 3 makes the leap-frog point.

Van Cleve: Yes, I noticed that term.

Willens: And it also reflects Interior's view regarding what the House Committee would be ready to accept with respect to self-government. Then a point that Interior made regularly that State never sort of responded to and that is there still would remain international scrutiny more likely than not under any status that would be acceptable to the Congress. It's never been made very clear in the documents whether that was viewed by State as accurate, which I think it probably was at the time, or whether they felt it was better to move as far as one could even if you stayed under U.N. scrutiny on the grounds that you might be closer ultimately to getting out from under that kind of international scrutiny.

Van Cleve: U.N. scrutiny of the non-self-governing territories is vastly less than that of the Trust Territory. No visiting missions is the principal point. So I think we could have lived with Committee of 24 jurisdiction which tends to be laughed off these days in Guam and the Virgin Islands.

Willens: When a meeting like this one took place between Sisco and Carver in January of 1966, would you have been involved in briefing the participants or attending the meeting?

Van Cleve: I don't think that John Carver would have needed any written briefing. Maybe he might have, and if he did, we would have done it. But I doubt it. I could very well have been at this meeting. I'm wondering if this is the one that ended with my famous conversation with Joe Sisco in the corridor where he accused me of leaking to the Congress. I wondered to what extent that leaking relates to the Aspinall/Carver notion about moving the Trust Territory, because the leak apparently which we were accused of making was of the State Department proposal to appoint a White House czar for the Trust Territory and that's pretty different, of course, from a transfer of jurisdiction. I just plain don't know. But one does wonder if that is somehow relevant. You know, I have to say that it's not beyond the capacity of the human mind and certainly not of John Carver's, to have imagined that move to create a White House advisor was the equivalent of moving jurisdiction. I do hope you get to ask him that question.

Willens: There are so many meetings and it's unreasonable of me to try to ask you to recall a particular meeting. Do you have any recollection of a Sisco/Carver meeting on this subject that you attended?

Van Cleve: I'm sure that I was at such meetings but I've no specific recollection of this one. It all sounds so much the same to me. Everything said is what we said so often to one another.

Willens: There is a certain repetitive quality to this as I suppose there is in much of what we do. Under Tab 29 there is another Interior Department letter dated April 13, 1966 from Carver to Sisco. This refers to the receipt of some additional staff papers from State and also informs Sisco that the Office of Territories had prepared a detailed analysis and that there were further discussions going forward. This is a letter which expresses a very interesting view in the second paragraph where Carver said that "I have a most uncomfortable feeling of unreality about some of the proposals advanced to improve our posture in international sphere". Do you recall drafting this letter?

- Van Cleve: Again, it sounds a lot like what I might of written. It could have been a joint product between George Milner and me. But a lot of this is not the way we talk. The last paragraph on page 2, we rarely adverted to other parts of the world.
- Willens: It's a very strong letter expressing a view presumably held by Carver that there was enormous risk in proceeding too rapidly to grant the authority of self-government that he thought was being urged by State. This was one of the strong letters suggesting that, as I recall, if the staff ever reached any different conclusion he would be highly suspicious of their methodology.
- Van Cleve: That's right. And he used that word and that's a John Carver word. Doesn't the word "methodology" turn up in this letter? I think I decided that this was a letter that could have been written by John Carver himself. He had his very own typewriter and Bob Mangan did a lot of drafting for him. Very often he shared his letters with our office so as to be sure we were all on the same horse going in the same direction. The file copies of these things would show and they would show the surnames and you could find out. But my guess is that this is a Carver product. There are earmarks of him which are not my own standard earmarks.
- Willens: Well, you probably wouldn't have made the comment about methodology.
- Van Cleve: I think I wouldn't. That was not a word that I'd used or even felt I knew the meaning of until I got to the Federal Power Commission which was years later—that's a Power Commission word.
- Willens: Under the next tab, there's a State Department memorandum dated June 1, 1966 from Miss Brown to Mr. Sisco. This is in anticipation of yet another meeting but also reacts to the Carver letter and the differences between the agencies. You'll note on page one of Miss Brown's memo that she maintains there are indications that opinion leaders in the TTPI are restless, conscious of economic and social stagnation and "looking for some sort of political identity other than wards of the United Nations." Cleveland or Gleysteen was kind enough to say that on the whole the agencies tended to attribute to the Micronesians the views that supported the agency's own predilections and biases. There is some indication in later documents that the Interior Department too was beginning to recognize that time was moving on and that there was a growing need to resolve this. Is it fair to say that between 1965 and the time you left Interior in 1969 you began to appreciate or reflect some greater sense of urgency?
- Van Cleve: Absolutely, and the Congress of Micronesia resolution which precipitated our commission proposal was a palpable indication of that. But I think we knew it before that. We never doubted the need for a plebiscite, and we certainly thought it needed to be sooner rather than later, but not as soon as Solomon had said.
- Willens: There seemed to be some effort to resolve what I characterize as an impasse between the two departments at this point. There was a meeting that took place in early 1966, in January. There was another meeting that took place in June, I believe, and in fact there's a letter from you to Miss Brown dated June 16, 1966 under Tab 31 that reflects a meeting between representatives of State, Defense and Interior. I'm unclear whether it was at the meeting that the proposal was advanced by Interior, perhaps even by Secretary Udall, that more serious consideration be given to incorporating the Trust Territory within the State of Hawaii. Did you personally have any role in advancing that proposal up the line in Interior to get it presented to State at the meeting?

- Van Cleve: I don't remember. It always struck me as an interesting proposal but more academic than real.
- Willens: Your letter of June 16, 1966 suggested to Miss Brown at the State Department that there be more intensive consideration of the option that was apparently discussed at a meeting involving Secretary Udall to the effect that the boundaries of Hawaii might be expanded to include the Trust Territory. What is your recollection as to the origin and the viability of that proposal?
- Van Cleve: Probably not very viable. Wonderfully logical, and the origin could have been Senator Fong who talked along a similar line or introduced a resolution along a similar line a year or two earlier. I do remember that my colleague John Kirwan used to advance this as the only way he knew of to cause U.S. citizens in the territories to become fully enfranchised in the way of thee and me and John Kirwan and others. It would obviously have had that effect in terms of Congressional representation, voting in national elections and the like. John was, as I've mentioned, more interested in the Virgin Islands than he was in the Pacific, and he used to muse about whether the Virgin Islands had better be hooked onto Florida which had been the proposal of a Florida congressman or New York which would make sense in terms of culture and size. John was Jesuitical (if I may use that term) in everything he thought and did and accordingly there was Jesuitical logic to his proposal. But he rarely paid attention to reality, and I think (and thought then) that the processes that would be required to bring to pass something of this sort—State action, Micronesian action, Federal action, etc., etc.—made it just infeasible, just too many difficult fences had to be leaped.
- Willens: In advance of the meeting that took place in June of 1966, there was at least in the State Department's mind a compromise proposal that Defense, Interior and State had agreed upon. State seemed to believe that Interior had now agreed on a common position that could go forward to the White House, and it reflected some change in State Department's position. State now is suggesting that the Micronesians could be presented with an option to become a self-governing territory of the United States but that the specific content of what that meant would not be determined until a period of three, five or subsequently 10 years in their new status under U.S. jurisdiction. There was a change in State Department view here in an effort, it would appear, to accommodate some of the realities that Interior was emphasizing. Do you have any recollection of a change in substance of that kind?
- Van Cleve: Only from the papers that you gave me. I have no recollection beyond that.
- Willens: The compromise that State thought had been reached was not affirmed by the principals from the three departments who met in June of 1966. That provoked some dissatisfaction from both State and Defense, and Defense's view was that maybe it should go forward with State in supporting a presentation to the White House incorporating those two agencies' views even though Interior was not on board. That seems not to have been done. Do you have any recollection of discussions with your colleagues as to what happened at the meeting and whether the White House was going to be involved?
- Van Cleve: I have no recollection of that. I should because I have to have been involved. It's a subject I cared about and it does sound like a promising possible compromise. Our difficulty may have been the leap-frogging one, but that's a guess.
- Willens: It was about this time that Carver was replaced by Luce, sometime in 1966.
- Van Cleve: Do you mean Carver replaced by Luce or Carver replaced by Anderson? Let's see, because I don't know whether this . . .

- Willens: I don't have a precise date that a new Under Secretary of Interior came in in 1966.
- Van Cleve: I guess I don't have the Assistant Secretaries listed in the appendix to my book. I'm sorry about that.
- Willens: My question basically was whether Luce's entry into the Interior hierarchy had any impact.
- Van Cleve: I don't think so. It seems to me that he fell into line very quickly. I can remember briefing him very, very early on in his Interior Department life, and he seemed to be sympathetic and perceptive and quick witted. He was all those things.
- Willens: There was a State Department internal memo that I don't think I made available to you in the form of a briefing paper that stated that there "has been in the past some misunderstanding of our position on the TTPI and a suspicion that we are planning to supplant Interior in the administration of the territory or to try to substitute some other government agency." And it provides some further support that this rumor was known to many of the players—whether or not it was simply a rumor or was sought to be implemented in a specific proposal. At the time that these debates were going on there was meanwhile an effort by Interior to get increased funding. It was about in 1966 that Interior made the effort to get five-year funding and the Congressional people reacted with a three-year program. I think you have some recollection about that.
- Van Cleve: Yes, I mentioned it the other day.
- Willens: It was also at this time in 1966 that the final decision was made with respect to the Peace Corps. You referred to the legal issue that had earlier precluded the Peace Corps being used in the Trust Territory. Did you as a member of the Solicitor's Office at Interior have any legal input in the early 1960s as to whether the Peace Corps could appropriately provide volunteers in the Trust Territory?
- Van Cleve: I don't remember having any. I should ask Harry who was the Deputy General Counsel of the Peace Corps in there when it first was created, but he would not remember that. No, I think what happened was that Will Goding got the idea of the merits of some Peace Corps presence. He had in mind a very little program, maybe a dozen people per district, something like that. I think I played no role at all in this. George Milner I believe told me that he and Will Goding went over to the Peace Corps to discuss this. It would have been in 1961, 1962, early on and the Peace Corps said it could only serve in foreign areas and that the Trust Territory wasn't foreign enough for Peace Corps purposes. That was its legal conclusion. I don't even know that it came from the General Counsel.
- Willens: Whose conclusion was it now?
- Van Cleve: The Peace Corps conclusion was that we can't do it. I don't know that even came from the Peace Corps lawyers, as a matter of fact. I never saw anything in writing about it. Subsequently, after Mrs. Anderson went to talk to the Peace Corps, specifically to this person named Ross Pritchard, whom we all found very difficult. He became the president of a university in the southwest or in south central something like Oklahoma or Arkansas or something. It was amazing. We had not thought him up to that sort of thing. Mrs. Anderson and Ross Pritchard, who was very flashy, developed a scheme and Ross Pritchard activated the General Counsel's office. And there's something in here between Eric Stevenson and me, Eric Stevenson then being General Counsel. He was a classmate of mine at the law school, as a matter of fact, so we knew one another. He came over one day. And the Peace Corps had no difficulty doing a turnabout on this subject at all. We were delighted except when it developed that what Ross Pritchard had in mind was sending

