

INTERVIEW OF RICHARD H. WYTTENBACH-SANTOS

by Howard P. Willens

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- Willens: Richard H. Wyttenbach-Santos had a variety of responsibilities during the 1970s relating to the Northern Marianas negotiations. Dick, I want to thank you very much for making yourself available on your visit in Saipan here today from Guam, which is where you live. I would like to begin with asking you to give me a brief biographical sketch regarding your birth, your early education and your career over the past twenty years.
- Wyttenbach: I was born in June 9, 1941 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. My father was a captain of an oil tanker for City Service. His name was William F. German, so I was Richard H. German. My mother was a schoolteacher. Two months after Pearl Harbour, my father was killed by a German submarine attack off Fort Pierce, Florida. About two years later, my mother remarried to another merchant sailor by the name of Appling, I was legally adopted, so my name was Richard H. Appling. Then he deserted after six months, after a convoy run, and so we all moved in with my grandparents and cousins and aunt and uncle. So when I was eight years old, an usher from the first wedding looked up the family, and I convinced him to marry my mother, so I was an usher at my mother's wedding when she married Fred Wyttenbach. I was legally adopted, so I've had three names, and last month I changed it again, so my name is now Richard Harrington German, the way I was born, and then Wyttenbach-Santos, my wife's maiden name. And I have an older sister who married a B just to get back up on top. But Wyttenbach is my adopted father. I went to public school because my mother was a public school teacher in the suburbs of Philadelphia. I went to the Naval Academy as the son of a deceased veteran, even though we weren't sure my father was an official veteran at that time, my first father. So I graduated in 1963 from the Naval Academy with a bachelor of science degree but a minor in social studies. After I was on ships for four years, I went to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University up in Boston and got a masters degree in international relations, a second masters degree in international law, and a Ph.D. in political science. And my dissertation was on the political status of Micronesia, which included the Marianas and also covered Guam. So I traced the in-fighting in Washington from 1941 until 1952 essentially on what to do with the Micronesian islands, and whether or not to annex them. Basically the Congress and the military wanted to annex the islands after World War II and the State Department and President Roosevelt and then Truman wanted to make them part of the United Nations system. It was involved in the drafting of the U.N. Charter. The original concept was for a very strong trusteeship system where you have an international bureaucracy directly administering all non-dependent territories such as India, Dakar, Hong Kong, Indochina, Algeria, to lead them to independence and because of the Micronesian islands it was watered down to what we have today. At the last second, in the San Francisco conference, the Pentagon got inserted the strategic trusteeship category just in case Truman made a mistake and put these islands under trusteeship rather than annex them.
- Willens: In fact the trusteeship agreement was entered into in 1947, is that not correct?
- Wyttenbach: Right, right.
- Willens: So, was not the decision whether to annex or not resolved at that point?

- Wyttenbach: No. There was a key decision about six months before that point. It was not resolved prior to the U.N. meeting in 1945.
- Willens: My question was that the trusteeship agreement was entered into 1947?
- Wyttenbach: Right.
- Willens: So, the issue of annexation or not was certainly resolved by 1947.
- Wyttenbach: But about six months before that, right.
- Willens: So the principal debate that took place was during the end of the war and the immediate few years following 1945.
- Wyttenbach: Exactly, 1944 to 1946. And then the fight continued as to who would administer the islands. That lasted from 1947 to 1948 and Truman finally said it should be civilians administering civilians and then they made the plans to transfer to the Interior Department.
- Willens: What kind of research materials were you able to locate to deal with those issues?
- Wyttenbach: It was all in the Navy Archives office in Washington. Because I was a Navy officer, I was able to get into the classified archives, dig out all the papers and then go through the bureaucracy red tape to get them declassified. What they had was the four secretaries committee, Interior, State, War and Navy, told to get together to study this problem. So you have Interior and State documents in the Navy files and that is how I found them there at the Navy Archives downtown, at the Navy Yard in Washington.
- Willens: Where can your Ph.D. dissertation be found?
- Wyttenbach: At the Micronesia Area Research Center on Guam. I know there is one in the library here [on Saipan], probably in the PSS library here. The original documents, about eight inches worth, are with the Micronesia Area Research Center. Also you can get my dissertation at the University of Michigan Ph.D. catalogue service.
- Willens: What is the title of the dissertation?
- Wyttenbach: It is called Micronesia and Its Strategic Trusteeship: A Case Study in American Political Military Decisionmaking.
- Willens: Did you complete that in 1970?
- Wyttenbach: 1970. I'm sorry, spring 1971.
- Willens: Were you in an academic life full time then for several years in the late 1960s?
- Wyttenbach: Right. I was leading a full academic life from June of 1968 and then I got the doctorate in June of 1971.
- Willens: And then what did you do?
- Wyttenbach: And then I went as a student at the Naval War College for a year. While I was at the Naval War College I was called down for thirty days to work in the Office for Micronesian Status Negotiations in Washington by Captain Crowe to help him prepare for the Palau round of negotiations in April. I had met him through doing research for my doctorate.
- Willens: You are referring to Captain Crowe?
- Wyttenbach: William J. Crowe, Jr.
- Willens: You are making reference to the April 1972 Micronesian Status Negotiations in Palau. Did you attend those negotiations?

Wyttenbach: No. I put them on the airplane and went back to War College as a student. The War College was not happy about losing me. Admiral Crowe called me one day and said that somebody, and I think it was Jim Wilson, in the office had had a heart attack and they were behind the power curve, as he put it, getting ready for that round of negotiations and could I come down. I had met him when he was head of what they called OP 612 in the Navy staff in Washington, which was East Asia Pacific branch under the policy branch of the Navy Department. I had met him in 1969, 1970 doing research. He was the one that worked on the Pueblo problem. Got the Pueblo back with the fancy solution about the signature on the statements, if you don't know about that little story. He later became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When he called me, I said fine, I am bored here, fourth year of graduate studies at the Navy War College. But the Navy War College did not want to let me go because it would set a bad example because other people could pull students out too. So, he went to the three star level in the Navy staff in Washington and I was on the next plane. They came running in the classroom and said follow me, get a bag and run down. So I ran down went into the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations in the Interior Department building, still in my Navy uniform and he promptly said I should not be wearing my uniform down there and get busy on the typewriter, since I know how to type. So I worked twelve hours a day for thirty days and I ended up spending weekends at his house playing bridge and put them on the plane then I went back as a student. So that was my first experience meeting Ambassador Haydn Williams at that time.

Willens: What was your next contact with Micronesia?

Wyttenbach: After that assignment I was the executive officer of a war ship based out of San Diego, another tour in Vietnam, off the coast of Vietnam. Then I got a postcard from the personnel people in the Navy saying I was being stationed on Guam as a political advisor to the admiral on Guam.

Willens: When was that?

Wyttenbach: I was assigned in June of 1974. I would have gotten the postcard around Easter of 1974. So I wrote to Admiral Crowe and I said how come this is happening. Nobody had been sent, only drunks and has beens, had been sent to Guam. He said that he had created the position there and to trust him.

Willens: What position?

Wyttenbach: Special Assistant to the Commander of Naval Forces Marianas for Guam Affairs. There was another position he created, called Special Assistant to the Commander of Naval Forces Marianas for TTPI Affairs. During the negotiations, going through Guam, he had noticed a complete need for civil-military relations, that there was a weakness there and especially in Guam there was a problem with local controversy and the Admiral didn't have any good advisors for political affairs. He created these jobs and through Haydn Williams knowing about Fletcher. Captain Crowe of course was a Ph.D. from Princeton in international relations, so he arranged that I got to be the first Guam person. It didn't matter, we worked both issues. Then the TTPI person was Commander Bill Wesley, William Wesley, who also had a doctorate from Fletcher. Rear Admiral Steve Morrison was the admiral, Steve Morrison, whose son was the Jim Morrison of the Doors. We were the first ones in that job as political advisors.

Willens: How long did you serve in that job.

Wyttenbach: From June of 1974 to August of 1975 when I was yanked out of there by then Admiral Crowe to take his old job at OMSN.