a thousand PCVs to the Trust Territory which we thought would be disruptive and, of course, in due course it was fairly disruptive. But that's a different issue.

Willens: Well, there are a large number of documents (of which I have only a smattering) reflecting the discussions between the Peace Corps and the High Commissioner as to the ground rules under which the volunteers would operate. Ultimately there was a memorandum of understanding. I'm not too sure I understand what all the issues were except to the extent to which they would be treated as Trust Territory employees. Did you play any role in the negotiation or review of the memorandum of understanding governing the relationship between the High Commissioner and the volunteers?

Van Cleve: I have to say I don't remember. What we were concerned about were the Peace Corps volunteers. Most of us were young enough at the time to remember our own attitudes the year we got out of college, and we foresaw that they would run around telling the Micronesians that they should be unhappy with their lot, that they should rise up and be activists for some kind of termination. So long as they taught school and taught people how to raise copra better and so on so forth it was fine. But if they began organizing local meetings to create problems that then didn't seem to us to exist then we were a little nervous. That was the problem that was in the minds of all of us. Beyond that I simply don't remember.

Willens: Pritchard's memorandum, which I did share with you, set forth as one of the absolutely essential conditions to successful Peace Corps operation in the Trust Territory that there be an acceptance by the High Commissioner and his staff "that the Peace Corps will be allowed to operate in a substantial progressive and formative manner." The clear thrust of his memo was that the Peace Corps volunteers should not be subject to supervision by the High Commissioner and free to operate in the Trust Territory as they would in a foreign country.

Van Cleve: Right.

Willens: Then there are some documents that suggest you heard subsequently of criticisms that the Peace Corps volunteers were operating in a very independent manner in dealing with the Micronesians. Do you have any assessment as to what the strengths were of the program in Micronesia, as well as its weaknesses?

Van Cleve: Oh I think its strengths were very great. I'm just wondering who was High Commissioner at the time. Had Bill Norwood replaced Will Goding? It doesn't matter much. Norwood was 1966, so I don't know whether this was before or after. He began in 1966. I think the Peace Corps volunteers did enormous good in the education program. I remember being in Palau, it was lovely, and entering the biology lab there. There then was a fairly sophisticated laboratory for study of flora and fauna and objects of the sea and so on, and here was a man in his 60s surely pinning butterflies to a backing of the sort that zoologists have done historically, and I was simply charmed. I don't know whether he made a contribution to biology or to the Trust Territory, but it was a lovely thing to see. Turned out he was married to an English teacher, also a PCV who for heavens sakes had gone to Mount Holyoke, and so we of course got together. It was very, very standard Mount Holyoke thing to do, and these were people who were well in their 60s at that particular point. Anyway she was teaching school. She was much troubled by the state of the high school in Palau, but of course the PCVs had a very positive effect with respect to community development and education. To the extent that there were activists amongst them, it was inconvenient, and I think they created problems that probably would not earlier have existed. The Saipan lawyers outfit still plagues us or still plagued us in the

1970s. I don't know whether they still do or not, but some of their alumni are now in private practice and very difficult people. And they were difficult then, and I think we did not welcome this kind of activity. I guess that's as much as I can say about the Peace Corps.

Willens: At the time the proposal was made for the program, the Interior Department through Under Secretary Carver warned of a possible adverse Congressional reaction if the Peace Corps proposal went forward at the same time that Congress was considering legislation to increase the ceiling authorization to the Trust Territory and to approve funds for major capital improvements. It was feared by some in Interior that Congress might seize on the Peace Corps proposal as an excuse for not increasing appropriations. Does that stir any memory?

Van Cleave: Sure. It sounds familiar. I don't know that this effect ever came to pass. I don't think it did.

Willens: But Interior asked that the thing be sort of postponed and not announced until Congress had acted more or less, and the documents at least indicate that that view was on the whole ignored by Peace Corps and the White House.

Van Cleave: The Peace Corps really was pushing hard for this program. The Interior attitude was generally one of a lack of enthusiasm. There was a White House announcement, a great big White House press conference the day the Peace Corps program was announced, and I believe that I was the only person from Interior who went to it. We were all invited to go, but my colleagues, both above and below, were so turned off. Partly it was the attitude. I tell you this Ross Pritchard was very difficult. But partly it was a concern that this was too much too soon. Anyway, I thought somebody ought to be there because the Interior Department [had responsibility for the Trust Territory], and besides I had a warm feeling toward the Peace Corps. You know, a lot of us feel that if it existed the day we got out of college, we would have been PCVs. I'm sure I would have been. It was exactly the kind of thing I wanted to do. The government was the closest you could come to the Peace Corps in those days.

Willens: Right. Do you have any recollection of the press conference at which it was announced with such fanfare?

Van Cleave: Nothing very specific. It really did sound like the answer to the prayers of all brand new BAs, because they were looking for generalists you know. And they made it sound awfully romantic. I don't know that I can say more. I kind of remember its being in a huge auditorium at the old Bureau of the Budget building.

Willens: There were, apparently at some point, complaints about the volunteers, particularly the lawyers, but also those who were encouraging the Micronesians on political status issues. Is it possible to generalize as to what the thrust of the Peace Corps advice was on status issues? One commentary has suggested that the Peace Corps volunteers were urging the Micronesians to go slow, to insist on greater investment by the United States, and to use the U.N. Trusteeship Council as a source of support for bringing about change in U.S. policy before there be any vote in plebiscite. That was one position that reportedly was taken by some Peace Corps volunteers. Do you have any recollection as to whether that's an accurate statement of a view or whether there were other positions being urged?

Van Cleave: The chief thing that I remember was serious criticism of the Trust Territory government. These are relics of another time, they're not smart, they're not sympathetic and they don't

have your best interest at stake; all they're doing is hanging around out here because they can't be employed elsewhere—a more crass form of the Solomon Commission criticism of Trust Territory government people. And you know, I've already said there was some truth in it, but it was not helpful.

Willens: John Carver, even in his conversation with me yesterday, reaffirmed his views on this subject which have been summarized in Mr. Nevin's book as suggesting that "Micronesia is the most unworthy page in Peace Corps history." And Professor Carver sort of reiterated that basic assessment yesterday when the subject came up. What would have provoked his strong reaction, if you know?

Van Cleve: You know, I'm just wondering what caused him to say this. I think he's the person who was at some Michigan public institution, not Ann Arbor or East Lansing. I think I said that he had been a student of Robert Robbins, and I believe all those things are true and I think I met him back in the 1960s.

Willens: So he might still be in academia somewhere.

Van Cleve: Well, he should be. I did not bring my copy of that book home. He's a political scientist, you know, and the American Political Science Association up on New Hampshire Avenue could probably lead you to him. Anyway, he might know. I don't know, I've not heard that assessment. I read his book and forgot that he said that. Don't know what he meant, don't know what John Carver meant.

Willens: I'll pursue it with John Carver.

Van Cleve: There still PCVs there, aren't there now?

Willens: Don't know.

Van Cleve: I think there are.

Willens: I know that they came to a rather frustrating conclusion in the Northern Marianas in the early 1970s. There was a lot of dissatisfaction by the volunteers with their duties there and a lot of dissatisfaction among the local people with having them there. But I have not pursued them. As you say, many of the lawyers and others who have settled in the Northern Marianas (it may be true for other districts as well) were former Peace Corps people.

Van Cleve: Legal Services Corporation kind of thing.

Willens: I've had some dealings with many of them over the years.

Van Cleve: I bet.

Willens: It was about this time, in 1966 actually, that Nathan Associates went out to conduct a study of the economic prospects for Micronesia. The study may actually have begun as early as 1965. I forget. It seems to have been suggested in part by the Solomon Commission Report. Did you play any role in the decision to have such a study conducted and in selecting the Nathan people to do it?

Van Cleve: Certainly in selecting and I think in having it done. The Trust Territory was the contractor, but because they were there and potential contractors were here, it was our office that did the interviewing, and we have to had agreed that it was a good idea. It's interesting. I can remember conversations, particularly with Marty Mangan but probably also with Bob, John Carver and George Milner, to the effect that we really didn't need one more study. That everybody had a five foot shelf on what could be done in the Trust Territory and what we really needed was somebody to create economic development. And that was

our kick. We all agreed that this was true, that we didn't want another three volumes or whatever telling us things that we probably pretty well knew. We wanted somebody who would decide not just that tennis shoes (that was one of the Nathan notions) could profitably be made in the Trust Territory. But we wanted the contractor to find somebody who'd go out and make tennis shoes. And I can remember making this speech time after time. We issued a request for proposals. It was pretty clear that this was going to be a big contract. I somehow remember something like \$800,000 or \$900,000, which was huge by our standards and by most anybody's at that moment. And the request for proposals resulted in a tremendous number of people who wanted to do this job. And in the right way our procurement people sorted them out and gave us a half of dozen who seemed most promising. And we conducted group interviews with each of them in my office. And I made this little speech to each of them about, we don't want another series of volumes, we want somebody to beat the bushes. I remember using that phrase—beat the bushes—and find companies, American entrepreneurs who'll go out and get these things started. And it was simply wonderful. One afternoon I remember Robert Nathan, the man, was in my office explaining why his was the company that should get the job, and one of my colleagues left the interview for a moment, found the next contractor, who was going to be coming in, sitting in the outer office and hearing this booming voice of Bob Nathan. The next day we had some plastic put over the vents on my doors so that the likes of Bob Nathan's voice wouldn't be heard throughout. Anyway, we spent a lot of time interviewing all the companies, and we chose Nathan as being the most qualified. And what we got was a contribution to our five-foot shelf.

Willens: You did not really get in that report the kind of specific mechanism . . .

Van Cleve: Did not have identified ways to find or in fact the very people who would do the things that we thought needed to be done. Probably our fault, probably our contract was not written in a way that made clear what it was we wanted. But I did (as I say) make this speech to all of them, and nobody said we can't and Nathan at least didn't do that. I found the Nathan report, which I read with care after it was issued, disappointing for this reason. Nothing surprised me, except I think for the for vehemence with which he said we were leading the Trust Territory down a primrose path by paying American wages. And American wages would price Micronesia out of the market.

Willens: There were some points made that I would like to just touch on lightly and obtain your reactions. One aspect of the report suggested that, notwithstanding the change in federal policy that took place under the Kennedy Administration, that during the period from 1962 to 1965 the basic policies and programs of the previous decade were generally continued. In other words, there is a strong suggestion in the report that notwithstanding the increase in funding the same old policies and programs will more or less still in effect and they were challenging that fact. Do you have any recollection of reacting to that?

Van Cleve: I have no recollection. I would have reacted adversely because I thought we did a lot of things differently and more energetically in the 1960s than had been done before.

Willens: They also stressed in the report the fact that there was a lot in the traditions and institutions throughout Micronesia that were incompatible with the individual freedom and responsibility to work productively necessary to generate a new kind of economic development. They were suggesting that there were many cultural obstacles to meaningful economic development, although to a much lesser extent in the Marianas which they singled out in contrast. I assume that was not a particularly new thought as far as you were concerned?

- Van Cleve: I don't have a recollection of it, but it sounds to me as though I would have thought it's a sensible observation.
- Willens: There are in these studies complaints about lack of planning by the Trust Territory government and the response from the Trust Territory Administration that they really have to have more funding or more long-term perspective before you can do meaningful planning. Did the Nathan Report provide any useful discussion that would help improve planning mechanisms in Micronesia?
- Van Cleve: I can't possibly remember I'm afraid after all these years. They probably did, you know. It was a very professional report as that kind of thing goes. It just didn't deal with what I thought was the real question.
- Willens: What did you regard as the real question?
- Van Cleve: How do you get this place going? Where are these people who will do something for us that will provide jobs and dollars and so on?
- Willens: In earlier years, you'd seen papers discussing the possibility of developing an agriculture industry, a fishing industry, a tourism industry, and the Nathan Report as I recall, didn't really have anything particularly new to say about those alternatives. They did emphasize, however, the need to resolve the political status issue in order to provide an environment in which either U.S. or foreign investors would feel more comfortable in investing.
- Van Cleve: I think we accepted that. I think we knew that, and I think yes, I'm sure that there are documents in here that suggest that well before Nathan we realized that people don't invest in areas whose future is unsettled.
- Willens: There's also this philosophical issue that came up in the Nathan Report and also in some of the U.N. visiting missions as to whether the present level of funding, this may refer to the point you made earlier, was contributing to a relationship of permanent economic dependence of the Trust Territory on the U.S. as distinct from the economic model of trying to develop a more viable self-reliant independent alternative. The Nathan Report addresses that to some extent. The U.N. visiting mission people from time to time also pointed out that the more money the U.S. was putting into the Trust Territory the more they were building bridges of dependency and so forth that amounted to a pre-judgment of the ultimate political status that the Micronesians would select. Do you have any recollection of those issues coming up?
- Van Cleve: Not particularly, no. Again, it sounds to me sort of sensible.
- Willens: In view of what U.S. policy was at the time . . .
- Van Cleve: We should not have minded. Exactly.
- Willens: . . . if more funding generated this kind of reaction, the better it was.
- Van Cleve: You bet.
- Willens: I gather that in terms of overall assessment you were disappointed in the Nathan Report in that it didn't get into some of the nuts and bolts of a kind that you thought would make a difference and it became an informed and professionally done economic study that went on the shelf.
- Van Cleve: First rate report from which we learned a lot of things, some of which we knew before. But what we had really wanted was a plan and its implementation, and we lacked the implementation.

- Willens: In the last few years of the
- Van Cleve: And let me say, I don't know whether it was realistic to have thought that anybody could do that which we wanted, but I know what we wanted and I know we didn't get it. And I was not alone. We all wanted it.
- Willens: I heard an anecdote from Jim Leonard.
- Van Cleve: Yes, he was part of this wasn't he? Yes.
- Willens: He was one of the few consultants invited back to Micronesia by the Marianas Political Status Commission.
- Van Cleve: Yes.
- Willens: He recalls going up to Japan to investigate Japanese interest in Micronesia, in particular the Northern Marianas or Saipan, and he went to one of the major trading companies. After the pleasantries were exchanged, he put the question to the Japanese executives whether they had any interest, and (this may be exaggerated with the passage of time) he was taken into a room where there was a massive table covered with a cloth. They pulled the cloth off and there was the island of Saipan with full economic development and programs for golf courses and hotels. Leonard concluded that this particular Japanese gentleman had more than a passing interest.
- Van Cleve: My goodness, my goodness.
- Willens: I think I probably elaborated on this story over the years.
- Van Cleve: It's a nice story in any event.
- Willens: That's a reminder of Japanese interest. To some extent it is a tension that continues to plague the place, in that there's much less U.S. investment interest than had been anticipated and much more foreign [investment].
- Van Cleve: Yes. Incidentally, you and I met, I don't know if you remember for the first time, and I kind of think Jim Leonard might have been there. Bill Bozman is an old friend of ours. His wife and I were roommates going way, way back, and we've known Bill and Ellen socially for 40 years and more than that. Bill Bozman asked me—he was working I think for the Urban Institute at the time, and it was just after I had left Interior in 1969—he asked me if I would meet with him and you and I think maybe Jim Leonard I'm not sure. But I know you were there. And I think we went to the, I want to say we went to the Statler and had a drink. Does this sound familiar to you?
- Willens: As early as 1969?
- Van Cleve: Yes. It was right after I first left Interior. Anyway, that's the first time I ever saw you.
- Willens: Is that right?
- Van Cleve: Yes.
- Willens: You know I wasn't in retained or had any interest in this until 1972.
- Van Cleve: Well, it's got to have been early. It doesn't matter. We can ask Bill some day because I think he was at the Urban Institute rather briefly.
- Willens: That's right. Actually my firm represented the Urban Institute in those years.
- Van Cleve: You were interested in the Trust Territory, and I think that's why Bill got us together. So, maybe it was 1972. Bill was the catalyst in any case. Okay.

- Willens: In the last few years of your tenure in the 1960s as Director of the Office, there was a change in focus within the Executive Branch and discussion of a presidential commission to look at the political status issue. You made reference to the 1966 resolution of the Congress of Micronesia asking that the United States create such a commission. What do you recall as contributing to Interior's belief that the presidential commission approach might be a useful one?
- Van Cleve: I remember the day that I looked for the 15th time at the Congress of Micronesia Resolution which was in my too difficult box (or "manana" box or whatever you wanted to call it) because we had to respond and I hadn't been able to come to terms with how we might do it. Looked at it for the umpteenth time and said "Eureka, this is the way out of the problem that we've got." If we can get the Congress to enact legislation—a presidential commission of the sort that the Micronesians had sought was not the solution it seemed to me. But a commission sanctioned by act of Congress with Congressional participation is the way to get us moving forward. We had struggled pretty long already with this split of opinion between us and State, and the solution is to get in the same room everybody who really cares—Interior, State, the key committees, and preferably some Micronesian leaders. And we do in effect what the Congress of Micronesia had asked but expand it to include federal legislation and Congressional participation. And I remember being terribly excited and thinking that this would finally get us going. I remember also because I had learned my lesson about not taking Wayne Aspinall by surprise. I explained a couple of days ago that we'd done that on the Trust Territory ceiling bill. I was one afternoon in Stewart Udall's office on whatever business I know not. I was explaining to him this commission notion that we were then beginning to develop more fully, and I said we really should talk with Wayne Aspinall about it before we go too far to make sure that we are not surprising him. Stewart Udall agreed, at which point Wayne Aspinall telephoned Udall on some item of business at the conclusion of which the Secretary said, by the way, Ruth Van Cleve's here and she's got an idea that sounds good; let me put her on and ask her to sound you out. This was, oh heavens, quarter to six on a Friday or sometime which was not a good time to be discussing a serious matter, but I accepted the opportunity, described the commission legislation that we had in mind which was very like what eventually went forward, and said we think this may be the one way we can imagine to get us going on the resolution of the Trust Territory political status. And Wayne Aspinall agreed and said he thought that sounded like a good idea. Now, he didn't adhere to that point of view because it was the House of course that balked when we finally a couple years later had hearings on it. But this is to say that the matter was even cleared in the fashion I've described and I can remember it quite clearly.
- Willens: It was prompted in part by the request from the Congress of Micronesia.
- Van Cleve: Two things. It was the Congress of Micronesia which put the idea of a commission in my mind, and the other was this terrible frustration which was increasing by the day of our not being able to come to terms because State wouldn't listen to Congress or our view as to what the Congress would do. So, get 'em all in the same room and then we'll see what we can do. So, that's the genesis of the commission proposal, and I was really very optimistic about it for a long, long time.
- Willens: Skipping ahead, I mean there came a time when Congressman Bingham introduced a resolution . . .
- Van Cleve: Yes.