- Willens: What job was that?
- Wyttenbach: He was the military advisor to the President's personal representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations.
- Willens: You had begun working for OMSN as military advisor in or about August of 1975.
- Wyttenbach: Exactly.
- Willens: How long did you remain in that position?
- Wyttenbach: Until June of 1977. June or July of 1977. Admiral Crowe had that job initially from 1969 when it was created until around 1974. He made admiral in the job and then he was replaced by Captain Dick Scott who later worked for the Office of Territorial Affairs upstairs. I replaced Scott.
- Willens: What year did you replace Scott?
- Wyttenbach: August of 1975.
- Willens: Scott had previously served in that position as military advisor at OMSN?
- Wyttenbach: Right.
- Willens: Then in June of 1977, what position did you assume?
- Wyttenbach: Then I went to be commanding officer of a guided missile warship.
- Willens: What?
- Wyttenbach: A guided missile destroyer.
- Willens: How long were you in that position?
- Wyttenbach: For two years. 1977 to 1979, September 1979.
- Willens: Did you serve in various other military positions in the following years?
- Wyttenbach: Yes. After that I was the International Policy Officer for the commander of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii from 1979 to 1982. Then I was the Plans and Policy Officer for the Seventh Fleet. The Pacific Fleet is from California to India, North Pole to South Pole, California to Africa. Then I was the Plans and Policy Officer for the Seventh Fleet commander based out of Japan, which covers everything from the dateline to Africa, North Pole to South Pole.
- Willens: I gather you retired in 1989.
- Wyttenbach: No, I retired in 1991.
- Willens: I'm sorry, 1991. Did you have any military assignment up to your point of retirement that related to Micronesia?
- Wyttenbach: Right. The whole series. As the International Policy Officer from 1979 to 1982, and as the Plans and Policy Officer from 1982 to 1984, I was always responsible for the Navy's policies relating to the Marianas and Guam. Then as the Special Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations for Joint Matters from 1987 to 1989, I was in charge of all international relations for this part of the world. From the top of the pyramid. Then in 1989, when I married a Chamorro, I became the Chief of Staff for the Commander of Naval Forces Marianas. In June of 1989 I came back to Guam physically and I was the number two military person in the region. One third of the time my admiral was off-island, so I was the Acting Admiral for Commander of Naval Forces.

- Willens: And you remained in that position?
- Wyttenbach: Until September of 1990. Then I was transferred, pulled off early by the admiral in Hawaii and I was the Plans and Policy Officer for the Pacific fleet, including Guam and the Marianas and Micronesia. I had everything to do with Micronesia in all those different jobs, but especially, from 1989 until 1991. Then I retired in 1991, came back to Guam.
- Willens: All right. That's very helpful. Let me now go back to the April 1972 preparation stage. When you were asked to assist in preparing for the Micronesian status negotiations, do you remember being briefed to any extent about the desire of the Northern Marianas to pursue separate status negotiations?
- Wyttenbach: I don't remember anything at that time. I forget when the Hana meeting was. Before then, I don't think that was an issue. The papers I was dealing with for April 1972 were the general defense provisions in terms of being responsible for defense affairs and the Kwajalein issue. I don't remember any discussion about separatism for the Marianas in April of 1972.
- Willens: When did you first have the occasion to become familiar with the provisions of the Covenant?
- Wyttenbach: When I was on Guam as the Special Assistant for Guam matters, I would be the bobbsy twin, or the teammate with the Special Assistant for TTPI matters, so he was working the logistics end of it. Whenever the negotiators came through, Bob Westlake would accompany the negotiators and make all the arrangements logistically.
- Willens: That was the period between June of 1974 and August 1975?
- Wyttenbach: Right.
- Willens: Up to the point of June 1974, did you have any familiarity or a need to become familiar with the Marianas negotiations?
- Wyttenbach: No, not at all.
- Willens: During the June 1974 to August 1975 period, what specific assignments, if any, do you recall having in connection with the Marianas?
- Wyttenbach: The one specific assignment that I had was to purchase the pens and carry the pens up to Saipan for the signing ceremony for the Covenant. They were fancy pens, I remember that, and I remember that when I arrived in Saipan to deliver them, Ambassador Williams counted them and there was one short of what would be required up on the stage and he said he wasn't going to be the one to not get a pen. So, who would we pick among the Marianas people not to have a pen. It was a big emotional thing right before the ceremony. Then of course, one or two people did not show up to sign the agreement, so we lucked out. Two people did not sign the agreement. That was my assignment.
- Willens: What is your recollection of the setting in which the signing ceremony took place?
- Wyttenbach: It was suspenseful, for the American side because it was the big room and we had the chairs up on the stage and we didn't know if the Carolinians would show up and I think (my memory is vague) if Oscar Rasa, one of the Rasa brothers, would show up or not. Felix Rabauliman and Rasa, we didn't know if they would show up or not and the Ambassador and the American delegation were very, very anxious that everybody showed up and they showed a united front. They didn't want any indications of disunity on the Marianas side for the ceremony.

- Willens: As you understood the situation, they had not been advised up to that point that Rasa and Rabauliman would not show up?
- Wyttenbach: That's correct.
- Willens: So they were waiting
- Wyttenbach: I know that for a fact because they were upset that they were one pen short. If you counted those two people showing up and signing they would be one pen short. They definitely were suspenseful, whether or not they were going to show up, but if they showed up they would be one pen short. So, they didn't know ahead of time, no. They were hoping they would show up, but how do you handle the one pen short?
- Willens: Did you arrive on the island on Saturday morning or on Friday?
- Wyttenbach: I arrived just an hour before the ceremony.
- Willens: Were you aware that there had been a court challenge that morning to the signing of the Covenant?
- Wyttenbach: No. Was I correct about Rasa and Rabauliman?
- Willens: Rasa and Rabauliman did not sign.
- Wyttenbach: So my memory is correct.
- Willens: What do you remember, in addition, if anything, about the setting and the general atmosphere?
- Wyttenbach: It was not a joyful occasion for the Americans because they were just kind of uptight about if everything was going to go all right on the ceremony.
- Willens: Wasn't Ambassador Williams pleased that after more than two years there was going to be, in fact, approval of a negotiated document?
- Wyttenbach: No. That is not what struck me, because from working for him later I know that he is always thinking ahead. He doesn't stop and rest and celebrate for one hour his success of the moment. He is always thinking what has to be done next? The impression I had was he was just anxious about being short one pen, and who screwed up on that. He was anxious about would it be a unity type thing being signed because he was looking forward to the fight to get it through the U.S. Congress. He was just thinking ahead, he wasn't relaxing and feeling good about what was happening that day, he was worried about what was going to happen in the future.
- Willens: Had you worked enough with Ambassador Williams before that point in order to form an impression of him as a negotiator and a public servant?
- Wyttenbach: As a public servant, I worked for thirty days straight, five days a week for four weeks. It was twelve hours a day. OMSN was a very small office, Mary Jane was a secretary, there was one ambassador, William Crowe, myself and one man that handled press affairs but nobody had a very good opinion of him. He just kind of read press clippings and didn't do much and they didn't like the fact that he wasn't carrying his own weight. Then they got the younger girl in there.
- Willens: Based on that intense work experience back in 1972, how would you describe Ambassador Williams?
- Wyttenbach: Great. Skillful. He knew all the issues cold. He knew the various networks in Washington government and how to touch bases. It was a hectic time getting ready for the prime negotiations, so it was point paper after point paper and then quick checking with the

staffers and people in Congress. Phil Burton, I remember the Ambassador talking to Phil Burton quite often. He used Crowe for his contacts in the Pentagon, but he was all over the place with Justice, Interior and with Congress. He was just a dynamo. What I remember about him was his paychecks would just be sitting on his desk or in a pocket of his jacket and Mary Jane used to complain about that. Phyllis was the younger girl's name. Mary Jane used to complain because he would never cash his paychecks. She said he was the President of the Asia Foundation and he just didn't seem to need the money. It was coming up on the six month deadline for federal checks and she was worried about it.

Willens: What?

Wyttenbach: There is a deadline, you have to cash a federal check within six months, otherwise it is void. She was worried that the checks would become void because he never got around to cashing a check. We had a couple of meetings at the place where he stayed whenever he was in Washington. He stayed at the Asian Foundation apartment and condominium down by the new State Department, there on the corner near the World Health Organization, nice place. He was just work, work, work, work. He had pen to paper and he did the work himself. He had the door open, easy to talk to. We were right there, it wasn't a distant type relationship. He didn't remove himself and he wasn't distant. He was right in there, he got his hands dirty, he rolled up his sleeves, he was on the phone, he was working issues. He would drag me along for meetings and stuff and I was just a young Navy officer. Gee whiz. It was my second insight to government. A year earlier, I had been hauled down from the Fletcher School to be interviewed to work for Kissinger in the White House by Al Haig and that was eye opening. The second time in April of 1972 was eye opening too because this was a man with Ambassadorial rank and he was just working the telephone as hard as he could to get ready for the Palau negotiations.

Willens: Did you form a judgment over the years as to what were the principal motivating factors that influenced Ambassador Williams to make such a substantial commitment to the task?

Wyttenbach: Yes. I worked directly for him for two years, from 1975 to 1977. His number one motivation is patriotism. He is a red, white and blue, wave the flag, patriot. So patriotism was his number one motive. Conservative patriotism.