Willens: . . . in the House calling for such a status commission. It's somewhat unclear from the documents I have as to whether Bingham's proposal was essentially the same as yours. I guess it wasn't because subsequently I think Executive Branch proposed a substitute that reflected the resolution that emerged out of Executive Branch deliberations.

Van Cleve: That's right. And looking at these documents earlier, I realize the distinction between them and I can't now tell you what it is. Maybe it has to do with Congressional participation. I just don't know.

Willens: Well, it might be Micronesian participation.

Van Cleve: Except our proposal did not specify Micronesian participation. Well, let me answer that question then get on to the issue of the difficulty of getting that commission proposal from my desk to the Congress because it took years and so much, so much by way of high level meetings. Jack Bingham, as we called him, had had something to do with the Trusteeship Council at some point in his life. I forget now what he was. He wasn't a representative, I don't think. Maybe he was. Anyway, he was pretty expert on this subject, and he was on Wayne Aspinall's committee, and he and I often talked. And he invited me to lunch one day, and my best recollection is that over lunch I talked to him about the idea of a commission. He was close to the State Department. His prior employment had permitted him to understand State's view better than most people, and he wanted to know what he could do to be helpful. That was exactly his posture. And I said that we had a commission idea that we were attempting to get out of the Executive Branch and described it to him. That may have been the cause for his putting in his own commission bill, which was not so far different from ours, that is to say, it would have got us forward on the basis of federal legislation.

Willens: I need some help in clarifying the relationship between the commission proposal that was under consideration by Interior in early 1967 with a position paper that was prepared by your Office that is set forth at Tab 35 in the volume of documents. This position paper seems to carry a date of about March 15, 1967. You may not have had a chance to do more than skim this paper, but it was an effort to put together in one place Interior's views with respect to the assumptions regarding the Trust Territory and its future political status, to set forth the alternatives, some eight in number, to discuss some alternatives for resolving the political status question (one being the presidential commission) and to make some recommendations. Do you recall what prompted the preparation of this paper?

Van Cleve: No, I didn't. It's such a long thing and the type makes it look like something that came out of our office and it almost certainly would have. It has the look of a George Milner paper, but on this subject George and I cooperated very closely, and we probably would have edited one another very extensively.

Willens: Well, on page 19 of the

Van Cleve: It says the purpose of this analysis to complement the Interior Department's current legislative proposal for a study commission. This is page 1, paragraph 1.

Willens: Yes.

Van Cleve: So, I guess we did it as a kind of lobbying device within the Executive Branch.

Willens: Because then on page 19 it does refer under the subheading of presidential commission to the Congress of Micronesia proposal and also refers to the department study commission proposal, which indicates that you had preliminarily reached a judgment that this was a useful way to proceed. This is then a working paper or a background paper that was available for use within the department and elsewhere?

- Van Cleve: Yes.
- Willens: You remember what kind of distribution was made of this?
- Van Cleve: I have no recollection at all.
- Willens: Certainly was a suggestion here as I recall that there wasn't much point to continuing with an Executive Branch Task Force.
- Van Cleve: Yes, I think this issue paper at Tab 35 in my book was probably prepared as a kind of primer for the edification of anybody encountering this proposal, literally anybody. The fact that there is a glossary attached, which is very like what we had in a lot of publications at the Interior Department to explain to the great American public what an incorporated territory was and so on, suggests that this was not for the narrow audience of people who knew something about the problem. It was for those who started fresh, and it could be read selectively by people who needed more or less information. I'm pretty sure that that's the kind of thing we had in mind as we wrote it.
- Willens: The paper did set forth quite clearly Interior's views on the subject, including its view that the preferred political status outcome would be integration with an existing state, specifically Hawaii. But then the paper recognized that such a status couldn't be obtained in the near future, and you had to have a plebiscite in the near future. In fact Interior's paper said that five years might be too late at one point. So then in lieu of integration with an existing state, the paper basically recommends bringing the Trust Territory under U.S. sovereignty as an unincorporated territory, which it describes as an appropriate interim status. It recognized that this would not remove the Trust Territory from U.N. scrutiny and would be contrary to some of the views of the State Department. But it then goes on to suggest that the study commission is a necessary prerequisite, because you can't really talk to the Micronesians about political status alternatives until you have made some effort to find out what the people wanted.
- Van Cleve: And what the Congress would give.
- Willens: This seems to be an organized effort to collect the views of the Micronesians, I mean, other than they were available through the Congress of Micronesia or other sources. Was that one of the principal thoughts you had in mind?
- Van Cleve: Oh yes, yes. I think I said (did I not earlier?) that we had originally anticipated that Micronesians would be members, and we so stated in early documents associated with this proposal. I also said that the State Department threw up one road block after another to keep this thing from moving forward. It's not reflected very fully in here. But really, we had just a terrible struggle. We met several times with Nicholas Katzenbach, and he may have made the point you can't have an alien on a presidential commission. I can't now remember the basis for this statement. I think that there was some purported legal theory as to why an alien couldn't serve. But in any case, we threw up our hands and said, all right we'll go forward without specifying a Micronesian with the hope that eventually we could pull it off. But it was more important that we get the commission than that there be specified members. Anyway, time after time after time, there was also a State Department view that the commission was unacceptable because presidential appointees couldn't serve with members of Congress. I have wondered whether the subsequent constitutional developments under the Appointments Clause bear some relationship to this, but of course, this was well before all of that Appointments Clause litigation, *Buckley v. Valeo*, if that's one of them. And so we just struggled every inch of the way. And there is in here something from the Bureau of the Budget.

- Willens: Yes, we'll come to that.
- Van Cleve: Okay, well let me stop talking and you ask questions in an ordered way.
- Willens: There's some suggestion in the materials that in early 1967 you were functioning as the chairman of a newly created working group that met with State and evaluated this proposal. There's some indication that the State Department was initially receptive to it and thought it deserved further consideration. And it was in subsequent meetings that some of these issues that you've referred to developed. One issue appears to have been the role of Congress in authorizing a commission as distinct from a presidentially-appointed commission without any legislative direction from Congress. That seems to be one of the major policy issues. Is that your recollection?
- Van Cleve: Yes, that's consistent with everything that I can remember and have reminded myself of in these pages. We very much wanted a Congressional authorization because it would suggest a commitment that we thought we had to have in order to present a real plebiscite to the Micronesians. Unless the Congress was willing to participate in an outline of what the alternatives were, we just couldn't be sure that these were the alternatives. That was always, of course, our stumbling block.
- Willens: Well, do you have any recollection as to what State's response to that Interior position was?
- Van Cleve: Probably that it was more important what happened in New York than what happened on Capitol Hill which was our constant rub. No, I've certainly no specific recollection, but we just felt as—they probably felt the same way—we felt as though we were just hitting our heads against a wall day in, day out.
- Willens: Quite apart from the role of Congress in authorizing the commission, there seemed to be a separate issue as to whether the authority establishing the commission—whether it was the President or Congress—had to give the commission specific directions what status alternatives would be evaluated.
- Van Cleve: That's right, that's right.
- Willens: Am I correct in interpreting that to be one of the major issues?
- Van Cleve: Well, I certainly saw that emerge. I would not have remembered it. But I certainly saw that emerge in these papers. And that would have been yet another stumbling block created because, of course, if the State Department were to succeed in persuading whoever the decision-maker was that only free association as defined in the U.N. was an alternative to sovereign independence, then we would not have got any farther because we were sure that this was not politically saleable on the Hill.
- Willens: There is a Sisco memorandum under Tab 33 in the book dated, we think, January 20, 1967, addressed to the Under Secretary trying to summarize for reasons that are unclear what the present state of play was at the State Department. And here it emphasizes the then current State Department view (in the first paragraph) of an early plebiscite offering specified alternatives, and here you'll note that the free association alternative has a provision for self-governing status, the specific nature of which will be determined by the people at TTPI after a specified period, probably five to ten years.
- Van Cleve: Yes.
- Willens: And I made reference to that earlier as reflecting a fairly significant, in my opinion, change in the State Department's view.

- Van Cleve: Yes, I agree.
- Willens: Was that position discussed in the course of reviewing the proposal for a commission? Was the State Department opposed to the idea of a commission, even a presidentially-established commission, because it wanted to continue along the lines of an early plebiscite and thought a commission might stand in the way of achieving that objective?
- Van Cleve: I have no recollection of that being the position. And that doesn't make a lot of sense to me. As outlined here, of course, free association becomes so much more palatable. The State Department didn't want a commission without severe presidential constraints for fear the commission would come up with the wrong alternative. That was why they opposed it. And I guess they thought that a bunch of Congressmen plus the Interior Department plus maybe Micronesians in one room could outweigh the sanctity of the U.S. international commitment, which Nicholas Katzenbach writes about with such passion that you'd think he thought we were traitors.
- Willens: Sisco has two memoranda that I think are particularly relevant to this issue. One is under Tab 37. It's a Sisco memorandum to the Under Secretary who I guess then was Mr. Katzenbach, and this was prepared in advance of a meeting with Interior, State, and Defense. And then under the next tab, we have a memorandum with respect to the meeting in which you apparently participated that took place in April of 1967. Here we have the State Department's reaction to the commission proposal, and they indicate that they oppose Interior's proposal for a legislatively controlled commission, but they agree that the Congress must play an important role in the picture. What was your understanding of their view as to Congressional participation?
- Van Cleve: I did look at all these things, of course, within the last 24 hours, It's so hard to keep them sorted out so that I don't . . .
- Willens: The second one under Tab 38 may be the most productive . . .
- Van Cleve: Yes, that's what I'm looking at.
- Willens: . . . because there's an effort to identify the areas of agreement, which are substantial, in the very first paragraph and then identifying as the main difference what Interior's view is as to the future political status as contrasted with the State Department's preference for some other form of self-government. And Luce on behalf of the Interior Department is suggesting that that should be left to a commission to resolve, and it's apparently that point that Katzenbach takes issue with.
- Van Cleve: Yes, I think that's exactly the case, and it's paragraph two on page two that seems to again state this problem of the sanctity of our commitment to do nothing to make the Trust Territory a part of the United States. That must have riled us. I can remember this as a very troublesome meeting in which I made some comment about Puerto Rico's status as a commonwealth, and Nicholas Katzenbach engaged in a put-down that I found absolutely humiliating. I wanted to slink away. It was like a Yale Law School professor. You remember them. And we never seemed to be able to get the point across, and this was another occasion where we didn't. That we absolutely had to work with the Congress because there was no future for the Trust Territory in the American system if the Congress didn't accept it. That was the point. And of course, they could use these strong words about international commitments which we didn't mean to ignore.
- Willens: It looks like to some extent the difference between the agencies (between State and Interior) was getting to be very specific, and to some extent, quite academic. There seemed

to be broad areas of agreement, and it seems a little difficult to see why a proposal for a commission couldn't have emerged from all this.

Van Cleve: Well, I think really the problem was that State didn't trust Congress to be susceptible to State's persuasion. If Congressional members participated freely without the kind of constraints State wanted, then the result would be one that State thought unacceptable by U.N. standards, and I think that they were right. It would have been unacceptable by U.N. standards. As I said on Tuesday, our reaction was it really doesn't matter. As between New York and Capitol Hill, Capitol Hill is infinitely more important to the future of Micronesia than is the U.N.

Willens: What do you recall being the Bureau of the Budget position?

Van Cleve: Well, you see, this goes back to my theory already presented, that every time there is an argument involving the State Department in the Executive Branch, the State Department wins. And I think it was Dick Austin who I just vaguely remember, who said, in effect, that the State Department's position was superior to ours. I can't remember. Which is that tab? The fact is that after all of this, after compromising to the extent we needed to on Micronesian membership, on not compromising on the absence of presidential restraints, on trying really quite hard to work out a commission proposal with State, here it was finally carrying the day at the Bureau of the Budget because the Budget examiner, Dick Austin . . .

Willens: It's under Tab 41.

Van Cleve: 41, okay.

Willens: A draft memorandum of the a conversation between representatives of the various agencies with Bureau of the Budget and reporting that Austin of the Bureau of the Budget continued to believe that there were still differences between State and Interior.

Van Cleve: Oh, and that State wouldn't win in a commission, that was what he was saying, in effect, as I remember reading this. All right. "The Commission would recommend an alternative, unacceptable to the Department of State and which would not achieve the objective of terminating the Trusteeship Agreement." Well, we knew that. We knew that that was a possibility. Now, the thing that is not shown here, and I don't suppose it could ever be found. We had worked very hard to get as far as we were. We had tried hard to persuade the Bureau of the Budget that this should go forward. We did have Defense with us, and we apparently had Chuck Johnson who was our National Security Council contact. And that was not enough to persuade the Bureau of the Budget to clear the proposal which is the bureaucratic status that we were then in. We had sent the proposed bill to BOB, and it had sent it around in the usual way for clearance, and it had got it except for State and we'd had meetings with Dick Austin. We tried hard to persuade him as we had tried for years to persuade State that this was the only way to get us going forward. And the net effect was that BOB said no clearance. And it was then that I went to Stewart Udall, and this is what isn't shown. I went to Stewart Udall and I said, you know, there has to be a way to get beyond our examiner at the Bureau of the Budget. We've got to elevate this question. We are going to sit doing nothing for another however long if we don't get this going forward. He had long since been persuaded and had testified (as these papers show) on behalf of the commission proposal. He's Stewart Udall. I shouldn't say testified but had argued in various Executive Branch fora about the virtue of our proposal as had Luce, as had we all. And so there's just got to be a way of going forward, and I think that what we have to do is have you send a document to the President. And there is a document to the President in here from Stewart Udall; it's not the one he signed on that particular

afternoon. He called me up; he said okay, you know, put something together, and I did and it got to his desk having been approved by all the people between me and him. And the gist of it was that we have got this proposal which is acceptable in part of the Executive Branch, but not to the Department of State. It is, we think, the only way to go forward. Will you, Mr. President, make a decision between these departments? As I said to Stewart Udall, probably his instinct, President Johnson's, would be the same as most others: to side with the State Department, but that's the one thing we must do before we give up. And he signed this thing, and we had yet another meeting with Katzenbach afterwards. It was an astonishing thing to do. I'd never been party to any effort to get the President himself to settle an argument between departments. And we asked him to.

Willens: And what happened?

Van Cleve: We had another meeting with Katzenbach, and the proposal went forward. I can't tell you more than that.

Willens: Is that right? That is very interesting, because there are documents that I've seen and provided for you indicating that as of June of 1967, after some of these early discussions, the Bureau of the Budget was now requesting your agency to develop the basic memorandum for the President and the Speaker letter and generally to assume the lead in developing the Executive Branch's position with respect to the legislation in advance of it being transmitted to the Hill.

Van Cleve: That's not necessarily inconsistent with my memory. And of course, my memory could be absolutely haywire, but it's not haywire that Stewart Udall said, "Do I really got to sign this thing to the President? I don't write to the President every day." And I said, "Yes, you got to because there's no other way to get this moving forward." And it may be subsequent to that that these developments by the Bureau of the Budget occurred. The date of Dick Austin's, this was May 19 . . .

Willens: Okay, but then, we have . . .

Van Cleve: May 24 is Jack Bingham's thing, isn't it? Yes.

Willens: Let me see where it is, because it is in here, and it's . . .

Van Cleve: Here's Luce to Katzenbach in June, June 30.

Willens: I have Austin's. He wrote a memorandum dated June 29, 1967, reflecting the Bureau's decision to request Interior to prepare a draft memo for the President and to get explicit concurrent or disagreement from State and Defense. And pursuant to that request, Mrs. Van Cleve on June 30 submitted a draft memo to the President for review by the Bureau of the Budget, and then you subsequently got the okay to circulate that. So, you prepared a draft memo to the President which I thought was very "revealing and forthright," identifying the points of agreement and disagreement. Now to that, I wonder where the rough draft Speaker letter? There's a Dear Mr. Katzenbach letter here under Tab 43 . . .

Van Cleve: 43, yes.

Willens: . . . and then, I think, that was the memo that was prepared because it sets forth the agreements among the agencies and then the somewhat different positions on page 2. That, I think, is what was prepared by your office . . .

Van Cleve: Yes.

Willens: . . . in response to Bureau of the Budget's request. Then under the next tab, 44, there's a draft letter to Mr. Aspinall with respect to the proposed legislation. I don't really know

whether these things went up. I guess, ultimately, they did in August of 1967. The President ultimately did transmit a commission proposal, I think it was.

Van Cleave: Yes, with a White House press release.

Willens: There was some talk about it, yes.

Van Cleave: Yes, because that's in here, the Presidential document.

Willens: So, but your recollection . . .

Van Cleave: It's 49.

Willens: . . . is that as a result of all these discussions and specifically the intervention by Secretary Udall, you believe, that some agreement finally emerged.

Van Cleave: Oh, yes, without question. And it was our proposal that went forward. It was the Interior proposal so that as a result of what I'm saying is in my mind plus these documents the Interior proposal supported by Defense went to the Congress, was passed by the Senate, was heard in the House and not passed there.

Willens: But we do have under Tab 45, we have a letter back to Interior dated July 5, 1967 from Katzenbach basically responding to the proposed memo to the President and the draft letter to Congressman Aspinall as prepared by Interior. And he reiterates the considered judgment of the Department of State on this subject that reflects the fact that the State still disagrees.

Van Cleave: Yes.

Willens: Nonetheless, the facts seem to demonstrate that, whether there were further meetings or not, Interior's views on this prevailed and the President did send it up to the Hill in August.

Van Cleave: What was the date, August 21.

Willens: Yes.

Van Cleave: Well, I kind of think that the memorandum to the President in here is not what I'm remembering. This is a standard bureaucratic document of the sort that, I guess this says, that BOB asked us to do this and we did it. The thing that I remember was something probably between the July 5 date of the Katzenbach letter to Luce and the August submittal by the President.

Willens: Did you draft the memorandum that Secretary Udall sent to the President?

Van Cleave: Yes, I'm sure. By "you," you mean me institutionally, and yes would be the answer to that.

Willens: The point here seems to be that no Administration proposal had gone up to the Hill notwithstanding several requests for it from Congressman Carey, who's named in the memorandum, and there's also been reference to hearings the previous month at which the various departments were being asked to express their views.

Van Cleave: Well, there was a hearing scheduled, as I read this, there was a hearing scheduled on the Bingham bill and we wanted to present our alternative at that time.

Willens: But you were unable to do so. Is that your recollection?

Van Cleave: Well, certainly we were not if the hearing was held before August 21st.