Willens: What does that mean, the conservative adjective?

Wyttenbach: He never talked about it, but I took pride at that time and I know that he probably reflected it, that we were securing American defense interests for a hundred years into the future. He had been the International Security Advisor for the Eisenhower Administration, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He had been involved in the Asia Foundation. He was a graduate of the Fletcher School. But he took pride in the fact that he was securing the United States interests. He always talked in terms of the United States interest. Not in terms of the United Nations. He put down the United Nations. The more Russia yelled at us, the more we knew we were doing the right thing. The more Russia was saying things that indicated they were upset with what we were doing in Micronesia, we knew we were doing the right thing, according to him. The United Nations was a nice little group of people, but we shouldn't let them dictate what the people of the Marianas voted for. After the plebiscite, he just used that statistic again and again, 76.6 percent [voted in favor], I think it was.

Willens: Did you have any involvement in the plebiscite campaign?

Wyttenbach: No.

- Willens: You mentioned his sense of patriotism first, secondly, his awareness of the importance of the undertaking to the defense interests of the United States over the next hundred years. What was his feeling about the aspirations of the people of the Northern Marianas?
- Wyttenbach: He used that to obtain the American defense interests. In other words, he respected it, but he used it. He wasn't working for the people in Marianas. He wasn't representing the people in the Marianas. He always said they have got a high priced sophisticated D.C. law firm working for them. We're not negotiating with local yokels. He said they are smart. Eddie Pangelinan he always gave credit for high, high intelligence. He said the Palauans are the best negotiators in the world and when you are up against Paul Warnke and Howard Willens, you're just up against the best negotiators in the world. He said I don't need to represent the Marianas people, they are well-represented. I'm representing the United States of America. So when he had the results of the plebiscite, then he used that to get votes in the Senate for the Covenant with the people that it would appeal to. The people that he could go to, for example, Hubert Humphrey, was one I particularly remember and say here, a free plebiscite supervised by Erwin Canham, who is mister integrity (and he always talked about having Canham certify [the plebiscite results] because he had a reputation for integrity). Haydn didn't do anything sly (and we can talk about the CIA later). I don't think he ever did anything sly. I think the whole Hana thing was something which was above board. I think that he said that's the U.S. interest, if the other Micronesians don't want to be Americans, fine, but these people do and that protects our interests. So he used the people's feelings. He didn't generate the people's feelings, but he used the expression of people's feelings to justify the American interest.
- Willens: For many years the United States took the very firm position that it would not agree to separate negotiations and that the six districts of Micronesia ought to strive to work out a common future political status for all the districts. What do you understand caused a change in the U.S. view?
- Wyttenbach: I wasn't there when that happened, but from my talking in the office, it was when the rest of Micronesia became sure that they were firm. They were solid, that they did not want the U.S. in their domain. They did not want a permanent relationship under the U.S. flag. When the rest of Micronesia said that, and the Pentagon said we need a joint use base option on Tinian, with its supporting harbor access, (that was one of the firm continuing requirements of the Pentagon) he was told to get the security interest in Tinian. When he saw that the others were not going to do that [allow a permanent relationship], then he would have gone and gotten his instructions changed. He always was very careful to get his instructions from the White House through the National Security Council. We used White House letterhead and we were officially under the National Security Council staff but we were housed in the Interior Department building. Interior was told to give us the space and the lights and the heat and the Pentagon kicked in I think \$200,000 a year and State kicked in \$200,000 a year. He had a State person there and a Defense person there and we tapped Interior's legal services and we tapped Herman Marcuse over in Justice and things like that. I think that happened when the others [Micronesian districts] showed that they were actually firm against a territorial relationship and so he went to option 2 or whatever it was phrased in the Presidential instructions. He didn't do anything to trigger that. I never heard him, and I have spent hours, and zillions of hours with him, he never triggered that. He took advantage of it, but he never triggered it. He didn't instigate it. No. The only time we ever did anything sneaky and I am jumping ahead a couple of years, is we were having a heck of a fight getting the Covenant through the Senate and that's when I came in, in 1977. It was already past the House.

- Willens: In 1975.
- Wyttenbach: 1975, I'm sorry and we're about to go into the Senate. We had to go through three committees. Interior Committee, Armed Services Committee, and the Foreign Affairs Committee. So we had Powell, Bennett Johnston and Stennis. So all of a sudden, we didn't have the unity that we had in the House when Phil Burton in the middle of the night got the Covenant approved. We couldn't do that with the Senate.
- Willens: What was your strategy then in dealing with the Senate?
- Wyttenbach: Dealing with the Senate, we had to go through all three committees because Bennett Johnston could not get the other two committees to agree to let him have it. Our strategy was to work on the conservatives on the national security aspect, and work on the liberals on the self-determination aspect of it. So he used the results of the plebiscite as the express will of the people to work on the liberals.
- Willens: Who were the leading liberals that you lobbied?
- Wyttenbach: Hubert Humphrey, Pell, unsuccessfully, with Pell. I'm trying to think of some of the others. Then on the conservatives, the ones that we lobbied were the people who were against us. We always had a feeling that the numbers were against us and the numbers came out much higher than we thought, 66 to 33. Who was against us included a staff officer for Gary Hart who was a retired army lieutenant colonel who was bitter about the Air Force and he went around poisoning the well against us because it was in favor of what the Defense Department wanted. The Air Force was the executive agent for the joint use base on Tinian, a \$300 million base that had been planned. Not a plan to build it, but the concept would be a \$300 million joint use base in case we were kicked out of the Philippines or Okinawa.
- Willens: Who was the individual?
- Wyttenbach: I will have drag out his name but he was a staffer for Gary Hart. His position was anything other than complete integration or complete independence was unacceptable. So that appealed to Gary Hart, Tunney, Culver, Teddy Kennedy, those guys. On our side we were able to capture Humphrey and Hollings. Where do you put Hollings? He is a Southern Democrat on the conservative side.
- Willens: Let's stay with the liberal side of the Senate for the moment. There was also an element, as I recall and check me if I am wrong, that some of the liberals were opposed because this was a means to facilitate establishment of a new military presence out in the Western Pacific that they thought was a dubious need. Is that your recollection?
- Wyttenbach: They threw that argument out but we batted it down by saying there was no actual plan to do so. We dragged out our military speakers and we said there is no plan to do so, that we would have the option for a hundred years to do so, but we don't have any need to do so and all of this is securing for another hundred years what we already have under the trusteeship. Under the strategic trusteeship we can build bases there, we can blow up atom bombs there, we can put nuclear waste there, we can do anything we want there. We're not gaining anything military-wise, we're just preserving it.
- Willens: Another contention I remember from the liberal side was that they thought that the United States by facilitating fragmentation of Micronesia was perhaps in violation of a U.N. requirement, the spirit of the U.N. Charter. Do you recall that contention?
- Wyttenbach: Yes. And the only contention was that we had to, or we should have been negotiating having the United Nations trusteeship canceled in all the negotiations.

Willens: How did you respond to those issues?

Wyttenbach: The third one in terms of the U.N. was that we would have to have the U.N. approval for termination of the trusteeship. The first one was on fragmentation was: this is a free expression of the will of the people that they voted in a plebiscite, supervised by the United Nations, organized and run by Mr. Erwin Canham of the Christian Science Monitor that was the most honest selection that anybody could have, and that to not let them separate would be to deny them self-determination. On the question of having the U.N. with us, we said no in terms of the U.N. negotiations, the U.N. has never been in with negotiations before and there is no precedent for that. In terms of having the U.N. approve the termination of the agreement, the way it was phrased was, and I am the one that came up with this idea at the time, the way that the trusteeship is phrased is it continues until terminated, but it doesn't say by whom. Okay. My idea was, here again, the argument we used was self-determination. We can't let a group of people, or the Russians in the Security Council, because the strategic trusteeship remember came under the Security Council not under the Trusteeship Council, although the Trusteeship Council would administer it in terms of negotiations. A vote like that would have to be in the Security Council and the Russians had the veto. We knew the Russians were against what we were doing from broadcasts and statements by the Russians. We knew the Russians would veto our termination. My suggestion was, reverse the flow, that we would just announce to the United Nations that the trusteeship was terminated and let the Russians put in a resolution opposing that position and then we would veto that resolution. That's eventually what they accepted until the Soviet Union changed and the Soviet Union agreed to vote for it. That is why we felt secure enough to take it to a vote to the Security Council just a couple of years ago, 1991. But in 1986, the Reagan Administration went to the U.N. and just announced the termination of the trusteeship agreement and if the Russians didn't like it they were free to then object to it and then we would veto their proposal. So that was my idea back in 1977. We would tell those people that, based on Mr. Canham's education program and running the thing, to not accept it would be to deny these people their free right of expression and the U.S. had assumed an obligation under the Trusteeship Agreement to give them the status of their choice. Now some liberals came back and said that doesn't mean that we are obligated to give Cuba or anybody else American citizenship or the Philippines American citizenship. We don't have the obligation to let anybody become American citizens if they just want to be. We said no, this is a special deal where we negotiated the agreement, we promised to lead them to self-government or independence. So we are obligated to provide self government for these people and they voted for American citizenship so we are obligated to give it to them. Now the liberals then said, and this was Pell's compromised solution at the end, he said let's approve this thing then but put it on the shelf and wait for the others to finish up their negotiations and then take the entire package to the United Nations as one package. And they also, by the way, both Bennett Johnston and the House told us, okay this one fragmentation is okay but no more. They said we don't want to see any more fragmentation from Micronesia, it's just too hard, bureaucratically speaking, to handle in Washington to have a bunch of little entities. We don't need a fragment any more. So, you can get away with it this one time, Mr. Administration, but don't fragment the rest, okay.