- Willens: Yes, there were hearings as I recall. I may be getting confused here. No, no, there were hearings on July 26th, 196 . . .
- Van Cleve: 7.
- Willens: . . . 7, but I'm not too sure there are any materials in here. They're referred to in the Udall letter to the President. There were hearings on the Bingham resolution. After the Katzenbach letter to Under Secretary Luce, there was a response back that's under Tab 46. It's a letter dated July 13.
- Van Cleve: Yes.
- Willens: From Under Secretary Luce, and this reiterates Interior's view and suggests in a nice way that these alternative views don't necessarily have to be resolved before creating a study commission and that the study commission can look at some of these issues itself.
- Van Cleve: Yes.
- Willens: It also advances for the first time Interior's legal view as to the meaning of the word "toward".
- Van Cleve: Yes. Well, we'd been saying that for ten years.
- Willens: The State lawyers, in documents I guess I haven't shared with you, took strong issue with that.
- Van Cleve: Oh, yes.
- Willens: As you might have expected.
- Van Cleve: I did know that, but you know, if you look literally at the words, it seemed to us to give us greater latitude than the State Department position suggested. But I do understand that. But the Interior Committees would look at the word "toward," you see, in the way that we have and ascribe to it its standard meaning.
- Willens: Did you testify or accompany an Interior representative in testimony on the Bingham resolution before the House?
- Van Cleve: Isn't that funny? I probably did. It seems to me I thought I remembered as we were speaking here. Let's see. July 21 was the scheduled hearing date. Have you tried to get records from the Committee?
- Willens: Unsuccessful efforts. I'm not so sure that they keep transcripts. What's your experience? Did you recall if they created transcripts of the Executive session?
- Van Cleve: Oh, they would have had a transcript, but it would not necessarily have been printed. They printed a relatively small chunk, and it is my experience that the Hill is as bad as the White House in terms of a memory. They just don't hang onto things. I don't think the whole Executive Branch does anymore, but it did a pretty good job during the period that you're interested in here. I just don't know. I'm pretty sure I would have gone, and I very often testified, but probably this would have been bigger than I thought I was, so that we would have gotten perhaps Luce. I do remember the Secretary, accompanying the Secretary more than once on this issue to the House Committee, but we would not have been in a position—if the hearing on July 21—we would not have been in a position to produce our proposal since that obviously didn't emerge until August 21.
- Willens: There was one memo referring to a what must have been a fairly sharp exchange between you and Mr. Katzenbach.
- Van Cleve: Was this on Puerto Rico? Do you remember?

Willens: Well, no. It basically comes out of some internal State Department memorandum actually, and it refers to a meeting on July 19, 1967, involving Udall and Katzenbach and you. This was an effort after these letters were exchanged to resolve the differences because there was a hearing coming up and they wanted to have at least not inconsistent positions.

Van Cleve: Yes.

Willens: There was a memorandum prepared by Mr. Eaton in August that referred to this July 19 meeting. And it said "At one point Mrs. Van Cleve asked Katzenbach whether he wished for Interior to lie about the present level of political sophistication in the Trust Territory. Katzenbach replied that the manner in which the facts were represented would have a great influence on the kind of reception which the Administration position will receive in the Committee."

Van Cleve: I can't believe that I ever would have said that to an Under Secretary of State. I'm confident that that's the State Department putting its own gloss on things. It's not a word that comes easily to most of us. And surely, you know, I'm just not that impolite.

Willens: As it happened, Udall did testify on July 26. And we have a State Department report saying it was relatively successful.

Van Cleve: What was the day of this, I'm sorry?

Willens: July 26, 1967.

Van Cleve: Okay.

Willens: And he apparently communicated the news that the three executive agencies had more or less agreed on draft legislation to establish a joint commission, and that some members of the sub-committee were pleased about that, although other members were concerned about offering the TTPI the choice of independence. But Udall, consistent with the undertaking that he had made with State, deferred to State as to what the U.N. requirements were, and he honored his commitments according to the State Department reports.

Van Cleve: Yes, I saw something like that.

Willens: The State Department memos reflect concern among committee members that the U.S. may be pressing too quickly here to force these decisions upon the Micronesians. Do you have any recollections as to what the Committee's views were on the Bingham resolution and on the subsequently introduced proposal?

Van Cleve: No, what you have just outlined sounds to me just right. We never doubted that we needed to offer the option of independence, and I am not surprised that Stewart Udall said that straight out during the hearing. And it doesn't surprise me that some members of the Interior Committee thought that was dangerous. They were extremely anxious that the Trust Territory not be lost.

Willens: Just to digress from this for a one minute or two. There was another visiting mission in 1967, and Angie Brooks was actively involved in this one. In the interim, there had been a World Health Organization report in 1965 that was quite critical of health facilities and services in Micronesia. Ambassador Corner, I guess, of New Zealand . . .

Van Cleve: Yes.

Willens: . . . was critical to some extent, but the visiting mission briefing proceeded very much as it had three years earlier. Do you recall any participation by you in briefing sessions of the 1967 Mission?

- Van Cleve: I recall that we had a lot of them. We were all kind of captivated by Angie Brooks. Do you remember her?
- Willens: No.
- Van Cleve: Oh, she was a kind of flamboyant black woman. Liberia, Nigeria, one or the other. And articulate and interesting. And I remember also that the State Department said that we should entertain the visiting mission for lunch. And by that time in his moves toward egalitarianism, Stewart Udall had abolished the Secretary's dining room but said that we could tap his very tiny representation budget for lunch. And so, I thought what we would do would be take them all to the Lawyer's Club. It was a reasonable walk from Interior, and we did. And it was the crummiest lunch I ever had. It was the U.N. visiting mission. You know, I'd been often enough to the Trusteeship Council to know how splendidly they dined at lunch, and we had the State Department and the visiting mission and ourselves at the Lawyer's Club for a really third rate meal. And I was embarrassed. But that's not what you asked. We did brief her, and I thought she was receptive. I thought all those meetings went well, as I recall.
- Willens: There was some informal input back from the visiting mission after it did its field trip. And there's some evidence of that is contained in Tab 36, which is a letter dated April 5, 1967, from you to Miss Brown by way of keeping her advised.
- Van Cleve: Yes.
- Willens: You enclosed a copy of a letter from High Commissioner Norwood which I'm not too sure I have. May have. It has the interesting quote about the concern expressed by the visiting mission as to the role of the Peace Corps volunteers.
- Van Cleve: Yes, I remember that.
- Willens: And that struck me as sort of unexpected. Did you feel that these channels of informal communication with the mission members were useful and reliable? You obviously attached some importance to this in terms of passing it out.
- Van Cleve: Oh, well, I would think so, sure. They are responsible representatives of their governments. It's kind of interesting that they should be so well disposed toward the United States to try to warn us, isn't it?
- Willens: Now is that why you sent it over to Miss Brown, I mean, who was not one of your, I mean, was . . .
- Van Cleve: Not one of my admirers. You may put it that way if you like.
- Willens: . . . not one of your favorite people. But this was a way of informing her that there was at least this informal feeling among some members of the visiting mission that moving promptly to bring the Trust Territory under the jurisdiction of the United States would not be ideologically or otherwise offensive.
- Van Cleve: Well, or I could have just had a proper bureaucratic reaction that this was her bailiwick, and she ought to know what U.N. people were saying. I don't think I had a more complicated or a secondary reaction or motive. I don't know. We were really pretty scrupulous, you know. The Presidential Executive Order giving Interior jurisdiction made perfectly clear that matters associated with the U.N. were the State Department's bailiwick, and we never trod in that area beyond anything that the State Department knew about and condoned.
- Willens: In its formal report, however, the visiting mission commented again about Marianas separatism and also suggested that some Micronesians felt they were being hurried into

a decision with respect to status. Now if true, that assessment of Micronesian sentiment showed some change in the intervening the three years since the last report. Did you have any sense near the end of your tenure that there was some greater inclination on the part of the Micronesians to want to go slow and not come to a decision point for a longer period of time?

Van Cleve: If I did, I've pretty much forgotten it. I guess I would have said at the time that Micronesians are not of one mind on anything any more than anyone else is. So, some might have felt pushed while others felt a sense of urgency. I don't know.

Willens: And did you have any greater sense by this time of the passionate Marianas view in favor of separatism, or was the separatism issue basically no different in 1967 or 1968 than it had been in your mind three or four years earlier?

Van Cleve: We knew of the passion, but I don't believe that we were going to accede to it. I don't believe we thought we should accede to it. We were still full of this anti-fragmentation thinking. On which we did take the State Department's lead. I don't want you to think we ignored them in all things.

Willens: No, I understand that. Bill Gleysteen came into his job sometime in 1966, and he recalled for me that, as the longer he remained in the job, the more he began to see some of the diversity among the Micronesians. He recalls specifically a dinner that he had with three or four representatives from Micronesia, perhaps members of the Congress of Micronesia from different districts, he began to get the sense that they don't all speak with the same...

Van Cleve: Yes.

Willens: . . . voice. Let's turn to the last year, then, really of the Administration and your tour of duty on this occasion in the Office of Territories. There was another Congressional visit in, I guess, early 1968, I think, involving both House of Representatives and Senate committee members. Do you have any recollections of that visit and did you participate?

Van Cleve: I simply cannot remember, and those records I no longer have. So, I don't know. Probably, very probably, because I tended to go with the Congressional committees. They also invited Interior, and I was the logical person to go, but I don't remember specifically.

Willens: Well, one of the few reports I have of this trip was a Peace Corps-generated document where the author described the House of Representatives delegation as "more hawkish" than his Senate counterparts. The reference was to the views expressed by the Congressmen during the trip as to future political status and putting aside the hawkish characterization, I mean, does it reflect generally your view that the Senate was inclined to be somewhat more receptive to the wishes of the Micronesians as they expressed them than the House of Representatives was?

Van Cleve: Not necessarily. I don't mind the characterization of hawkish, and certainly Henry Jackson fell into that category pretty clearly. I would not be able to distinguish between the two, in terms either of their hawkishness nor their receptivity. I think they were all quite receptive to Micronesian views so long as they were consistent with Micronesia remaining a part of the United States.

Willens: There is some indication here that the Senators involved were Burdick, Metcalf, and Moss. I don't have the names yet of the House of Representatives.

Van Cleve: I did not travel with any of those people so perhaps I was not on that trip.

- Willens: There was a report that the Senators who made the trip subsequently filed, and they reached some conclusions along the following lines: One, that the logistical problems involved in administering such a large territory were of staggering dimensions. I see you're nodding your head affirmatively on that point. Secondly, that the educational system suffered from serious shortcomings. And I suppose . . .
- Van Cleve: No doubt.
- Willens: . . . that continues to be a problem. Third, that there were some recent favorable developments in health treatment and facilities.
- Van Cleve: Yes.
- Willens: A very positive statement. And lastly, that there was little to be "excited about" relating to economic developments.
- Van Cleve: Probably true, probably true.
- Willens: The Senate report was generated in connection with legislation to increase appropriations to the TTPI, and the Senators were generally supporting that proposition. On the other hand, on the House side, Chairman Aspinall and Subcommittee Chairman Carey asked the State Department to testify before the Subcommittee in Executive Session in March of 1968, and the State Department people were generating briefing papers and generally wanted to use the occasion as an opportunity to support the status commission legislation. Do you have any recollection of discussions between Interior and State in terms of presenting the Executive Branch's views to the House Committee on the status legislation in 1968?
- Van Cleve: Have no recollection. We must have talked with them. We were in constant touch, you know, even though we didn't terribly much enjoy it. We really did work together.
- Willens: There is under Tab 50 some briefing materials that were prepared in advance of apparently Mr. Sisco's appearance.
- Van Cleve: Yes.
- Willens: He may have been the designated Department representative to go up and deal with this subject.
- Van Cleve: Right.
- Willens: And subsequently under Tab 51 there's a report of his appearance, which includes some criticism of the Defense Department representatives.
- Van Cleve: Oh, yes. I remember that one.
- Willens: Some conviction that he demonstrated successfully that the State Department does not have horns.
- Van Cleve: Yes. I read that, too. And some compliments to Stewart Udall, as I recall also. I think maybe this is one of the places where they said he had reflected or he had kept his commitments.
- Willens: At this time in the spring and summer of 1968, there were in fact hearings in the Senate. And the Senate did adopt the proposed bill calling for a status commission. As I understand it, it changed the plebiscite date from a specific year, if I'm correct in this, to a date as soon as possible. Do you recall any consideration in which you participated as to a specific date for a proposed plebiscite?

- Van Cleave: I have no specific recollection on that. It does not seem to me to have been an unreasonable thing to do. More important, I would think you could lay hands on the Senate Committee report on the legislation, which would probably tell you something useful on this subject.
- Willens: Yes. I did at one point try to collect all the reports on the subject, but I haven't reviewed that recently. There seemed to be on the House side, though, some difficulty as to getting a hearing before Chairman Aspinall. He seemed to be asking that the Executive Branch agencies evidence their agreement before he'd have any hearings. Do you have any recollection as to what his position was with respect to the status legislation?
- Van Cleave: Well, I think I mentioned earlier my one effort to touch base with him before we proceeded very far down the road, the telephone conversation in Stewart Udall's office. It was therefore disturbing, disappointing to learn that he had reportedly—I don't know that this would appear as a matter of official record anyplace—after the proposed legislation arrived, taken the position that he just plain didn't like commissions. We knew that in a number of connections, of course, the Congress creates commission legislation for one reason or another every week, but he apparently thought it was a way of putting off a decision in principle. Our theory was that he also saw that in a commission, particularly one of 17 members only eight of whom were from the Congress and only two of whom were from his Committee, his Committee would lose control. His Committee would not be able to control the result. And we ascribed to him the not wonderful but not surprising view that he didn't want to lose that control. And there was also in these papers a suggestion that he thought that the Executive Branch rather than the Congress would control the commission, and he didn't like that. Didn't that emerge in some of these papers?
- Willens: Yes, I think it does. It's sort of a match with the view that his Committee had the necessary expertise, as well as the responsibility to work this out without the need for a commission.
- Van Cleave: That's right. That, too, emerges here, and I think that also was his point of view. But of course, they never did do it.
- Willens: Well, there were eventually hearings after the flurry of meetings among State and Defense and Interior, and there is a McHenry memorandum under Tab 55 reflecting a meeting of the three agencies to plan tactics for the House consideration of the status commission bill. And there were some differences there expressed about Aspinall's readiness to conduct those hearings and some efforts among the agencies as reported by this memorandum to sort of soft-pedal the differences between the agencies in order to get some uniform support for the House of Representatives. Did you have the sense reflected in this McHenry memorandum that Congressman Aspinall was essentially asking the Executive Branch agencies to wrestle with the range of problems that you had hoped would be on the agenda of the status commission?
- Van Cleave: I'd have to say that I have no specific recollection of that. I did not read this memorandum from Don McHenry as being anything inconsistent with what my feelings were at the time. I just have got no specific reactions.
- Willens: The last memo then under Tab 57 that I refer your attention to is a McHenry memorandum reporting on what he described as a long conversation with you after the House hearings had occurred. Did you have an opportunity to review this?
- Van Cleave: Oh, I certainly did, yes, I certainly did.

- Willens: Is this generally consistent with your recollection as to what you thought at the time?
- Van Cleve: I mostly don't have a recollection, but it sounds absolutely reasonable. I do remember being sorry that Tom Foley, who had been a great friend of ours, was not on our side.
- Willens: Why was it that he no longer (according to this memorandum) supported the status commission proposal?
- Van Cleve: Nothing beyond what is said here, and it was not my habit to ring up members of Congress to chat with them about it. Others in my position did so before and after. I just felt more like a civil servant than a politician and therefore never really did this kind of schmoozing, I think is the term for it, isn't it?
- Willens: It seems clear as of July 1968, with the election only a few months off and with other pressing problems in the Executive Branch and the Hill, that the status commission was essentially dead for this session of Congress.
- Van Cleve: Oh, yes, yes.
- Willens: Was that a disappointing result?
- Van Cleve: Oh, absolutely. Absolutely. Because we did see it as a way to get us going and now we had no way of getting us going.
- Willens: Meanwhile, the Micronesian Future Status Commission had already issued a status report in 1968 and had been given a year more within which to formulate its views. Do you recall having any sense that the United States was losing the initiative here with respect to future status options and that the Micronesians were increasingly seizing the initiative?
- Van Cleve: Oh, that's an absolutely reasonable thing to have thought. Whether I did or not, I can't confirm. No further intelligent commentary from me on this subject.
- Willens: One of the interesting points of this memorandum that I'm sure you enjoyed was that you told McHenry, if this memorandum is accurate, that Secretary Udall was basically taking the position that one could not wait another year with respect to this matter and that maybe there ought to be high level White House assistant appointed.
- Van Cleve: Yes.
- Willens: And you recognized that this proposal was almost the same as the State Department had a few years ago but that Secretary Udall may not have been aware of this fact. And this is where you say you remembered it rather clearly since Sisco had become furious with you at the time, thinking that you'd leaked the proposal for a White House assistant.
- Van Cleve: Right.
- Willens: We've talked about that and what alternative rumors might have been shared with the members of Congress. The documents show that late in 1968, about the time of the election, either shortly before or shortly after, a draft organic act emerged out of nowhere, it appears, and was the subject of some detailed correspondence between you and Deputy High Commissioner Mangan. And I did not include that in here; I didn't want to belabor this any more than I already have. But do you have any recollection as to whether your staff turned its attention in the fall of 1968 to prepare a draft organic bill that would at least be a step toward accomplishing the end result that you thought was desirable?
- Van Cleve: I think I drafted it. I'm pretty sure I did, on the typewriter that now sits on the second floor of this house. And I think I did it in response to a Defense request. Can't remember the timing just now, but I remember coming back from the Trust Territory and stopping

as usual in Hawaii and being invited with very little preliminary to visit CINCPAC the day I'd arrived. You know, one got in at 3:00 a.m., and I guess I had awaiting me then an invitation to visit CINCPAC with the statement that, if I were willing to do this, they would send a car at 11:00 a.m. Well, I really didn't want to, because I was weary, but I did think maybe you had to. So I went to CINCPAC and was ushered into the War Room. It was kind of exciting, now that I think of it, and there must have been 200 officers sitting in the audience. The War Room at CINCPAC is not like the War Room at the White House, which I was in once also on the Trust Territory. The War Room at CINCPAC is a big theater, and here was an audience, rows of seats for an audience, and lots of mostly Naval officers, and a podium. And somebody said, and here she is, and I was introduced, and I was supposed to start talking about my trip to the Trust Territory. I want to say that this was subsequent to the election, because I had some feeling that it was a swan song. At the same time, I would not have traveled after the election, because that would not have been the seemly thing to do. So it must have been earlier, but it was pretty surely 1968. And I was quizzed. Does something in there support any of this?

Willens: Yes, it does.

Van Cleve: Oh, good.

Willens: It looks like it was in the last months of 1968, but one of the memoranda I refer to was entitled "Discussion of Possible Revisions to the Organic Act of Micronesia" and was dated October 21, 1968, so the work seemed to have taken place before the election as you mentioned. I don't have a date for the correspondence between you and Mr. Mangan, but I have the document revisions somewhere.