Willens: How did you deal with the Pell proposal?

Wyttenbach: The Pell proposal was a last minute thing when they must have felt some need, they couldn't kill it outright, so they felt some need to have some amendment that sounded

right but we called it in our staff, the killer amendment. Because in effect we thought it would kill the Covenant by making it wait that long. We had a very tough time because the amendment was going to come up for a vote first so we had to get the word out to our people to vote no on the first time up to kill the killer amendment, and in the second vote then to vote yes. The second vote would be for the whole Covenant. There was only that one amendment proposal on the floor. The way we dealt with that was to get the word out to our people to say hey, if you are with us, vote no the first time, vote yes the second time. When we went through the three committees, one of the stories I remember is that we lost the subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, 8 to 3. We lost it. But we won the full committee vote. I was in the hallway when that happened, the subcommittee vote. It was behind closed doors, we didn't see the vote and they came out and said it was against us, 8 to 5 or 8 to 3. We lost the subcommittee vote. Stennis was against us. Stennis's position with Long, I'm sorry, Byrd, Harry Byrd of Virginia and originally Hollings, their position was, we don't need any people that far away from the mainland to become citizens.

Willens: You are now turning to the conservatives.

Wyttenbach: Conservatives, okay. We actually lost the Armed Services vote.

Willens: Was that on military grounds or because of this inclination not to acquire any new territory so far away from the United States.

Wyttenbach: The second, the latter, because the Pentagon people had testified by then, Admiral Crowe was the regional person for Pacific affairs. He had testified and then a man by the name of Hilton for the Navy, Admiral Hilton.

Willens: Why didn't the committee follow that?

Wyttenbach: They didn't follow it because I think they were racist. They were racist. One person said, brown skinned people; he said we don't need anymore brown skinned people that far away. How am I going to tell my people down south that they are eligible for foodstamps when they don't turn in any taxes to America? I had a bet with the staff lady for Senator Ford of Kentucky that I would buy her lunch if he voted with us, and vice versa, if he voted against us. On the floor he voted with us on the killer amendment (he voted against it) and then I saw somebody get up and grab him and take him over with Teddy Kennedy and Gary Hart, then they talked to him on the floor and on the second vote he voted against us. I asked her why, she said that they told him, they being Teddy Kennedy and Culver and everybody, they told him how are you going to explain this to the people in Kentucky about them getting food stamps, living ten thousand miles away from America and their not paying any taxes to the Federal Treasury. The food stamp thing was a little demagogic thing thrown up. I was talking about the one little sneaky thing we did is Baker, Hollings, Griffin, the minority leader and Culver decided to come out to Saipan to see for themselves and touch their toe on the beach. Earlier we found out that Mansfield's son or a relative of Byrd of Virginia, his brother had died on the shores of Saipan in World War II and Mansfield had given speeches in 1944 for the annexation of Saipan, so we used that in our lobbying. These four were going to come out to Saipan to see for themselves and we knew that Baker was for us and Griffin was for it, because they were for the Administration.

Willens: Right, but that Culver was against?

Wyttenbach: Culver was against and Hollings was a big question mark leaning against.

Willens: So what did you do?

- Wyttenbach: Haydn sent me out to Saipan ahead of time to make sure that they were taken care of. I say that the only sneaky thing we ever did was when they came here to the Hyatt Regency Hotel, which in those days was the Continental, for a lunch time forum I had worked with the Marianas people. I was Haydn's liaison to the Marianas people and particularly in this one little case it was, it's not important, but Joe Cruz of Tinian, he just made sure that the crowd, there was a large crowd there to meet these four senators, and that they spontaneously broke into "God Bless America" when the senators showed up for the meeting at the Continental Hotel. That is the only nefarious thing we ever did was to suggest to Joe Cruz that he break into singing "God Bless America".
- Willens: What kind of activities did the four senators engage in during their visit?
- Wyttenbach: They questioned everybody. They had their forum and they had meetings with the Political Status Commission. I remember Baker on the beach with his wife enjoying the water and the beach and this is right at New Years, actually it was New Years day I think they were here, if my memory serves me right. They enjoyed a day or so in the sun but they also talked to everybody and the nice thing is that when they came back, Hollings, in particular, gave a speech during the debate on the floor and he said: "I was there. I was there, I was against it when I went, I'm for it when I came back."
- Willens: Why?
- Wyttenbach: Because I talked to the people and that's what they really want. The Administration did not coerce them, did not influence them, the Administration dealt above board with them and this is what they definitely want. I've been there.
- Willens: I have information that they definitely heard speeches against the Covenant by Mr. Limes and Mr. Olopai. They heard dissenting views as well.
- Wyttenbach: I flew with them when they left Saipan. They never mentioned that to me. I guess they did but when they were back in Washington they never expressed that. We had the votes of all four. Culver, I think he ended up with us, but he was quiet, he didn't lobby one way or the other. I think we might have neutralized Culver.
- Willens: I have some suggestion in my materials that Senator Bennett Johnston visited the Marianas on or about December 30, 1975. Does that square with your recollection? He apparently was not part of the delegation of four. Do you remember the reason for a separate trip?
- Wyttenbach: No. That's news to me. That would have been right after I got to the office. When was it that the delegation went, was that the season or a year later?
- Willens: January, early January of 1976.
- Wyttenbach: Just a week later. I came out just a couple of days before the delegation, I didn't come out with anything to do with Bennett, so maybe I was all wrapped up in getting things organized for the delegation of four and I missed Bennett's visit.
- Willens: On the whole you think it was good strategy in retrospect to encourage them to visit the Marianas?
- Wyttenbach: Absolutely, because when they came back, Culver was neutralized. Baker and Griffin could speak from experience, but the one that really surprised us was Hollings. He looks like a Senator, tall, distinguished with white hair and when he stood on the floor that day, and it was a very good lively debate. I helped write the soliloquy between the two senators on our side to put it on the record, but there was a lot of spontaneous debate too as well as preplanned debate and his was unknown to us. We didn't know that he was going to give a speech in the debate. There were a lot of senators on the floor, they were listening to this.

We didn't know for sure, we always ran scared, the vote surprised us. We're running scared and on the big day on the floor, I was up on the balcony, Hollings stood up and when he spoke, sounding very senatorial, he said, my colleagues, I was there. He didn't talk about anybody speaking against it.

Willens: Let me pursue a few of the topics that you mentioned. As you may recall, in 1973, the Defense Department changed its priorities so as to defer its plans for constructing a multiple service facility in Tinian.

Wyttenbach: I don't know the detail of that.

Willens: The question is, did you become aware in your subsequent assignments as to what kind of analysis within Defense had led to that reassessment?

Wyttenbach: First, I didn't know that they actually had ever planned to build on Tinian. That's news to me, if they did. When I came into the picture, it was the base rights and Palau also. We never had a plan to put submarines in Palau. That was a Russian misinformation, disinformation campaign. It was always in the context that if we were kicked out of the Philippines and maybe out of Okinawa, once in a while they would mention that. It wasn't separate or in addition to the Philippines, it was if we got kicked out of the Philippines, to replace the Philippines. You know that they had some building plan for sure during the Vietnam war. It would have had some relationship to Vietnam because remember during the height of Vietnam in 1972, Andersen [Air Force Base] in Guam was just overloaded with B52s and they needed to spread out. It was always in terms of if we get kicked out of the Philippines, we need somewhere to go.

Willens: So as far as you recall, it was always a matter of contingency planning and securing the base rights was simply a way to preserve the opportunity to have a facility on American soil if the need arose in the future because of developments in the Philippines, in particular.

Wyttenbach: Exactly.

Willens: Do you recall any discussion with Ambassador Williams involving Commander Scott with respect to this issue?

Wyttenbach: Dick Scott, no. I never saw Haydn Williams talk to Dick Scott, except when we were up for the signing ceremony in terms of you military guys can't do it right, you can't count the number of pens we need.

Willens: Do you recall any dissatisfaction with respect to Commander Scott that prompted his departure from the office.

Wyttenbach: I see what you mean. No. Just to set the record of the pens. I got the number of pens I was told to get so I don't know where the count went wrong. Indirectly, when I was on Guam in July of 1975 handling the refugees from Vietnam, I got a phone call in the middle of the night from Admiral Crowe, Bill Crowe, who I had known before, and he says Captain Scott is being removed from the office by Ambassador Williams because he has lost confidence in him because he hasn't kept in touch with what is going on in the Pentagon. As a military advisor to the Ambassador that is one of your responsibilities to know what is coming up. Specifically, and this might not have been all in one phone call, but as I came to understand it, the Air Force had originally said that they wanted all of Tinian. Before I forget, because my memory is going bad, another strategy we used with the conservatives was that securing the rights on the Northern Marianas was needed to protect the air bases and the military bases, the Navy base on Guam. Within the air defense circle you couldn't have any potential enemy control in the Northern Marianas as long as we had the bases on Guam. We used that with the senators, that we needed a permanent relationship with

the Northern Marianas to protect the bases on Guam. Admiral Crowe told me that they were negotiating for the entire island of Tinian to the point where Haydn Williams was up on the negotiating round on Saipan showing the people of Tinian, the delegation, the Marianas delegation model homes. There would be concrete homes built on Saipan to relocate the people from Tinian to Saipan. They were beautiful little concrete homes and the land would be acquired and they just about were willing to do that because the Air Force did not want to have a tawdry town outside the gate like in the Philippines. They said it's that much cleaner if we just get the whole island. Haydn was really working at it and the impression I got was that was a little hump in the road that the people in the Marianas were resisting and he got a flash message, flash priority, immediate type message. He got a flash message from Washington during the negotiations on Saipan and of course that would have come through the military base on Guam, saying that there has been a change in that DOD only needed to have the northern two thirds of Tinian, the 19,000 acres, they could keep the village of San Jose on Tinian and not relocate the people. Haydn felt he had been embarrassed and lost face and that Captain Scott should have had some heads up on that and advised him of that so that he didn't go so far out on the limb working for the whole island. So, Dick Scott had to leave.

- Willens: That suggests that the Ambassador was, as he was regarded then, a stern taskmaster.
- Wyttenbach: I never thought of him that way. He was more of a father figure to me. He never once, and I worked for him for two solid years, he never once yelled at me or screamed at me or I never saw him yell at anybody else.
- Willens: I wasn't using the word stern as suggesting irrational behavior but just that he had set high standards and expected his subordinates to live up to them.
- Wyttenbach: That's right, exactly right. He had very high standards. He did it by example, he was only there maybe half the time except we were working to get the Covenant through the Senate almost all of the time. He would commute from San Francisco, so he would be with us for a week or ten days, then not there for a week. Even when he was out in San Francisco, there would be messages and telephone calls every day and it was a high energy office. We would telephone Saipan every night to get the news from our liaison office in Saipan and type up a memorandum of the conversation the next morning. Yes, he had very high standards and if you met the standards, it was just great but he never yelled or screamed at anybody. The Ambassador and I never talked about this, about Dick Scott. Never once did we talk about this. It was all from Admiral Crowe. Crowe wanted me to replace him and I was a Lieutenant Commander. Crowe was the senior captain who made admiral on the job. Scott was a senior captain. So, I was a young person and I said how am I going to do that because I don't know Washington. I have never been assigned to Washington. He said, "No, you are a politician, Dick, you know how to dance around and keep from being caught into a corner and you just do your normal dancing." I remember that phrase, you just keep up your normal dancing and you will have no troubles.
- Willens: Did you?
- Wyttenbach: Oh yes.
- Willens: Kept up your normal dancing.
- Wyttenbach: I kept up my normal dancing. I always made sure I spent some time over at the Pentagon, walking around the offices. We call it schmoozing, networking is the word today, I guess. But I would schmooze around the Pentagon, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Air Force, the Marines, the Navy and OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], Admiral Crowe's office.

The assistant for Admiral Crowe was Captain Jim Elster who was the action officer for this stuff and he had been the commanding officer in the main wire station on Guam up until July of 1975 and so Crowe always said that Jim Elster was the most brilliant political military person in the Navy. When he became the head of the Plans and Policy Branch, he had Elster as his chief of staff, when he became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he had Jim Elster, who had retired as a captain. Crowe had tried his hardest to make Elster an admiral, but he got a bad fitness report from the admiral in Guam. Elster had a private little office near Crowe's in the Pentagon so he was the some of the brains behind Crowe when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I always kept my fingers in the Pentagon, through Elster and through Crowe and through Admiral Bob Hilton, who was the Navy guy that handled the issue and then some colonels in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I made sure I kept dancing. Haydn in the very beginning, our whole concentration was not on the rest of Micronesia. The whole concentration was on the Marianas, from August of 1975 until I saw Gerry Ford sign the thing. Then even after that we had our first meeting for figuring out the laws applicable to all sides. I would move around on the other side of the table and sat with the Northern Marianas delegation. I said, "Now we are on your side, we're not opposite." Haydn assigned me as the liaison to the Marianas delegation that came to Washington. There were four people and it was Pete A. Tenorio, Joe Cruz, Ben Manglona and Eddie Pangelinan.

Willens: When was that?

Wyttenbach: This was when we working the halls of the Senate. So this would have been around December, January, February, March.

Willens: How would you evaluate the lobbying performance of each of those four individuals?

Wyttenbach: Eddie Pangelinan was the most intelligent person I have ever met within a thousand miles of here in the region. He would physically sweat, he was a worry wart, smart, very eloquent, no accent. He looked like a lawyer, he walked like a lawyer, he could really, he was mister smooth. He was obviously to me, the intellectual leader of the group. But he could not have done it by himself because he looked like anybody else in Washington. Physically and the way he acted. We walked the halls, you couldn't work on just appointments. We would try to get maybe an appointment for the morning or the afternoon with these staffers and my job was to go see staffers and whatever senators that I could. Haydn would come in and see the senators and initially I was too aggressive because I would be walking through the door first and making the talks and Senator Hart complained to Ambassador Williams that I was lobbying. I was a Navy officer and that was against the law for the Executive Branch to lobby. You could brief, but you can't lobby. Hart said that he was going to call me on that if I didn't stop it. So from then on we had to have the Marianas delegation go through the door first and start talking first and then they would refer to me for any of the Administration positions.

Willens: Would you always accompany them?

Wyttenbach: Yes. I always accompanied them, unless they did something I didn't know about. They were free to do whatever they wanted. They might have done stuff that I didn't know about but we were all coordinating the efforts. We had a chart, I will send you a copy, but we had a chart of all the senators and who visited them when and which ones we thought were on our side, which ones were definitely against, which ones were maybe. We worked that chart. I would put down the date that I talked to a staffer or the senator and then Haydn would say okay I will talk to Other people might have talked to them too. They were not restricted by us at all. They were free agents.

- Willens: Was Joe Cruz one of the four?
- Wyttenbach: One of the four and Benjamin Manglona, the current Lieutenant Governor. We needed them to come in to look islander, physically.
- Willens: How did you evaluate Joe Cruz?
- Wyttenbach: Joe Cruz was the happy go lucky guy that was in Washington along for the junket and he was from Tinian. He was on the other end of the spectrum. He was the guy that was saying I'm a local politician, I'm the people on my island on Tinian and it's okay with us if you want the base there. We're all true blue. He played the part of the country politician.
- Willens: Was he effective?
- Wyttenbach: Oh yes, because Eddie could not have done it alone. Eddie was the smooth Washington lawyer and he needed Joe Cruz to show that really these people were different out there and the grass roots guy with the accent, the dark brown skin, non-Spanish blood also wanted this. When Joe Cruz would break into "God Bless America," your tears came out. He got you from the gut. Joe Cruz got you from the gut, Eddie got you from the brain. Eddie was light skinned, sophisticated. Joe Cruz was unsophisticated. They were the two ends of the spectrum. Ben Manglona came in the middle along with Pete A. Tenorio. They were about the same thing.
- Willens: What did they contribute?
- Wyttenbach: They had their pitch down pat. They were, we represent the people, they were all good in their own way. They were in the middle, they weren't the country yokel, and they weren't the super sophisticate, they were in the middle. I guess what they contributed was just the above board, honest, we're real people, we're not talking in abstractions here, we're real people, we really want it.
- Willens: Do you remember any involvement by Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering in the lobbying effort?
- Wyttenbach: Oh yes.
- Willens: Who do you recall dealing with?
- Wyttenbach: I was in your office twice.
- Willens: Mike Helfer, is that the name?
- Wyttenbach: Yes. They helped with appointments and once in a while I think Mike went with us and there again I said that this delegation of four might have gone without me many times and it would have been through your office or through here.
- Willens: Would you really fairly characterize it twenty years later as being a coordinated amicable joint effort?
- Wyttenbach: Yes. Even at the time, it was a coordinated joint effort. The impression I had when I got there in August of 1975 was that the negotiations were finished and now it is a joint coordinated amicable effort. They lived in our office. I was over in their lawyers office. We had the same kind of score sheet, with the papers, the point papers we had, we shared that with these four gentlemen in the law firm. It was a joint strategy, joint effort. It was beautiful. I had no secrets from those four people. They became my brothers.
- Willens: Do you remember hearing during these months that from time to time during the negotiations there was somewhat more of an adversary relationship between the Commission on the one hand and Ambassador Williams and his staff on the other?