Van Cleve: Well, I was on this occasion quizzed extensively by the people present on the likelihood of the Micronesians being willing to affiliate with the U.S. And the gist of my answers, as I remember them, was that the genuine problem area was probably Palau. That so far as I could see, the Northern Marianas and the other districts of the Trust Territory were so disposed as to be willing to accept affiliation with the U.S. under an organic act, that I did think there was some difficulty in Palau, its attitude having then seemed to me to be so different from other parts of Micronesia. But that I thought that, if the chips were down, the rest would go along. And subsequent to that, somebody from Defense invited me to lunch in the Flag Officers Mess. I'm telling you all about the fancy things that have happened to me in my career, white tablecloths and so on, and asked me would I produce an organic act for them to have in their files, in effect. And I agreed that I would, and I drafted something. And I don't have a piece of paper to support anything in it, but I remember thinking that it was a respectable point of beginning. I had forgotten that I had an exchange with Marty Mangan on the subject, but that makes sense, because Marty had done a lot of federal legislative work in Washington. And interestingly, after I left the Territories Office in early 1969, that proposal was carried by Harrison Loesch on his first trip on this subject. It of course was wholly unacceptable and got him into a lot of soup. And thereafter he proposed commonwealth, which was different from what I had drafted, and that was even worse. I heard about all these things 18th hand. You doubtless know about them in a way that I do not. But anyway, the answer is yes, I did draft something, and I did it myself.

Willens: Do you recall ever sharing that draft with Congressman Aspinall or some of his staff?

Van Cleve: No. I would not have done that. Somebody else might have, but I absolutely was straight arrow on the subject of the rules.

- Willens: Now there came a time six months into 1969 where Aspinall in fact asked Interior to draft an organic act, and I think they used the various versions that emerged from your initiative to do that, and then they apologized profusely to the State Department and others, saying they were just doing it as a drafting service and they didn't necessarily agree with its contents. So there was an interplay between Interior and Congressman Aspinall in or about June of 1969, so that was why I asked the question. Now one thing that may interest you actually in terms of the timetable and particularly the visit to the Flag Room, if that's the right name, is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote a memo to the Secretary of Defense dated October 31, 1968, and Defense, like other agencies, was sort of trying to wrap up this subject matter in light of the failures or successes of the preceding years and in anticipation of a new civilian Administration. And the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded, among other things, that the TTPI had the same strategic importance in 1968 as it did in 1962 and 1965, which were occasions for earlier Joint Chiefs assessment memoranda. They identify some of the purposes to which it might be put. And the last paragraph of the memorandum stated: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff note with concern that we do not appear to be any nearer to the achievement of the U.S. goal of moving the TTPI into a permanent relationship within the political framework of the United States than we were when the policy was announced by NSAM 145 in April 1962." It was sort of a sobering conclusion to a period of some six or seven years since President Kennedy had articulated the U.S. objective that we have talked about at some length. Is that assessment too blunt for you after these years?
- Van Cleve: Well, I guess it's awfully blunt, and it's not quite as bleak as that, because people knew a lot more in 1968 than they did in 1961. Certainly the Interior people and those key to this issue didn't survive that transition. But there has to have been some educational fallout within Interior, and I'm sure there was in these other departments. The result, of course, was the appointment of Haydn Williams to handle these things, which I suppose was a form of the State Department's earlier proposal about a Presidential representative. Not quite, but somewhat akin to it. But it's sad, isn't it, when you think of all of that energy.
- Willens: Well, that's what I was doing, you know, just sort of stepping back a minute. I forget who it was, I think it was Mr. Gleysteen, who said, when it was all said and done, there had been what he characterized as "paper progress" on the matter.
- Van Cleve: Yes.
- Willens: Which is something less than real substantive progress. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs were not privy to a lot of the debate and deliberation that went on within the agencies, and they also weren't in the best position perhaps to evaluate the increased funding and the improvements to the quality of life in Micronesia that were a direct result of the changed U.S. policy.
- Van Cleve: Well, that's the other point that I should have made, that of course things were much better in the Trust Territory than they were in 1962. But strictly on the status question, no, we had not really done it. And as we started virtually by saying on Tuesday afternoon, you know, I have wondered whether if I had drafted that organic act a half a dozen years earlier and had fed it in the dead of night to Wayne Aspinall or one of his staff people and if they had picked up the cudgels, enacted it and a plebiscite had followed, what would the next result have been?
- Willens: I'm wondering whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff memo to the Secretary of Defense might not have followed your being asked to draft the organic act and reflects some of the briefing you gave in Hawaii and so forth.

- Van Cleve: Well, the briefing in Hawaii would have been exactly what the Defense Department wanted to hear with that little quirk about Palau. That is to say, as of then they would have wanted to know that the Trust Territory was in our judgment prepared to jump into a permanent relationship with the United States and that (and I remember speaking to this effect) in my judgment, they would find acceptable something like what we then had going in Guam. And so, they liked that, and that was probably why I got invited to the white tablecloth luncheon and the Flag Officers Mess followed by the drafting of this thing.
- Willens: Is Harrison Loesch still alive?
- Van Cleve: Don't know anything about him.
- Willens: After you left for the Federal Power Commission, in early 1969 . . .
- Van Cleve: Not early.
- Willens: When did you?
- Van Cleve: In the summer.
- Willens: In the summer of 1969. In that event, do you have any recollection of the inter-departmental studies of this issue that were generated under National Security Advisor Kissinger and his staff?
- Van Cleve: Never saw any.
- Willens: There was a process that was initiated in early 1969 that yielded ultimately the recommendation that Secretary Hickel in May of 1969 present a version of the so-called organic or Political Relations Act to the Micronesians or that he announce the readiness of the U.S. to establish a relationship with the Micronesians. I guess he had the authority to say what you felt unable to say on the occasion that you previously reported to me with respect to telling the Micronesians what U.S. objectives were. So there was a process that was engaged in and reflected either a substantial or necessary change in the State Department views under the pressure of a new Administration and new priorities, and so forth.
- Van Cleve: Maybe this means that we did do something of value in the 1960s on this subject, because it may have affected the decision in the 1970s. But of course that particularly approach was washed out before it really occurred.
- Willens: So as you stayed on, then, were you still within the Territory or were you immediately. . . .
- Van Cleve: Oh, no. I left I think it was in March, and I knew it was going to happen before it did. So I immediately withdrew, and nobody ever asked me a question thereafter. That was a mean transition. I'm a transition expert from way back, having experienced Truman to Eisenhower and all that followed, and that one was as nasty as any I've ever known. And of course my own successor was a genuine partisan, a kind of belligerent partisan, who believed that anybody who wasn't as partisan as she was not to be paid any attention to at all. This was Elizabeth Farrington.
- Willens: Is she alive?
- Van Cleve: Oh, no, no. No, she was 100 years old then. I think it's true. Apparently the only way the Interior Department could relieve itself of Mrs. Farrington, who was very old and by definition ineffective—she took long naps every afternoon, and came in late and left early, and she had been the delegate from Hawaii. And she was a Farrington, of that family, or her husband was, and she became one back in about 1920,—the only way the

Interior Department could, without terrible embarrassment, relieve itself of the terrible embarrassment of Mrs. Farrington, who got drunk at the White House a few times, was to abolish the office, and that's what they did in about 1971. And reconstituted it in about 1973. But the office was abolished, and Royston C. Hughes became the head of an ad hoc unit that was for all practical purposes the continuation. Anyway, poor old Betty Farrington, who had a lot going for her, but she expected a sinecure and didn't realize she was going to have to do something, and she was not up to it. She was in her mid-70s, mid to late 70s, at the point that she got the job.

Willens: When you were writing your book in the early 1970s, I understand that your book was published in 1974, but you indicate somewhere in there that it seems that the events with which you were able to write end in mid-1973 or thereabouts. Did you have any occasion to go back and talk to people then about what was going on?

Van Cleve: Oh, yes. I got information from them so as to update my own knowledge, and there were a few left. John DeYoung, who was a splendid person, is no longer alive. John DeYoung was a source of information. There were a couple of Budget people. Hugh Gallagher was one. And these were people whom I had known in years past, and they were part of this ad hoc group and remained on. And they were useful sources of information for purpose of confirming my recollections or correcting my recollections. So I did touch bases with them then.

Willens: Did you acquire any information on the basis of which you could make any judgments at the time about how the Haydn Williams appointment and the Micronesian negotiations were working out? You suggest in the book that things seemed well on the way toward resolution and you didn't really see the need to address those issues.

Van Cleve: Yes, well, I couldn't speak with authority on these subjects. If I implied some disappointment at the appointment of Haydn Williams and of Interior's losing its premiership on this issue, it would not have been inappropriate. Maybe I didn't say that, but that kind of solution to government problems tends to bother the orderly old political scientist that I like to think of as what I am. So it worked. It was the way to proceed, as it happened. But I think that I was a little sorry. If I had been in Interior, I would have seen this as a disgraceful development, as a statement that I couldn't do it, and of course, I couldn't. I had the chance, and I didn't pull it off. But in any event, Haydn Williams is of course and remains a perfectly remarkable man. Unlike Betty Farrington, he, at whatever he is, he's got to be 80, doesn't he?

Willens: Not quite, I don't think, but he's very active.

Van Cleve: Well, he seems awfully good. I ran into him at the Ninth Circuit argument at the Stanford Law School in one of the controller cases.

Willens: Well, he attended the argument that I made.

Van Cleve: Ah, ha, well . . .

Willens: I appeared on behalf of the Commonwealth.

Van Cleve: . . . I knew that, but this is before.

Willens: Well, he was in the court room.

Van Cleve: Exactly so. Well, he was in the court room in an earlier argument on the same controller issue, and Harry and I were in California at the time, so I thought it would be interesting to drive down. We were meeting friends at Stanford anyway.

- Willens: You said earlier.
- Van Cleve: Yes. The one that became moot.
- Willens: That's right. Well, we have then more or less completed the interview. Thank you very much.
- Van Cleve: You're quite welcome.
- Willens: I cannot promise that I won't be back to you, but I will probably at some point want to exchange thoughts about what happened when you came back in 1977 and for those next four years. But they're not immediately subjects that I'm prepared to deal with or have anything useful to ask you about.
- Van Cleve: Very good. Well, you do a wonderful job of causing people like me to remember so much more than we otherwise would, and I'm sorry now to have said I don't know as often as I did.