Wyttenbach: Yes. What I heard was, and this was from the Ambassador, from Bill Crowe, and Jim Wilson that the Ambassador and you and Eddie Pangelinan were intellectual giants and I am not making up words here, who debated sovereignty into eternity, into the night. It was definitely a fair up above board negotiation with different interests. The Marianas had an interest that they were selling. They were selling strategic locations to the United States. The United States had an interest. There was a spectrum and so they were fair, well argued out, fought out, if you want to use that word, hands off apart, type of negotiations with the frictions of any negotiations, their arguments about sovereignty. And that's where I come down. I came into it after that was finished. The feeling in the office was, hey, we really had our struggle. They fought a good fight, we put up a good fight. We have something we both can live with and now that is behind us. Nobody ever dragged up the old issues except the word sovereignty. That came up. We're still not satisfied that we convinced Eddie about sovereignty. You had one split second of sovereignty on the plebiscite. When you went in and dropped your vote on the plebiscite, that was your split second, you didn't have sovereignty before, sovereignty resided with Spain and then it was with Germany and then resided with the League of Nations and the League of Nations in turn gave all their rights to the United Nations. If sovereignty lies anywhere it's with the strategic trusteeship. So you had one split second of sovereignty and once you voted for the relationship, the U.S. is sovereign. That was the impression I had, that there was a well fought out battle, there were still arguments about sovereignty, but by god we've got to coordinate to get this through. The deal was struck, we have to get it through. The phrase I heard, and I don't know if I made it up or if I heard it, was creative ambiguity. Have you ever heard that phrase?

Willens: No.

Wyttenbach: I mentioned it to the negotiator for the [Section] 702 talks in 1989, Wiggins or whatever his name was, came through and I briefed him and when I mentioned to Haydn Williams a year ago, he said: "I don't know what you're talking about. It was as clear as a bell to me." What I am saying is everywhere in the Covenant I would see the phrase self-governing entity under the sovereignty of the United States and that appears about three or four different places. Sometimes in the same sentence. So, I call that creative ambiguity. The Marianas people could read self-governing and the U.S. would read under the sovereignty of the United States. I think it was deliberate to put those phrases in the same sentence again and again because it's left for posterity to determine that relationship. To me the question of sovereignty never was settled. That's hindsight because if it was, why the hell didn't you put it in there? Why do you say self-governing under the sovereignty of the United States? It's either under the sovereignty of the United States or it's self-governing. Which is which?

Willens: That's wrong and we'll talk about that sometime off the record. There is no question about sovereignty. The question is how you define self-government and whether it operates as a limitation on federal authority. Did you ever hear any discussion of what local self-government meant and whether the U.S. Congress was limited in what it could do on local matters within the Marianas?

Wyttenbach: What I understood, and there again maybe I have become liberal over the ages, I understood that the Marianas were negotiated from the outside of the U.S. to come in. In other words, Guam is inside trying to get out. The Marianas negotiated from the outside. The Marianas says here is the way it is and we will be internally self-governing under what is spelled out in ink in the Covenant. It has to be a republican form of government, has to have separation of powers, has to have a constitution. The court system has to do this

way and that's where it is and if it's not there, it's theirs, not the United States. That's what I understood. Talking to Haydn now, he is saying, "Hey it's a territorial relationship with a fancy name."

Willens: There is a mutual consent provision.

Wyttenbach: For only the four little basic points, yes. The U.S. soil, citizenship, don't change it by mutual consent and neither do defense interests.

Willens: It includes the right to local self-government.

Wyttenbach: What I am saying is there is a debate today and it would have been neat if it had been pinned down a little bit more. At the time we took great pride, the office did, I didn't do it, the office took great pride in the fact that they had negotiated something a layman could understand that could be interpreted to fit changing events. Sort of like the U.S. Constitution. They took great pride in that. With Rosenblatt later, and I was relieved by a lawyer and he was relieved by a Navy lawyer, and he was relieved by another Navy lawyer, Carlton Hills, and the guy before him came out of the Guam office. Two Navy lawyers took my place. I am a politician, a political military person, Crowe is a political military person, Dick Scott was. After us, you had two Navy lawyers and you combine that with Rosenblatt, who was a lawyer, I don't want to say bad things about lawyers, but all of a sudden the compacts with the rest of the places, the Micronesians, you had to be a lawyer to understand it. The document was thick, a couple of inches thick with a lot of fancy language. Our Covenant was a simple document, that a simple layman could understand. You didn't have to have a law degree to understand it. As it turned out, there is an argument now as to what is self-government. I used the word creative ambiguity because the impression I had was there was never a final decision on sovereignty. That Eddie Pangelinan had never given in and agreed with the Ambassador that their sovereignty only lasted for a split second. That Eddie's position was that the people were sovereign, they were always sovereign, they always will be sovereign. The Ambassador was saying no, you just had one split second of sovereignty and then the U.S. government has sovereignty. I had the impression that that was never settled, and to paper over that difference you used creative ambiguity in the document.

Willens: Were you aware that the self-government issue was recently litigated up to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and there has been an opinion and that addresses, to some extent, the question both of sovereignty and of the extent of local self-government.

Wyttenbach: If the Territorial Clause of the Constitution applied or not applied, why wasn't that listed in black and white in the Covenant? Why was it just left to an answer to a question during the hearing by Eddie Pangelinan? I'm just wondering.

Willens: I've heard that before.

Wyttenbach: The Ambassador and I, I respect the Ambassador so much that once we kind of rub up against that little line, I back off.

Willens: Is there anything else that you remember about the lobbying effort that you haven't told us? I think you have covered it quite thoroughly.

Wyttenbach: We flooded the hall with old talking point papers, briefing papers, little pamphlets. The Ambassador had me pull out my dissertation; the Congressional involvement, the history of the Congressional involvement in the Covenant. On Senator Bumpers, I don't think I have told that story yet, but he personally came to me and said, "What can I get from the Administration in return from my vote on the Covenant?" I can remember that's the word for word. I said, "I don't understand sir, this is way out there in the middle of nowhere, it

is nowhere near your home state, I think it's Arkansas." He said, "Well what I can think of is that it is coming under the jurisdiction of the Interior Committee and also under the Interior Committee comes national parks and there is an area in my home state that we are anxious to have designated and funded as a national park but the Administration isn't putting that high enough on its priority list to do that and so if I can get a commitment from the Administration to create that national park and fund it in my home state then I would vote for the Covenant." I went back to Ambassador Williams and he got the commitment and I delivered the commitment and away we went. There is a park somewhere in Arkansas because of Saipan. I should mention the Guam government too.

Willens: Why don't you go ahead. What is your recollection about the involvement of the Guamanian government?

Wyttenbach: We had indications that the people of Guam were a little jealous. Back in 1898, the islands had split, and Guam had been under a U.S. flag since 1898 where Saipan was under the German and then the Japanese flag. The Saipanese were used as overseers and foremen, interpreters for the Japanese on Guam. There was a lot of resentment of that, even among the same families. Here Guam was still an unincorporated territory at a time when America was negotiating for self-government with their cousins to the north, who would be exempt from the Jones Act and would control [their own] immigration, the things that Guam wanted. Guam had been loyal to the United States all through World War II where Saipan had been with the Japanese. There was a lot of resentment on Guam. There again, Ambassador Williams said he doesn't remember this. I made a trip to Guam, I still have in my papers a draft resolution for the Guam legislature that I wrote because I had been the liaison between the military and the Guam government right before this job in Washington. I delivered the draft resolution to the speaker of the Guam legislature, who is now my brother-in-law, a good friend of mine, who is now the governor. At the same time, I visited the governor, Ricky Bordallo with his Chief of Staff, Gene Ramsey and Paul Souder, who is still alive today. The other two are dead. I said that the Administration had authorized me, and I don't remember who did it, what I recall was Brent Scowcroft, because Brent Scowcroft was the military advisor to the National Security Adviser to the President and he had just finished being advisor again to President Bush. When he was National Security Advisor for President Ford, I remember getting the authorization from him. I don't know how we did it but I said to the governor of Guam, "If you support us in Washington for the Covenant of the Northern Marianas to get it through the Senate, we guarantee you, Guam, at least a good a deal as the Marianas are getting," and that is the phrase I used.

Willens: At least as good a deal as the Marianas are getting. Was that an important undertaking in the governor's mind?

Wyttenbach: In the governor's mind it was an absolute undertaking. The legislature passed the resolution which we used. We flooded Capitol Hill with that resolution because some of the liberals had been saying what does Guam think about this. We also got the Micronesians to agree to it too without a special deal like that. I also saw Paul Calvo in Washington who was a Republican, head of the Republican Party and later became governor of Guam, in a hotel room and said the same thing, with the addition of the fact that we were having trouble in the White House getting attention paid to our problems with the Senate. We were nervous about the vote and we didn't get the responses we thought we should be getting from the National Security Council staff. The Ambassador asked me to go to my friend Paul Calvo and ask him to use his political party connections into the White House to get them to pay attention to the impending danger of not having attention paid to the

Senate.

Willens: Did he do that?

Wyttenbach: He did that.

Willens: How do you know?

Wyttenbach: He told me he did later.

Willens: Did the White House evidence any support for you?

Wyttenbach: Yes, we had a meeting over there with a high official. I don't remember his name, but it was right in the White House. It was the West Wing of the White House whereas before we had always been dealing in the Old Executive Office Building. This was in the West Wing of the White House and it was some smooth guy in their Congressional liaison office. He said: "Tell me, I hear you are having some problems, tell me what you need us to do in the Senate." After that we had complete cooperation from Senator Baker. I remember him sitting in a windowsill outside the cloakroom and he was running down the names and numbers for us, how they count numbers, and he indicated that he had had some calls from the White House, he would do his best to help us out. He said, "Okay, who do you need my help with?" This was Howard Baker.

Willens: Do you remember whether the Guamanian governor or anyone on his behalf tried to follow up on this commitment that you made on behalf of the United States?

Wyttenbach: The governor tried to get a political status commission organized. A different composition was advocated by the Republicans. Ricky was a Democrat and it got all hung up in the political composition of the thing and whether or not they should have a constitution first or whether or not they should have a draft act first. It never really took off in Guam.

Willens: There never was an organized effort within Guam to press forward in 1976 and in subsequent years?

Wyttenbach: No. Where as there was an organized effort in Washington because Fred Zeder by now was the territorial guy right upstairs, and Dick Scott was working for him. Zeder had been named as the head of a task force, interagency task force, this is under Carter by now. So it dragged on a while. My delivering of the message was under Ford and, Zeder was under Ford. Zeder was a Republican. So it was under Zeder that the Executive Branch was ready to go. I was then representative to the Guam task force that Zeder was the head of, and we were ready to start negotiations with Guam. We didn't have any formal instructions from the President, but we were ready to negotiate and Guam wasn't ready. So it just sat there.

Willens: As I understand it, you became a member of what was called the Joint Commission on Transition?

Wyttenbach: I wasn't an official member, but I was there for the first meeting. The Joint Commission on Transition came to our office and I will never forget Eddie Pangelinan telling us, you know we just opened up our new office in Washington.

Willens: Let's put this in context. After the Covenant was approved by President Ford on March 24, 1976 then there was a transitional effort that was about to be funded and ready to be implemented. It had been previously negotiated between the parties. You were, as I understand it, still with the OMSN until June of 1977?

Wyttenbach: My job after the signing by Ford was to take care of anything doing with the Marianas plus regular military interests. I was the Marianas guy after the signing. Before the signing,

- it was everybody's job.
- Willens: Were you involved in the transitional effort?
- Wyttenbach: Yes.
- Willens: In what respect?
- Wyttenbach: Representing OMSN.
- Willens: I don't understand that. The transitional effort focused on economic and social plans and there was a staff created with Pete A. Tenorio as Director and Stephen Loftus as Deputy Director. There was a legal fund available. Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering was hired to help prepare for the constitutional convention. Now which of those specific planning activities were you personally involved in.
- Wyttenbach: None.
- Willens: None.
- Wyttenbach: No, I was there just really at the first meeting to make sure it got kicked off okay, that nothing went wrong to reflect back on the Covenant that we had just got approved. I was just tying up loose strings to make sure that it got off okay. I didn't participate anyway substantively. I was just the eyes and ears for Haydn Williams to make sure that the transition team got off and running.
- Willens: Some time in 1976, as I recall, Ambassador Williams resigned.
- Wyttenbach: Right.
- Willens: But you remained with the OMSN.
- Wyttenbach: Right, with Manhard.
- Willens: Were your duties then principally directed at the Micronesian negotiations?
- Wyttenbach: Right, absolutely.
- Willens: It was during 1976 that you participated in what I believe was the eighth round of Micronesian negotiations?
- Wyttenbach: Right.
- Willens: Do you remember any incident involving the Marianas transitional effort that came to your attention because it presented a particular problem of some kind.
- Wyttenbach: Just one.
- Willens: What was that?
- Wyttenbach: Eddie came to me, because I was close to Eddie. I immediately told everybody about it. He said we found a bug in our office. An electronic listening device. The telephone man was in, because in the transition thing we rented office space, and the telephone man said I would like to show you this bug that was on the telephone.
- Willens: In Washington, D.C.
- Wyttenbach: In Washington, D.C. This was right after the CIA got caught bugging the telephones in Micronesia. So, I said Eddie, I lived with you for months, you lived with us for months, it was a cooperative arrangement and as I mentioned on the first meeting of this transition body, I was the one who stood up on the American side of the table and I walked around and sat next to Pete A. Tenorio and I said now that the President has signed the Covenant,

we are no longer your side against our side. It is now all together and I said let's not sit one side of the table and the other side of the table. I did that, this was like a week later. Eddie said, yes, I'm sure it's not a new bug that you put in there for now, I think it was left over from the business corporation that was there before us, before we rented it. So I am not going to tell anybody about it. I'm sure it was a past history bug from the predecessor who was an industrial spy as opposed to you guys wanting to learn what we are doing on transition. So we just put that to bed. That is the only thing I remember on the transition, me changing sides of the table, and the bug.

Willens: What did you know about the CIA bug incident here in Micronesia?

Wyttenbach: We had the Micronesians on hold while we concentrated on the Covenant because we only had so many people. We got the Covenant approved in March. Haydn Williams said let's get this thing back on track. We came to a negotiating round here on Saipan and we were up at a Hafa Adai Hotel here in Saipan because that's where Haydn always went even though they had opened up the Continental Hotel, and much nicer places. He was almost like a lucky thing, he always liked yaki sobo, down at the restaurant and he always liked this one room, it was his lucky room. They had knocked a hole through the wall so that two rooms were one suite. The building is still existing. It's kind of a leanto thing in front of the new Hafa Adai shopping center. That was the Haydn Williams suite. He would be in the bedroom and Margaret would be there. I walked in on her once when she was in her slip. In the sitting room we talked, it was Paul Warnke, Lazarus Salii, Haydn and me. Haydn would always have me there because I had the memory and I could always write up notes later. An earlier time we had Paul Warnke visit the office in Washington and it was Paul Warnke, Haydn and me. He said he didn't want me taking notes but he wanted me to do the memorandum for the record afterwards. So after about thirty minutes or an hour, I couldn't stand it anymore so I had to pretend I had to go to the bathroom so I ran outside, quick wrote down some notes and then went back in and kept going. Here I am with Warnke, and this was after Carter had been elected, but not before he took office, at that session here, that was the little leadership meeting, then we had the plenary session. I remember the plenary session on Saipan. That's interesting isn't it, that it was on Saipan even though Saipan was all separate by then. I remember every representative from Micronesia initialing the document and I have in the record, it's right in that record, I guess the eighth round, you see all of the initials all over the thing. We got them to initial it all over.

Willens: Had they reached agreement on the financial issues by that time?

Wyttenbach: They had reached agreement on the dollar level but they wanted an automatic inflation clause in there. They agreed to everything else. Warnke said we can't agree to that thing unless we have the inflation clause. I said to him, maybe it was during the campaign before the actual election, but I said you are a Democrat, you're going to have a big job if Carter gets elected and so don't you trust Carter to protect us against inflation and so you don't need an inflation clause. Paul just laughed at me. He later became head of SALT talks. We went home from that negotiating session and that was Haydn's last session. We went up to the White House, to the National Security Council, and we said we need authority for this. If we can get you to change our instructions (because he never went beyond his instructions), if you can change our instructions, we've got a deal.

Willens: Let me interrupt. Sometimes he would extend beyond instructions that make it clear that he could do so only contingent on obtaining approval. But, I gather that in this particular case, he elected not to pursue that.

- Wyttenbach: I think he told them, I cannot phrase it that way in black in white. What I can do is I will take your position back to the highest levels and try and get my instructions changed and I will support that change.
- Willens: What happened?
- Wyttenbach: What happened was, I took a phone call from Bob Woodward of the *Washington Post* because I was also in charge of press relations and Woodward said what's this about the CIA bugging the negotiations in Palau? I said I think I will take this phone call and get back to you because I didn't know anything like this.
- Willens: Which session in Palau?
- Wyttenbach: No. It was the negotiation between sessions. I have all of the documents on Guam. We called it a crisis of confidence, the phrase that we put on it, the crisis of confidence flail. What had happened was that it was all investigated by the Intelligence Committee in the Senate and the story that came out, it is unclassified, it was public record, and Brent Scowcroft admitted that CIA was in Micronesia and it would never happen again. That was from Brent Scowcroft in 1976. What had happened was that somebody said we need to know what's going on in Micronesia, the Trust Territory to see if there is any foreign stuff going on. The FBI said we can't go there because it's not America, we are limited to the United States. The CIA said we cannot go there because it is not foreign, we can only go to foreign places. So somebody, I never talked to Haydn Williams about this, somebody went to the Congress or whoever and said what do we do? The committee of forty, who I understand is the committee that approves this type of thing, they said okay, CIA, you go. The CIA came to Micronesia and I was on the Admiral's staff in Guam when it came so I knew about it that way, I knew the logistics of it. This CIA guy was a riot, he later became known as the cornchip kid.
- Willens: What's cornchip?
- Wyttenbach: He went down to Palau. First of all, he had an office up in Guam.
- Willens: What year are you talking about?
- Wyttenbach: He first came in 1975 and then he got discovered in 1976. Very incompetent person.
- Willens: All this then is a part or a matter of public record.
- Wyttenbach: Yes.
- Willens: You had to deal with this.
- Wyttenbach: I had to deal with this. The Micronesians said the cornchip is because he offered a bag of cornchips and a bottle of vodka to a girl down in Palau if she would join the CIA. He was really incompetent. There is a lamp in Tobey with a bug in it but there is no electricity in Tobey. A Chief came to Palau and said that's a beautiful lamp so the Chief gave the lamp to his relative and it's in Tobey. They had taped stuff in Palau but nobody in the CIA could translate the tapes. It's all public record. The Micronesians all said stop, we're not going to negotiate anymore with you until you tell us what impact that had on the negotiations and who cooperated with the CIA. They investigated it and said that there was no impact on the negotiations.
- Willens: This happened right during the negotiations after the initialing.
- Wyttenbach: Right. After the initialing. But it had been going on but the discovery came up after the initialing.

- Willens: There was in effect a recess then.
- Wyttenbach: A recess for at least a year. In the meantime, Carter was elected and he said I want to have a whole new study of our policy towards Micronesia. We had an interagency policy study and that was chaired by Assistant Secretary of State Nimmons who used to be in that office.
- Willens: Dick, in conclusion, I want to ask you for your judgment after these years of experience out here as to why you think it is that the five districts of Micronesia excluding the Marianas never were able to collectively agree on a common future political status.
- Wyttenbach: First of all, in terms of the Marianas with the others, the Marianas is completely different in terms of the result of the Spanish influence. The Spanish really were only in the Marianas. They were very tentatively in the other islands. In the other islands you have clan ownership of land, a chief system, a nobility class, whereas in the Northern Marianas you had private ownership of land, and no chief system. A radical difference between the Marianas and the rest. They had no concept of being together. Once that split, and America was willing to accept that because of the national security interests thing in Hana. After that, the others split because during that one year recess because of the CIA and the Carter Administration taking over, the centrifugal forces were that the Marshalls thought that they had the money coming in from Kwajalein, Palau thought that they were going to get lots of money from the super port project, which was a Japan and Iran with a Hanover Bank project for a transshipment port, and phase two would be an oil refinery in Palau which became the issue of the year in 1977 for the Friends of the Earth. They thought that they were going to get money from that before the Shah fell. The Palauans didn't want to share that money with the poor cousins to the east, the Marshallese didn't want to share that money to the poor people to the west and it was a money thing. So the Marshalls went a separate way because they didn't want to share their money, the Palauans let everyone think they were going to get money and they thought they were the smartest politicians in the world and they kind of outsmarted themselves. The poor little folks in the middle got stuck.
- Willens: What is your assessment of how these three individual entities have worked out, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States, and Palau.
- Wyttenbach: First, Palau is still a trusteeship, it's the longest ongoing negotiations in American history. The Panama Canal is ten years. We did have a celebration after the Covenant passed the Senate. We had lunch at the F Street Club and Ambassador Bunker, a friend of Haydn Williams, arranged that for us, from the Panama negotiations. The Palauans have negotiated for so long that they have lost their opportunity. They have lost their leverage because now that Russia collapsed the whole modus operandi, modus vivendi of wanting anything in Palau has disappeared. So the Pentagon could care less. I was in the Pentagon in 1987 where I signed off of a piece of paper saying that if Palau wanted to be independent, fine. That paper has been signed by the Pentagon.
- Willens: How about the Federated States?
- Wyttenbach: The Federated States economically will be subservient for years and years and years. They are not making it. Right now the U.S. is willing to pay the money just from a bureaucratic momentum. Now if that momentum ever unwinds and the energy is lost, then Japan would come in.
- Willens: Did the Federated States ever have the prospect of any sort of meaningful economic development?

- Wyttenbach: I personally never thought so. I don't think so. Now the Marshalls, they are the most successful of all of them and that's because of the Kwajalein money. But now that the Soviet Union is no longer a threat and the missile people don't get their money, that is in danger too. The fishery has not developed as they thought. The tourism has not developed as they thought. I know Japan has told Palau that if they don't have an American flag relationship they weren't going to invest in Palau. One person got murdered, the other committed suicide, and so Japan knowing from the number two guy in the Japanese Embassy in Washington in 1987, he said we told the Palauans, if you don't have a permanent relationship with the U.S. of some sort, like the compact, you are not going to get Japanese investment. Tosh Nakayama in the FSM, he said, "Why won't Japan hop scotch over Saipan and come to us?" Tosh Nakayama told me he said, "We have told the Japanese, hop scotch or leap frog, leap frog over Guam and Saipan and come to us, but the Japanese are just not anxious to do it."
- Willens: To come to them for tourist investment? Or do they begin to have the services and the attractions that Saipan and Guam have?
- Wyttenbach: Right, exactly.
- Willens: You said they do have the attractions?
- Wyttenbach: He was asking Japan to do that.
- Willens: I understand.
- Wyttenbach: Japan is just reluctant to do it because they don't need it. They just don't need it yet and the western work habits have not taken hold in Pohnpei or Truk.
- Willens: Dick, could you give me a very brief summary of where you stand in the current negotiations with respect to Tinian?
- Wyttenbach: I was the Plans and Policy Director on the Navy staff in Hawaii when Clark airbase in the Philippines closed and the colonel at the Air Force headquarters in Hawaii said that they would be moving to Andersen Air Force Base on Guam and that would prevent the possibility of the naval air station on Guam consolidating with Andersen. I said, "No, wait a minute, what about Tinian? Your rights in Tinian?" This colonel said, "What rights in Tinian?" They had forgotten that. The Air Force bureaucratically had forgotten they had any rights in Tinian.
- Willens: What year was that?
- Wyttenbach: 1990.
- Willens: What is the current plan?
- Wyttenbach: The Marianas is negotiating with the federal government to lease back the land from Tinian that had been leased to the federal government. They had leased lands to the federal government, 19,000 acres for fifty years renewable for another fifty at no extra cost and now under the terms of the Covenant, the U.S. is obligated to lease-back for uses in agriculture, 6,000 of those 19,000 acres. We have opened formal negotiations a couple of months ago and we just had a second round yesterday to do the details of lease back. The military says they came back from Washington and they got the guidance from the Secretary of Defense office in Washington to have maximum flexibility on the negotiations and to have progress. We have indications that they are willing for a forty year leaseback instead of a one year to one year, one year agreement which is important to us to get investment there. Also I would like to bring down a line that incorporates their exclusive use and then have maximum involvement in the port area.

Willens: It looks as though there is a good potential for lease-back up to forty years or for some 6 to 8 thousand acres?

Wyttenbach: About 8,000 acres.

Willens: I want to thank you, Dick, for your help and I might get back to you again.